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PLUTARCH'S
MORALIA

I



INSCRIPTION FOUND AT DELPHI.

PLUTARCH'S MORALIA

IN FIFTEEN VOLUMES

I

1 A—86 A

WITH AN ENGLISH TRANSLATION BY

FRANK COLE BABBITT

TRINITY COLLEGE, HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT

CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON

WILLIAM HEINEMANN LTD

MCMLX

First printed 1927
Reprinted 1949, 1960

Printed in Great Britain

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PREFACE

THE text on which the translation is based is that of the edition of Plutarch's *Moralia* by G. N. Bernardakis (Leipzig, 1888–96), corrected occasionally by the edition of D. Wyttenbach (Oxford, 1795-1830). The changes made in the text of Bernardakis consist in striking out about half of the emendations which he has adopted, and restoring the readings of the MSS., so far as these could be determined, and in adopting a few emendations proposed since Bernardakis's text was published. A few emendations marked by the initials of the translator are offered with all modesty. Of these a very few are surely right; the others may perhaps suggest to somebody else a way to what is right. Most of Hatzidakis's corrections in Ἀθηνᾶ vol. xiii. have been entered silently: with some of them it is more difficult to agree; for example ἔσται (73 B) for ἔστι might well stand if it were so written, but the present is equally good in such a passage. In some other matters Hatzidakis seems inclined to carry his logic to extremes.

It is useless to apologize for the translation or to attempt to defend it; it is what it is, but at any rate it has not been done in haste. Paraphrase and copious notes would often make matters clearer, but they are excluded by the plan of the volumes.

It is not likely that the numerous references in the

notes will be found to be absolutely free from error. They have all been verified at least once, but anybody who has had experience knows that absolute accuracy in the printed volume is hard to attain. Since an author is often himself his own best interpreter, it is hoped that frequent references to Plutarch's own writings may not be without use.

F. C. B.

Trinity College,
Hartford, Conn.
September 1922.

INTRODUCTION

1. PLUTARCH'S LIFE AND WRITINGS

It is the irony of Fate that of Plutarch, the biographer, there is no biography. Save for a meagre notice in Suidas, our knowledge of his life is derived almost wholly from casual references in his own writings. The dates of his birth and death cannot be determined exactly; even his father's name is unknown; we can only guess that it was Nicarchus or Autobulus, but, since Plutarch often speaks of his family and friends, it is perhaps worth while to set down here the few known facts. His great-grandfather was Nicarchus, his grandfather Lamprias, and he had two brothers, Lamprias and Timon. His ancestors presumably lived at Chaeroneia, the small but historic town in northern Boeotia, and here Plutarch was born about the middle of the first century of our era (perhaps A.D. 46 or 47), a short time before the emperor Claudius was succeeded by Nero. Emperor succeeded emperor during Plutarch's lifetime, and he must have been alive during the first few years of Hadrian's reign, as his death probably occurred not long before A.D. 120. At Chaeroneia Plutarch spent the greater part of his life, and here in due time he married Alexion's daughter Timoxena, a comfortable home-keeping

woman, and it is certain that the two lived happily together. We know the names of four sons, Autobulus, Plutarch, Soclarus, and Chaeron, and one daughter, Timoxena, whose death in early childhood was the occasion of the touching letter to his wife (*Consolatio ad uxorem suam*). If he had other children their names are not recorded, and not all of his sons lived to reach manhood. Three other relatives by marriage, Craton, Firmus, and Patrocleas, complete the list of Plutarch's immediate family whose acquaintance is gradually made by the reader of the *Moralia*.

Plutarch's family was possessed of considerable means, and the boy doubtless received the customary liberal education of the time, including mathematics and music. Later he studied at Athens, the greatest university town of his day for both Greeks and Romans. Here he was the pupil of Ammonius of Lamptrae, a Peripatetic philosopher deeply imbued with the religious idealism of the Academy. That he received instruction also in rhetoric seems fairly certain. From that time on he devoted himself to writing and lecturing, interrupted only by the call of civil or religious duty.

To shirk any public duty was directly contrary to Plutarch's theories and practice. In early manhood he was selected to be one of a committee sent on a mission to the Roman proconsul. In his own town he served as building-commissioner, and later as archon. About the year 95 he became priest at Delphi, and he seems to have held this office as long as he lived. He was an honorary member of the tribe Leontis at Athens. Statements that he was raised to consular rank by Trajan, and was pro-

curator of Achaea in the days of Hadrian, rest on more doubtful authority, but may well be true.

Plutarch travelled widely in Greece, whether for business or for pleasure, and visited also Egypt and Asia Minor; but his most important journeyings brought him to Rome, where he spent a considerable time between the years, approximately, of A.D. 75 to 90. Three facts stand out in regard to his residence at Rome. He was too busily occupied with State affairs to master the Latin language; he lectured, as he had done at home, in his own language, somewhat after the manner of the modern exchange professor; he made many friends among prominent men of Rome, such as Q. Sosius Senecio (consul 99 and 107), Mestrius Florus, Iunius Arulenus Rusticus (praetor 69), C. Minucius Fundanus (consul 107, proconsul of Asia), Paccius, Sextius Sulla from Carthage, and others of less eminence. Many of these friendships lasted until the friends were parted by death.

Plutarch was fortunate in the time in which his life fell. The administrative machinery of the Roman Empire, as instituted by Augustus, was still in good order, and ran smoothly, even under a Nero, and the political turbulence at Rome was but little felt in the peaceful provinces of the Empire. During the latter half of Plutarch's life a profound peace descended on the whole world, and men could turn with relief to the intellectual pursuits, and in these Greece, or rather the Greek, was still supreme.

The latter half of Plutarch's life was spent almost exclusively in his native town Chaeroneia, for which, as he tells us, he had a great fondness, and which he was unwilling to make less populous by removing himself from it. Here he wrote and lectured, and enjoyed the

society of his family and friends and occasional visitors, leaving it only for a visit now and then to Athens (where he doubtless lectured) or to some other neighbouring town, or to Corinth or Sparta or Patrae, or to the favourite watering-place, Aedepsus in Euboea.

All of Plutarch's writings that we have are in prose, but we have the title of one composition by him in verse on the subject of dumb animals. (One may perhaps recall Bishop Doane's poem on his dog.)

The *Moralia* ("Ethical Essays") were written, in great part, before the *Lives*, but the two works have much in common. In the *Lives* Plutarch is not interested in the dry record of fact, but in the conduct of the men whom he describes, and their ethical reaction to the situations in which they found themselves; and in the *Moralia* he is constantly illustrating his points by concrete stories (often the same stories that are told in the *Lives*) about men and women. The threads used as the warp in the composition of the *Moralia* become the woof in the *Lives*, and those yarns which form the warp in the *Lives* are found again in the woof of the *Moralia*.

The *Moralia* are in the form of dialogues, letters, and lectures, but the dramatic value of the dialogue as developed by Plato is quite neglected by Plutarch, and his dialogue very frequently becomes a monologue. So, too, the epistolary form, save in a few cases, is used by Plutarch merely as another method of introducing a lecture, or a narration, or a short sermon.

It is thought that the traditional title (*Moralia*) was given to an early collection of twenty-one (or twenty) of the ethical essays (Nos. 1-21, or 1-19, 21, in MS. E, Par. 1672; see p. xxi), and that this title was kept even after the collection had been greatly

augmented by the addition of other miscellaneous writings of Plutarch, copied from other MSS. Certainly a better descriptive title would be "Miscellaneous Essays and Letters," for the *Moralia* cover many fields, and show an astounding learning and a wide range of interests. They deal largely with philosophy, especially ethics, touching rather lightly, however, on metaphysics. There were many controversial articles, especially against the Stoics and the Epicureans, but the larger part of these has not been preserved. They include also articles dealing with education, music, politics, archaeology, aetiology, ethnology, and philology, as well as literary and historical essays, and commentaries on ancient writers. In the field of science they treat of mathematics, physics, astronomy, geography, zoology, and animal psychology. They include also some personal letters and a miscellaneous collection of stories and anecdotes.

Plutarch's language is the Greek language of his day, abounding in abstract terms not used by earlier writers.[a] His style is studied but easy. It was doubtless influenced by the rhetorical teaching of his time, for he is fond of antithetical clauses, is inclined to use his verbs in pairs, and his nouns and adjectives are frequently twins and even triplets. His occasionally involved word-order may be due in some cases to a conscious effort to avoid hiatus. His mind, like Homer's, was constantly comparing one thing with another, so that, to say nothing of his formal comparisons of men, his pages fairly teem with such expressions as "like to," "in the same way as," "just as," "a sort of," "one might say," and the

[a] *Cf.* George Depue Hadzsits, *Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical Ideal of Plutarch* . . . (Cincinnati, Ohio, 1906).

like, which, in combination with many metaphorical expressions, commonly make for vividness, yet sometimes distract the reader's thought.

Plutarch's sentences, as a rule, are not short. A sentence covering half a page or even more is not uncommon, but the sesquipedalian style is not peculiar to Plutarch; it was common property in his day, and even as crisp a writer as Lucian could indulge in it on occasion. Yet Plutarch's language has the merit, withal, of being usually clear, even if it sometimes defies the translator.

In philosophy Plutarch does not go very far below the surface. He is, however, deeply concerned with the application of philosophy to the concrete problems of daily conduct (*φιλοσοφία βίου κυβερνήτης*). His philosophic system, so far as he consciously formulated one, was largely eclectic. He was an earnest follower of Plato, not with the blind adulation of the neo-platonists, but with a warm admiration for the high ethical standards set by Plato. In fact, he did much to popularize Plato. Aristotle had already put his indelible stamp on philosophy, and to Aristotle also Plutarch is indebted, although he may not himself have been deeply conscious of his debt. Many of the earlier philosophers also, such as Empedocles, Democritus, Pythagoras, Heracleitus, and Theophrastus are frequently quoted with approbation by Plutarch. But towards the Stoics and Epicureans his attitude was frankly hostile. The essays on "The Contradictions of the Stoics," "That the Stoics say Things more absurd than do the Poets," "Against Colotes" (an Epicurean), and "That it is not possible to live happily according to Epicurus's Doctrines," to say nothing of others,

make his attitude quite clear. Yet, in spite of his declarations against the Stoics and the Epicureans, he consciously or unconsciously appropriated much from them, and not infrequently quotes them with approval. But we must remember that Stoicism and Epicureanism at that time were in close competition with Christianity in setting and upholding ethical standards, and Plutarch was at heart too moral and religious to ignore the good which was to be found in them.

In religion Plutarch had leanings towards monotheism, but he was also inclined to mysticism, so that he found it hard to shake off many of the traditional accretions of the Greek religion, with its crowd of spirits both good and bad. Possessed as he was of a kindly nature, he could not bear to think of all evil-doers as destined to everlasting torment, and he would have even a Nero spend only a reasonable time in a purgatory, and then enter upon a new life. Almost a part of his religion was his kindly affection for animals, which was quite unusual in his day, and we may well believe that the poem on dumb animals, attributed to him, was his.

Plutarch was a popular writer in the best sense of the word, for he is always interesting and always instructive, and he can be understood by the ordinary man. For him philosophy does not dwell apart on the chill heights of speculation, but walks on earth as the everyday companion of man to guide him in right living. The philosopher cures the ills of the mind as the physician cures the ills of the body, and Plutarch strives to be such a physician of the mind. But he is well aware that medicine must be made palatable, and so his medicine for mental disorders is combined with much else that is attractive. For

example, he did not write dramas, and yet he is a most dramatic writer; he was not a poet, and yet he has a wonderful power of poetic presentation. It is true that his own originality is often obscured by his habit of quoting freely from other writers, yet it shines through on nearly every page.

His *Lives*, as a rule, march steadily on from their beginning to the end, and so too in the *Moralia* we find a steady ordered progress in the discussion, leading the reader on step by step in a way that marks the truly artistic writer; and when we observe also that at the proper time there is injected a happy metaphor, or an apt illustration or anecdote, or a clever aphorism, while the whole is replete with sound common sense, we can see why Plutarch has had such popularity for so many centuries.

It would be futile to argue that Plutarch has no defects as a writer. He is sometimes inaccurate; but so is the average man. He often bothers himself over matters which are not worth bothering over; but so does the average man. His thinking and his investigations sometimes lead to wrong results or to no results; but the average man does no better, usually worse. Such things, after all, are minor matters which do not in any way detract from the important fact that Plutarch, like John Fiske, could take any subject and present it in such a way that it could be understood by the average man, and in such an interesting way that it would hold his attention. So if we seriously ask ourselves why Plutarch has been, and still is, one of the most widely read and most influential of authors in all literature, the most concise answer may perhaps be found in the line of Terence: "Homo sum; humani nil a me alienum puto."

It is most instructive to follow,[a] century by century, the influence of Plutarch through the ages, and to see how he was read, quoted, and admired by many men of differing temperament, Aulus Gellius, St. Jerome, Rabelais, Montaigne, Rousseau, Bacon, Dryden, Emerson—to name but a few of the long list. Especially to Christians Plutarch has always made a strong appeal, since his writings have much in common with the New Testament, being derived in some cases from the same sources. Christian preachers, from the Church Fathers to Jeremy Taylor, or even later, have not hesitated to draw freely upon Plutarch, or even to appropriate whole essays. The attitude of Plutarch towards religion so impressed Johannes Mauropus (Metropolitan of Euchaeta) in the eleventh century that his dogmatic theology almost broke down when he wrote these verses[b]:

> If any Pagans, Lord, Thy grace shall save
> From wrath divine, this boon I humbly crave,
> Plato and Plutarch save: Thine was the cause
> Their speech supported: Thine, too, were the laws
> Their hearts obeyed; and if their eyes were blind
> To recognize Thee Lord of human kind,
> Needs only that Thy gift of grace be shown
> To bring them, and bring all men, to the Throne.

[a] In Wyttenbach's introduction and in Hirzel's *Plutarch*.

[b] The translation may be found in Oakesmith, *The Religion of Plutarch*, p. 203; the original (in Migne's text) is as follows:

> Εἴπερ τινὰς βούλοιο τῶν ἀλλοτρίων
> τῆς σῆς ἀπειλῆς ἐξελέσθαι, Χριστέ μου,
> Πλάτωνα καὶ Πλούταρχον ἐξέλοιο μοι·
> ἄμφω γάρ εἰσι καὶ λόγον καὶ τὸν τρόπον
> τοῖς σοῖς νόμοις ἔγγιστα προσπεφυκότες.
> εἰ δ' ἠγνόησαν ὡς Θεὸς σὺ τῶν ὅλων
> ἐνταῦθα τῆς σῆς χρηστότητος δεῖ μόνον
> δι' ἣν ἅπαντας δωρεὰν σώζειν θέλεις.

2. BIBLIOGRAPHY

The earliest information which we have in regard to Plutarch's writings is a list of titles purporting to have been made by his son (?) Lamprias. It may be found in Bernardakis's edition, vol. vii. pp. 473-477, and in some other editions. It contains 227 titles, of which the first forty are titles of *Lives*, and the remaining 187 must be classed as *Moralia*. At the best, this catalogue of Lamprias can only be regarded as a list of titles of a collection of Plutarch's writings which was got together not long after his death. That it is far from complete is shown by the fact that Bernardakis (vol. vii. pp. 150-182) gives 152 quotations from Plutarch which cannot be allocated with certainty under any known title of a work by him. Moreover, about twenty pieces preserved to us, the majority of undoubted authenticity, are not mentioned in the catalogue of Lamprias, and this number can be augmented by taking other quotations into account. The *Moralia* which have been preserved can be listed under about eighty titles, and of these approximately sixty, corresponding usually word for word, are found in the catalogue of Lamprias. It is clear, then, that of Plutarch's miscellaneous writings (*Moralia*) we now possess considerably less than half.

Just how or when this larger part of the *Moralia* was lost we cannot surely determine, but it is extremely probable that the greatest loss occurred in the centuries immediately following the closing of the schools of philosophy by Justinian (A.D. 529),

for before that time Plutarch's lost works were often quoted and referred to by other writers, but thereafter quotations and references to these are much more infrequent. At some time also, probably in the tenth century, abstracts of some of Plutarch's works were made, and these abstracts usually supplanted the originals.[a] At any rate, as early as the eleventh century it appears that the traditional works of Plutarch were reduced to their present compass. That the reduction went no further is due to the fact that by that time copies of his works were being made, and that these copies (*i.e.* the present MSS.) have been preserved and reproduced in printed texts. The first large collection of the *Moralia* was made in the thirteenth century (Nos. 1-69 as contained in MS. No. 1671 (A) of the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris and in some other MSS.). This collection is commonly referred to as the Corpus Planudeum, since it was for many years believed that the collection was made by Maximus Planudes. the famous editor of the *Palatine Anthology*.

(i) The Manuscripts

The MSS. of the *Moralia* are numerous. Wegehaupt (*Plutarchstudien*) gives a list of nearly a hundred (omitting, as a rule, those that contain but a single essay), and there are undoubtedly in existence others which have not yet been discovered. It is quite

[a] Three at least of these abstracts have come down to us, Nos. 40, 41, and 42 (p. xxii).

likely that still others, known to have been in existence, may be rediscovered. A MS. of the whole *Moralia* is a great rarity, and most of the MS. contain a group of selected essays, chosen usually from among those numbered 1-69 ("Corpus Planudeum") in Par. 1671 (A).

Some information regarding the MSS. of the *Moralia* is given by M. Treu, *Zur Geschichte der Ueberlieferung von Plutarchs Moralia*, in Progrs. Waldenburg, 1877, Ohlau, 1881, and Friedrichs-gym., Breslau, 1884, by Wyttenbach, Bernardakis, and Paton, in the introductions to their editions, and by H. Wegehaupt in *Philologus* 64 (1905), and more particularly in his *Plutarchstudien in italienischen Bibliotheken* (Cuxhaven, 1906), which contains a most convenient list of the MSS. with dates and bibliography.

The most important MSS. seem to be, at present, five in the Bibliothèque Nationale at Paris, No. 1672 (E) of the thirteenth or fourteenth century, No. 1956 (D) of the eleventh or twelfth century, No. 1675 (B) of the fifteenth century, No. 1955 (C) of the eleventh or twelfth century, No. 1957 (F) of the eleventh century, one at Rome, Urbinas 97 of the tenth century, one at Milan, Ambros. 82 of the fifteenth century, three at Venice, Marc. Gr. 249 (V 1) of the eleventh or twelfth century, Marc. Gr. 250 (V 2) of the eleventh century, Marc. Gr. 427 (V 4) of the fourteenth century, and one at Vienna, Vindob. 148 (phil. Gr. 72) of the eleventh or twelfth century. The last-named seems to be the archetype of all the present MSS. of the *Symposiacs*.

The MSS., however, often show utterly different values in the different essays, and until they have been collated and tested for each essay separately,

in the way which Paton and Titchener [a] have marked out, any final judgement must be suspended.

On the other hand, the numerous quotations from Plutarch found in other writers, which have come down to us through an independent tradition, speak well for the general trustworthiness of our MSS. in giving us the sense of what Plutarch wrote. It is clear that the errors [b] found in the MSS. (save actual omissions) are of a minor sort, which will yield in time to the regular processes of textual criticism.

The order of the essays in Par. 1672 (E), to which reference will be made later, is as follows:

1 De virtute et vitio.
2 De liberis educandis.
3 De profectibus in virtute.
4 De sera numinis vindicta.
5 De capienda ex inimicis utilitate.
6 De audiendis poetis.
7 De adulatore et amico.
8 De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando.
9 De cohibenda ira.
10 De curiositate.
11 De tranquillitate animi.

[a] While this volume is passing through the press it is possible to add here a reference to John Bradford Titchener, *The Manuscript Tradition of Plutarch's Aetia Graeca and Aetia Romana* (University of Illinois Studies in Language and Literature, vol. ix. No. 2, May 1924), a very valuable collation and evaluation of the MSS. containing these two pieces.

[b] Some of these errors seem clearly to be due to confusion of uncial letters. To illustrate by a couple of examples not hitherto noted, *lερεύειν* should probably be read for *lερεῦσιν* (p. 83 c) and *περισπῶν* for *περιέπων* (p. 92 B), one mistake being the converse of the other. But the great need is a good critical edition, and in the meantime one has to limit one's self to corrections of the sort that any good proof-reader would make.

12 De vitioso pudore.
13 De fraterno amore.
14 De garrulitate.
15 De audiendo.
16 De amicorum multitudine.
17 De cupiditate divitiarum.
18 De fortuna.
19 Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores.
20 Aqua an ignis utilior.
21 De superstitione.
22 Consolatio ad Apollonium.
23 Consolatio ad uxorem.
24 De exilio.
25 Galba.
26 Otho.
27 De gloria Atheniensium.
28 Cum principibus philosophandum esse.
29 De sanitate praecepta.
30 An seni respublica gerenda sit.
31 Septem sapientum convivium.
32 De Iside et Osiride.
33 De mulierum virtutibus.
34 Coniugalia praecepta.
35 Ad principem ineruditum.
36 De esu carnium orationes ii.
37 De fato.
38 Quaestiones Platonicae.
39 De musica.
40 Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere.
41 Aristophanis et Menandri comparatio.
42 De animae procreatione epitome.
43 Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum.
44 De latenter vivendo.
45 An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat.
46 De amore prolis.
47 De invidia et odio.
48 De unius in republica dominatione cett.
49 Amatoriae narrationes.
50 Quaestiones naturales.

51 De placitis philosophorum libri v.
52 De virtute morali.
53 De primo frigido.
54 De vita et poesi Homeri.
55 An virtus doceri possit.
56 De fortuna Romanorum.
57 De Alexandri fortuna aut virtute orationes ii.
58 Praecepta gerendae reipublicae.
59 Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata.
60 Apophthegmata Laconica.
Instituta Laconica.
Lacaenarum apophthegmata.
61 Parallela Romana et Graeca.
62 Quaestiones Romanae et Graecae.
63 Decem oratorum vitae.
64 Bruta ratione uti.
65 De vitando aere alieno.
66 De Stoicorum repugnantiis.
67 De sollertia animalium.
68 De E Delphico.
69 De defectu oraculorum.
70 Amatorius.
71 De facie in orbe lunae.
72 De Pythiae oraculis.
73 Adversus Coloten.
74 De communibus notitiis.
75 De genio Socratis.
76 De Herodoti malignitate.
77 De animae procreatione in Timaeo.
78 Quaestionum convivalium libri ix.

(ii) Editions

The first printed edition of the Greek text of the *Moralia* was the Aldine, published at Venice in 1509 under the title *Plutarchi Opuscula LXXXXII.*

(*Venetiis, in aedibus Aldi et Andreae soceri*). It was based on Venetian MSS. which had belonged to Cardinal Bessarion, and perhaps on others; its readings are still of importance whether they were derived from MSS. or from the judicious mind of the editor, Demetrius Ducas, a Greek from Crete.

An edition published at Basle in 1542 shows a good many corrections of the Aldine text.

The edition of Xylander (W. Holtzman) in 1570 (reprinted in 1572 and 1574), with Latin translation and a few notes, marks a great step in advance by reason of the critical acumen of the editor. In this edition the Lives of Galba and Otho were removed from the *Moralia* and printed with the *Lives*. Current references to the *Moralia* are based on the pages of Xylander's edition.

The edition of the complete works of Plutarch by H. Stephanus (Henri Étienne) in thirteen volumes (six of Greek text and seven of Latin translation and notes; Paris, 1572) was based on the Aldine, helped by notes of earlier scholars, and perhaps by some of the Paris MSS.

An edition containing the Greek text of Stephanus and the Latin translation of Xylander was published at Frankfort in 1599, and reprinted at Frankfort in 1620 and at Paris in 1624 with the same pagination and only slight changes and additions. The references in Wyttenbach's lexicon are based on the pagination of these editions, which is the same as that of Xylander. There is, naturally, a lack of harmony between the text and the translation.

J. J. Reiske edited the whole of Plutarch (Leipzig, 1774–82). He was prolific in suggesting emendations, some few of which are very good.

J. G. Hutten also edited the whole of Plutarch (Tübingen, 1791–1804), following Reiske in the main.

But the man who made the greatest contribution to our understanding of the *Moralia* was Daniel Wyttenbach, a native of Switzerland, who lived most of his life in Holland. He undertook to prepare for the Oxford Press a critical edition of the *Moralia* with a commentary. The revision of the Greek text and of the accompanying Latin translation of Xylander was carried out, but he did not live to complete the commentary, which ends abruptly at p. 392 D. The work was published at Oxford, 1795–1830, the last volume of the commentary and the *Index Verborum* appearing after Wyttenbach's death. A reprint of the work soon appeared in Germany (Leipzig, 1796–1834). Wyttenbach was a thorough scholar, well read in Greek and Latin literature, endowed with sane judgement, and, above all, with modesty. His work will endure.

The Didot edition of Plutarch with a Latin translation (Paris, 1846–55; *Moralia* ed. by F. Duebner) adds but little to our knowledge, since conjectures and MSS. readings are indistinguishable, and the same may be said of the Tauchnitz edition (editio sterotypa, Leipzig, 1871–75, several times reprinted).

The most recent edition is the Teubner text of G. N. Bernardakis (Leipzig, 1888–96; 7 vols. and epilogos). The editor collated many MSS., or parts of them, and has improved the reading of many passages, yet the work, as a whole, is unsatisfactory, and the reader is often left in the dark when he is seeking light. Bernardakis has defended himself quite successfully against the onslaughts of Wila-

mowitz - Moellendorff, but the more temperate criticism of G. N. Hatzidakis (Ἀθηνᾶ, vol. xiii., 1901) cannot be met so easily.

There is very great need of a full critical edition of the *Moralia*, and further progress in the understanding of Plutarch waits largely upon the preparations of such an edition.

Some separate editions of one or more essays have an independent value. Among these may be mentioned: W. R. Paton, *Pythici dialogi tres* (Berlin, 1893) and *De cupiditate divitum* (London, 1896); G. Parthey, *Isis und Osiris* (Berlin, 1850); R. Volkmann, Περὶ Μουσικῆς (Leipzig, 1856); H. Weil et Th. Reinach, Περὶ Μουσικῆς (Paris, 1890); A. G. Winckelmann, *Opera moralia selecta, Eroticus et eroticae narrationes* (Zürich, 1836); G. N. Bernardakis, Τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς Ε (Leipzig, 1894); O. Crusius, *De proverbiis Alexandrinorum* (Leipzig, 1887) and *Commentarius* (1895); H. B. Hackett and W. S. Tyler, *The Delay of the Deity in Punishing the Wicked* (revised edition, New York, 1867).

(iii) Special Works on Plutarch

Merely to name the titles of the special works and articles dealing with Plutarch would require many pages, and the selection of a few for mention is not meant to cast any discredit on others. The names of those who have dealt with matters of textual criticism will of necessity appear from time to time

in the critical notes, and others will be found in the works named below.

Probably the best single work on Plutarch in English is that of Archbishop Trench (London, 1873; 2nd ed. 1874). Ralph Waldo Emerson's short but suggestive essay was written for Goodwin's revision of the translation of the *Moralia* (Boston, 1870). J. P. Mahaffy deals with Plutarch in pp. 339-402 of his *The Silver Age of the Greek World* (Chicago and London, 1906), reprinted from his *Greek World under Roman Sway*, and the Rt. Hon. George Wyndham wrote an excellent introduction to North's translation of the *Lives* in the Tudor Translations (London, 1895–1896). Mention should be made also of W. von Christ's *Geschichte der griechischen Litteratur*, ii.[1] pp. 367-404, which is especially valuable for its bibliography.

John Oakesmith, in *The Religion of Plutarch* (London, 1902), treats interestingly of Plutarch's attitude toward religion and the schools of philosophy. An edition giving the quotations in full had been printed a year earlier for private circulation. Excellent also is Octave Gréard's work, *De la Morale de Plutarque* (Paris, 1866, now in the sixth edition at least), which treats some of the same topics as Oakesmith's book, but is conceived in quite a different spirit, and worked out under a totally different arrangement.

A comprehensive work in German on Plutarch is that of R. Volkmann, *Leben, Schriften, und Philosophie des Plutarch von Chaeronea* (Berlin, 1869). Most enthusiastic admiration for Plutarch is expressed by J. J. Hartman in his book *De Plutarcho scriptore et philosopho* (Leyden, 1916). The greater part of the

book is concerned with textual criticism of the *Moralia*, but it contains also introductions to the various essays, and scattered through it are many acute and illuminating observations. At the end is a felicitous essay on Plutarch's life and his manifold activities and interests. In somewhat similar vein is *Plutarch* by R. Hirzel (Leipzig, 1912), who devotes the greater part of his book to a systematic account of the influence of Plutarch through the centuries from Christian times to the present day, the last chapter being devoted to the significance of Plutarch for us and what it may yet be.

(iv) Translations

Plutarch has been translated into many languages. Portions of the *Moralia* were translated into Syriac as early perhaps as the sixth or seventh century.[a] In the latter half of the fifteenth century some of the essays were translated into Latin, and several of these Latin translations were printed a considerable time before the Greek text was printed. Fourteen fifteenth-century editions of Latin translations of portions of Plutarch's works are recorded, the favourite selection being the essay on *The Education of Children*, which thus had a considerable influence on education in the years following. The Latin translation which is printed with many editions of the text is, in the main, the work of Xylander;

[a] It may suffice to refer those interested to *Studia Sinaitica*, No. iv., where reference is made to other publications.

Stephanus, however, for his edition, adapted earlier translations, taking but a few from Xylander.

The French version of Plutarch by Jacques Amyot (Paris, 1559–72), apart from its literary merit, has an independent critical value, since he consulted many of the Paris MSS. which were inaccessible to the earlier editors.

Another French version by M. l'Abbé Ricard (Paris 1783–92, often reprinted in whole or in part) has been very popular, but it not infrequently comes nearer to being a paraphrase than a translation.

The earliest German translation of the *Moralia* was that of M. Herr (Strassburg, 1535). The standard German version is that of J. F. S. Kaltwasser (Frankfort, 1783–1800). Still another version, the joint work of four German scholars, was published at Stuttgart in 1828–61. There are also several translations of separate essays, or groups of essays, and mention should be made of the translation of *The Face in the Moon*, and more especially of the commentary, by the astronomer Kepler.

In English the earliest translation of the *Moralia* was made by Philemon Holland, Doctor of Physick (London, 1603; reprinted in 1657, and in part again quite recently in Everyman's Library). Plutarch was only one of several classical authors translated by Holland. His translation is verbose, sometimes approaching a paraphrase, but it is nevertheless generally accurate, and shows that he understood the original. Holland's translation of the "Romane Questions" was reprinted with the addition of sundry dissertations by F. B. Jevons (London, 1892).

The translation of the *Moralia* "by Several Hands" (London, 1684–94; 5th ed. revised 1718) is an

extremely uneven piece of work. (See W. W. Goodwin's introduction to his revision.) Some of the versions are excellent, but it is clear that others were made from Xylander's Latin translation, or possibly from the French of Amyot, without regard to the Greek text, for they contain blunders arising from the Latin which a glance at the Greek would have corrected.

A revision of this translation was made by W. W. Goodwin (Boston, 1870, and reprinted), to which Ralph Waldo Emerson contributed a characteristic introduction (reprinted in Emerson's works). Professor Goodwin did all that it was humanly possible to do for such a translation short of actual rewriting. Emerson (p. xxiii) pays this tribute to his work: "... in recent reading of the old text, on coming on anything absurd or unintelligible, I referred to the new text, and found a clear and accurate statement in its place." Professor Goodwin, who knew as well as anyone the real difficulties inherent in interpreting Plutarch, must have been the first to detect the pathos of this remark.

Bohn's Classical Library contains two volumes of selected essays from the *Moralia*: *The Theosophical Essays*, translated by C. W. King (London, 1882 and reprinted) and the *Ethical Essays*, translated by A. R. Shilleto (London, 1888, and reprinted). These are vigorously condemned by Oakesmith for their misinterpretations, yet they contain a good deal that is valuable and interesting.

Two volumes of translations from the *Moralia* have been recently published by the Clarendon Press under the title *Selected Essays of Plutarch*: vol. i., translated by T. G. Tucker (Oxford, 1913); vol. ii.,

translated by A. O. Prickard (Oxford, 1918).[a] The latter is perhaps the more carefully done, but both are excellent, scholarly, and readable translations, always deserving serious consideration.

Plutarch on Education by C. W. Super (Syracuse, N.Y., 1910) is mainly a translation of *Moralia* 1 A-48 D. As a translation it is marred by many errors and misinterpretations.

There are also some interesting versions of single pieces, such as that of *How the Young Man should study Poetry*, by F. M. Padelford in *Yale Studies in English*, xv. (New York, 1902), which, however, shows some slips in interpretation, or the excellent translation of *Plutarch on the Delay of the Divine Justice*, with introduction and notes by Andrew P. Peabody (Boston, 1885).

The statement is not infrequently made in histories of Greek literature that Plutarch is the one Greek author whose work is improved by being translated. Those who make or repeat this statement ought to be condemned to keep company with Sisyphus and the Danaïds, and to spend their time in the futile attempt to demonstrate how such a statement can be true.

[a] Vol. i. contains *De liberis educandis*, *De recta ratione audiendi*, *Quomodo adulator*, *Coniugalia praecepta*, *Septem sapientium convivium*, *De garrulitate*, *De curiositate*, *Ad principem ineruditum*, *An seni respublica gerenda sit*; vol. ii. contains *De genio Socratis*, the three Pythian dialogues *De sera numinis vindicta*, the fragments of *De anima*, and *De superstitione*. It includes all but one of the essays translated by C. W. King in the Bohn Library.

3. THE TRADITIONAL ORDER OF THE BOOKS of the *Moralia* as they appear since the edition of Stephanus (1572), and their division into volumes in this edition.

		PAGE
I.	De liberis educandis (Περὶ παίδων ἀγωγῆς) .	1A
	Quomodo adolescens poetas audire debeat (Πῶς δεῖ τὸν νέον ποιημάτων ἀκούειν) . .	17D
	De recta ratione audiendi (Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν) .	37B
	Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur (Πῶς ἄν τις διακρίνειε τὸν κόλακα τοῦ φίλου) .	48E
	Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus (Πῶς ἄν τις αἴσθοιτο ἑαυτοῦ προκόπτοντος ἐπ' ἀρετῇ)	75A
II.	De capienda ex inimicis utilitate (Πῶς ἄν τις ὑπ' ἐχθρῶν ὠφελοῖτο)	86B
	De amicorum multitudine (Περὶ πολυφιλίας) .	93A
	De fortuna (Περὶ τύχης)	97C
	De virtute et vitio (Περὶ ἀρετῆς καὶ κακίας) .	100B
	Consolatio ad Apollonium (Παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς Ἀπολλώνιον)	101F
	De tuenda sanitate praecepta (Ὑγιεινὰ παραγγέλματα)	122B
	Coniugalia praecepta (Γαμικὰ παραγγέλματα) .	138A
	Septem sapientium convivium (Τῶν ἑπτὰ σοφῶν συμπόσιον)	146B
	De superstitione (Περὶ δεισιδαιμονίας) . .	164E
III.	Regum et imperatorum apophthegmata (Ἀποφθέγματα βασιλέων καὶ στρατηγῶν) . .	172A
	Apophthegmata Laconica (Ἀποφθέγματα Λακωνικά)	208A
	Instituta Laconica (Τὰ παλαιὰ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων ἐπιτηδεύματα)	236F

		PAGE
	Lacaenarum apophthegmata (Λακαινῶν ἀποφθέγματα)	240C
	Mulierum virtutes (Γυναικῶν ἀρεταί)	242E
IV.	Quaestiones Romanae (Αἴτια Ῥωμαϊκά)	263D
	Quaestiones Graecae (Αἴτια Ἑλληνικά)	291D
	Parallela Graeca et Romana (Συναγωγὴ ἱστοριῶν παραλλήλων Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ Ῥωμαϊκῶν)	305A
	De fortuna Romanorum (Περὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίων τύχης)	316B
	De Alexandri magni fortuna aut virtute, libri ii (Περὶ τῆς Ἀλεξάνδρου τύχης ἢ ἀρετῆς, λόγοι β′)	326D
	Bellone an pace clariores fuerint Athenienses (Πότερον Ἀθηναῖοι κατὰ πόλεμον ἢ κατὰ σοφίαν ἐνδοξότεροι)	345C
V.	De Iside et Osiride (Περὶ Ἴσιδος καὶ Ὀσίριδος)	351C
	De E apud Delphos (Περὶ τοῦ ΕΙ τοῦ ἐν Δελφοῖς)	384C
	De Pythiae oraculis (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ χρᾶν ἔμμετρα νῦν τὴν Πυθίαν)	394D
	De defectu oraculorum (Περὶ τῶν ἐκλελοιπότων χρηστηρίων)	409E
VI.	An virtus doceri possit (Εἰ διδακτὸν ἡ ἀρετή)	439A
	De virtute morali (Περὶ τῆς ἠθικῆς ἀρετῆς)	440D
	De cohibenda ira (Περὶ ἀοργησίας)	452E
	De tranquillitate animi (Περὶ εὐθυμίας)	464E
	De fraterno amore (Περὶ φιλαδελφίας)	478A
	De amore prolis (Περὶ τῆς εἰς τὰ ἔκγονα φιλοστοργίας)	493A
	An vitiositas ad infelicitatem sufficiat (Εἰ αὐτάρκης ἡ κακία πρὸς κακοδαιμονίαν)	498A
	Animine an corporis affectiones sint peiores (Πότερον τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ τὰ τοῦ σώματος πάθη χείρονα)	500B
	De garrulitate (Περὶ ἀδολεσχίας)	502B
	De curiositate (Περὶ πολυπραγμοσύνης)	515B
VII.	De cupiditate divitiarum (Περὶ φιλοπλουτίας)	523C
	De vitioso pudore (Περὶ δυσωπίας)	528C
	De invidia et odio (Περὶ φθόνου καὶ μίσους)	536E
	De se ipsum citra invidiam laudando (Περὶ τοῦ ἑαυτὸν ἐπαινεῖν ἀνεπιφθόνως)	539A
	De sera numinis vindicta (Περὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ θείου βραδέως τιμωρουμένων)	548A

		PAGE
	De fato (Περὶ εἱμαρμένης)	568B
	De genio Socratis (Περὶ τοῦ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου)	575A
	De exilio (Περὶ φυγῆς)	599A
	Consolatio ad uxorem (Παραμυθητικὸς πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα)	608A
VIII.	Quaestionum convivalium libri vi (Συμποσιακῶν προβλημάτων βιβλία ϛ′)	612C
	I, 612C; II, 629B; III, 644E; IV, 659E; V, 672D; VI, 686A	
IX.	Quaestionum convivalium libri iii (Συμποσιακῶν προβλημάτων βιβλία γ′)	697C
	VII, 697C; VIII, 716D; IX, 736C	
	Amatorius (Ἐρωτικός)	748E
X.	Amatoriae narrationes (Ἐρωτικαὶ διηγήσεις)	771E
	Maxime cum principibus philosopho esse disserendum (Περὶ τοῦ ὅτι μάλιστα τοῖς ἡγεμόσι δεῖ τὸν φιλόσοφον διαλέγεσθαι)	776A
	Ad principem ineruditum (Πρὸς ἡγεμόνα ἀπαίδευτον)	779C
	An seni respublica gerenda sit (Εἰ πρεσβυτέρῳ πολιτευτέον)	783A
	Praecepta gerendae reipublicae (Πολιτικὰ παραγγέλματα)	798A
	De unius in republica dominatione, populari statu, et paucorum imperio (Περὶ μοναρχίας καὶ δημοκρατίας καὶ ὀλιγαρχίας)	826A
	De vitando aere alieno (Περὶ τοῦ μὴ δεῖν δανείζεσθαι)	827D
	Vitae decem oratorum (Περὶ τῶν δέκα ῥητόρων)	832B
	Comparationis Aristophanis et Menandri compendium (Συγκρίσεως Ἀριστοφάνους καὶ Μενάνδρου ἐπιτομή)	853A
XI.	De Herodoti malignitate (Περὶ τῆς Ἡροδότου κακοηθείας)	854E
	De placitis philosophorum, libri v (Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων τοῖς φιλοσόφοις, βιβλία ε′)	874D
	Quaestiones naturales (Αἴτια φυσικά)	911C
XII.	De facie quae in orbe lunae apparet (Περὶ τοῦ ἐμφαινομένου προσώπου τῷ κύκλῳ τῆς σελήνης)	920A
	De primo frigido (Περὶ τοῦ πρώτως ψυχροῦ)	945E

		PAGE
	Aquane an ignis sit utilior (Περὶ τοῦ πότερον ὕδωρ ἢ πῦρ χρησιμώτερον)	955D
	Terrestriane an aquatilia animalia sint callidiora (Πότερα τῶν ζῴων φρονιμώτερα τὰ χερσαῖα ἢ τὰ ἔνυδρα)	959A
	Bruta animalia ratione uti, sive Gryllus (Περὶ τοῦ τὰ ἄλογα λόγῳ χρῆσθαι) . . .	985D
	De esu carnium orationes ii (Περὶ σαρκοφαγίας λόγοι β′)	993A
XIII.	Platonicae quaestiones (Πλατωνικὰ ζητήματα) .	999C
	De animae procreatione in Timaeo (Περὶ τῆς ἐν Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας)	1012A
	Compendium libri de animae procreatione in Timaeo (Ἐπιτομὴ τοῦ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ ψυχογονίας)	1030D
	De Stoicorum repugnantiis (Περὶ Στωικῶν ἐναντιωμάτων)	1033A
	Compendium argumenti Stoicos absurdiora poetis dicere (Σύνοψις τοῦ ὅτι παραδοξότερα οἱ Στωικοὶ τῶν ποιητῶν λέγουσι) . . .	1057C
	De communibus notitiis adversus Stoicos (Περὶ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν πρὸς τοὺς Στωικούς) .	1058E
XIV.	Non posse suaviter vivi secundum Epicurum (Ὅτι οὐδ' ἡδέως ζῆν ἔστι κατ' Ἐπίκουρον) .	1086C
	Adversus Colotem (Πρὸς Κωλώτην) . .	1107D
	An recte dictum sit latenter esse vivendum (εἰ καλῶς εἴρηται τὸ λάθε βιώσας) . . .	1128A
	De musica (Περὶ μουσικῆς)	1131A
XV.	Fragments and Index	

THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

(DE LIBERIS EDUCANDIS)

INTRODUCTION

It is generally believed that the essay which stands first in the collected works of Plutarch cannot have been written by him. The arguments against the genuineness of the essay, based both on external and internal evidence, are too long to be repeated here, but they may be found in Wyttenbach's edition vol. vi. pp. 29-64.

The essay, however, is interesting in itself, since it reflects in many ways the educational conditions of its time Frankly recognizing the difference in natural endowments, the author insists on the great benefits which inevitably come from training. Physical training is of course required, and military training is held to be most important for preparing men to win in battle. A knowledge of philosophy is the final goal of education.

The invectives against the indifference of parents about the education of their children, and their unwillingness to pay adequate salaries so as to secure men of character as teachers, may have the same familiar ring two thousand years hence.

Finally, a word is added on the excesses of young men, and a warning against flatterers,—suggested perhaps by Plutarch's essay devoted to that subject.

ΠΕΡΙ ΠΑΙΔΩΝ ΑΓΩΓΗΣ

1 1. Τί τις ἂν ἔχοι εἰπεῖν περὶ τῆς τῶν ἐλευθέρων παίδων ἀγωγῆς καὶ τίνι χρώμενοι σπουδαῖοι τοὺς τρόπους ἂν ἀποβαῖεν, φέρε σκεψώμεθα.

2. Βέλτιον δ' ἴσως ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἄρξασθαι πρῶτον. τοῖς τοίνυν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν ἐνδόξων τέκνων
B γενέσθαι πατράσιν ὑποθείμην ἂν ἔγωγε μὴ ταῖς τυχούσαις γυναιξὶ συνοικεῖν, λέγω δ' οἷον ἑταίραις ἢ παλλακαῖς· τοῖς γὰρ μητρόθεν ἢ πατρόθεν οὐκ εὖ γεγονόσιν ἀνεξάλειπτα παρακολουθεῖ τὰ τῆς δυσγενείας ὀνείδη παρὰ πάντα τὸν βίον καὶ πρόχειρα τοῖς ἐλέγχειν καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι βουλομένοις. καὶ σοφὸς ἦν ἄρ' ὁ ποιητὴς ὅς φησιν

> ὅταν δὲ κρηπὶς μὴ καταβληθῇ γένους
> ὀρθῶς, ἀνάγκη δυστυχεῖν τοὺς ἐκγόνους.

Καλὸς οὖν παρρησίας θησαυρὸς εὐγένεια, ἧς δὴ πλεῖστον λόγον ποιητέον τοῖς νομίμου παιδοποιίας γλιχομένοις. καὶ μὲν δὴ τὰ φρονήματα τῶν
C ὑπόχαλκον καὶ κίβδηλον ἐχόντων τὸ γένος σφάλλεσθαι καὶ ταπεινοῦσθαι πέφυκε, καὶ μάλ' ὀρθῶς λέγων[1] ὁ ποιητής φησι

[1] λέγων ὁ Hartman : ὁ λέγων.

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[a] Euripides, *Hercules Furens*, 1261.

THE EDUCATION OF CHILDREN

1. Let us consider what may be said of the education of free-born children, and what advantages they should enjoy to give them a sound character when they grow up.

2. It is perhaps better to begin with their parentage first; and I should advise those desirous of becoming fathers of notable offspring to abstain from random cohabitation with women; I mean with such women as courtesans and concubines. For those who are not well-born, whether on the father's or the mother's side, have an indelible disgrace in their low birth, which accompanies them throughout their lives, and offers to anyone desiring to use it a ready subject of reproach and insult. Wise was the poet who declares:

> The home's foundation being wrongly laid,
> The offspring needs must be unfortunate.[a]

A goodly treasure, then, is honourable birth, and such a man may speak his mind freely, a thing which should be held of the highest account by those who wish to have issue lawfully begotten. In the nature of things, the spirits of those whose blood is base or counterfeit are constantly being brought down and humbled, and quite rightly does the poet declare:

δουλοῖ γὰρ ἄνδρα, κἂν θρασύσπλαγχνός τις ᾖ,
ὅταν συνειδῇ μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς[1] κακά.

ὥσπερ ἀμέλει μεγαλαυχίας ἐμπίπλανται καὶ φρυάγματος οἱ γονέων διασήμων. Κλεόφαντον[2] γοῦν τὸν Θεμιστοκλέους πολλάκις λέγουσι φάναι καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς ὡς ὅ τι ἂν αὐτὸς βούληται, τοῦτο καὶ τῷ δήμῳ συνδοκεῖ τῷ τῶν Ἀθηναίων· ἃ μὲν γὰρ αὐτὸς ἐθέλει, καὶ ἡ μήτηρ· ἃ δ' ἂν ἡ μήτηρ, καὶ
D Θεμιστοκλῆς· ἃ δ' ἂν Θεμιστοκλῆς, καὶ πάντες Ἀθηναῖοι. πάνυ δ' ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν καὶ Λακεδαιμονίους τῆς μεγαλοφροσύνης, οἵτινες Ἀρχίδαμον τὸν βασιλέα ἑαυτῶν ἐζημίωσαν χρήμασιν, ὅτι μικρὰν τὸ μέγεθος γυναῖκα γάμῳ λαβεῖν ὑπέμεινεν, ὑπειπόντες[3] ὡς οὐ βασιλέας ἀλλὰ βασιλείδια παρασχεῖν αὐτοῖς διανοοῖτο.

3. Ἐχόμενον δ' ἂν εἴη τούτων εἰπεῖν ὅπερ οὐδὲ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν παρεωρᾶτο. τὸ ποῖον; ὅτι τοὺς ἕνεκα παιδοποιίας πλησιάζοντας ταῖς γυναιξὶν ἤτοι τὸ παράπαν ἀοίνους ἢ μετρίως γοῦν οἰνωμένους ποιεῖσθαι προσήκει τὸν συνουσιασμόν. φίλοινοι γὰρ καὶ μεθυστικοὶ γίγνεσθαι φιλοῦσιν
2 ὧν ἂν τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς σπορᾶς οἱ πατέρες ἐν μέθῃ ποιησάμενοι τύχωσιν. ᾗ καὶ Διογένης μειράκιον ἐκστατικὸν ἰδὼν καὶ παραφρονοῦν "νεανίσκε" ἔφησεν, "ὁ πατήρ σε μεθύων ἔσπειρε." καὶ περὶ μὲν τῆς γενέσεως τοσαῦτ' εἰρήσθω μοι, περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀγωγῆς καὶ δὴ λεκτέον.

4. Καθόλου μὲν εἰπεῖν, ὃ κατὰ τῶν τεχνῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπιστημῶν λέγειν εἰώθαμεν, ταὐτὸ καὶ κατὰ

[1] μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς Euripides: πατρὸς ἢ μητρὸς.
[2] Διόφαντον MSS. [3] ἐπειπόντες Meziriacus.

A man, though bold, is made a slave whene'er
He learns his mother's or his sire's disgrace.[a]

Children of distinguished parents are, of course, correspondingly full of exultation and pride. At all events, they say that Cleophantus, the son of Themistocles, often declared to many persons, that whatever he desired was always agreed to by the Athenian people; for whatever he wished his mother also wished; whatever his mother wished Themistocles also wished; and whatever Themistocles wished all the Athenians wished. It is very proper also to bestow a word of praise on the Spartans for the noble spirit they showed in fining their king, Archidamus, because he had permitted himself to take to wife a woman short of stature, the reason they gave being that he proposed to supply them not with kings but with kinglets.

3. In this connexion we should speak of a matter which has not been overlooked by our predecessors. What is this? It is that husbands who approach their wives for the sake of issue should do so only when they have either not taken any wine at all, or at any rate, a very moderate portion. For children whose fathers have chanced to beget them in drunkenness are wont to be fond of wine, and to be given to excessive drinking. Wherefore Diogenes, observing an emotional and crack-brained youth, said, "Young man, your father must have been drunk when he begot you!" So much for my views on the subject of birth. We must now speak of education.

4. As a general statement, the same assertion may be made in regard to moral excellence that we

[a] Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 424.

(2) τῆς ἀρετῆς φατέον ἐστίν, ὡς εἰς τὴν παντελῆ δικαιοπραγίαν τρία δεῖ συνδραμεῖν, φύσιν καὶ λόγον καὶ ἔθος. καλῶ δὲ λόγον μὲν τὴν μάθησιν, ἔθος δὲ τὴν ἄσκησιν. εἰσὶ δ' αἱ μὲν ἀρχαὶ τῆς φύσεως, αἱ δὲ προκοπαὶ τῆς μαθήσεως, αἱ δὲ
B χρήσεις τῆς μελέτης, αἱ δ' ἀκρότητες πάντων. καθ' ὃ δ' ἂν λειφθῇ τούτων, κατὰ τοῦτ' ἀνάγκη χωλὴν γίγνεσθαι τὴν ἀρετήν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις ἄνευ μαθήσεως τυφλόν, ἡ δὲ μάθησις δίχα φύσεως ἐλλιπές, ἡ δ' ἄσκησις χωρὶς ἀμφοῖν ἀτελές. ὥσπερ δ' ἐπὶ τῆς γεωργίας πρῶτον μὲν ἀγαθὴν ὑπάρξαι δεῖ τὴν γῆν, εἶτα δὲ τὸν[1] φυτουργὸν ἐπιστήμονα, εἶτα τὰ σπέρματα σπουδαῖα, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον γῇ μὲν ἔοικεν ἡ φύσις, γεωργῷ δ' ὁ παιδεύων, σπέρματι δ' αἱ τῶν λόγων ὑποθῆκαι καὶ τὰ παρ-
C αγγέλματα. ταῦτα πάντα διατεινάμενος ἂν[2] εἴποιμ' ὅτι συνῆλθε καὶ συνέπνευσεν εἰς τὰς τῶν παρ' ἅπασιν ἀδομένων ψυχάς, Πυθαγόρου καὶ Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ τῶν ὅσοι δόξης ἀειμνήστου τετυχήκασιν.

Εὔδαιμον μὲν οὖν καὶ θεοφιλὲς εἴ τῳ ταῦτα πάντα θεῶν τις ἀπέδωκεν. εἰ δέ τις οἴεται τοὺς οὐκ εὖ πεφυκότας μαθήσεως καὶ μελέτης τυχόντας ὀρθῆς πρὸς ἀρετὴν οὐκ ἂν τὴν τῆς φύσεως ἐλάττωσιν εἰς τοὐνδεχόμενον ἀναδραμεῖν,[3] ἴστω πολλοῦ, μᾶλλον δὲ τοῦ παντὸς διαμαρτάνων. φύσεως μὲν γὰρ ἀρετὴν διαφθείρει ῥᾳθυμία, φαυλότητα δ' ἐπανορθοῖ διδαχή· καὶ τὰ μὲν ῥᾴδια τοὺς ἀμε-

[1] τὸν added by Hercher. [2] ἂν added by Emperius.
[3] ἀναλαβεῖν Wyttenbach.

are in the habit of making in regard to the arts and sciences, namely, that there must be a concurrence of three things in order to produce perfectly right action, and these are: nature, reason, and habit. By reason I mean the act of learning, and by habit constant practice. The first beginnings come from nature, advancement from learning, the practical use from continued repetition, and the culmination from all combined; but so far as any one of these is wanting, the moral excellence must, to this extent, be crippled. For nature without learning is a blind thing, and learning without nature is an imperfect thing, and practice without both is an ineffective thing. Just as in farming, first of all the soil must be good, secondly, the husbandman skilful, and thirdly, the seed sound, so, after the same manner, nature is like to the soil, the teacher to the farmer, and the verbal counsels and precepts like to the seed. I should strenuously insist that all three qualities met together and formed a perfect union in the souls of those men who are celebrated among all mankind,—Pythagoras, Socrates, Plato, and all who have attained an ever-living fame.

Now it is a fortunate thing and a token of divine love if ever a heavenly power has bestowed all these qualities on any one man; but if anybody imagines that those not endowed with natural gifts, who yet have the chance to learn and to apply themselves in the right way to the attaining of virtue, cannot repair the want of their nature and advance so far as in them lies, let him know that he is in great, or rather total, error. For indifference ruins a good natural endowment, but instruction amends a poor one; easy things escape the careless, but difficult

(2) λοῦντας φεύγει, τὰ δὲ χαλεπὰ ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις
D ἁλίσκεται. καταμάθοις δ' ἂν ὡς ἀνύσιμον πρᾶγμα καὶ τελεσιουργὸν ἐπιμέλεια καὶ πόνος ἐστίν, ἐπὶ πολλὰ τῶν γιγνομένων ἐπιβλέψας. σταγόνες μὲν γὰρ ὕδατος πέτρας κοιλαίνουσι, σίδηρος δὲ καὶ χαλκὸς ταῖς ἐπαφαῖς τῶν χειρῶν ἐκτρίβονται, οἱ δ' ἁρμάτειοι τροχοὶ πόνῳ[1] καμφθέντες οὐδ' ἂν εἴ τι γένοιτο τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς δύναιντ' ἀναλαβεῖν εὐθυωρίαν· τάς γε μὴν καμπύλας τῶν ὑποκριτῶν βακτηρίας ἀπευθύνειν ἀμήχανον, ἀλλὰ τὸ παρὰ φύσιν τῷ πόνῳ τοῦ κατὰ φύσιν ἐγένετο κρεῖττον. καὶ μόνα ἆρα ταῦτα τὴν τῆς ἐπιμελείας ἰσχὺν διαδείκνυσιν; οὔκ, ἀλλὰ καὶ μυρί' ἐπὶ μυρίοις.
E ἀγαθὴ γῆ πέφυκεν· ἀλλ' ἀμεληθεῖσα χερσεύεται, καὶ ὅσῳ τῇ φύσει βελτίων ἐστί, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐξαργηθεῖσα δι' ἀμέλειαν ἐξαπόλλυται. ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἀπόκροτος καὶ τραχυτέρα τοῦ δέοντος· ἀλλὰ γεωργηθεῖσα παραυτίκα γενναίους καρποὺς ἐξήνεγκε. ποῖα δὲ δένδρα οὐκ ὀλιγωρηθέντα μὲν στρεβλὰ φύεται καὶ ἄκαρπα καθίσταται, τυχόντα δ' ὀρθῆς παιδαγωγίας ἔγκαρπα γίγνεται καὶ τελεσφόρα; ποία δὲ σώματος ἰσχὺς οὐκ ἐξαμβλοῦται καὶ καταφθίνει δι' ἀμέλειαν καὶ τρυφὴν καὶ καχεξίαν; τίς δ' ἀσθενὴς φύσις οὐ τοῖς γυμνασαμένοις καὶ καταθλήσασι πλεῖστον εἰς ἰσχὺν ἐπέδωκε; τίνες
F δ' ἵπποι καλῶς πωλοδαμνηθέντες οὐκ εὐπειθεῖς ἐγένοντο τοῖς ἀναβάταις; τίνες δ' ἀδάμαστοι μείναντες οὐ σκληραύχενες καὶ θυμοειδεῖς ἀπέβησαν; καὶ τί δεῖ τἄλλα θαυμάζειν, ὅπου γε τῶν θηρίων τῶν ἀγριωτάτων ὁρῶμεν πολλὰ καὶ τιθασευόμενα καὶ χειροήθη γιγνόμενα τοῖς πόνοις; εὖ δὲ

[1] πόνῳ: τόνῳ in many mss.

things are conquered by careful application. One may understand how effective and how productive a thing is application and hard work, if he only direct his attention to many effects that are daily observed. For drops of water make hollows in rocks, steel and bronze are worn away by the touch of hands, and rims of chariot-wheels once bent by dint of labour, cannot, no matter what be done, recover their original lines. The bent staves which actors use it is impossible to straighten ; indeed the unnatural shape has, through labour, come to predominate over the natural. And are these the only things which clearly show the potency of diligence ? No, but myriads upon myriads. A piece of land is good by nature, but without care it grows waste, and the better it is by nature, so much the more is it spoiled by neglect if it be not worked. Another piece is forbidding and rougher than land should be, but, if it be tilled, straightway it produces noble crops. What trees if they are neglected do not grow crooked and prove unfruitful ? Yet if they receive right culture, they become fruitful, and bring their fruit to maturity. What bodily strength is not impaired and finally ruined by neglect and luxury and ill condition ? On the other hand, what weak physique does not show a very great improvement in strength if men exercise and train themselves ? What horses if they are well broken when young do not become obedient to their riders, whereas if they are left unbroken they turn out stubborn and restive ? Why wonder at other instances, seeing as we do that many of the wildest animals are made tame and used to their labours ?

καὶ ὁ Θετταλὸς ἐρωτηθεὶς τίνες εἰσὶν οἱ ἠπιώτατοι Θετταλῶν, ἔφη "οἱ παυόμενοι πολεμεῖν." καὶ τί δεῖ τὰ πολλὰ λέγειν; καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἦθος ἔθος[1] ἐστὶ
3 πολυχρόνιον, καὶ τὰς ἠθικὰς ἀρετὰς ἐθικὰς ἄν τις λέγῃ, οὐκ ἄν τι πλημμελεῖν δόξειεν. ἐνὶ δὲ περὶ τούτων ἔτι παραδείγματι χρησάμενος ἀπαλλάξομαι τοῦ ἔτι περὶ αὐτῶν μηκύνειν. Λυκοῦργος γὰρ ὁ τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων νομοθέτης δύο σκύλακας τῶν αὐτῶν γονέων λαβὼν οὐδὲν ὁμοίως ἀλλήλοις ἤγαγεν, ἀλλὰ τὸν μὲν λίχνον ἀπέφηνε καὶ σινάμωρον, τὸν δ' ἐξιχνεύειν καὶ θηρᾶν δυνατόν. εἶτά ποτε τῶν Λακεδαιμονίων εἰς ταὐτὸ συνειλεγμένων, "μεγάλη τοι ῥοπὴ πρὸς ἀρετῆς κύησίν[2] ἐστιν,
B ἄνδρες," ἔφησε, "Λακεδαιμόνιοι, καὶ ἔθη καὶ παιδεῖαι καὶ διδασκαλίαι καὶ βίων ἀγωγαί, καὶ ἐγὼ ταῦθ' ὑμῖν αὐτίκα δὴ μάλα ποιήσω φανερά." εἶτα προσαγαγὼν τοὺς δύο σκύλακας διαφῆκε, καταθεὶς εἰς μέσον λοπάδα καὶ λαγωὸν κατευθὺ τῶν σκυλάκων. καὶ ὁ μὲν ἐπὶ τὸν λαγωὸν ᾔξεν, ὁ δ' ἐπὶ τὴν λοπάδα ὥρμησε. τῶν δὲ Λακεδαιμονίων οὐδέπω συμβαλεῖν ἐχόντων τί ποτ' αὐτῷ τοῦτο δύναται καὶ τί βουλόμενος τοὺς σκύλακας ἐπεδείκνυεν, "οὗτοι γονέων," ἔφη, "τῶν αὐτῶν ἀμφότεροι, διαφόρου δὲ τυχόντες ἀγωγῆς ὁ μὲν λίχνος ὁ δὲ θηρευτὴς ἀποβέβηκε." καὶ περὶ μὲν ἐθῶν καὶ βίων ἀρκείτω ταῦτα.

C 5. Περὶ δὲ τροφῆς ἐχόμενον ἂν εἴη λέγειν. δεῖ δέ, ὡς ἐγὼ ἂν φαίην, αὐτὰς τὰς μητέρας τὰ τέκνα τρέφειν καὶ τούτοις τοὺς μαστοὺς ὑπέχειν· συμπαθέστερόν τε γὰρ θρέψουσι καὶ διὰ πλείονος ἐπι-

[1] ἔθος added by Xylander.
[2] κτῆσιν Wyttenbach.

Well did the Thessalian say, when asked who were the most pacific of the Thessalians, " Those who are just returning from war." But why discuss the matter at length? For character is habit long continued, and if one were to call the virtues of character the virtues of habit, he would not seem to go far astray. I will cite but one more example on this point and then I shall desist from discussing it further. Lycurgus,[a] the lawgiver of the Spartans, took two puppies of the same litter, and reared them in quite different ways, so that from the one he produced a mischievous and greedy cur, and from the other a dog able to follow a scent and to hunt. And then at a time when the Spartans were gathered together, he said, " Men of Sparta, of a truth habit and training and teaching and guidance in living are a great influence toward engendering excellence, and I will make this evident to you at once." Thereupon producing the two dogs, he let them loose, putting down directly in front of them a dish of food and a hare. The one dog rushed after the hare, and the other made for the dish. While the Spartans were as yet unable to make out what import he gave to this, and with what intent he was exhibiting the dogs, he said, " These dogs are both of the same litter, but they have received a different bringing-up, with the result that the one has turned out a glutton and the other a hunter." In regard to habits and manner of life let this suffice.

5. Next in order comes the subject of feeding. Mothers ought, I should say, themselves to feed their infants and nurse them themselves. For they will feed them with a livelier affection and greater

[a] The story is repeated in *Moralia*, 225 F.

(3) μελείας, ὡς ἂν ἔνδοθεν καὶ τὸ δὴ λεγόμενον ἐξ ὀνύχων ἀγαπῶσαι τὰ τέκνα. αἱ τίτθαι δὲ καὶ αἱ τροφοὶ τὴν εὔνοιαν ὑποβολιμαίαν καὶ παρέγγραπτον ἔχουσιν, ἅτε μισθοῦ φιλοῦσαι. δηλοῖ δὲ καὶ ἡ φύσις ὅτι δεῖ τὰς μητέρας ἃ γεγεννήκασιν αὐτὰς τιτθεύειν καὶ τρέφειν· διὰ γὰρ τοῦτο παντὶ ζῴῳ τεκόντι τὴν ἐκ τοῦ γάλακτος τροφὴν ἐχορήγησε. σοφὸν
D δ' ἄρα καὶ ἡ πρόνοια· διττοὺς ἐνέθηκε ταῖς γυναιξὶ τοὺς μαστούς, ἵνα, κἂν[1] εἰ δίδυμα τέκοιεν, διττὰς ἔχοιεν τὰς τῆς τροφῆς πηγάς. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων εὐνούστεραι τοῖς τέκνοις γίγνοιντ' ἂν καὶ φιλητικώτεραι. καὶ μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἀπεικότως· ἡ συντροφία γὰρ ὥσπερ ἐπιτόνιόν ἐστι τῆς εὐνοίας. καὶ γὰρ τὰ θηρία τῶν συντρεφομένων ἀποσπώμενα ταῦτα ποθοῦντα φαίνεται. μάλιστα μὲν οὖν ὅπερ ἔφην αὐτὰς πειρατέον τὰ τέκνα τρέφειν τὰς μητέρας· εἰ δ' ἄρ' ἀδυνάτως ἔχοιεν ἢ διὰ σώματος ἀσθένειαν (γένοιτο γὰρ ἄν τι καὶ τοιοῦτον) ἢ πρὸς ἑτέρων τέκνων σπεύδουσαι γένεσιν, ἀλλὰ τάς γε τίτθας καὶ τροφοὺς οὐ τὰς τυχούσας ἀλλ' ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα
E σπουδαίας δοκιμαστέον ἐστί. πρῶτον μὲν τοῖς ἤθεσιν Ἑλληνίδας. ὥσπερ γὰρ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος εὐθὺς ἀπὸ γενέσεως πλάττειν τῶν τέκνων ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστιν, ἵνα ταὐτ' ὀρθὰ καὶ ἀστραβῆ φύηται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἐξ ἀρχῆς τὰ τῶν τέκνων ἤθη ῥυθμίζειν προσήκει. εὔπλαστον γὰρ καὶ ὑγρὸν

[1] κἂν Bernardakis: καὶ.

[a] So Cicero, *Ad fam.* i. 6 "a teneris unguiculis"; *cf.* J. C. Rolfe in *Proceedings of Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, July 1903, p. 55.

care, as loving them inwardly, and, according to the proverb, to their finger-tips.[a] But the goodwill of foster-mothers and nursemaids is insincere and forced, since they love for pay. Nature too makes clear the fact that mothers should themselves nurse and feed what they have brought into the world, since it is for this purpose that she has provided for every animal which gives birth to young a source of food in its milk. Wise also is her forethought; for she has fashioned women's breasts double, so that, if there be twins, they may have a double source of nutrition. Yet apart from all this, mothers would come to be more kindly disposed towards their children, and more inclined to show them affection. Not unnaturally either, I swear; for this fellowship in feeding is a bond that knits kindliness together. Yes, even the brute beasts, when dragged away from their companions in feeding, evidently miss them.[b] So, as I have said, mothers must endeavour, if possible, to nurse their children themselves; but if they are unable to do this, either because of bodily weakness (for such a thing can happen) or because they are in haste to bear more children, yet foster-mothers and nursemaids are not to be selected at random, but as good ones as possible must be chosen; and, first of all, in character they must be Greek. For just as it is necessary, immediately after birth, to begin to mould the limbs of the children's bodies in order that these may grow straight and without deformity, so, in the same fashion, it is fitting from the beginning to regulate the characters of children. For youth

[b] From Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, ii. 1. 28. *Cf. Memorabilia*, ii. 3. 4.

ἡ νεότης, καὶ ταῖς τούτων ψυχαῖς ἁπαλαῖς ἔτι τὰ μαθήματα ἐντήκεται· πᾶν δὲ τὸ σκληρὸν χαλεπῶς
F μαλάττεται. καθάπερ γὰρ σφραγῖδες τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς ἐναπομάττονται κηροῖς, οὕτως αἱ μαθήσεις ταῖς τῶν ἔτι παιδίων ψυχαῖς ἐναποτυποῦνται. καί μοι δοκεῖ Πλάτων ὁ δαιμόνιος ἐμμελῶν παραινεῖν ταῖς τίτθαις μηδὲ τοὺς τυχόντας μύθους τοῖς παιδίοις λέγειν, ἵνα μὴ τὰς τούτων ψυχὰς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἀνοίας καὶ διαφθορᾶς ἀναπίμπλασθαι συμβαίνῃ. κινδυνεύει δὲ καὶ Φωκυλίδης ὁ ποιητὴς καλῶς παραινεῖν λέγων

χρὴ παῖδ' ἔτ' ἐόντα
καλὰ διδάσκειν ἔργα.

6. Οὐ τοίνυν οὐδὲ τοῦτο παραλιπεῖν ἄξιόν ἐστιν, ὅτι καὶ τὰ παιδία τὰ μέλλοντα τοῖς τροφίμοις ὑπηρετεῖν καὶ τούτοις σύντροφα γίγνεσθαι ζητητέον
4 πρώτιστα μὲν σπουδαῖα τοὺς τρόπους, ἔτι μέντοι Ἑλληνικὰ καὶ περίτρανα λαλεῖν, ἵνα μὴ συναναχρωννύμενοι βαρβάροις καὶ τὸ ἦθος μοχθηροῖς ἀποφέρωνταί τι τῆς ἐκείνων φαυλότητος. καὶ οἱ παροιμιαζόμενοι δέ φασιν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου λέγοντες, ὅτι "ἂν χωλῷ παροικήσῃς, ὑποσκάζειν μαθήσῃ."

7. Ἐπειδὰν τοίνυν ἡλικίαν λάβωσιν ὑπὸ παιδαγωγοῖς τετάχθαι, ἐνταῦθα δὴ πολλὴν ἐπιμέλειαν ἐκτέον ἐστὶ τῆς τούτων καταστάσεως, ὡς μὴ λάθωσιν ἀνδραπόδοις ἢ βαρβάροις ἢ παλιμβόλοις τὰ τέκνα παραδόντες. ἐπεὶ νῦν γε τὸ γιγνόμενον πολλοῖς ὑπερκαταγέλαστόν ἐστι. τῶν γὰρ δούλων
B τῶν σπουδαίων τοὺς μὲν γεωργοὺς ἀποδεικνύουσι,

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[a] Plato, *Republic*, 377 E.
[b] Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, ii. 448 (frag. 13).

is impressionable and plastic, and while such minds are still tender lessons are infused deeply into them; but anything which has become hard is with difficulty softened. For just as seals leave their impression in soft wax, so are lessons impressed upon the minds of children while they are young. And, as it seems to me, Plato, that remarkable man, quite properly advises[a] nurses, even in telling stories to children, not to choose at random, lest haply their minds be filled at the outset with foolishness and corruption. Phocylides,[b] too, the poet, appears to give admirable advice in saying:

Should teach while still a child
The tale of noble deeds.

6. Now there is another point which should not be omitted, that in choosing the younger slaves, who are to be the servants and companions of young masters, those should be sought out who are, first and foremost, sound in character, who are Greeks as well, and distinct of speech, so that the children may not be contaminated by barbarians and persons of low character, and so take on some of their commonness. The proverb-makers say, and quite to the point, "If you dwell with a lame man, you will learn to limp."

7. When now they attain to an age to be put under the charge of attendants, then especially great care must be taken in the appointment of these, so as not to entrust one's children inadvertently to slaves taken in war or to barbarians or to those who are unstable. Nowadays, the common practice of many persons is more than ridiculous; for some of their trustworthy slaves they appoint to manage their farms, others they make masters of their

(4) τοὺς δὲ ναυκλήρους τοὺς δ' ἐμπόρους τοὺς δ' οἰκονόμους τοὺς δὲ δανειστάς· ὅ τι δ' ἂν εὕρωσιν ἀνδράποδον οἰνόληπτον καὶ λίχνον, πρὸς πᾶσαν πραγματείαν ἄχρηστον, τούτῳ φέροντες ὑποβάλλουσι τοὺς υἱούς. δεῖ δὲ τὸν σπουδαῖον παιδαγωγὸν τοιοῦτον εἶναι τὴν φύσιν οἷόσπερ ἦν ὁ Φοῖνιξ ὁ τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως παιδαγωγός.

Τὸ δὲ πάντων μέγιστον καὶ κυριώτατον τῶν εἰρημένων ἔρχομαι φράσων. διδασκάλους γὰρ ζητητέον τοῖς τέκνοις, οἳ καὶ τοῖς βίοις εἰσὶν ἀδιάβλητοι καὶ τοῖς τρόποις ἀνεπίληπτοι καὶ ταῖς C ἐμπειρίαις ἄριστοι· πηγὴ γὰρ καὶ ῥίζα καλοκαγαθίας τὸ νομίμου τυχεῖν παιδείας. καὶ καθάπερ τὰς χάρακας οἱ γεωργοὶ τοῖς φυτοῖς παρατιθέασιν, οὕτως οἱ νόμιμοι τῶν διδασκάλων ἐμμελεῖς τὰς ὑποθήκας καὶ παραινέσεις παραπηγνύουσι τοῖς νέοις, ἵν' ὀρθὰ τούτων βλαστάνῃ τὰ ἤθη. νῦν δέ τις κἂν[1] καταπτύσειε τῶν πατέρων ἐνίων, οἵτινες πρὶν δοκιμάσαι τοὺς μέλλοντας διδάσκειν, δι' ἄγνοιαν, ἔσθ' ὅτε καὶ δι' ἀπειρίαν, ἀνθρώποις ἀδοκίμοις καὶ παρασήμοις ἐγχειρίζουσι τοὺς παῖδας. καὶ οὕπω τοῦτ' ἐστὶ καταγέλαστον εἰ δι' ἀπειρίαν D αὐτὸ πράττουσιν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἐσχάτως ἄτοπον. τὸ ποῖον; ἐνίοτε γὰρ εἰδότες, αἰσθόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἄλλων[2] αὐτοῖς τοῦτο λεγόντων, τὴν ἐνίων τῶν παιδευτῶν ἀπειρίαν ἅμα καὶ μοχθηρίαν, ὅμως τούτοις ἐπιτρέπουσι τοὺς παῖδας, οἱ μὲν ταῖς τῶν ἀρεσκευομένων ἡττώμενοι κολακείαις, εἰσὶ δ' οἳ καὶ δεομένοις χαριζόμενοι φίλοις, παρόμοιον ποιοῦντες ὥσπερ ἂν εἴ τις τῷ σώματι κάμνων τὸν σὺν

[1] κἂν Hercher: καί.

[2] αἰσθόμενοι δὲ καὶ ἄλλων Bernardakis: αἰσθομένοις μᾶλλον.

ships, others their factors, others they make house-stewards, and some even money-lenders; but any slave whom they find to be a wine-bibber and a glutton, and useless for any kind of business, to him they bring their sons and put them in his charge. But the good attendant ought to be a man of such nature as was Phoenix, the attendant of Achilles.

I come now to a point which is more important and weighty than anything I have said so far. Teachers must be sought for the children who are free from scandal in their lives, who are unimpeachable in their manners, and in experience the very best that may be found. For to receive a proper education is the source and root of all goodness. As husbandmen place stakes beside the young plants, so do competent teachers with all care set their precepts and exhortations beside the young, in order that their characters may grow to be upright. Nowadays there are some fathers who deserve utter contempt, who, before examining those who are going to teach, either because of ignorance, or sometimes because of inexperience, hand over their children to untried and untrustworthy men. And this is not so ridiculous if their action is due to inexperience, but there is another case which is absurd to the last degree. What is this? Why, sometimes even with knowledge and with information from others, who tell them of the inexperience and even of the depravity of certain teachers, they nevertheless entrust their children to them; some yield to the flatteries of those who would please them, and there are those who do it as a favour to insistent friends. Their action resembles that of a person, who, if he were afflicted with bodily disease,

ἐπιστήμῃ δυνηθέντ' ἂν σῶσαι παραλιπών, φίλῳ χαριζόμενος τὸν δι' ἀπειρίαν ἀπολέσαντ' ἂν αὐτὸν προέλοιτο, ἢ ναύκληρον τὸν ἄριστον ἀφεὶς τὸν
E χείριστον δοκιμάσειε φίλου δεηθέντος. Ζεῦ καὶ θεοὶ πάντες, πατήρ τις καλούμενος πλείω λόγον τῆς τῶν δεομένων ποιεῖται χάριτος ἢ τῆς τῶν τέκνων παιδεύσεως; εἶτ' οὐκ εἰκότα πολλάκις Σωκράτης ἐκεῖνος ὁ παλαιὸς ἔλεγεν, ὅτι εἴπερ ἄρα δυνατὸν ἦν, ἀναβάντα ἐπὶ τὸ μετεωρότατον τῆς πόλεως ἀνακραγεῖν μέρος[1] "ὦ ἄνθρωποι, ποῖ φέρεσθε, οἵτινες χρημάτων μὲν κτήσεως πέρι πᾶσαν ποιεῖσθε σπουδήν, τῶν δ' υἱέων, οἷς ταῦτα καταλείψετε, μικρὰ φροντίζετε;" τούτοις δ' ἂν ἔγωγε προσθείην ὅτι οἱ τοιοῦτοι πατέρες παραπλήσιον ποιοῦσιν, οἷον εἴ τις τοῦ μὲν ὑποδήματος
F φροντίζοι, τοῦ δὲ ποδὸς ὀλιγώρως ἔχοι. πολλοὶ δ' εἰς τοσοῦτο τῶν πατέρων προβαίνουσι φιλαργυρίας ἅμα καὶ μισοτεκνίας, ὥσθ' ἵνα μὴ πλείονα μισθὸν τελέσειαν, ἀνθρώπους τοῦ μηδενὸς[2] τιμίους αἱροῦνται τοῖς τέκνοις παιδευτάς, εὔωνον ἀμαθίαν διώκοντες. ἦ καὶ Ἀρίστιππος οὐκ ἀκόμψως ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ ἀστείως ἐπέσκωψε τῷ λόγῳ πατέρα νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν κενόν. ἐρωτήσαντος γάρ τινος αὐτὸν πόσον αἰτοίη μισθὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς τοῦ τέκνου παιδεύσεως, "χιλίας" ἔφησε "δραχμάς." τοῦ δ' "Ἡράκλεις" εἰπόντος, "ὡς ὑπέρπολυ τὸ αἴτημα·
5 δύναμαι γὰρ ἀνδράποδον χιλίων πρίασθαι," "τοιγαροῦν" εἶπε "δύο ἔξεις ἀνδράποδα, καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ ὃν ἂν πρίῃ." τὸ δ' ὅλον πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπον τῇ

[1] Hartman would add δεῖ or δέοι. Possibly μέρος may be a corruption of some word like πρέποι.

[2] τοῦ μηδενὸς Blass: τοὺς μηδενός.

should reject that man who by his knowledge might be able to save his life, and, as a favour to a friend, should prefer one who by his inexperience might cause his death; or again that of a person who should dismiss a most excellent shipmaster, and accept the very worst because of a friend's insistence. Heaven help us! Does a man who bears the name of father think more of gratifying those who ask favours than he thinks of the education of his children? And did not Socrates [a] of old often say very fittingly, that if it were in any way possible one should go up to the loftiest part of the city and cry aloud, "Men, whither is your course taking you, who give all possible attention to the acquiring of money but give small thought to your sons to whom ye are to leave it?" To this I should like to add that such fathers act nearly as one would act who should give thought to his shoe but pay no regard to his foot. Many fathers, however, go so far in their devotion to money as well as in animosity toward their children, that in order to avoid paying a larger fee, they select as teachers for their children men who are not worth any wage at all—looking for ignorance, which is cheap enough. Wherefore Aristippus not inelegantly, in fact very cleverly, rebuked a father who was devoid both of mind and sense. For when a man asked him what fee he should require for teaching his child, Aristippus replied, "A thousand drachmas"; but when the other exclaimed, "Great Heavens! what an excessive demand! I can buy a slave for a thousand," Aristippus retorted, "Then you will have two slaves, your son and the one you buy." And, in general,

[a] Plato, *Cleitophon*, 407 A.

(5) μὲν δεξιᾷ συνεθίζειν τὰ παιδία δέχεσθαι τὰς τροφάς, κἂν εἰ[1] προτείνειε τὴν ἀριστεράν, ἐπιτιμᾶν, μηδεμίαν δὲ ποιεῖσθαι πρόνοιαν τοῦ λόγων ἐπιδεξίων καὶ νομίμων ἀκούειν;

Τί οὖν συμβαίνει τοῖς θαυμαστοῖς πατράσιν, ἐπειδὰν κακῶς μὲν θρέψωσι κακῶς δὲ παιδεύσωσι τοὺς υἱεῖς, ἐγὼ φράσω. ὅταν γὰρ εἰς ἄνδρας ἐγγραφέντες τοῦ μὲν ὑγιαίνοντος καὶ τεταγμένου βίου καταμελήσωσιν, ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς ἀτάκτους καὶ
B ἀνδραποδώδεις ἡδονὰς ἑαυτοὺς κρημνίσωσι, τότε δὴ μεταμέλονται τὴν τῶν τέκνων προδεδωκότες παιδείαν, ὅτ' οὐδὲν ὄφελος, τοῖς ἐκείνων ἀδικήμασιν ἀδημονοῦντες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν κόλακας καὶ παρασίτους ἀναλαμβάνουσιν, ἀνθρώπους ἀσήμους καὶ καταράτους καὶ τῆς νεότητος ἀνατροπέας καὶ λυμεῶνας, οἱ δέ τινες ἑταίρας καὶ χαμαιτύπας λυτροῦνται σοβαρὰς καὶ πολυτελεῖς, οἱ δὲ κατοψοφαγοῦσιν, οἱ δ' εἰς κύβους καὶ κώμους ἐξοκέλλουσιν, ἤδη δέ τινες καὶ τῶν νεανικωτέρων ἅπτονται κακῶν, μοιχεύοντες καὶ κιττοφοροῦντες καὶ μίαν
C ἡδονὴν θανάτου τιμώμενοι. φιλοσοφίᾳ δ' ὁμιλήσαντες οὗτοι οὐ τοιούτοις ἴσως πράγμασιν ἑαυτοὺς ἂν καταπειθεῖς παρέσχοντο, καὶ τό γε παράγγελμα τοῦ Διογένους ἔμαθον ἄν, ὃς φορτικῶς μὲν τοῖς ῥήμασιν ἀληθῶς δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι παραινεῖ καί φησιν "εἴσελθε εἰς πορνεῖόν που, ἵνα μάθῃς ὅτι τῶν ἀναξίων τὰ τίμια οὐδὲν διαφέρει."

8. Συνελὼν τοίνυν ἐγώ φημι (καὶ χρησμολογεῖν

[1] εἰ added by Bernardakis.

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[a] The explanation may be found in the *Palatine Anthology*, v. No. 301 (the *Greek Anthology* in the L.C.L., vol. i. p. 291,

is it not absurd for people to accustom children to take their food with their right hand, and, if one puts out his left, to rebuke him, and yet to take no forethought that they shall hear right and proper words of instruction?

Now I will tell what happens to these admirable fathers when they have badly brought up and badly educated their sons. When their sons are enrolled in the ranks of men, and disdain the sane and orderly life, and throw themselves headlong into disorderly and slavish pleasures, then, when it is of no use, the fathers regret that they have been false to their duty in the education of their sons, being now distressed at their wrongdoing. For some of them take up with flatterers and parasites, abominable men of obscure origin, corrupters and spoilers of youth, and others buy the freedom of courtesans and prostitutes, proud and sumptuous in expense; still others give themselves up to the pleasures of the table, while others come to wreck in dice and revels, and some finally take to the wilder forms of evil-doing, such as adultery and bacchanalian routs, ready to pay with life itself for a single pleasure. But if these men had become conversant with the higher education, they perhaps would not have allowed themselves to be dominated by such practices, and they would at least have become acquainted with the precept[a] of Diogenes, who with coarseness of speech, but with substantial truth, advises and says, "Go into any brothel to learn that there is no difference between what costs money and what costs nothing."

8. Briefly, then, I say (an oracle one might pro-

No. 302), or in Plutarch, *Moralia*, 1044 B, or in Athenaeus, iv. 48 (p. 158 F).

(5) μᾶλλον ἢ παραινεῖν δόξαιμ' ἂν εἰκότως) ὅτι ἓν πρῶτον καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευταῖον ἐν τούτοις κεφάλαιον ἀγωγὴ σπουδαία καὶ παιδεία νόμιμός ἐστι, καὶ ταῦτα φορὰ καὶ συνεργὰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν φημί. καὶ τὰ μὲν ἄλλα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνθρώπινα καὶ μικρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀξιοσπούδαστα
D καθέστηκεν. εὐγένεια καλὸν μέν, ἀλλὰ προγόνων ἀγαθόν. πλοῦτος δὲ τίμιον μέν, ἀλλὰ τύχης κτῆμα, ἐπειδὴ τῶν μὲν ἐχόντων πολλάκις ἀφείλετο, τοῖς δ' οὐκ ἐλπίσασι φέρουσα προσήνεγκε, καὶ ὁ πολὺς πλοῦτος σκοπὸς ἔκκειται τοῖς βουλομένοις βαλλάντια τοξεύειν, κακούργοις οἰκέταις καὶ συκοφάνταις, καὶ τὸ μέγιστον, ὅτι καὶ τοῖς πονηροτάτοις μέτεστι. δόξα γε μὴν σεμνὸν μέν,[1] ἀλλ' ἀβέβαιον. κάλλος δὲ περιμάχητον μέν, ἀλλ' ὀλιγοχρόνιον. ὑγίεια δὲ τίμιον μέν, ἀλλ' εὐμετάστατον. ἰσχὺς δὲ ζηλωτὸν μέν, ἀλλὰ νόσῳ εὐάλωτον καὶ
E γήρᾳ. τὸ δ' ὅλον εἴ τις ἐπὶ τῇ τοῦ σώματος ῥώμῃ φρονεῖ, μαθέτω γνώμης διαμαρτάνων. πόστον γάρ ἐστιν ἰσχὺς ἀνθρωπίνη τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων δυνάμεως; λέγω δ' οἷον ἐλεφάντων καὶ ταύρων καὶ λεόντων. παιδεία δὲ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν μόνον ἐστὶν ἀθάνατον καὶ θεῖον. καὶ δύο τὰ πάντων ἐστὶ κυριώτατα ἐν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει, νοῦς καὶ λόγος. καὶ ὁ μὲν νοῦς ἀρχικός ἐστι τοῦ λόγου, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὑπηρετικὸς τοῦ νοῦ, τύχῃ μὲν ἀνάλωτος, συκοφαντίᾳ δ' ἀναφαίρετος, νόσῳ δ' ἀδιάφθορος, γήρᾳ δ' ἀλύμαντος. μόνος γὰρ ὁ νοῦς παλαιούμενος ἀνηβᾷ, καὶ ὁ χρόνος τἄλλα πάντ' ἀφαιρῶν τῷ

[1] μέν added by Hercher.

perly call it, rather than advice) that, to sum up, the beginning, the middle, and end in all these matters is good education and proper training ; and it is this, I say, which leads on and helps towards moral excellence and towards happiness. And, in comparison with this, all other advantages are human, and trivial, and not worth our serious concern. Good birth is a fine thing, but it is an advantage which must be credited to one's ancestors. Wealth is held in esteem, but it is a chattel of fortune, since oftentime she takes it away from those who possess it, and brings and presents it to those who do not expect it. Besides, great wealth is the very mark for those who aim their shafts at the purse—rascally slaves and blackmailers ; and above all, even the vilest may possess it. Repute, moreover, is imposing, but unstable. Beauty is highly prized, but short-lived. Health is a valued possession, but inconstant. Strength is much admired, but it falls an easy prey to disease and old age. And, in general, if anybody prides himself wholly upon the strength of his body, let him know that he is sadly mistaken in judgement. For how small is man's strength compared with the power of other living creatures ! I mean, for instance, elephants and bulls and lions. But learning, of all things in this world, is alone immortal and divine. Two elements in man's nature are supreme over all—mind and reason. The mind exercises control over reason, and reason is the servant of the mind, unassailable by fortune, impregnable to calumny, uncorrupted by disease, unimpaired by old age. For the mind alone grows young with increase of years, and time, which takes away all things else, but adds wisdom

F γήρᾳ προστίθησι τὴν ἐπιστήμην. ὅ γε μὴν πόλεμος χειμάρρου δίκην πάντα σύρων καὶ πάντα παραφέρων μόνην οὐ δύναται παιδείαν παρελέσθαι. καί μοι δοκεῖ Στίλπων ὁ Μεγαρεὺς φιλόσοφος ἀξιομνημόνευτον ποιῆσαι ἀπόκρισιν, ὅτε Δημήτριος ἐξανδραποδισάμενος τὴν πόλιν εἰς ἔδαφος κατέβαλε καὶ τὸν Στίλπωνα ἤρετο μή τι ἀπολωλεκὼς εἴη. καὶ ὅς "οὐ δῆτα," εἶπε, "πόλεμος γὰρ οὐ λαφυρ-
6 αγωγεῖ ἀρετήν." σύμφωνος δὲ καὶ συνῳδὸς καὶ ἡ Σωκράτους ἀπόκρισις ταύτῃ φαίνεται. καὶ γὰρ οὗτος ἐρωτήσαντος αὐτόν μοι δοκεῖ Γοργίου ἦν ἔχει περὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ὑπόληψιν καὶ εἰ νομίζει τοῦτον εὐδαίμονα εἶναι, "οὐκ οἶδ'," ἔφησε, "πῶς ἀρετῆς καὶ παιδείας ἔχει," ὡς τῆς εὐδαιμονίας ἐν τούτοις, οὐκ ἐν τοῖς τυχηροῖς ἀγαθοῖς κειμένης.

9. Ὥσπερ δὲ παραινῶ τῆς παιδείας τῶν τέκνων μηδὲν ποιεῖσθαι προὐργιαίτερον, οὕτως αὖ πάλιν φημὶ δεῖν τῆς ἀδιαφθόρου καὶ ὑγιαινούσης ἔχεσθαι, τῶν δὲ πανηγυρικῶν λήρων ὡς πορρωτάτω τοὺς
B υἱεῖς ἀπάγειν. τὸ γὰρ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀρέσκειν τοῖς σοφοῖς ἐστιν ἀπαρέσκειν. μαρτυρεῖ δέ μου τῷ λόγῳ καὶ Εὐριπίδης λέγων

> ἐγὼ δ' ἄκομψος εἰς ὄχλον δοῦναι λόγον,
> εἰς ἡλικας δὲ κὠλίγους σοφώτερος.
> ἔχει δὲ μοῖραν καὶ τόδ'·[1] οἱ γὰρ ἐν σοφοῖς
> φαῦλοι παρ' ὄχλῳ μουσικώτεροι λέγειν.

ὁρῶ δ' ἔγωγε τοὺς τοῖς συρφετώδεσιν ὄχλοις ἀρεστῶς καὶ κεχαρισμένως ἐπιτηδεύοντας λέγειν

[1] ἔχει δὲ μοῖραν καὶ τόδ'· added by Hercher from Euripides, but Plutarch often condenses his quotations.

to old age. War, again, like a torrent, sweeps everything away and carries everything along in its current, but learning alone it cannot take away. It seems to me that Stilpo, the philosopher of Megara, made an answer worth recording, at the time when Demetrius, having reduced the people of that city to slavery and razed its buildings, asked him whether perchance he had lost anything ; but Stilpo replied : " No, indeed, for war cannot make spoil of virtue." In full accord and harmony with this appears the reply of Socrates.[a] For he, when someone (I think it was Gorgias) asked him what notion he had regarding the great king, and whether he thought him happy, said, " I do not know how he stands in the matter of righteousness and learning,"—his thought being that happiness depends upon these and not upon accidental advantages.

9. Just as I advise people to make nothing of more immediate importance than the education of their children, so again I say they ought to cling to the uncorrupted and sound education, and to withdraw their sons as far away as possible from the nonsense of ostentatious public discourse. For to please the multitude is to displease the wise. And Euripides bears witness to my words when he says :[b]

> I have no gift to reason with a crowd ;
> I'm wiser with my friends and fewer folk.
> And this is just ; since those the wise hold cheap
> Are better tuned to speak before a crowd.

I observe that those who practise speaking in a way to catch the favour of the vulgar herd also turn

[a] Plato, *Gorgias*, 470 E ; *cf.* Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, v. 12.

[b] *Hippolytus*, 986.

(6) καὶ τὸν βίον ὡς τὰ πολλὰ ἀσώτους καὶ φιλ-
ηδόνους ἀποβαίνοντας. καὶ νὴ Δί' εἰκότως. εἰ
γὰρ ἄλλοις ἡδονὰς παρασκευάζοντες ἀμελοῦσι τοῦ
C καλοῦ, σχολῇ γ' ἂν τῆς ἰδίας ἡδυπαθείας καὶ
τρυφῆς ὑπεράνω τὸ ὀρθὸν καὶ ὑγιὲς ποιήσαιντο ἢ
τὸ σῶφρον ἀντὶ τοῦ τερπνοῦ διώξαιεν. πρὸς δὲ
τούτοις τί ἂν τοὺς παῖδας * * ;[1] καλὸν γάρ τοι
μηδὲν εἰκῇ μήτε λέγειν μήτε πράττειν, καὶ κατὰ
τὴν παροιμίαν "χαλεπὰ τὰ καλά." οἱ δ' αὐτο-
σχέδιοι τῶν λόγων πολλῆς εὐχερείας καὶ ῥᾳδιουργίας
εἰσὶ πλήρεις, οὔθ' ὅθεν ἀρκτέον οὔθ' ὅποι παυστέον
ἐστὶν εἰδότων. χωρὶς δὲ τῶν ἄλλων πλημμελη-
μάτων οἳ ἂν ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα λέγωσιν, εἰς
ἀμετρίαν δεινὴν ἐκπίπτουσι καὶ πολυλογίαν. σκέ-
ψις δ' οὐκ ἐᾷ τῆς ἱκνουμένης συμμετρίας τὸν λόγον
D ἐκπίπτειν. ὁ Περικλῆς, "ὡς ἡμῖν ἀκούειν παρα-
δέδοται," καλούμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ δήμου πολλάκις
οὐχ ὑπήκουσε, λέγων ἀσύντακτος εἶναι. ὡσαύτως
δὲ καὶ Δημοσθένης ζηλωτὴς τῆς τούτου πολιτείας
γενόμενος καλούντων αὐτὸν τῶν Ἀθηναίων σύμ-
βουλον ἀντέβαινεν "οὐ συντέταγμαι" λέγων.
καὶ ταῦτα μὲν ἴσως ἀδέσποτός ἐστι καὶ πεπλα-
σμένη παράδοσις· ἐν δὲ τῷ κατὰ Μειδίου τὴν τῆς
σκέψεως ὠφέλειαν ἐναργῶς παρίστησι. φησὶ γοῦν
"ἐγὼ δ' ἐσκέφθαι μὲν ὦ ἄνδρες[2] Ἀθηναῖοι φημὶ

[1] Some MSS. have here *χρηστὸν ἕτερον διδάξαιμεν, καὶ τίσι ἀγαθοῖς ἐπιφύεσθαι παραινέσαιμεν*, which, to say the least, is inept.

[2] *ἄνδρες* added by Hercher from Demosthenes.

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[a] The lacuna in the MSS. probably had something to this effect.

[b] *Cf.* Plato, *Cratylus*, 257 E.

out in general to be incontinent in their lives and fond of pleasure. And this surely is to be expected; for if, in providing pleasure for others, they disregard what is honourable, they would be slow to place that which is upright and sound above the gratification of their own pleasures and luxurious tastes, and slow to pursue the temperate course instead of the agreeable. Moreover, why should children [be taught such a way of speaking]?[a] For it is a good thing not to say or do anything at random, and according to the proverb, "Good things are hard."[b] Speeches made offhand display a large measure of readiness and facility, being characteristic of persons who know not where should be the beginning or where the end. But, apart from all other errors, those who speak on the impulse of the moment fall into a dreadful disregard of limit and into loquacity. Reflexion on the other hand prevents a discourse from exceeding the due limits of proportion. Pericles, "as the story has been handed down for us to hear,"[c] though called upon by the people, oftentimes did not heed their summons, saying that he was unprepared.[d] In like manner also Demosthenes, who was an ardent follower of Pericles' political policy, when the Athenians called upon him to give his counsel, resisted, saying, "I have not prepared myself." This, perhaps, is an unauthentic and fictitious tradition; but in his speech against Meidias[e] he presents clearly the helpfulness of reflection. At any rate he says, "Men of Athens, I say I have given much thought

[c] Demosthenes, *Or.* 23 (*Against Aristocrates*), 66, p. 641.
[d] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Pericles*, chap. 7 (155 *ad fin.*).
[e] Demosthenes, *Or.* 21 (*Against Meidias*), 191, p. 576.

κοὐκ ἂν ἀρνηθείην καὶ μεμελετηκέναι[1] γ' ὡς ἐνῆν μάλιστ' ἐμοί· καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἄθλιος ἦν, εἰ τοιαῦτα παθὼν καὶ πάσχων ἠμέλουν ὧν περὶ τούτων ἐρεῖν
E ἔμελλον πρὸς ὑμᾶς.[2]" τὸ δὲ δεῖν παντάπασιν ἀποδοκιμάζειν τῶν λόγων τὴν ἑτοιμότητα ἢ πάλιν αὖ ταύτην οὐκ ἐπ' ἀξίοις ἀσκεῖν οὐ φαίην ἂν ἔγωγε, ἀλλ' ὡς ἐν φαρμάκου μοίρᾳ τοῦτο ποιητέον ἐστί. μέχρι δὴ τῆς τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἡλικίας οὐδὲν ἐκ τοῦ παρατυχόντος ἀξιῶ λέγειν, ἀλλ' ὅταν τις ῥιζώσῃ τὴν δύναμιν, τότε τοῦτον τῶν[3] καιρῶν καλούντων
F ἐλευθεριάζειν τοῖς λόγοις προσήκει. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ πολὺν χρόνον δεθέντες κἂν εἰ[4] λυθεῖεν ὕστερον, ὑπὸ τῆς πολυχρονίου τῶν δεσμῶν συνηθείας οὐ δυνάμενοι βαδίζειν ὑποσκελίζονται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον οἱ πολλῷ χρόνῳ τὸν λόγον σφίγξαντες, κἂν εἴ ποτε ἐκ τοῦ παραχρῆμα δεήσειεν εἰπεῖν, οὐδὲν ἧττον τὸν αὐτὸν τῆς ἑρμηνείας χαρακτῆρα φυλάττουσι. τὸ δ' ἔτι παῖδας ὄντας ἐᾶν ἐπὶ καιροῦ λέγειν ματαιολογίας τῆς ἐσχάτης αἴτιον καθ-
7 ίσταται. ζωγράφος φασὶν ἄθλιος Ἀπελλῆ δείξας εἰκόνα "ταύτην," ἔφη, "νῦν γέγραφα," ὁ δὲ "καὶ ἦν μὴ λέγῃς" εἶπεν "οἶδ' ὅτι ταχὺ γέγραπται· θαυμάζω δὲ πῶς οὐχὶ τοιαύτας πλείους γέγραφας."

Ὥσπερ τοίνυν (ἐπανάγω γὰρ πρὸς τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου ὑπόθεσιν) τὴν θεατρικὴν καὶ παρατράγῳδον, οὕτως αὖ πάλιν καὶ τὴν σμικρολογίαν τῆς λέξεως καὶ ταπείνωσιν παραινῶ διευλαβεῖσθαι

[1] καὶ μεμελετηκέναι Demosthenes: καταμεμελετηκέναι.
[2] πρὸς ὑμᾶς Demosthenes: a lacuna in the MSS.
[3] τοῦτον τῶν Herwerden: τοῦτον or τῶν.
[4] εἰ added by Hercher.

to this matter, and I could not deny that I have also rehearsed my speech to the best of my ability ; for I should be a miserable wretch, if, in view of his past and present treatment of me, I had paid no attention to what I was going to say to you about it." But I, for my part, would not assert that readiness of speech is to be utterly rejected, or again that it should not be used in its proper place, but that it is to be used like a drug, with caution. Indeed until one arrives at man's estate I do not think it right that he should speak at all offhand, but when he shall have firmly established his powers, then, if the occasion invite, it is fitting for him to exercise some freedom in his speech. For just as those who have been in fetters for a long time, even if later they be set free, yet, because of the long-continued habituation to their bonds, are not able to walk freely, and are not sure on their feet, so is it with those who for a long time have kept their speech under close restraint : if ever it becomes necessary to speak offhand, they nevertheless keep to the same type of expression as before. But to allow those who are still young to speak extempore stands responsible for the worst sort of rambling talk. They tell the story of a wretched painter, who, exhibiting to Apelles a painting, said, " This I have only this moment painted." Whereupon Apelles replied, " Even should you not say so, yet I know that it was painted hastily, and I only wonder that you have not painted more of like sort."

I advise then (for I return now to my original theme) that, as one should always be careful to avoid the theatrical and melodramatic style, so, on the other hand, one should exercise the same caution

(7) καὶ φεύγειν· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὑπέρογκος ἀπολίτευτός
ἐστιν, ἡ δ' ἰσχνὴ λίαν ἀνέκπληκτος. καθάπερ δὲ
B τὸ σῶμα οὐ μόνον ὑγιεινὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐεκτικὸν
εἶναι χρή, καὶ τὸν λόγον ὡσαύτως οὐκ ἄνοσον
μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ εὔρωστον εἶναι δεῖ. τὸ μὲν γὰρ
ἀσφαλὲς ἐπαινεῖται μόνον, τὸ δ' ἐπικίνδυνον καὶ
θαυμάζεται. τὴν αὐτὴν[1] δὲ τυγχάνω γνώμην ἔχων
καὶ περὶ τῆς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ διαθέσεως. οὔτε γὰρ
θρασὺν οὔτ' ἄτολμον καὶ καταπλῆγα προσῆκεν
εἶναι· τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἰς ἀναισχυντίαν, τὸ δ' εἰς ἀνδρα-
ποδωδίαν περίσταται· ἔντεχνον δὲ τὸ τὴν μέσην
ἐν ἅπασι τέμνειν ἐμμελές τε.

Βούλομαι δ', ἕως ἔτι μέμνημαι τῆς παιδείας ὡς
ἔχω δόξης περὶ αὐτῆς, εἰπεῖν ὅτι τὸν μονόκωλον
λόγον πρῶτον μὲν ἀμουσίας οὐ μικρὸν ποιοῦμαι
τεκμήριον· ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἄσκησιν ἀψίκορον
καὶ πάντη ἀνεπίμονον εἶναι νομίζω. μονῳδία γὰρ
C ἐν ἅπασίν ἐστι πλήσμιον καὶ πρόσαντες, ἡ δὲ
ποικιλία τερπνόν, καθάπερ κἂν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἅπασιν,
οἷον ἀκούσμασιν ἢ θεάμασιν.

10. Δεῖ τοίνυν τὸν παῖδα τὸν ἐλεύθερον μηδε-
νὸς μηδὲ τῶν ἄλλων τῶν καλουμένων ἐγκυκλίων
παιδευμάτων μήτ' ἀνήκοον μήτ' ἀθέατον ἐᾶν εἶναι,
ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν ἐκ παραδρομῆς μαθεῖν ὥσπερεὶ
γεύματος ἕνεκεν (ἐν ἅπασι γὰρ τὸ τέλειον ἀδύνατον),
τὴν δὲ φιλοσοφίαν πρεσβεύειν. ἔχω δὲ δι' εἰκόνος
παραστῆσαι τὴν ἐμαυτοῦ γνώμην· ὥσπερ γὰρ
D περιπλεῦσαι μὲν πολλὰς πόλεις καλόν, ἐνοικῆσαι

[1] *αὐτὴν* added by Hercher.

to avoid triviality and vulgarity in style; for a turgid diction is unfitted for a man in public life, and a barren style is too unimpressive; but as the body ought to be not merely healthy but also sturdy, so also speech should be not merely free from fault but vigorous too. For the cautious is merely commended, but the audacious is admired as well. It so happens that I entertain the same opinion also in regard to mental disposition. For a man should not be bold, on the one hand, or, on the other, pusillanimous and cowering, since the one resolves itself into impudence, and the other into servility. Always to pursue the middle course in everything is artistic and in good taste.

While I am still dwelling upon my own opinion in regard to education, I desire to say that in the first place a discourse composed of a series of short sentences I regard as no small proof of lack of culture; in the second place I think that in practice such discourse soon palls, and in every case it causes impatience; for monotony is in everything tiresome and repellent, but variety is agreeable, as it is in everything else, as, for example, in entertainments that appeal to the eye or the ear.

10. Now the free-born child should not be allowed to go without some knowledge, both through hearing and observation, of every branch also of what is called general education; yet these he should learn only incidentally, just to get a taste of them, as it were (for perfection in everything is impossible), but philosophy he should honour above all else. I can perhaps make my opinion clear by means of a figure: for example, it is a fine thing to voyage about and view many cities, but profitable to dwell

(7) δὲ τῇ κρατίστῃ χρήσιμον· ἀστείως δὲ καὶ Βίων ἔλεγεν ὁ φιλόσοφος ὅτι ὥσπερ οἱ μνηστῆρες τῇ Πηνελόπῃ πλησιάζειν μὴ δυνάμενοι ταῖς ταύτης ἐμίγνυντο θεραπαίναις, οὕτω καὶ οἱ φιλοσοφίας μὴ δυνάμενοι κατατυχεῖν ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις παιδεύμασι τοῖς οὐδενὸς ἀξίοις ἑαυτοὺς κατασκελετεύουσι. διὸ δεῖ τῆς ἄλλης παιδείας ὥσπερ κεφάλαιον ποιεῖν τὴν φιλοσοφίαν. περὶ μὲν γὰρ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμέλειαν διττὰς εὗρον ἐπιστήμας οἱ ἄνθρωποι, τὴν ἰατρικὴν καὶ τὴν[1] γυμναστικήν, ὧν ἡ μὲν τὴν ὑγίειαν, ἡ δὲ τὴν εὐεξίαν ἐντίθησι. τῶν δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρρωστημάτων καὶ παθῶν ἡ φιλοσοφία μόνη φάρμακόν ἐστι. διὰ γὰρ ταύτην ἔστι καὶ μετὰ ταύτης γνῶναι τί τὸ καλὸν τί τὸ αἰσχρόν, τί τὸ δίκαιον τί τὸ ἄδικον, τί τὸ συλλήβδην αἱρετόν,
E τί τὸ φευκτόν·[2] πῶς θεοῖς πῶς γονεῦσι πῶς πρεσβυτέροις πῶς νόμοις πῶς ἀλλοτρίοις πῶς ἄρχουσι πῶς φίλοις πῶς γυναιξὶ πῶς τέκνοις πῶς οἰκέταις χρηστέον ἐστί· ὅτι δεῖ θεοὺς μὲν σέβεσθαι, γονέας δὲ τιμᾶν, πρεσβυτέρους αἰδεῖσθαι, νόμοις πειθαρχεῖν, ἄρχουσιν ὑπείκειν, φίλους ἀγαπᾶν, πρὸς γυναῖκας σωφρονεῖν, τέκνων στερκτικοὺς εἶναι, δούλους μὴ περιυβρίζειν· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, μήτ' ἐν ταῖς εὐπραγίαις περιχαρεῖς μήτ' ἐν ταῖς συμφοραῖς περιλύπους ὑπάρχειν, μήτ' ἐν ταῖς ἡδοναῖς ἐκλύτους εἶναι μήτ' ἐν ταῖς ὀργαῖς ἐκπαθεῖς καὶ θηρι-
F ώδεις. ἅπερ ἐγὼ πάντων τῶν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας περιγιγνομένων ἀγαθῶν πρεσβύτατα κρίνω. τὸ μὲν γὰρ εὐγενῶς εὐτυχεῖν ἀνδρός, τὸ δ' ἀνεπιφθόνως

[1] *τὴν* added by Hercher.

[2] *τὸ φευκτόν* Hercher: *φευκτόν*. Some mss. have simply *αἱρετὸν ἢ φευκτόν*.

only in the best one. And it was a clever saying of Bion, the philosopher, that, just as the suitors, not being able to approach Penelope, consorted with her maid-servants, so also do those who are not able to attain to philosophy wear themselves to a shadow over the other kinds of education which have no value. Wherefore it is necessary to make philosophy as it were the head and front of all education. For as regards the care of the body men have discovered two sciences, the medical and the gymnastic, of which the one implants health, the other sturdiness, in the body; but for the illnesses and affections of the mind philosophy alone is the remedy. For through philosophy and in company with philosophy it is possible to attain knowledge of what is honourable and what is shameful, what is just and what is unjust, what, in brief, is to be chosen and what to be avoided, how a man must bear himself in his relations with the gods, with his parents, with his elders, with the laws, with strangers, with those in authority, with friends, with women, with children, with servants; that one ought to reverence the gods, to honour one's parents, to respect one's elders, to be obedient to the laws, to yield to those in authority, to love one's friends, to be chaste with women, to be affectionate with children, and not to be overbearing with slaves; and, most important of all, not to be overjoyful at success or overmuch distressed at misfortune, nor to be dissolute in pleasures, nor impulsive and brutish in temper. These things I regard as pre-eminent among all the advantages which accrue from philosophy. For to have a generous heart in prosperity shows a man, to excite no envy withal shows

εὐηνίου ἀνθρώπου, τὸ δὲ τοῖς λογισμοῖς περιεῖναι τῶν ἡδονῶν σοφοῦ,[1] τὸ δ' ὀργῆς κατακρατεῖν ἀνδρὸς οὐ τοῦ τυχόντος ἐστί. τελείους δ' ἀνθρώπους ἡγοῦμαι τοὺς δυναμένους τὴν πολιτικὴν
8 δύναμιν μεῖξαι καὶ κεράσαι τῇ φιλοσοφίᾳ, καὶ δυεῖν ὄντοιν[2] μεγίστοιν ἀγαθοῖν ἐπηβόλους ὑπάρχειν ὑπολαμβάνω, τοῦ τε κοινωφελοῦς βίου πολιτευομένους, τοῦ τ' ἀκύμονος καὶ γαληνοῦ διατρίβοντας περὶ φιλοσοφίαν. τριῶν γὰρ ὄντων βίων ὧν ὁ μέν ἐστι πρακτικὸς ὁ δὲ θεωρητικὸς ὁ δ' ἀπολαυστικός, ὁ μέν, ἔκλυτος καὶ δοῦλος τῶν ἡδονῶν ὤν,[3] ζωώδης καὶ μικροπρεπής ἐστιν, ὁ δὲ θεωρητικός, τοῦ πρακτικοῦ διαμαρτάνων, ἀνωφελής, ὁ δὲ πρακτικός, ἀμοιρήσας φιλοσοφίας, ἄμουσος καὶ πλημμελής. πειρατέον οὖν εἰς δύναμιν καὶ τὰ κοινὰ
B πράττειν καὶ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι κατὰ τὸ παρεῖκον τῶν καιρῶν. οὕτως ἐπολιτεύσατο Περικλῆς, οὕτως Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντῖνος, οὕτω Δίων ὁ Συρακόσιος, οὕτως Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὁ Θηβαῖος, ὧν ἄτερος[4] Πλάτωνος ἐγένετο συνουσιαστής.

Καὶ περὶ μὲν παιδείας οὐκ οἶδ' ὅ τι δεῖ πλείονα λέγοντα διατρίβειν· πρὸς δὲ τοῖς εἰρημένοις χρήσιμον, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀναγκαῖόν ἐστι μηδὲ τῆς τῶν παλαιῶν συγγραμμάτων κτήσεως ὀλιγώρως ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων ποιεῖσθαι συλλογὴν κατὰ τὸ γεωργῶδες. τὸν γὰρ αὐτὸν τρόπον ὄργανον τῆς παιδείας ἡ χρῆσις τῶν βιβλίων ἐστί, καὶ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τὴν ἐπιστήμην τηρεῖν συμβέβηκεν.
C 11. Οὐ τοίνυν ἄξιον οὐδὲ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων

[1] σοφοῦ Heusinger: σοφῶν.
[2] ὄντοιν] τοῖν Hartman. [3] ὤν added by Hartman.
[4] ἄτερος an early correction: ἑκάτερος.

a disciplined nature; to rule pleasure by reason marks the wise man, and not every man can master his passion. But I regard as perfect, so far as men can be, those who are able to combine and mingle political capacity with philosophy; and I am inclined to think that these are secure in the possession of two things which are of the greatest good: a life useful to the world in their public position, and the calm and untroubled life in their pursuit of philosophy. For there are three forms of life, of which the first is the practical life, the second the contemplative life, and the third the life of enjoyment. The last, which is dissolute and enslaved to pleasure, is bestial and mean, but the contemplative life, which falls short in practice, is not useful, while the practical life which has no portion in philosophy, is without culture or taste. One must try, then, as well as one can, both to take part in public life, and to lay hold of philosophy so far as the opportunity is granted. Such was the life of Pericles as a public man, such was Archytas of Tarentum, such was Dion of Syracuse, such was Epaminondas of Thebes, of whom the next to the last was the associate of Plato.

In regard to education I do not know why it is necessary to take the time to say more; but in addition to the foregoing, it is useful, or rather it is necessary, not to be indifferent about acquiring the works of earlier writers, but to make a collection of these, like a set of tools in farming. For the corresponding tool of education is the use of books, and by their means it has come to pass that we are able to study knowledge at its source.

11. It is not proper, either, to overlook the exercise

(8) ἀγωνίαν παρορᾶν, ἀλλὰ πέμποντας ἐς παιδοτρίβου τοὺς παῖδας ἱκανῶς ταῦτα διαπονεῖν, ἅμα μὲν τῆς τῶν σωμάτων εὐρυθμίας ἕνεκεν, ἅμα δὲ καὶ πρὸς ῥώμην· καλοῦ γὰρ γήρως θεμέλιος ἐν παισὶν ἡ τῶν σωμάτων εὐεξία. καθάπερ οὖν ἐν εὐδίᾳ τὰ πρὸς τὸν χειμῶνα προσῆκε παρασκευάζειν, οὕτως ἐν νεότητι τὴν εὐταξίαν καὶ τὴν σωφροσύνην ἐφόδιον
D εἰς τὸ γῆρας ἀποτίθεσθαι. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ ταμιεύεσθαι τὸν τοῦ σώματος πόνον, ὡς μὴ καταξήρους γινομένους πρὸς τὴν τῆς παιδείας ἐπιμέλειαν ἀπαγορεύειν· κατὰ γὰρ Πλάτωνα ὕπνοι καὶ κόποι[1] μαθήμασι πολέμιοι. καὶ τί ταῦτα[2]; ἀλλ' ὅπερ πάντων ἐστὶ κυριώτατον τῶν εἰρημένων σπεύδω λέγειν. πρὸς γὰρ τοὺς στρατιωτικοὺς ἀγῶνας τοὺς παῖδας ἀσκητέον ἐν ἀκοντισμοῖς αὐτοὺς καταθλοῦντας καὶ τοξείαις καὶ θήραις. "τὰ" γὰρ "τῶν ἡττωμένων" ἐν ταῖς μάχαις "ἀγαθὰ τοῖς νικῶσιν ἆθλα πρόκειται." πόλεμος δ' ἐσκιατραφημένην σωμάτων ἕξιν οὐ δέχεται, ἰσχνὸς δὲ στρατιώτης πολεμικῶν ἀγώνων ἐθὰς ἀθλητῶν πιμελώδων[3] φάλαγγας διωθεῖ.
E Τί οὖν; ἄν τις εἴποι, σὺ δὲ δὴ περὶ τῆς ἐλευθέρων ἀγωγῆς ὑποσχόμενος παραγγέλματα δώσειν ἔπειτα φαίνῃ τῆς μὲν τῶν πενήτων καὶ δημοτικῶν παραμελῶν ἀγωγῆς, μόνοις δὲ τοῖς πλουσίοις ὁμολογεῖς[4] τὰς ὑποθήκας διδόναι. πρὸς οὓς οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀπαντῆσαι. ἐγὼ γὰρ μάλιστ' ἂν βουλοίμην πᾶσι

[1] κόποι καὶ ὕπνοι Plato, *Rep.* 537 B.
[2] καὶ τί ταῦτα: καὶ ταῦτα μὲν τοιαῦτα Emperius.
[3] πιμελώδων F.C.B., *cf.* Plato, *Rep.* 556 C D: ἀπολέμων Hatzidakis: καταπιμέλων Tucker: καὶ πολεμίων.
[4] ὁμολογεῖς Hartman: ὁμονοεῖς.

of the body, but we should send the children to the trainer's and cultivate adequately this side of education with all diligence, not merely for the sake of gracefulness of body but also with an eye to strength; for sturdiness of body in childhood is the foundation of a hale old age. Just as in fair weather, then, one ought to prepare for storm, so also in youth one should store up discipline and self-restraint as a provision for old age. But the amount of bodily exercise should be so limited as not to be a drain on the children and make them too tired to study; for, according to Plato,[a] sleep and weariness are the enemies of learning. But why do I introduce this subject here? Just because I am anxious to say that which is of greater importance than all the rest: it is for the contests of war that boys must be practised, by exercising themselves in throwing the javelin, shooting with the bow, and in hunting. "For the goods of the vanquished" in battle "are prizes offered to the victors."[b] War has no place for a bodily condition produced by an indoor life, and a slenderly built soldier accustomed to military exercises forces his way through the masses of fleshy athletes.

But perchance someone may say, "What is this? You, who have promised to give directions in regard to the education of free-born children, are now evidently disregarding the education of the poor children of the common people, and you acknowledge that you are offering your suggestions for the rich only." To these it is not difficult to make reply. My dearest wish would be that my scheme

[a] *Republic*, 537 B.
[b] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, ii. 3. 2.

κοινῇ χρήσιμον εἶναι τὴν ἀγωγήν· εἰ δέ τινες ἐνδεῶς τοῖς ἰδίοις πράττοντες ἀδυνατήσουσι τοῖς ἐμοῖς χρῆσθαι παραγγέλμασι, τὴν τύχην αἰτιάσθωσαν, οὐ τὸν ταῦτα συμβουλεύοντα. πειρατέον μὲν οὖν εἰς δύναμιν τὴν κρατίστην ἀγωγὴν ποιεῖσθαι τῶν παίδων καὶ τοῖς πένησιν· εἰ δὲ μή, τῇ γε δυ-
F νατῇ χρηστέον. καὶ ταῦτα μὲν δὴ τῷ λόγῳ παρεφορτισάμην, ἵν' ἐφεξῆς καὶ τἄλλα τὰ φέροντα πρὸς τὴν ὀρθὴν τῶν νέων ἀγωγὴν συνάψω.

12. Κἀκεῖνό φημι, δεῖν τοὺς παῖδας ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἄγειν παραινέσεσι καὶ λόγοις, μὴ μὰ Δία πληγαῖς μηδ' αἰκισμοῖς. δοκεῖ γάρ που ταῦτα τοῖς δούλοις μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἐλευθέροις πρέπειν· ἀπονάρκωσι γὰρ καὶ φρίττουσι πρὸς τοὺς πόνους, τὰ μὲν διὰ τὰς ἀλγηδόνας τῶν πληγῶν, τὰ δὲ καὶ διὰ τὰς ὕβρεις. ἔπαινοι δὲ καὶ ψόγοι πάσης
9 εἰσὶν αἰκίας ὠφελιμώτεροι τοῖς ἐλευθέροις, οἱ μὲν ἐπὶ τὰ καλὰ παρορμῶντες οἱ δ' ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀνείργοντες.

Δεῖ δ' ἐναλλὰξ καὶ ποικίλως χρῆσθαι ταῖς ἐπιπλήξεσι καὶ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις, κἀπειδάν ποτε θρασύνωνται,[1] ταῖς ἐπιπλήξεσιν ἐν αἰσχύνῃ ποιεῖσθαι, καὶ πάλιν ἀνακαλεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ μιμεῖσθαι τὰς τίτθας, αἵτινες ἐπειδὰν τὰ παιδία κλαυθμυρίσωσιν, εἰς παρηγορίαν πάλιν τὸν μαστὸν ὑπέχουσι. δεῖ δ' αὐτοὺς μηδὲ τοῖς ἐγκωμίοις ἐπαίρειν καὶ φυσᾶν· χαυνοῦνται γὰρ ταῖς ὑπερβολαῖς τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ θρύπτονται.

[1] *θρασύνωνται* Hercher : *εὐφρανῶνται*. Perhaps *εὐφραίνωνται*, "are in a blithe mood," should be read here.

of education should be generally useful; but if some, being needy in their private circumstances, shall be unable to avail themselves of my directions, let them lay the blame therefor upon fortune and not upon him who gives this counsel. Even the poor must endeavour, as well as they can, to provide the best education for their children, but, if that be impossible, then they must avail themselves of that which is within their means. I have burdened the discussion with this minor matter so as to connect therewith in due order the other topics which tend toward the right education of the young.

12. This also I assert, that children ought to be led to honourable practices by means of encouragement and reasoning, and most certainly not by blows or ill-treatment, for it surely is agreed that these are fitting rather for slaves than for the free-born; for so they grow numb and shudder at their tasks, partly from the pain of the blows, partly from the degradation. Praise and reproof are more helpful for the free-born than any sort of ill-usage, since the praise incites them toward what is honourable, and reproof keeps them from what is disgraceful.

But rebukes and praise should be used alternately and in a variety of ways; it is well to choose some time when the children are full of confidence to put them to shame by rebuke, and then in turn to cheer them up by praises, and to imitate the nurses, who, when they have made their babies cry, in turn offer them the breast for comfort. Moreover in praising them it is essential not to excite and puff them up, for they are made conceited and spoiled by excess of praise.

B 13. Ἤδη δέ τινας ἐγὼ εἶδον πατέρας, οἷς τὸ
(9) λίαν φιλεῖν τοῦ μὴ φιλεῖν αἴτιον κατέστη. τί οὖν
ἐστιν ὃ βούλομαι λέγειν, ἵνα τῷ[1] παραδείγματι φω-
τεινότερον ποιήσω τὸν λόγον; σπεύδοντες γὰρ
τοὺς παῖδας ἐν πᾶσι τάχιον πρωτεῦσαι πόνους
αὐτοῖς ὑπερμέτρους ἐπιβάλλουσιν, οἷς ἀπαυδῶντες
ἐκπίπτουσι, καὶ ἄλλως βαρυνόμενοι ταῖς κακο-
παθείαις οὐ δέχονται τὴν μάθησιν εὐηνίως. ὥσπερ
γὰρ τὰ φυτὰ τοῖς μὲν μετρίοις ὕδασι τρέφεται,
τοῖς δὲ πολλοῖς πνίγεται, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ψυχὴ
τοῖς μὲν συμμέτροις αὔξεται πόνοις, τοῖς δ' ὑπερ-
C βάλλουσι βαπτίζεται. δοτέον οὖν τοῖς παισὶν
ἀναπνοὴν τῶν συνεχῶν πόνων, ἐνθυμουμένους ὅτι
πᾶς ὁ βίος ἡμῶν εἰς ἄνεσιν καὶ σπουδὴν διῄρηται.
καὶ διὰ τοῦτ' οὐ μόνον ἐγρήγορσις ἀλλὰ καὶ ὕπνος
εὑρέθη, οὐδὲ πόλεμος ἀλλὰ καὶ εἰρήνη, οὐδὲ χειμὼν
ἀλλὰ καὶ εὐδία, οὐδ' ἐνεργοὶ πράξεις ἀλλὰ καὶ
ἑορταί. συνελόντι δ' εἰπεῖν ἡ ἀνάπαυσις τῶν πόνων
ἐστὶν ἄρτυμα. καὶ οὐκ ἐπὶ τῶν ζῴων μόνων
τοῦτ' ἄν[2] ἴδοι τις γιγνόμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν
ἀψύχων· καὶ γὰρ τὰ τόξα καὶ τὰς λύρας ἀνίεμεν,
ἵν' ἐπιτεῖναι δυνηθῶμεν. καθόλου δὲ σῴζεται σῶμα
μὲν ἐνδείᾳ καὶ πληρώσει, ψυχὴ δ' ἀνέσει καὶ πόνῳ.
D Ἄξιον δ' ἐπιτιμᾶν τῶν πατέρων ἐνίοις, οἵτινες
παιδαγωγοῖς καὶ διδασκάλοις ἐπιτρέψαντες τοὺς
υἱεῖς αὐτοὶ τῆς τούτων μαθήσεως οὔτ' αὐτόπται
γίγνονται τὸ παράπαν οὔτ' αὐτήκοοι, πλεῖστον

[1] λέγειν; ἱκανῷ Kronenberg. [2] ἄν added by Hercher.

13. In my time I have seen fathers in whom excessive affection had become the cause of no affection. What is it that I mean to say, in order that by the example I give I may make my argument more luminous? It is this: in their eagerness that their children may the sooner rank first in everything, they lay upon them unreasonable tasks, which the children find themselves unable to perform, and so come to grief; besides, being depressed by their unfortunate experiences, they do not respond to the instruction which they receive. For, just as plants are nourished by moderate applications of water, but are drowned by many in succession, in the same fashion the mind is made to grow by properly adapted tasks, but is submerged by those which are excessive. Children must be given some breathing-space from continued tasks, for we must bear in mind that our whole life is divided between relaxation and application. For this reason there have been created not only waking hours but also sleep, not only war but also peace, not only storm but also fair weather, not only periods of vigorous activity but also holidays. In short, rest gives relish to labour. We may observe that this holds true not merely in the case of living creatures, but also in the case of inanimate things, for we unstring bows and lyres that we may be able to tighten them again. The body, generally speaking, is maintained by hunger and its satisfaction, and the mind by relaxation and labour.

It is right to rebuke some fathers who, after entrusting their sons to attendants and masters, do not themselves take cognizance at all of their instruction by means of their own eyes or their own

(9) τοῦ δέοντος ἁμαρτάνοντες. αὐτοὺς γὰρ παρ' ὀλίγας ἡμέρας δεῖ δοκιμασίαν λαμβάνειν τῶν παίδων, ἀλλὰ μὴ τὰς ἐλπίδας ἔχειν ἐν μισθωτοῦ διαθέσει· καὶ γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι πλείονα ποιήσονται τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν τῶν παίδων, μέλλοντες ἑκάστοτε διδόναι τὰς εὐθύνας. κἀνταῦθα δὴ τὸ ῥηθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἱπποκόμου χάριεν, ὡς οὐδὲν οὕτω πιαίνει τὸν ἵππον ὡς βασιλέως ὀφθαλμός.

E Πάντων δὲ μάλιστα τὴν μνήμην τῶν παίδων ἀσκεῖν καὶ συνεθίζειν· αὕτη γὰρ ὥσπερ τῆς παιδείας ἐστὶ ταμιεῖον, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο μητέρα τῶν Μουσῶν ἐμυθολόγησαν εἶναι τὴν Μνημοσύνην, αἰνιττόμενοι καὶ παραδηλοῦντες ὅτι οὕτως οὐδὲν γεννᾶν καὶ τρέφειν ὡς ἡ μνήμη πέφυκε. καὶ τοίνυν ταύτην κατ' ἀμφότερ' ἐστὶν ἀσκητέον, εἴτ' ἐκ φύσεως μνήμονες εἶεν οἱ παῖδες, εἴτε καὶ τοὐναντίον ἐπιλήσμονες. τὴν γὰρ πλεονεξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἐπιρρώσομεν, τὴν δ' ἔλλειψιν ἀναπληρώσομεν· καὶ οἱ μὲν τῶν ἄλλων ἔσονται βελτίους, οἱ δ' ἑαυτῶν. τὸ γὰρ Ἡσιόδειον καλῶς εἴρηται

> εἰ γάρ κεν καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο
F καὶ θαμὰ τοῦτ' ἔρδοις, τάχα κεν μέγα καὶ τὸ γένοιτο.

μὴ λανθανέτω τοίνυν μηδὲ τοῦτο τοὺς πατέρας, ὅτι τὸ μνημονικὸν τῆς μαθήσεως μέρος οὐ μόνον πρὸς τὴν παιδείαν ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς τὰς τοῦ βίου πράξεις οὐκ ἐλαχίστην συμβάλλεται μοῖραν. ἡ γὰρ τῶν γεγενημένων πράξεων μνήμη τῆς περὶ τῶν μελλόντων εὐβουλίας γίγνεται παράδειγμα.

14. Καὶ μέντοι καὶ τῆς αἰσχρολογίας ἀπακτέον

ears. Herein they most fail in their duty; for they ought themselves every few days to test their children, and not rest their hopes upon the disposition of a hired person; for even those persons will devote more attention to the children if they know they must from time to time render an account. And in this connexion there is point as well as wit in the remark of the groom who said that nothing makes the horse so fat as the king's eye.[a]

Above all, the memory of children should be trained and exercised; for this is, as it were, a storehouse of learning; and it is for this reason that the mythologists have made Memory the mother of the Muses, thereby intimating by an allegory that there is nothing in the world like memory for creating and fostering. This, then, is to be trained in either case, whether one's children be naturally gifted with a good memory, or, on the contrary, forgetful. For we shall thus strengthen nature's generous endowment, and thus fill out her deficiency; and while the first class of children will excel others, the second class will excel their former selves. The saying of Hesiod[b] is admirably put:

> If even small upon the small you place
> And do this oft, the whole will soon be great.

Nor should parents forget that those branches of instruction which involve memory make no small contribution, not merely to education, but also to the practical activities of life; for the memory of past activities serves as a pattern of good counsel for the future.

14. Moreover, one's sons are to be kept from foul

[a] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, 12. 20.

[b] *Works and Days*, 361: "Many a little makes a mickle."

τοὺς υἱεῖς· "λόγος γὰρ ἔργου σκιή" κατὰ Δημόκρι-
10 τον. εἶτά γε μὴν ἐντευκτικοὺς αὐτοὺς εἶναι παρα-
σκευαστέον καὶ φιλοπροσηγόρους· οὐδὲν γὰρ ὡς τὰ
ἀνέντευκτα τῶν ἠθῶν ἐστιν οὕτως ἀξιομίσητον.
ἔτι τοίνυν οἱ παῖδες ἀμισεῖς γίγνοιντ' ἂν τοῖς συν-
οῦσι μὴ παντελῶς ἐν ταῖς ζητήσεσιν ἀπαρα-
χώρητοι γιγνόμενοι· οὐ γὰρ τὸ νικᾶν μόνον ἀλλὰ
καὶ τὸ ἡττᾶσθαι ἐπίστασθαι καλὸν ἐν οἷς τὸ νικᾶν
βλαβερόν. ἔστι γὰρ ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ νίκη Καδμεία.
ἔχω δὲ μάρτυρα τούτου Εὐριπίδην τὸν σοφὸν ἐπ-
αγαγέσθαι λέγοντα

B δυοῖν λεγόντοιν, θατέρου θυμουμένου,
ὁ μὴ ἀντιτείνων τοῖς λόγοις σοφώτερος.

[a]Ἀ τοίνυν τῶν εἰρημένων οὐδενὸς ἧττόν ἐστιν
ἀλλὰ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐπιτηδευτέα τοῖς νέοις καὶ δὴ
λεκτέον. ταῦτα δ' ἐστὶ τὸ[1] τὸν βίον ἀτύφωτον
ἀσκεῖν, τὸ τὴν γλῶτταν κατέχειν, τὸ τῆς ὀργῆς
ὑπεράνω γίγνεσθαι, τὸ τῶν χειρῶν κρατεῖν. τού-
των ἕκαστον ἡλίκον ἐστὶ σκεπτέον· ἔσται δ' ἐπὶ
παραδειγμάτων γνωριμώτερα.

Οἷον ἵν' ἀπὸ τοῦ τελευταίου πρῶτον ἄρξωμαι,
τὰς χεῖράς τινες ὑποσχόντες λήμμασιν ἀδίκοις
τὴν δόξαν τῶν προβεβιωμένων ἐξέχεαν· ὡς Γύλ-
C ιππος ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος τὰ σακκία τῶν χρημάτων
παραλύσας φυγὰς ἀπηλάθη τῆς Σπάρτης.

[1] τὸ added by Meziriacus.

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[a] Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ii. p. 87.

[b] A victory which (like a Pyrrhic victory) is disastrous to the victor. The reference is to the combat between Eteocles and Polyneices, the two sons of Oedipus. *Cf.* also *Moralia*, 488 A and Herodotus, i. 166.

language; for, according to Democritus,[a] "A word is a deed's shadow." Then, too, proper measures must be taken to ensure that they shall be tactful and courteous in their address; for nothing is so deservedly disliked as tactless characters. Besides, children may avoid getting themselves disliked by their associates if they do not prove totally unyielding in discussions. For it is a fine thing to understand, not only how to gain the victory, but also how to submit to defeat, in cases where victory is injurious; for there is really such a thing as a "Cadmean victory."[b] As a witness of this I may quote Euripides the wise, who says:

> When of two speakers one is growing wroth,
> Wiser is he that yields in argument.[c]

We must now lay down some rules of conduct which the young should follow no less but even more than those previously given. These are: To practise the simple life, to hold the tongue in check, to conquer anger, to control the hands. We must consider the importance of each of these; and they will be more intelligible if based on examples.

So, to begin with the last, some men by putting their hands to wrongful gains have upset the good repute of their earlier lives. Witness the case of Gylippus,[d] the Spartan, who was forced into exile because he had secretly unsewed the bags of money.

[c] From the *Protesilaus*; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 654.

[d] The story is told in detail by Plutarch in his *Life of Lysander*, chap. 16 (p. 442).

(10) Τό γε μὴν ἀόργητον ἀνδρός ἐστι σοφοῦ. Σωκράτης μὲν γάρ, λακτίσαντος αὐτὸν νεανίσκου θρασέος μάλα καὶ βδελυροῦ, τοὺς ἀμφ' αὐτὸν ὁρῶν ἀγανακτοῦντας καὶ σφαδάζοντας ὡς καὶ διώκειν αὐτὸν ἐθέλειν, "ἆρ'," ἔφησε, "καὶ εἴ μ' ὄνος ἐλάκτισεν, ἀντιλακτίσαι τοῦτον ἠξιώσατ' ἄν;" οὐ μὴν ἐκεῖνός γε παντελῶς κατεπροίξατο, πάντων δ' αὐτὸν ὀνειδιζόντων καὶ λακτιστὴν ἀποκαλούντων ἀπήγξατο.

Ἀριστοφάνους δέ, ὅτε τὰς Νεφέλας ἐξέφερε, παντοίως πᾶσαν ὕβριν αὐτοῦ κατασκεδαννύντος, καί τινος τῶν παρόντων "κᾆτα[1] τοιαῦτ' ἀνακωμῳδοῦντος οὐκ ἀγανακτεῖς" εἰπόντος "ὦ Σώ-
D κρατες;" "μὰ Δί' οὐκ ἔγωγ'," ἔφησεν· "ὡς γὰρ ἐν συμποσίῳ μεγάλῳ τῷ θεάτρῳ σκώπτομαι." ἀδελφὰ τούτοις καὶ σύζυγα φανήσονται πεποιηκότες Ἀρχύτας ὁ Ταραντῖνος καὶ Πλάτων. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐπανελθὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ πολέμου (στρατηγῶν δ' ἐτύγχανε) γῆν καταλαβὼν κεχερσωμένην, τὸν ἐπίτροπον καλέσας αὐτῆς "ὤμωξας ἄν," ἔφησεν, "εἰ μὴ λίαν ὠργιζόμην." Πλάτων δὲ δούλῳ λίχνῳ καὶ βδελυρῷ θυμωθείς, τὸν τῆς ἀδελφῆς υἱὸν Σπεύσιππον καλέσας "τοῦτον," ἔφησεν ἀπελθών, "κρότησον· ἐγὼ γὰρ πάνυ θυμοῦμαι." χαλεπὰ δὲ ταῦτα καὶ δυσμίμητα φαίη τις ἄν.
E οἶδα κἀγώ. πειρατέον οὖν εἰς ὅσον οἷόν τ' ἐστὶ τούτοις παραδείγμασι χρωμένους τὸ πολὺ τῆς ἀκρατοῦς καὶ μαινομένης ὑφαιρεῖν ὀργῆς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐς τἄλλα ἐνάμιλλοι ταῖς ἐκείνων ἐσμὲν οὔτ'

[1] κᾆτα Bernardakis: κατὰ.

Again, an unruffled temper is certainly the mark of a wise man. Thus Socrates once, when a bold and impudent youth had kicked him, observed that the bystanders were so indignant and so violently moved as to wish to follow up the offender; but he only said: "If an ass had kicked me, should you have thought it proper to kick him in return?" That youth, however, did not by any means get off scot-free, but as everybody jeered at him, and nicknamed him "Kicker," he ended by hanging himself.

And when Aristophanes brought out the *Clouds*, and heaped all manner of abuse upon Socrates in every possible way, one of those who had been present said to Socrates, "Are you not indignant, Socrates, that he used you as he did in the play?" "No indeed," he replied; "when they break a jest upon me in the theatre I feel as if I were at a big party of good friends." What Archytas of Tarentum and Plato did will be seen to be closely akin to this. For Archytas, on his return from the war (where he had been general) found his land gone to waste. He summoned his overseer and said, "You should be sorry for this, if I were not in too great a temper." And Plato, provoked at a gluttonous and impudent slave, called his sister's son, Speusippus, and said as he withdrew, "Beat this fellow, for I am too much provoked." But it may be urged that such actions are difficult and hard to imitate. I know that myself. But the effort must be made, by employing the actions of such men as standards as far as possible, to abate a great part of our unbridled and furious temper; for in other respects also we are not comparable with them either in

ἐμπειρίαις οὔτε καλοκαγαθίαις. ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον ἐκείνων, ὥσπερ θεῶν ἱεροφάνται καὶ δᾳδοῦχοι τῆς σοφίας ὄντες, ὅσαπέρ ἐστιν ἐν δυνατῷ, ταῦτα μιμεῖσθαι καὶ περικινίζειν ἐπιχειροῦμεν.

Τὸ τοίνυν τῆς γλώττης κρατεῖν (περὶ τούτου γάρ, ὤνπερ[1] ὑπεθέμην, εἰπεῖν λοιπόν) εἴ τις μικρὸν καὶ φαῦλον ὑπείληφε, πλεῖστον διαμαρτάνει τῆς ἀληθείας. σοφὸν γὰρ εὔκαιρος σιγὴ καὶ παντὸς
F λόγου κρεῖττον. καὶ διὰ τοῦτό μοι δοκεῖ τὰς μυστηριώδεις τελετὰς οἱ παλαιοὶ κατέδειξαν, ἵν' ἐν ταύταις σιωπᾶν ἐθισθέντες ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων μυστηρίων πίστιν τὸν ἀπὸ τῶν θείων[2] μεταφέρωμεν φόβον. καὶ γὰρ ἂν σιωπήσας μὲν οὐδεὶς μετενόησε, λαλήσαντες δὲ παμπληθεῖς. καὶ τὸ μὲν σιγηθὲν ἐξειπεῖν ῥᾴδιον, τὸ δὲ ῥηθὲν ἀναλαβεῖν ἀδύνατον. μυρίους δ' ἔγωγ' οἶδ' ἀκούσας ταῖς μεγίσταις συμφοραῖς περιπεσόντας διὰ τὴν
11 τῆς γλώττης ἀκρασίαν. ὧν τοὺς ἄλλους παραλιπὼν ἑνὸς ἢ δυεῖν τύπου ἕνεκεν ἐπιμνησθήσομαι. τοῦ γὰρ Φιλαδέλφου γήμαντος τὴν ἀδελφὴν Ἀρσινόην Σωτάδης εἰπών

εἰς οὐχ ὁσίην τρυμαλιὴν τὸ κέντρον ὠθεῖς

ἐν δεσμωτηρίῳ πολλοὺς κατεσάπη χρόνους καὶ τῆς ἀκαίρου λαλιᾶς οὐ μεμπτὴν ἔδωκε δίκην, ἵνα δὲ γέλωτα παράσχῃ τοῖς ἄλλοις, αὐτὸς πολὺν χρόνον ἔκλαυσεν. ἐνάμιλλα δὲ τούτοις καὶ σύζυγα καὶ Θεόκριτος ὁ σοφιστὴς εἶπέ τε καὶ ἔπαθε, καὶ πολὺ δεινότερα. Ἀλεξάνδρου γὰρ πορφυρᾶς ἐσθῆτας

[1] ὤνπερ Hartman : ὥσπερ.
[2] θείων Hartman : θεῶν.

experience or in magnanimity. Yet we, no less than they, feeling ourselves to be the high priests of God's mysteries and torch-bearers of wisdom, do attempt, so far as lies in our power, to imitate and to get a little taste of such conduct for ourselves.

The control of the tongue, then, still remains to be discussed of the topics I suggested. If anybody has the notion that this is a slight and insignificant matter, he is very far from the truth. For timely silence is a wise thing, and better than any speech. And this is the reason, as it appears to me, why the men of olden time established the rites of initiation into the mysteries, that we, by becoming accustomed to keep silence there, may transfer that fear which we learned from the divine secrets to the safe keeping of the secrets of men. For, again, nobody was ever sorry because he kept silent, but hundreds because they talked. Again, the word unspoken can easily be uttered later; but the spoken word cannot possibly be recalled. I have heard of countless men who have fallen into the greatest misfortunes through intemperate speech. Of these I shall mention one or two as typical and omit the rest. When Ptolemy Philadelphus married his sister Arsinoë, Sotades [a] said,

'Tis wrong for you to try to spur that mare,

and thereafter he rotted in prison for many years; and so suffered condign punishment for his untimely talking, and to make other men laugh he sorrowed a long time himself. A story to match and couple with this, and much more dreadful, is what the sophist Theocritus said and suffered. Alexander

[a] *Cf.* Athenaeus, xiv. 13 (p. 620 F).

(11) κελεύσαντος κατασκευάζειν τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἵν'
B ἐπανελθὼν τὰ ἐπινίκια τοῦ πολέμου τοῦ κατὰ τῶν
βαρβάρων θύσειε, καὶ τῶν ἐθνῶν κατὰ κεφαλὴν
εἰσφερόντων ἄργυρον "πρότερον μέν," ἔφησεν,
"ἠμφισβήτουν, νῦν δ' ἤσθημαι σαφῶς ὅτι ὁ
'πορφύρεος' Ὁμήρου 'θάνατος' οὗτός ἐστιν."
ἐξ ὧν ἐχθρὸν ἐκτήσατο τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον. Ἀντί-
γονον δὲ τὸν βασιλέα τῶν Μακεδόνων ἑτερόφθαλμον
ὄντα τὴν πήρωσιν προφέρων εἰς οὐ μετρίαν ὀργὴν
κατέστησε. τὸν γὰρ ἀρχιμάγειρον Εὐτροπίωνα
γεγενημένον ἐν τάξει πέμψας παραγενέσθαι πρὸς
C αὐτὸν ἠξίου καὶ λόγον δοῦναι καὶ λαβεῖν. ταῦτα
δ' ἀπαγγέλλοντος ἐκείνου πρὸς αὐτὸν καὶ πολλάκις
προσιόντος "εὖ οἶδ'," ἔφησεν, "ὅτι ὠμόν με θέλεις
τῷ Κύκλωπι παραθεῖναι," ὀνειδίζων τὸν μὲν ὅτι
πηρός, τὸν δ' ὅτι μάγειρος ἦν. κἀκεῖνος "τοι-
γαροῦν" εἰπών "τὴν κεφαλὴν οὐχ ἕξεις ἀλλὰ τῆς
ἀθυροστομίας ταύτης καὶ μανίας δώσεις δίκην," ἀπ-
ήγγειλε τὰ εἰρημένα τῷ βασιλεῖ, ὁ δὲ πέμψας ἀν-
εῖλε τὸν Θεόκριτον.

Παρὰ πάντα δὲ ταῦτα, ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἱεροπρεπέ-
στατον, ἐθίζειν τοὺς παῖδας τῷ τἀληθῆ λέγειν·
τὸ γὰρ ψεύδεσθαι δουλοπρεπὲς καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώ-
ποις ἄξιον μισεῖσθαι καὶ οὐδὲ μετρίοις δούλοις
συγγνωστόν.

D 15. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν οὐκ ἐνδοιάσας οὐδὲ μελλήσας
περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων εὐκοσμίας καὶ σωφροσύνης
διείλεγμαι· περὶ δὲ τοῦ ῥηθήσεσθαι μέλλοντος
ἀμφίδοξός εἰμι καὶ διχογνώμων, καὶ τῇδε κἀκεῖσε

[a] *Il.* v. 83, and elsewhere.

had bidden the Greeks to make ready crimson robes so that on his return he might offer a sacrifice of thanksgiving for his victory in the war against the barbarians, and all the states had to pay a poll-tax in money, when Theocritus remarked, "Before this I used to be in doubt, but now I know for a certainty that this is Homer's 'Crimson Death.'"[a] And thereby he made an enemy of Alexander. And Antigonus, king of the Macedonians, who was blind of one eye, he drove to immoderate anger by reproaching him with his disfigurement. For Antigonus sent his chief cook, Eutropion, who had been an officer in his army, to Theocritus, and insisted that Theocritus should come to him and engage him in discussion. When Eutropion delivered his message to Theocritus, coming several times for the purpose, the latter said, "I know very well that you want to serve me up raw to your Cyclops," twitting the one for being disfigured and the other for being now a cook. "Then you shall not keep your head on," said Eutropion, "but you shall pay the penalty for this reckless talk and madness of yours." He thereupon reported the remark to the king, who sent and had Theocritus put to death.

But besides all this, we should, as a most sacred duty, accustom children to speak the truth. For lying is fit for slaves only, and deserves to be hated of all men, and even in decent slaves it is not to be condoned.

15. So far I have felt no doubt or even hesitation in saying what I have said about the decorous conduct and modest behaviour of the young; but in regard to the topic now to be introduced I am of two opinions and two minds, and I incline now

(11) μετακλίνων ὡς ἐπὶ πλάστιγγος πρὸς οὐδέτερον ῥέψαι δύναμαι, πολὺς δ' ὄκνος ἔχει με καὶ τῆς εἰσηγήσεως καὶ τῆς ἀποτροπῆς τοῦ πράγματος. ἀποτολμητέον δ' οὖν ὅμως εἰπεῖν αὐτό. τί οὖν τοῦτ' ἐστί; πότερα δεῖ τοὺς ἐρῶντας τῶν παίδων
E ἐᾶν τούτοις συνεῖναι καὶ συνδιατρίβειν, ἢ τοὐναντίον εἴργειν αὐτοὺς καὶ ἀποσοβεῖν τῆς πρὸς τούτους ὁμιλίας προσῆκεν; ὅταν μὲν γὰρ ἀποβλέψω πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας τοὺς αὐθεκάστους καὶ τὸν τρόπον ὀμφακίας καὶ στρυφνούς, οἳ τῶν τέκνων ὕβριν οὐκ ἀνεκτὴν τὴν τῶν ἐρώντων ὁμιλίαν ἡγοῦνται, εὐλαβοῦμαι ταύτης εἰσηγητὴς γενέσθαι καὶ σύμβουλος. ὅταν δ' αὖ πάλιν ἐνθυμηθῶ τὸν Σωκράτη τὸν Πλάτωνα τὸν Ξενοφῶντα τὸν Αἰσχίνην τὸν Κέβητα, τὸν πάντα χορὸν ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν οἳ τοὺς ἄρρενας ἐδοκίμασαν ἔρωτας καὶ τὰ μειράκια προήγαγον ἐπί τε παιδείαν καὶ δημαγωγίαν καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν τῶν τρόπων, πάλιν ἕτερος γίγνομαι
F καὶ κάμπτομαι πρὸς τὸν ἐκείνων τῶν ἀνδρῶν ζῆλον. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ τούτοις Εὐριπίδης οὕτω λέγων

ἀλλ' ἔστι δή τις ἄλλος ἐν βροτοῖς ἔρως,
ψυχῆς δικαίας σώφρονός τε κἀγαθῆς.

τὸ δὲ τοῦ Πλάτωνος σπουδῇ καὶ χαριεντισμῷ μεμιγμένον οὐ παραλειπτέον. ἐξεῖναι γάρ φησι δεῖν τοῖς ἀριστεύσασιν ὧν ἂν βούλωνται τῶν καλῶν φιλῆσαι. τοὺς μὲν οὖν τῆς ὥρας ἐπιθυμοῦντας ἀπελαύνειν προσῆκε, τοὺς δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐραστὰς ἐγκρίνειν κατὰ τὸ σύνολον. καὶ τοὺς μὲν Θήβησι καὶ τοὺς ἐν[1] Ἠλιδι φευκτέον ἔρωτας καὶ τὸν ἐν

[1] ἐν added by Hercher.

this way, now that, as though on a balance, being unable to settle down on either side ; and a feeling of great reluctance possesses me, whether to introduce or to avoid the subject. Still I must venture to speak of it. What is it then ? It is the question whether boys' admirers are to be permitted to associate with them and pass their time with them, or whether, on the contrary, they should be kept away and driven off from association with the youth. For when I have regard to those uncompromising fathers, harsh and surly in their manner, who think the society of admirers an intolerable outrage to their sons, I feel cautious about standing as its sponsor and advocate. But again, when I think of Socrates, Plato, Xenophon, Aeschines, Cebes, and that whole band of men who sanctioned affection between men, and thus guided the youth onward to learning, leadership, and virtuous conduct, I am of a different mind again, and am inclined to emulate their example. Euripides [a] gives testimony in their favour when he says :

> Among mankind another love exists,
> That of an upright, chaste, and noble soul.

Nor may we omit the remark of Plato [b] wherein jest and seriousness are combined. For he says that those who have acquitted themselves nobly ought to have the right to kiss any fair one they please. Now we ought indeed to drive away those whose desire is for mere outward beauty, but to admit without reserve those who are lovers of the soul. And while the sort of love prevailing at Thebes and in Elis is to be avoided, as well as the so-called

[a] In the *Theseus* ; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 388.

[b] *Republic*, 468 B.

12 Κρήτῃ καλούμενον ἁρπαγμόν, τοὺς δ' Ἀθήνησι καὶ τοὺς ἐν Λακεδαίμονι ζηλωτέον.

16. Περὶ μὲν οὖν τούτων, ὅπως ἕκαστος αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν πέπεικεν, οὕτως ὑπολαμβανέτω· ἐγὼ δ' ἐπειδὴ περὶ τῆς τῶν παίδων εὐταξίας εἴρηκα καὶ κοσμιότητος, καὶ ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν μειρακίων ἡλικίαν ἤδη μεταβήσομαι καὶ μικρὰ παντάπασιν λέξω. πολλάκις γὰρ κατεμεμψάμην τοὺς μοχθηρῶν ἐθῶν γεγονότας εἰσηγητάς, οἵτινες τοῖς μὲν παισὶ παιδαγωγοὺς καὶ διδασκάλους ἐπέστησαν, τὴν δὲ
B τῶν μειρακίων ὁρμὴν ἄφετον εἴασαν νέμεσθαι, δέον αὖ τοὐναντίον πλείω τῶν μειρακίων ποιεῖσθαι τὴν εὐλάβειαν καὶ φυλακὴν ἢ τῶν παίδων. τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν ὅτι τὰ μὲν τῶν παίδων πλημμελήματα μικρὰ καὶ παντελῶς ἐστιν ἰάσιμα, παιδαγωγῶν ἴσως ὀλιγωρία καὶ διδασκάλων παραγωγὴ καὶ ἀνηκουστία· τὰ δὲ τῶν ἤδη νεανισκευομένων ἀδικήματα πολλάκις ὑπερφυᾶ γίνεται καὶ σχέτλια,
C ἀμετρία γαστρὸς καὶ κλοπαὶ πατρῴων χρημάτων καὶ κύβοι καὶ κῶμοι καὶ πότοι καὶ παρθένων ἔρωτες καὶ γυναικῶν οἰκοφθορίαι γαμετῶν. οὐκοῦν τὰς τούτων ὁρμὰς ταῖς ἐπιμελείαις δεσμεύειν καὶ κατέχειν προσῆκεν. ἀταμίευτον γὰρ τῶν ἡδονῶν ἡ ἀκμὴ καὶ σκιρτητικὸν καὶ χαλινοῦ δεόμενον, ὥσθ' οἱ μὴ τῆς ἡλικίας ταύτης ἐρρωμένως ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι τῇ δὴ ἀνοίᾳ[1] διδόασιν ἐξουσίαν ἐπὶ τὰ ἀδικήματα. ἔδει τοίνυν τοὺς ἔμφρονας πατέρας παρὰ τοῦτον μάλιστα τὸν καιρὸν φυλάττειν ἐγρηγορέναι σωφρονίζειν τοὺς μειρακίσκους διδάσκοντας ἀπειλοῦντας δεομένους, παρα-

[1] τῇ δὴ ἀνοίᾳ an early correction: τῇ διανοίᾳ.

kidnapping in Crete, that which is found at Athens and in Lacedaemon is to be emulated.

16. In this matter each man may be allowed such opinion as accords with his own convictions. But now that I have spoken of the orderly and decorous behaviour of children, I shall next pass to the period of adolescence, and say a very few words about it. I have often expressed my utter disapprobation of men who have been responsible for the introduction of depraved habits. For, while it is true that they have put attendants and teachers in charge of their children, they nevertheless have allowed the impetuosity of youth to range unrestrained, when they ought, on the contrary, to have exercised greater caution and watchfulness over them when they were young men than when they were children. For who is not aware that the faults of children are trivial and altogether corrigible —heedlessness, perhaps, towards their attendants, or deceiving and refusing to mind their teachers? But the iniquities of early manhood are often monstrous and wicked—unlimited gluttony, theft of parents' money, gambling, revels, drinking-bouts, love affairs with young girls, and corruption of married women. The impulses of young men should therefore be kept fettered and restrained by careful supervision. For life's prime is prodigal in its pleasures, restive, and in need of a curb, so that parents who do not take hold of the reins with firm hand at this period of life, are manifestly, by their folly, giving to their sons licence for wrongdoing. Wise fathers ought, therefore, especially during this time, to be vigilant and alert, and to bring the young men to reason by instruction, by threats,

(12) δείγματα δεικνύντας τῶν διὰ φιληδονίαν μὲν συμφοραῖς περιπεσόντων διὰ δὲ καρτερίαν ἔπαινον καὶ δόξαν ἀγαθὴν περιποιησαμένων. δύο γὰρ ταῦθ' ὥσπερεὶ στοιχεῖα τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν, ἐλπίς
D τε τιμῆς καὶ φόβος τιμωρίας· ἡ μὲν γὰρ ὁρμητικωτέρους πρὸς τὰ κάλλιστα τῶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἡ δ' ὀκνηροὺς πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα τῶν ἔργων ἀπεργάζεται.

17. Καθόλου δ' ἀπείργειν προσήκει τοὺς παῖδας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πονηροὺς ἀνθρώπους συνουσίας· ἀποφέρονται γάρ τι τῆς τούτων κακίας. τοῦτο δὲ παρήγγειλε καὶ Πυθαγόρας αἰνίγμασιν ἅπερ ἐγὼ παραθεὶς ἐξηγήσομαι· καὶ γὰρ ταῦτα πρὸς ἀρετῆς κτῆσιν συμβάλλεται ῥοπὴν οὐκ ἐλαχίστην. οἷον·
E "Μὴ γεύεσθαι μελανούρων," τουτέστι μὴ συνδιατρίβειν μέλασιν ἀνθρώποις διὰ κακοήθειαν.

"Μὴ ζυγὸν ὑπερβαίνειν," τουτέστιν ὅτι δεῖ τῆς δικαιοσύνης πλεῖστον ποιεῖσθαι λόγον καὶ μὴ ταύτην ὑπερβαίνειν.

"Μὴ ἐπὶ χοίνικος καθίσαι," ἤτοι φεύγειν ἀργίαν καὶ προνοεῖν ὅπως τὴν ἀναγκαίαν παρασκευάσωμεν τροφήν.

"Μὴ παντὶ ἐμβάλλειν δεξιάν," ἀντὶ τοῦ προχείρως οὐ δεῖ συναλλάττειν.

"Μὴ φορεῖν στενὸν δακτύλιον," ὅτι δεῖ τὸν βίον[1] ἐπιτηδεύειν καὶ μηδενὶ[2] δεσμῷ προσάπτειν αὐτόν.

"Πῦρ σιδήρῳ μὴ σκαλεύειν," ἀντὶ τοῦ θυμού-

[1] Some MSS. add ἐλεύθερον "free" to βίον.
[2] μηδενὶ Tucker and F.C.B. independently: μὴ δεῖν.

[a] *Cf.* Athenaeus, x. 77 (p. 452 D); Iamblichus, *Protrept.* chap. 21 (pp. 131-160); Diogenes Laertius, viii. 1, 17-18; and Plutarch, *Life of Numa*, chap. 14 (69 C).

by entreaties, by pointing out examples of men who through love of pleasure have become involved in misfortunes, and of those who, through their steadfastness, have gained for themselves approval and good repute. For these two things—hope of reward and fear of punishment—are, as it were, the elements of virtue. For the one renders men more eager for honourable pursuits while the other makes them averse to base actions.

17. It should be the general rule to keep the young away from any association with base men; for they carry away something of their badness. This duty Pythagoras [a] also has enjoined in the form of allegories which I shall now quote and explain. For they contribute no small influence towards the acquisition of virtue. For example:

"Do not taste of black-tails [b];" that is, "Do not spend your time with men of black character, because of their malevolence."

"Do not step over the beam of a balance"; that is, one should give greatest heed to justice and not transgress it.

"Do not sit on a peck measure"; as much as to say that we should avoid idleness and have forethought for providing our daily bread.

"Do not give your hand to everybody"; instead of, "Do not make friends too readily."

"Do not wear a tight ring"; means that one should live his life unhampered, and not subject it to any bond.

"Do not poke a fire with steel"; [c] instead of,

[b] The name of a fish.

[c] *Cf.* the *Moralia* 281 A and 354 E, and *Life of Numa*, chap. 14 (69 c) where Plutarch has "with a sword."

μενον μὴ ἐρεθίζειν· οὐ γὰρ προσῆκεν, ἀλλ' ὑπείκειν τοῖς ὀργιζομένοις.

" Μὴ ἐσθίειν καρδίαν," ἤτοι[1] μὴ βλάπτειν τὴν ψυχὴν ταῖς φροντίσιν αὐτὴν κατατρύχοντα.

F " Κυάμων ἀπέχεσθαι," ὅτι οὐ δεῖ πολιτεύεσθαι· κυαμευταὶ γὰρ ἦσαν ἔμπροσθεν αἱ ψηφοφορίαι δι' ὧν πέρας ἐπετίθεσαν ταῖς ἀρχαῖς.

" Σιτίον εἰς ἀμίδα μὴ ἐμβάλλειν·" ἐπισημαίνει γὰρ ὅτι εἰς πονηρὰν ψυχὴν ἀστεῖον λόγον ἐμβάλλειν οὐ προσῆκεν· ὁ μὲν γὰρ λόγος τροφὴ διανοίας ἐστί, τοῦτον δ' ἀκάθαρτον ἡ πονηρία ποιεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

" Μὴ ἐπιστρέφεσθαι ἐπὶ τοὺς ὅρους ἑλθόντας," τουτέστι μέλλοντας ἀποθνήσκειν καὶ τὸν ὅρον τοῦ βίου πλησίον ὄντα ὁρῶντας φέρειν εὐκόλως καὶ μὴ ἀθυμεῖν.

Ἀνακάμψω δ' ἐπὶ τὴν ἐξ ἀρχῆς τοῦ λόγου ὑπόθεσιν· ἁπάντων γὰρ ὅπερ ἔφην τῶν πονηρῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀπάγειν δεῖ τοὺς παῖδας, μάλιστα δὲ
13 τῶν κολάκων. ὅπερ γὰρ πολλάκις καὶ πρὸς πολλοὺς τῶν πατέρων διατελῶ λέγων, καὶ νῦν ἂν εἴποιμι. γένος οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐξωλέστερον οὐδὲ μᾶλλον καὶ θᾶττον ἐκτραχηλίζον νεότητα τῶν κολάκων, οἳ καὶ τοὺς πατέρας καὶ τοὺς παῖδας προρρίζους ἐκτρίβουσι, τῶν μὲν τὸ γῆρας ἐπίλυπον, τῶν δὲ τὴν νεότητα[2] ποιοῦντες, τῶν δὲ συμβουλευμάτων δέλεαρ ἀφύλακτον προτείνοντες τὴν ἡδονήν. τοῖς παισὶ τῶν πλουσίων οἱ πατέρες νήφειν παραινοῦσιν οἱ δὲ μεθύειν, σωφρονεῖν οἱ δ' ἀσελγαίνειν,

[1] ἤτοι added by Hercher from the *Paroemiog. Graec.* (ii. p. 760).

[2] νεότητα] Schneider would add ἐπονείδιστον.

"Do not provoke an angry man." Indeed, it is wrong to do so, and we should yield to men who are in a temper.

"Do not eat your heart"; as much as to say, "Do not injure your soul by wasting it with worries."

"Abstain from beans"; means that a man should keep out of politics, for beans were used in earlier times for voting upon the removal of magistrates from office.[a]

"Do not put food into a slop-pail"; signifies that it is not fitting to put clever speech into a base mind. For speech is the food of thought, and baseness in men makes it unclean.

"Do not turn back on reaching the boundaries"; that is, when people are about to die and see the boundary of their life close at hand, they should bear all this with serenity and not be faint-hearted.

I return to the subject suggested at the beginning of the chapter. As I said there, the young should be kept away from every sort of base men, and most of all from flatterers. Let me repeat here what I say over and over again to many fathers: There is no class of persons more pernicious than flatterers, nor any that more surely and quickly gives youth a nasty tumble. They utterly ruin both fathers and sons, bringing to sorrow the old age of those and the youth of these, and dangling pleasure as an irresistible lure to get their advice taken. To sons who are to inherit wealth fathers commend sobriety, flatterers drinking to excess; fathers commend self-restraint, flatterers profligacy; fathers

[a] A form of recall (ἀποχειροτονία); *cf.* Aristotle, *Constitution of Athens*, chap. 61.

(13) φυλάττειν οἱ δὲ δαπανᾶν, φιλεργεῖν οἱ δὲ ῥᾳθυμεῖν,
B "στιγμὴ χρόνου πᾶς ἐστιν ὁ βίος" λέγοντες.
"ζῆν οὐ παραζῆν προσῆκε. τί δὲ φροντιστέον
ἡμῖν τῶν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀπειλῶν; κρονόληρος καὶ
σοροδαίμων ἐστί, καὶ μετέωρον αὐτὸν ἀράμενοι
τὴν ταχίστην ἐξοίσομεν." καθῆκε δέ τις καὶ
χαμαιτύπην καὶ προηγώγευσε γαμετήν, καὶ τὰ τῶν
πατέρων ἐφόδια τοῦ γήρως ἐσύλησε καὶ περιέκοψε.
μιαρὸν τὸ φῦλον, ὑποκριταὶ φιλίας, ἄγευστοι
παρρησίας, πλουσίων μὲν κόλακες πενήτων δ' ὑπερόπται, ὡς ἐκ λυρικῆς τέχνης ἐπὶ τοὺς νέους
ἀγόμενοι, σεσηρότες ὅθ' οἱ τρέφοντες γελῶσι, καὶ
ψυχῆς[1] ὑποβολιμαῖα καὶ νόθα μέρη βίου, πρὸς δὲ
C τὸ τῶν πλουσίων νεῦμα ζῶντες, τῇ τύχῃ μὲν
ἐλεύθεροι, τῇ προαιρέσει δὲ δοῦλοι· ὅταν δὲ μὴ
ὑβρίζωνται, τόθ' ὑβρίζεσθαι δοκοῦντες, ὅτι μάτην
παρατρέφονται. ὥστ' εἴ τῳ μέλει τῶν πατέρων
τῆς τῶν τέκνων εὐαγωγίας, ἐκδιωκτέον τὰ μιαρὰ
ταῦτα θρέμματα, ἐκδιωκτέον δ' οὐχ ἥκιστα καὶ
τὰς τῶν συμφοιτητῶν μοχθηρίας· καὶ γὰρ οὗτοι
τὰς ἐπιεικεστάτας φύσεις ἱκανοὶ διαφθείρειν εἰσί.

18. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν καλὰ καὶ συμφέροντα· ἃ δὲ
D μέλλω λέγειν, ἀνθρώπινα. οὐδὲ γὰρ αὖ πάλιν
τοὺς πατέρας ἔγωγ' ἀξιῶ τελέως τραχεῖς καὶ
σκληροὺς εἶναι τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ πολλαχοῦ καὶ
συγχωρῆσαί τινα τῷ νεωτέρῳ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων,
καὶ ἑαυτοὺς ἀναμιμνῄσκειν ὅτι ἐγένοντο νέοι. καὶ
καθάπερ ἰατροὶ τὰ πικρὰ τῶν φαρμάκων τοῖς

[1] *τύχης* Wyttenbach.

[a] Apparently adapted from some comedy; *cf.* Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii. p. 643.

frugality, flatterers extravagance ; fathers industry, flatterers indolence, saying, "All life is but a moment. We must live, not merely exist.[a] Why should we give a thought to your father's threats ? He's an old twaddler with one foot already in the grave, and before long we'll take his coffin on our shoulders and carry him out." Another of them posts a drab in the young man's path, or prostitutes a married woman for him, and spoils and wastes the father's provision for old age. Detestable is their whole tribe, pretenders of friendship, without a vestige of honest speech, flatterers of the rich but despisers of the poor, addressing themselves with instinctive art to the young, grinning broadly when their patrons laugh, spurious claimants to any spirit, and bastard members of human life, subsisting at the beck and nod of the wealthy ; free-born by freak of fortune, but slaves by choice. Whenever they are not treated with insult, they feel themselves insulted because then they do not fulfil the purpose for which they are kept. So if any father is concerned for the good upbringing of his children, he must drive away these detestable creatures, and quite as much must he drive away schoolmates who show depravity, for these also are capable of corrupting the most likely natures.

18. Now all these rules concern honour and good profit, but what follows concerns human nature. Take the fathers again : I do not think they should be utterly harsh and austere in their nature, but they should in many cases concede some shortcomings to the younger person, and remind themselves that they once were young. As physicians, by mixing bitter drugs with sweet syrups, have

(13) γλυκέσι χυμοῖς καταμιγνύντες τὴν τέρψιν ἐπὶ τὸ συμφέρον πάροδον εὗρον, οὕτω δεῖ τοὺς πατέρας τὴν τῶν ἐπιτιμημάτων ἀποτομίαν τῇ πραότητι
E μιγνύναι, καὶ τοτὲ μὲν ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις τῶν παίδων ἐφεῖναι καὶ χαλάσαι τὰς ἡνίας, τοτὲ δ' αὖ πάλιν ἀντιτεῖναι, καὶ μάλιστα μὲν εὐκόλως φέρειν τὰς ἁμαρτίας, εἰ δὲ μή γε, πρὸς καιρὸν ὀργισθέντας ταχέως ἀποφλεγμῆναι. μᾶλλον γὰρ ὀξύθυμον εἶναι δεῖ τὸν πατέρα ἢ βαρύθυμον, ὡς τό γε δυσμενὲς καὶ δυσκατάλλακτον μισοτεκνίας οὐ μικρὸν τεκμήριόν ἐστι. καλὸν δὲ καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων μηδ' εἰδέναι δοκεῖν, ἀλλὰ τὸ τοῦ γήρως ἀμβλυῶττον καὶ δύσκωφον ἐπὶ τὰ γιγνόμενα μεταφέρειν, ὡς ἔνια τῶν πραττομένων ὁρῶντας μὴ ὁρᾶν καὶ μὴ ἀκούειν ἀκούοντας. φίλων ἁμαρτήματα φέρομεν· τί θαυμαστὸν εἰ τέκνων; δούλων πολλάκις κραιπαλώντων μέθην οὐκ ἐξηλέγξαμεν. ἐφείσω ποτέ, ἀλλὰ καὶ χορήγησον· ἠγανάκτησάς ποτε, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύγγνωθι. ἐβουκόλησέ ποτε δι' οἰκέτου· τὴν
F ὀργὴν κάτασχε.[1] ἐξ ἀγροῦ ποτε ζεῦγος ἀφείλετο, ἦλθέ ποτε χθιζῆς μέθης ἀποπνέων, ἀγνόησον· μύρων ὄζων, σίγησον. οὕτω σκιρτῶσα νεότης πωλοδαμνεῖται.

19. Πειρατέον δὲ τοὺς τῶν ἡδονῶν ἥττους καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἐπιτιμήσεις δυσηκόους γάμῳ καταζεῦξαι, δεσμὸς γὰρ οὗτος τῆς νεότητος ἀσφαλέστατος. ἐγγυᾶσθαι δὲ δεῖ τοῖς υἱέσι γυναῖκας μήτ' εὐγενε-

[1] κατάσχες Emperius.

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[a] Evidence that the young man had been out in mixed company.

found that the agreeable taste gains access for what is beneficial, so fathers should combine the abruptness of their rebukes with mildness, and at one time grant some licence to the desires of their children, and slacken the reins a little, and then at another time draw them tight again. Most desirable is it that they should bear misdeeds with serenity, but if that be impossible, yet, if they be on occasion angered, they should quickly cool down. For it is better that a father should be quick-tempered than sullen, since a hostile and irreconcilable spirit is no small proof of animosity towards one's children. It is a good thing also to pretend not to know of some shortcomings, and to turn the old man's dull eye and dull ear to what they do, and seeing, not to see, and, hearing, not to hear, sometimes, what goes on. Our friends' shortcomings we bear with: why should it be surprising that we bear with our children's? Though our slaves often suffer from a headache in the morning, we do not force them to confess a debauch. "You were niggardly once; well, now be liberal. You were indignant once; well, pardon now. He tricked you once with the help of a slave; restrain your anger. He once took away a yoke of cattle from the field, he once came home with breath reeking from yesterday's debauch; ignore it. Or smelling of perfume;[a] do not say a word." In this fashion is restive youth gradually broken to harness.

19. An effort should be made to yoke in marriage those who cannot resist their desires, and who are deaf to admonitions. For marriage is the most secure bond for youth. One should, however, betroth to his sons women who are not greatly

στέρας πολλῷ μήτε πλουσιωτέρας· τὸ γὰρ "τὴν κατὰ σαυτὸν ἔλα" σοφόν. ὡς οἵ γε μακρῷ κρείττους ἑαυτῶν λαμβάνοντες οὐ τῶν γυναικῶν
14 ἄνδρες, τῶν δὲ προικῶν δοῦλοι λανθάνουσι γιγνόμενοι.

20. Βραχέα δὲ προσθεὶς ἔτι περιγράψω τὰς ὑποθήκας. πρὸ πάντων γὰρ δεῖ τοὺς πατέρας τῷ μηδὲν ἁμαρτάνειν ἀλλὰ πάνθ' ἃ δεῖ πράττειν ἐναργὲς αὐτοὺς παράδειγμα τοῖς τέκνοις παρέχειν, ἵνα πρὸς τὸν τούτων βίον ὥσπερ κάτοπτρον ἀποβλέποντες ἀποτρέπωνται τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἔργων καὶ λόγων. ὡς οἵτινες τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν υἱοῖς ἐπιτιμῶντες τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι περιπίπτουσιν, ἐπὶ τῷ ἐκείνων ὀνόματι λανθάνουσιν ἑαυτῶν κατήγοροι γιγνόμενοι· τὸ δ' ὅλον φαύλως ζῶντες οὐδὲ τοῖς
B δούλοις παρρησίαν ἄγουσιν ἐπιτιμᾶν, μή τί γε τοῖς υἱοῖς. χωρὶς δὲ τούτων γένοιντ' ἂν αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀδικημάτων σύμβουλοι καὶ διδάσκαλοι. ὅπου γὰρ γέροντές εἰσιν ἀναίσχυντοι, ἐνταῦθ' ἀνάγκη καὶ νέους ἀναιδεστάτους εἶναι.

Πειρατέον οὖν εἰς τὸν τῶν τέκνων σωφρονισμὸν πάνθ' ὅσα προσῆκεν ἐπιτηδεύειν, ζηλώσαντας Εὐρυδίκην, ἥτις Ἰλλυρὶς οὖσα καὶ τριβάρβαρος, ὅμως ἐπὶ τῇ μαθήσει τῶν τέκνων ὠφὲ τῆς ἡλικίας ἥψατο παιδείας. ἱκανῶς δ' αὐτῆς τὴν φιλοτεκνίαν σημαίνει τοὐπίγραμμα, ὅπερ ἀνέθηκε Μούσαις.

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[a] The figure is said to be derived from the language of boys whipping tops. It is attributed to Pittacus by Diogenes

above them either in birth or wealth. The maxim "Keep to your own place"[a] is wise, since those who take to wife women far above themselves unwittingly become not the husbands of their wives, but the slaves of their wives' dowries.

20. I will add but little more and then conclude my suggestions. Fathers ought above all, by not misbehaving and by doing as they ought to do, to make themselves a manifest example to their children, so that the latter, by looking at their fathers' lives as at a mirror, may be deterred from disgraceful deeds and words. For those who are themselves involved in the same errors as those for which they rebuke their erring sons, unwittingly accuse themselves in their sons' name. If the life they lead is wholly bad, they are not free to admonish even their slaves, let alone their sons. Besides, they are likely to become counsellors and instructors to their sons in their wrongdoing. For, wherever old men are lacking in decency, young men too are sure to be most shameless.[b]

We must endeavour, therefore, to employ every proper device for the discipline of our children, emulating the example of Eurydice, who, although she was an Illyrian and an utter barbarian, yet late in life took up education in the interest of her children's studies. The inscription which she dedicated to the Muses sufficiently attests her love for her children :

[a] Laertius, i. 4. 8; *cf. The Palatine Anthology*, vii. 89 (in L.C.L. *The Greek Anthology*, vol. ii. p. 63). A similar expression (from the race-track) may be found in Aristophanes, *Clouds*, 25.

[b] Plato, *Laws*, 729 c; also cited or referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 71 B, 144 F and 272 C.

(14) Εὐρυδίκη Ἱεραπολιῆτις τόνδ' ἀνέθηκε
Μούσαις εὔιστον ψυχῇ ἑλοῦσα πόθον.
C γράμματα γὰρ μνημεῖα λόγων μήτηρ γεγαυῖα
παίδων ἡβώντων ἐξεπόνησε μαθεῖν.

Τὸ μὲν οὖν πάσας τὰς προειρημένας[1] συμπεριλαβεῖν εὐχῆς ἴσως ἢ παραινέσεως ἔργον ἐστί· τὸ δὲ τὰς πλείους ζηλῶσαι καὶ αὐτὸ μὲν εὐμοιρίας δεόμενόν ἐστι καὶ πολλῆς ἐπιμελείας, ἄνυστὸν δ' οὖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει καθέστηκεν.

[1] Some word like ἐπιμελείας has probably been lost after προειρημένας. Two mss. have παραινέσεις instead of ἢ παραινέσεως in the next line, and some editions have preferred it.

Eurydice of Hierapolis
Made to the Muses this her offering
When she had gained her soul's desire to learn.
Mother of young and lusty sons was she,
And by her diligence attained to learn
Letters, wherein lies buried all our lore.

Now to put into effect all the suggestions which I have given is the province of prayer, perhaps, or exhortation. And even to follow zealously the majority of them demands good fortune and much careful attention, but to accomplish this lies within the capability of man.

HOW THE YOUNG MAN SHOULD STUDY POETRY

(QUOMODO ADOLESCENS POETAS AUDIRE DEBEAT)

INTRODUCTION

PLUTARCH'S essay on the study of poetry is not a discussion of the essentials of poetry, nor an analysis of its various kinds after the manner of Aristotle's *Poetics*, but it is concerned with poetry only as a means of training the young in preparation for the study of philosophy later. Some experience with the adumbrations of philosophic doctrines which are to be found in poetry will, in the opinion of the author, make such doctrines seem less strange when they are met later in the actual study of philosophy.

This training is to be imparted, not by confining the reading to selected passages, but by teaching the young to recognize and ignore the false and fabulous in poetry, to choose always the better interpretation, and, in immoral passages where art is employed for art's sake, not to be deluded into approving vicious sentiments because of their artistic presentation. Such passages may be offset by other passages from the same author or from another author, and, as a last resort, one may try his hand at emending unsavoury lines to make them conform to a higher ethical standard. This last proposal seems to the modern reader a weak subterfuge, but it was a practice not unknown even before Plutarch's time.

Philology, in the narrower sense, Plutarch says, is a science in itself, and a knowledge of it is not

essential to an understanding of literature (a fact enunciated from time to time by modern educators as a new discovery). But, on the other hand, Plutarch strongly insists that an exact appreciation of words and of their meanings in different contexts is indispensable to the understanding of any work of poetry.

The various points in the essay are illustrated by plentiful quotations drawn in the main from Homer, Hesiod, Archilochus, Pindar, Simonides, Theognis, Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, and Menander. These are accompanied by many keen and intelligent observations (such, for example, as that regarding Paris), which attest Plutarch's wide and careful reading in the classical authors.

The fact that Plutarch does not use the methods of historical criticism will not escape the reader, and, although this seems to us a great defect in the essay, it is wholly in keeping with the spirit of Plutarch's age. On the other hand there is well shown the genial and kindly Plutarch, who wishes to believe only good of all men, including the poets, however much they may fall short of the standards set by the divine Homer.

D ΠΩΣ ΔΕΙ ΤΟΝ ΝΕΟΝ ΠΟΙΗΜΑΤΩΝ ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ

(14) 1. Εἰ μέν, ὡς Φιλόξενος ὁ ποιητὴς ἔλεγεν, ὦ
E Μάρκε Σήδατε,[1] τῶν κρεῶν τὰ μὴ κρέα ἥδιστά ἐστι καὶ τῶν ἰχθύων οἱ μὴ ἰχθύες, ἐκείνοις ἀποφαίνεσθαι παρῶμεν οἷς ὁ Κάτων ἔφη τῆς καρδίας τὴν ὑπερῴαν εὐαισθητοτέραν ὑπάρχειν. ὅτι δὲ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λεγομένων οἱ σφόδρα νέοι τοῖς μὴ δοκοῦσι φιλοσόφως μηδ' ἀπὸ σπουδῆς λέγεσθαι χαίρουσι μᾶλλον καὶ παρέχουσιν ὑπηκόους ἑαυτοὺς καὶ χειροήθεις, δῆλόν ἐστιν ἡμῖν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον τὰ Αἰσώπεια μυθάρια καὶ τὰς ποιητικὰς ὑποθέσεις ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Ἄβαριν τὸν Ἡρακλείδου καὶ τὸν Λύκωνα τὸν Ἀρίστωνος διερχόμενοι καὶ τὰ[2] περὶ τῶν ψυχῶν δόγματα μεμιγμένα μυθολογίᾳ μεθ'
F ἡδονῆς ἐνθουσιῶσι. διὸ δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἐν ταῖς περὶ ἐδωδὴν καὶ πόσιν ἡδοναῖς διαφυλάττειν εὐσχήμονας αὐτούς, ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν ταῖς ἀκροάσεσιν καὶ ἀναγνώσεσιν ἐθίζειν, ὥσπερ ὄψῳ χρωμένους μετρίως τῷ τέρποντι, τὸ χρήσιμον ἀπ' αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ σωτήριον διώκειν. οὔτε γὰρ πόλιν αἱ κε-

[1] Σήδατε Basel edition (1572): σήδαπε.
[2] καὶ τὰ Wyttenbach: τὰ.

HOW THE YOUNG MAN SHOULD STUDY POETRY

1. If, my dear Marcus Sedatus, it is true, as the poet Philoxenus used to say, that of meats those that are not meat, and of fish those that are not fish, have the best flavour, let us leave the expounding of this matter to those persons of whom Cato said that their palates are more sensitive than their minds. And so of philosophical discourses it is clear to us that those seemingly not at all philosophical, or even serious, are found more enjoyable by the very young, who present themselves at such lectures as willing and submissive hearers. For in perusing not only Aesop's *Fables*, and *Tales from the Poets*, but even the *Abaris* of Heracleides, the *Lycon* of Ariston, and philosophic doctrines about the soul when these are combined with tales from mythology,[a] they get inspiration as well as pleasure. Wherefore we ought not only to keep the young decorous in the pleasures of eating and drinking, but, even more, in connexion with what they hear and read, by using in moderation, as a relish, that which gives pleasure, we should accustom them to seek what is useful and salutary therein. For close-shut gates do not

[a] Plutarch probably has Plato in mind, and is thinking of passages like "The Last Judgement" (*Gorgias*, 523 ff.).

κλειμέναι πύλαι τηροῦσιν ἀνάλωτον, ἂν διὰ μιᾶς παραδέξηται τοὺς πολεμίους, οὔτε νέον αἱ περὶ
15 τὰς ἄλλας ἡδονὰς ἐγκράτειαι σῴζουσιν, ἂν τῇ[1] δι' ἀκοῆς λάθῃ προέμενος αὑτόν, ἀλλ' ὅσον μᾶλλον αὔτη τοῦ φρονεῖν καὶ λογίζεσθαι πεφυκότος ἅπτεται, τοσοῦτο μᾶλλον ἀμεληθεῖσα βλάπτει καὶ διαφθείρει τὸν παραδεξάμενον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν οὔτ' ἴσως δυνατόν ἐστιν οὔτ' ὠφέλιμον ποιημάτων ἀπείργειν τὸν τηλικοῦτον ἡλίκος οὑμός τε τὸ νῦν Σώκλαρός ἐστι καὶ ὁ σὸς Κλέανδρος, εὖ μάλα παραφυλάττωμεν αὐτούς, ὡς ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσι μᾶλλον ἢ ταῖς ὁδοῖς παιδαγωγίας δεομένους. ἃ δ' οὖν ἐμοὶ περὶ ποιημάτων εἰπεῖν πρῴην ἐπῆλθε, νῦν πρὸς σὲ
B γεγραμμένα πέμψαι διενοήθην. καὶ λαβὼν ταῦτα δίελθε, κἂν δοκῇ σοι μηδὲν εἶναι φαυλότερα τῶν ἀμεθύστων καλουμένων, ἅτινες ἐν τοῖς πότοις περιάπτονται καὶ προλαμβάνουσι, μεταδίδου τῷ Κλεάνδρῳ καὶ προκαταλάμβανε τὴν φύσιν αὐτοῦ διὰ τὸ μηδαμοῦ νωθρὸν ἀλλὰ πανταχοῦ σφοδρὸν καὶ δεδορκὸς εὐαγωγοτέραν ὑπὸ τῶν τοιούτων οὖσαν.

πουλύποδος κεφαλῇ ἕνι μὲν κακὸν ἐν δὲ καὶ ἐσθλόν,

ὅτι βρωθῆναι μέν ἐστιν ἥδιστος, δυσόνειρον δ' ὕπνον ποιεῖ, φαντασίας ταραχώδεις καὶ ἀλλοκότους
C δεχόμενον, ὡς λέγουσιν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ποιητικῇ πολὺ μὲν τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τρόφιμον νέου ψυχῆς ἔνεστιν,

[1] τῇ Hartman : γε.

[a] "Preventitives of intoxication"; herbs or seeds (Plutarch, *Symp.* 647 B, Athenaeus, 24 c), or nuts (Plutarch, *Symp.* 624 c) which were eaten, or stones (Pliny, *N.H.* xxxvii. 9. 124) which were hung about the neck, in the belief that they would resist drunkenness.

preserve a city from capture if it admit the enemy through one; nor does continence in the other pleasures of sense save a young man, if he unwittingly abandon himself to that which comes through hearing. On the contrary, inasmuch as this form of pleasure engages more closely the man that is naturally given to thought and reason, so much the more, if neglected, does it injure and corrupt him that receives it. Since, then, it is neither possible, perhaps, nor profitable to debar from poetry a boy as old as my Soclarus and your Cleander now are, let us keep a very close watch over them, in the firm belief that they require oversight in their reading even more than in the streets. Accordingly, I have made up my mind to commit to writing and to send to you some thoughts on poetry which it occurred to me recently to express. I beg that you will take them and peruse them, and if they seem to you to be no worse than the things called amethysts [a] which some persons on convivial occasions hang upon their persons or take beforehand, then impart them to Cleander, and thus forestall his natural disposition, which, because it is slow in nothing, but impetuous and lively in everything, is more subject to such influences.

Bad may be found in the head of the cuttle-fish; good there is also,[b]

because it is very pleasant to eat but it makes one's sleep full of bad dreams and subject to strange and disturbing fancies, as they say. Similarly also in the art of poetry there is much that is pleasant and nourishing for the mind of a youth, but quite as much

[b] *Cf.* Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroemiographi Graeci*, i. p. 299; Plutarch, *Moralia*, 734 E.

(15) οὐκ ἔλαττον δὲ τὸ ταρακτικὸν καὶ παράφορον, ἂν μὴ τυγχάνῃ παιδαγωγίας ὀρθῆς ἡ ἀκρόασις. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ὡς ἔοικε περὶ τῆς Αἰγυπτίων χώρας ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τῆς ποιητικῆς ἔστιν εἰπεῖν ὅτι

φάρμακα, πολλὰ μὲν ἐσθλὰ μεμιγμένα πολλὰ δὲ λυγρὰ

τοῖς χρωμένοις ἀναδίδωσιν.

ἔνθ' ἔνι μὲν φιλότης, ἐν δ' ἵμερος, ἐν δ' ὀαριστὺς
πάρφασις, ἥ τ' ἔκλεψε νόον πύκα περ φρονεόντων.

οὐ γὰρ ἅπτεται τὸ ἀπατηλὸν αὐτῆς ἀβελτέρων κο-
D μιδῇ καὶ ἀνοήτων. διὸ καὶ Σιμωνίδης μὲν ἀπεκρί-
νατο πρὸς τὸν εἰπόντα "τί δὴ μόνους οὐκ ἐξαπατᾷς
Θετταλούς;" "ἀμαθέστεροι γάρ εἰσιν ἢ ὡς ὑπ'
ἐμοῦ ἐξαπατᾶσθαι." Γοργίας δὲ τὴν τραγῳδίαν
εἶπεν ἀπάτην, ἣν ὅ τ' ἀπατήσας δικαιότερος τοῦ
μὴ ἀπατήσαντος καὶ ὁ ἀπατηθεὶς σοφώτερος τοῦ
μὴ ἀπατηθέντος. πότερον οὖν τῶν νέων ὥσπερ
τῶν Ἰθακησίων σκληρῷ[1] τινι τὰ ὦτα καὶ ἀτέγκτῳ
κηρῷ καταπλάττοντες ἀναγκάζωμεν αὐτοὺς τὸ
Ἐπικούρειον ἀκάτιον ἀραμένους ποιητικὴν φεύγειν
καὶ παρεξελαύνειν, ἢ μᾶλλον ὀρθῷ τινι λογισμῷ
παριστάντες καὶ καταδέοντες, τὴν κρίσιν, ὅπως
μὴ παραφέρηται τῷ τέρποντι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον,
ἀπευθύνωμεν καὶ παραφυλάττωμεν;

E οὐδὲ γὰρ οὐδὲ Δρύαντος υἱὸς κρατερὸς Λυκόοργος

ὑγιαίνοντα νοῦν εἶχεν, ὅτι πολλῶν μεθυσκομένων
καὶ παροινούντων τὰς ἀμπέλους περιὼν ἐξέκοπτεν
ἀντὶ τοῦ τὰς κρήνας ἐγγυτέρω προσαγαγεῖν καὶ

[1] σκληρῷ Mehler: κηρῷ.

that is disturbing and misleading, unless in the hearing of it he have proper oversight. For it may be said, as it seems, not only of the land of the Egyptians but also of poetry, that it yields

Drugs, and some are good when mixed and others baneful [a]

to those who cultivate it.

Hidden therein are love and desire and winning converse,
Suasion that steals away the mind of the very wisest.[b]

For the element of deception in it does not gain any hold on utterly witless and foolish persons. This is the ground of Simonides' answer to the man who said to him, "Why are the Thessalians the only people whom you do not deceive?" His answer was, "Oh, they are too ignorant to be deceived by me"; and Gorgias called tragedy a deception wherein he who deceives is more honest than he who does not deceive, and he who is deceived is wiser than he who is not deceived. Shall we then stop the ears of the young, as those of the Ithacans were stopped, with a hard and unyielding wax, and force them to put to sea in the Epicurean boat, and avoid poetry and steer their course clear of it; or rather shall we set them against some upright standard of reason and there bind them fast, guiding and guarding their judgement, that it may not be carried away from the course by pleasure towards that which will do them hurt?

No, not even Lycurgus, the mighty son of Dryas [c]

had sound sense, because, when many became drunk and violent, he went about uprooting the grape-vines instead of bringing the springs of water nearer,

[a] Homer, *Od.* iv. 230.
[b] Homer, *Il.* xiv. 216.
[c] Homer, *Il.* vi. 130.

"μαινόμενον" θεόν, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, "ἑτέρῳ θεῷ νήφοντι[1] κολαζόμενον" σωφρονίζειν. ἀφαιρεῖ γὰρ ἡ κρᾶσις τοῦ οἴνου τὸ βλάπτον, οὐ συναναιροῦσα τὸ χρήσιμον. μηδ' ἡμεῖς οὖν τὴν ποιητικὴν
F ἡμερίδα τῶν Μουσῶν ἐκκόπτωμεν μηδ' ἀφανίζωμεν, ἀλλ' ὅπου μὲν ὑφ' ἡδονῆς ἀκράτου πρὸς δόξαν αὐθάδως θρασυνόμενον ἐξυβρίζει καὶ ὑλομανεῖ τὸ μυθῶδες αὐτῆς καὶ θεατρικόν, ἐπιλαμβανόμενοι κολούωμεν καὶ πιέζωμεν· ὅπου δ' ἅπτεταί τινος μούσης τῇ χάριτι καὶ τὸ γλυκὺ τοῦ λόγου καὶ ἀγωγὸν οὐκ ἄκαρπόν ἐστιν οὐδὲ κενόν, ἐνταῦθα φιλοσοφίαν εἰσάγωμεν καὶ καταμιγνύωμεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ μανδραγόρας ταῖς ἀμπέλοις παραφυόμενος καὶ διαδιδοὺς τὴν δύναμιν εἰς τὸν οἶνον μαλακωτέραν ποιεῖ τὴν καταφορὰν τοῖς πίνουσιν, οὕτω τοὺς λόγους ἡ ποίησις ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἀναλαμβάνουσα μιγνυμένους πρὸς τὸ μυθῶδες ἐλαφρὰν καὶ προσφιλῆ παρέχει τοῖς νέοις τὴν μάθησιν. ὅθεν οὐ φευκτέον ἐστὶ τὰ ποιήματα τοῖς φιλοσοφεῖν μέλλουσιν, ἀλλὰ προφιλοσοφητέον τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐθι-
16 ζομένους ἐν τῷ τέρποντι τὸ χρήσιμον ζητεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν· εἰ δὲ μή, διαμάχεσθαι καὶ δυσχεραίνειν. ἀρχὴ γὰρ αὕτη παιδεύσεως,

> ἔργου δὲ παντὸς ἦν τις ἄρχηται καλῶς,
> καὶ τὰς τελευτὰς εἰκὸς ἐσθ' οὕτως ἔχειν

κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα.

2. Πρῶτον μὲν οὖν εἰσάγειν εἰς τὰ ποιήματα δεῖ τὸν νέον μηδὲν οὕτω μεμελετημένον ἔχοντα καὶ

[1] ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἑτέρου θεοῦ Plato, *Laws*, 773 D.

[a] Plato, *Laws*, 773 D.

and thus chastening the "frenzied god," as Plato says, "through correction by another, a sober, god." [a] For the tempering of wine with water removes its harmfulness without depriving it at the same time of its usefulness. So let us not root up or destroy the Muses' vine of poetry, but where the mythical and dramatic part grows all riotous [b] and luxuriant, through pleasure unalloyed, which gives it boldness and obstinacy in seeking acclaim, let us take it in hand and prune it and pinch it back. But where with its grace it approaches a true kind of culture, and the sweet allurement of its language is not fruitless or vacuous, there let us introduce philosophy and blend it with poetry. For as the mandragora, when it grows beside the vine and imparts its influence to the wine, makes this weigh less heavily on those who drink it, so poetry, by taking up its themes from philosophy and blending them with fable, renders the task of learning light and agreeable for the young. Wherefore poetry should not be avoided by those who are intending to pursue philosophy, but they should use poetry as an introductory exercise in philosophy, by training themselves habitually to seek the profitable in what gives pleasure, and to find satisfaction therein; and if there be nothing profitable, to combat such poetry and be dissatisfied with it. For this is the beginning of education,

> If one begin each task in proper way
> So is it likely will the ending be,[c]

as Sophocles says.

2. First of all, then, the young man should be introduced into poetry with nothing in his mind so

[b] *Cf.* Theophrastus, *De causis plantarum*, iii. 1. 5.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 747.

(16) πρόχειρον ὡς τὸ "πολλὰ ψεύδονται ἀοιδοὶ" τὰ μὲν ἑκόντες τὰ δ' ἄκοντες. ἑκόντες μέν, ὅτι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἀκοῆς καὶ χάριν, ἣν οἱ πλεῖστοι διώκουσιν,
B αὐστηροτέραν ἡγοῦνται τὴν ἀλήθειαν τοῦ ψεύδους. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἔργῳ γιγνομένη, κἂν ἀτερπὲς ἔχῃ τὸ τέλος, οὐκ ἐξίσταται· τὸ δὲ πλαττόμενον λόγῳ ῥᾷστα περιχωρεῖ καὶ τρέπεται πρὸς τὸ ἥδιον ἐκ τοῦ λυποῦντος. οὔτε γὰρ μέτρον οὔτε τρόπος οὔτε λέξεως ὄγκος οὔτ' εὐκαιρία μεταφορᾶς οὔθ' ἁρμονία καὶ σύνθεσις ἔχει τοσοῦτον αἱμυλίας καὶ χάριτος ὅσον εὖ πεπλεγμένη διάθεσις μυθολογίας·
C ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν γραφαῖς κινητικώτερόν ἐστι χρῶμα γραμμῆς διὰ τὸ ἀνδρείκελον καὶ ἀπατηλόν, οὕτως ἐν ποιήμασι μεμιγμένον πιθανότητι ψεῦδος ἐκπλήττει καὶ ἀγαπᾶται μᾶλλον τῆς ἀμύθου καὶ ἁπλάστου περὶ μέτρον καὶ λέξιν κατασκευῆς. ὅθεν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔκ τινων ἐνυπνίων ποιητικῆς ἁψάμενος αὐτὸς μέν, ἅτε δὴ γεγονὼς ἀληθείας ἀγωνιστὴς τὸν ἅπαντα βίον, οὐ πιθανὸς ἦν οὐδ' εὐφυὴς ψευδῶν δημιουργός, τοὺς δ' Αἰσώπου μύθους ἔπεσιν ἐνήρμοζεν[1] ὡς ποίησιν οὐκ οὖσαν ᾗ ψεῦδος μὴ πρόσεστι. θυσίας μὲν γὰρ ἀχόρους καὶ ἀναύλους ἴσμεν, οὐκ ἴσμεν δ' ἄμυθον οὐδ' ἀψευδῆ ποίησιν. τὰ δ' Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἔπη καὶ Παρμενίδου καὶ θηριακὰ Νικάνδρου καὶ γνωμολογίαι Θεόγνιδος λόγοι εἰσὶ κιχράμενοι[2] παρὰ ποιητικῆς ὥσπερ

[1] *μύθους ἔπεσιν ἐνέτεινεν* Hercher, *ἐνήρμοζεν* Wyttenbach: *τοῖς ἔπεσι μύθους ἐνόμιζεν.*
[2] *κιχράμενοι* Madvig: *κεχρημένοι.*

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[a] Proverbial: *cf.* Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, i. 2.
[b] *Cf.* Plato, *Phaedo*, 60 A.

well imprinted, or so ready at hand, as the saying, "Many the lies the poets tell,"[a] some intentionally and some unintentionally; intentionally, because for the purpose of giving pleasure and gratification to the ear (and this is what most people look for in poetry) they feel that the truth is too stern in comparison with fiction. For the truth, because it is what actually happens, does not deviate from its course, even though the end be unpleasant; whereas fiction, being a verbal fabrication, very readily follows a roundabout route, and turns aside from the painful to what is more pleasant. For not metre nor figure of speech nor loftiness of diction nor aptness of metaphor nor unity of composition has so much allurement and charm, as a clever interweaving of fabulous narrative. But, just as in pictures, colour is more stimulating than line-drawing because it is life-like, and creates an illusion, so in poetry falsehood combined with plausibility is more striking, and gives more satisfaction, than the work which is elaborate in metre and diction, but devoid of myth and fiction. This explains why Socrates, being induced by some dreams to take up poetry, since he was not himself a plausible or naturally clever workman in falsehood, inasmuch as he had been the champion of truth all his life, put into verse the fables of Aesop,[b] assuming that there can be no poetic composition which has no addition of falsehood. It is true that we know of sacrifices without dancing or flute, but we do not know of any poetic composition without fable or without falsehood. The verses of Empedocles and of Parmenides, the *Antidotes against Poisons* of Nicander, and the maxims of Theognis, are merely compositions which have borrowed from poetic

(16) ὄχημα τὸ μέτρον καὶ τὸν ὄγκον, ἵνα τὸ πεζὸν
D διαφύγωσιν. ὅταν οὖν ἄτοπόν τι καὶ δυσχερὲς
ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι λέγηται περὶ θεῶν ἢ δαιμόνων
ἢ ἀρετῆς ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἐλλογίμου καὶ δόξαν ἔχοντος,
ὁ μὲν ὡς ἀληθῆ προσδεξάμενος λόγον οἴχεται
φερόμενος καὶ διέφθαρται τὴν δόξαν, ὁ δὲ μεμνη-
μένος ἀεὶ καὶ κατέχων ἐναργῶς τῆς ποιητικῆς τὴν
περὶ τὸ ψεῦδος γοητείαν καὶ δυνάμενος λέγειν
ἑκάστοτε πρὸς αὐτὴν

"ὦ μηχάνημα λυγκὸς[1] αἰολώτερον,

τί παίζουσα τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγεις, τί δ' ἐξαπατῶσα
E προσποιῇ διδάσκειν;" οὐδὲν πείσεται δεινὸν οὐδὲ
πιστεύσει φαῦλον, ἀλλ' ἐπιλήψεται μὲν αὐτοῦ
φοβουμένου τὸν Ποσειδῶνα καὶ ταρβοῦντος μὴ
τὴν γῆν ἀναρρήξῃ καὶ ἀπογυμνώσῃ τὸν Ἅιδην,
ἐπιλήψεται δὲ τῷ Ἀπόλλωνι χαλεπαίνοντος ὑπὲρ
τοῦ πρώτου τῶν Ἀχαιῶν,

ὃν[2] αὐτὸς ὑμνῶν αὐτὸς ἐν δαίτῃ[2] παρὼν
αὐτὸς τάδ' εἰπὼν αὐτός ἐστιν ὁ κτανών,

παύσεται δὲ τὸν φθιτὸν Ἀχιλλέα καὶ τὸν Ἀγα-
μέμνονα τὸν καθ' Ἅιδου δακρύων, ἀδυνάτους καὶ
ἀσθενεῖς χεῖρας ἐπιθυμίᾳ τοῦ ζῆν ὀρέγοντας. ἂν
δέ που συνταράττηται τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ κρατῆται
φαρματτόμενος, οὐκ ὀκνήσει πρὸς ἑαυτὸν εἰπεῖν

[1] λυγκὸς Nauck: λυγγὸς.
[2] ὁ δ' . . . *θοίνῃ* Plato, *Rep.* 383 B.

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[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *adesp.* No. 349.
[b] Homer, *Iliad*, xx. 60.
[c] Spoken by Thetis of the death of her son Achilles,

art its metre and lofty style as a vehicle in order to avoid plodding along in prose. Whenever, therefore, in the poems of a man of note and repute some strange and disconcerting statement either about gods or lesser deities or about virtue is made by the author, he who accepts the statement as true is carried off his feet, and has his opinions perverted; whereas he who always remembers and keeps clearly in mind the sorcery of the poetic art in dealing with falsehood, who is able on every such occasion to say to it,

> "Device more subtly cunning than the lynx,[a]

why knit your brows when jesting, why pretend to instruct when practising deception?" will not suffer any dire effects or even acquire any base beliefs, but he will check himself when he feels afraid of Poseidon [b] and is in terror lest the god rend the earth asunder and lay bare the nether world; he will check himself when he is feeling wroth at Apollo in behalf of the foremost of the Achaeans,

> Whose praises he himself did sing, himself
> Was present at the feast, these words he spoke
> Himself, and yet himself brought death to him;[c]

he will cease to shed tears over the dead Achilles and over Agamemnon [d] in the nether world, as they stretch out their impotent and feeble arms in their desire to be alive; and if, perchance, he is beginning to be disturbed by their suffering and overcome by the enchantment, he will not hesitate to say to himself,

as we are told by Plato, *Republic*, ii. p. 383 B, who quotes the passage more fully. *Cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Aeschylus*, No. 350.

[d] Homer, *Od.* xi. 470 and 390.

ἀλλὰ φόωσδε τάχιστα λιλαίεο· ταῦτα δὲ πάντα
F ἴσθ', ἵνα καὶ μετόπισθε τεῇ εἴπῃσθα γυναικί.

καὶ γὰρ τοῦτο χαριέντως Ὅμηρος εἰς τὴν νέκυιαν εἶπεν, ὡς γυναικὸς ἀκρόασιν οὖσαν διὰ τὸ μυθῶδες. Τοιαῦτα γάρ ἐστιν ἃ πλάττουσιν ἑκόντες οἱ ποιηταί· πλείονα δ' ἃ μὴ πλάττοντες ἀλλ' οἰόμενοι καὶ δοξάζοντες αὐτοὶ προσαναχρώννυνται τὸ ψεῦδος ἡμῖν· οἷον ἐπὶ τοῦ Διὸς εἰρηκότος Ὁμήρου

17 ἐν δ' ἐτίθει δύο κῆρε τανηλεγέος θανάτοιο,
τὴν μὲν Ἀχιλλῆος τὴν δ' Ἕκτορος ἱπποδάμοιο,
ἔλκε δὲ μέσσα λαβών· ῥέπε δ' Ἕκτορος αἴσιμον
ἦμαρ,
ᾤχετο δ' εἰς Ἀίδαο, λίπεν δέ ἑ Φοῖβος Ἀπόλλων,

τραγῳδίαν ὁ Αἰσχύλος ὅλην τῷ μύθῳ περιέθηκεν, ἐπιγράψας Ψυχοστασίαν καὶ παραστήσας ταῖς πλάστιγξι τοῦ Διὸς ἔνθεν μὲν τὴν Θέτιν ἔνθεν δὲ τὴν Ἠῶ, δεομένας ὑπὲρ τῶν υἱέων μαχομένων. τοῦτο δὲ παντὶ δῆλον ὅτι μυθοποίημα καὶ πλάσμα πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ἔκπληξιν ἀκροατοῦ γέγονε. τὸ δὲ

B Ζεύς, ὅς τ' ἀνθρώπων ταμίης πολέμοιο τέτυκται

καὶ τὸ

θεὸς μὲν αἰτίαν φύει βροτοῖς,
ὅταν κακῶσαι δῶμα παμπήδην θέλῃ,

ταῦτα δ' ἤδη κατὰ δόξαν εἴρηται καὶ πίστιν αὐτῶν, ἣν ἔχουσιν ἀπάτην περὶ θεῶν καὶ ἄγνοιαν εἰς ἡμᾶς

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[a] Homer, *Od.* xi. 223. [b] Homer, *Il.* xxii. 210.
[c] *Ibid.* iv. 84.

Hasten eager to the light, and all you saw here
Lay to heart that you may tell your wife hereafter.[a]

Certainly Homer has put this gracefully in reference to the visit to the shades, indicating that it is fit stuff for a woman's ear because of the element of fable in it.

Such things as this are what the poets fabricate intentionally, but more numerous are the things which they do not fabricate, but think and believe in their own hearts, and then impart to us in their false colouring. Take for example what Homer has said relating to Zeus:

In the scales he placed two fates of Death so grievous,
One of Achilles and the other of horse-taming Hector;
Grasping the middle he poised it, and Hector's fated day descended.
Down to Hades he went, and Phoebus Apollo forsook him.[b]

Now Aeschylus has fitted a whole tragedy to this story, giving it the title of *The Weighing of Souls*, and has placed beside the scales of Zeus on the one side Thetis, and on the other Dawn, entreating for their sons who are fighting. But it is patent to everybody that this is a mythical fabrication which has been created to please or astound the hearer. But in the lines

Zeus, appointed to decide the outcome of men's fighting[c]

and

A fault doth God create in men
Whene'er he wills to crush a house in woe,[d]

we have at last statements in accord with their opinion and belief, as they thus publish to us and try to make us share their delusion and ignorance

[a] From the *Niobe* of Aeschylus; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Aeschylus*, No. 156.

(17) ἐκφερόντων καὶ μεταδιδόντων. πάλιν αἱ περὶ τὰς νεκυίας τερατουργίαι καὶ διαθέσεις ὀνόμασι φοβεροῖς ἐνδημιουργοῦσαι φάσματα καὶ εἴδωλα ποταμῶν φλεγομένων καὶ τόπων ἀγρίων καὶ κολασμάτων σκυθρωπῶν οὐ πάνυ πολλοὺς διαλανθάνουσιν ὅτι τὸ μυθῶδες αὐτοῖς πολὺ καὶ τὸ ψεῦδος ὥσπερ τροφαῖς τὸ φαρμακῶδες ἐγκέκραται. καὶ οὔθ' Ὅμηρος οὔτε Πίνδαρος οὔτε Σοφοκλῆς πεπεισμένοι ταῦτ' ἔχειν οὕτως ἔγραψαν·

ἔνθεν τὸν ἄπειρον ἐρεύγονται σκότον
βληχροὶ δνοφερᾶς νυκτὸς ποταμοί,

καὶ

πὰρ δ' ἴσαν Ὠκεανοῦ τε ῥοὰς καὶ Λευκάδα πέτρην,

καὶ

στενωπὸς Ἄιδου καὶ παλιρροία βυθοῦ.

ὅσοι μέντοι τὸν θάνατον ὡς οἰκτρὸν ἢ τὴν ἀταφίαν ὡς δεινὸν ὀλοφυρόμενοι καὶ δεδιότες φωνὰς ἐξενηνόχασι

μή μ' ἄκλαυτον ἄθαπτον ἰὼν ὄπιθεν καταλείπειν

καὶ

ψυχὴ δ' ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἀϊδόσδε βεβήκει,
ὃν πότμον γοόωσα, λιποῦσ' ἀδρότητα[1] καὶ ἥβην

καὶ

μή μ' ἀπολέσῃς ἄωρον· ἡδὺ γὰρ τὸ φῶς
λεύσσειν· τὰ δ' ὑπὸ γῆς μή μ' ἰδεῖν ἀναγκάσῃς,

αὗται πεπονθότων εἰσὶ καὶ προεαλωκότων ὑπὸ

[1] ἀνδροτῆτα in most mss. of Homer.

[a] Pindar, *Frag.* 130 Christ. [b] Homer, *Od.* xxiv. 11.

regarding the gods. Then again the monstrous tales of visits to the shades, and the descriptions, which in awful language create spectres and pictures of blazing rivers and hideous places and grim punishments, do not blind very many people to the fact that fable and falsehood in plenty have been mingled with them like poison in nourishing food. And not Homer nor Pindar nor Sophocles really believed that these things are so when they wrote :

> From there the slow-moving rivers of dusky night
> Belch forth a darkness immeasurable,[a]

and

> On past Ocean's streams they went and the headland of Leucas,[b]

and

> The narrow throat of Hades and the refluent depths.[c]

However, take the case of those who, bewailing and fearing death as something piteous, or want of burial as something terrible, have given utterance to sentiments like these :

> Go not hence and leave me behind unwept, unburied,[d]

and

> Forth from his body went his soul on wing to Hades,
> Mourning its fate and leaving its vigour and manhood,[e]

and

> Destroy me not untimely ; for 'tis sweet
> To see the light. Compel me not to gaze
> Upon the regions underneath the earth.[f]

These are the voices of persons affected by emotion

[a] *Cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 748.
[b] Homer, *Od.* xi. 72. [c] Homer, *Il.* xvi. 856 and xxii. 362.
[d] Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 1218.

(17) δόξης καὶ ἀπάτης. διὸ μᾶλλον ἅπτονται καὶ διαταράττουσιν ἡμᾶς, ἀναπιμπλαμένους τοῦ πάθους καὶ τῆς ἀσθενείας ἀφ' ἧς λέγονται. πρὸς ταῦτα δὴ πάλιν παρασκευάζωμεν εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἔχειν ἔναυλον ὅτι ποιητικῇ μὲν οὐ πάνυ μέλον ἐστὶ τῆς ἀληθείας, ἡ δὲ περὶ ταῦτ' ἀλήθεια καὶ τοῖς μηδὲν
E ἄλλο πεποιημένοις ἔργον ἢ γνῶσιν καὶ μάθησιν τοῦ ὄντος εὖ μάλα δυσθήρατός ἐστι καὶ δύσληπτος, ὡς ὁμολογοῦσιν αὐτοί. καὶ τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους ἔστω πρόχειρα ταυτί·

οὔτως οὔτ' ἐπιδερκτὰ τάδ' ἀνδράσιν οὔτ' ἐπακουστὰ
οὔτε νόῳ περιληπτά,

καὶ τὰ Ξενοφάνους·

καὶ τὸ μὲν οὖν σαφὲς οὔτις ἀνὴρ γένετ' οὐδέ τις
ἔσται
F εἰδὼς ἀμφὶ θεῶν τε καὶ ἄσσα λέγω περὶ πάντων,

καὶ νὴ Δία τὰ Σωκράτους ἐξομνυμένου παρὰ Πλάτωνι τὴν περὶ τούτων γνῶσιν. ἧττον γὰρ ὡς εἰδόσι τι περὶ τούτων προσέξουσι τοῖς ποιηταῖς ἐν οἷς τοὺς φιλοσόφους ἰλιγγιῶντας ὁρῶσιν.

3. Ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιστήσομεν αὐτὸν ἅμα τῷ προσάγειν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ὑπογράφοντες τὴν ποιητικὴν ὅτι μιμητικὴ τέχνη καὶ δύναμίς ἐστιν ἀντίστροφος τῇ ζωγραφίᾳ. καὶ μὴ μόνον ἐκεῖνο τὸ

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[a] The passage is quoted more fully by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* vii. 122-4; *cf.* Diels, *Poetarum Philosophorum Fragmenta*, *Empedocles*, No. 2.

[b] Quoted with two additional lines by Sextus Empiricus, *Adv. math.* vii. 49; *cf.* Diels, *Poet. Philos. Frag.*, *Xenophanes*, No. 34.

and prepossessed by opinions and delusions. For this reason such sentiments take a more powerful hold on us and disturb us the more, inasmuch as we become infected by their emotions and by the weakness from whence they proceed. Against these influences, then, once more let us equip the young from the very outset to keep ever sounding in their ears the maxim, that the art of poetry is not greatly concerned with the truth, and that the truth about these matters, even for those who have made it their sole business to search out and understand the verities, is exceedingly hard to track down and hard to get hold of, as they themselves admit; and let these words of Empedocles be constantly in mind:

> Thus no eye of man hath seen nor ear hath heard this,
> Nor can it be comprehended by the mind,[a]

and the words of Xenophanes:

> Never yet was born a man nor ever shall be
> Knowing the truth about the gods and what I say of all things,[b]

and by all means the words of Socrates, in Plato,[c] when he solemnly disavows all acquaintance with these subjects. For young people then will give less heed to the poets, as having some knowledge of these matters, when they see that such questions stagger the philosophers.

3. We shall steady the young man still more if, at his first entrance into poetry, we give a general description of the poetic art as an imitative art and faculty analogous to painting. And let him not

[c] Plato, *Phaedo*, 69 D.

θρυλούμενον ἀκηκοὼς ἔστω, ζωγραφίαν μὲν εἶναι
18 φθεγγομένην τὴν ποίησιν, ποίησιν δὲ σιγῶσαν τὴν
ζωγραφίαν, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τοῦτῳ διδάσκωμεν αὐτὸν
ὅτι γεγραμμένην σαύραν ἢ πίθηκον ἢ Θερσίτου
πρόσωπον ἰδόντες ἡδόμεθα καὶ θαυμάζομεν οὐχ
ὡς καλὸν ἀλλ' ὡς ὅμοιον. οὐσίᾳ μὲν γὰρ οὐ
δύναται καλὸν γενέσθαι τὸ αἰσχρόν· ἡ δὲ μίμησις,
ἄν τε περὶ φαῦλον ἄν τε περὶ χρηστὸν ἐφίκηται τῆς
ὁμοιότητος, ἐπαινεῖται. καὶ τοὐναντίον ἂν αἰσχροῦ
σώματος εἰκόνα καλὴν παράσχῃ, τὸ πρέπον καὶ τὸ
εἰκὸς οὐκ ἀπέδωκεν. γράφουσι δὲ καὶ πράξεις
ἀτόπους ἔνιοι, καθάπερ Τιμόμαχος τὴν Μηδείας
τεκνοκτονίαν καὶ Θέων τὴν Ὀρέστου μητροκτονίαν
καὶ Παρράσιος τὴν Ὀδυσσέως προσποίητον μανίαν
B καὶ Χαιρεφάνης ἀκολάστους ὁμιλίας γυναικῶν
πρὸς ἄνδρας. ἐν οἷς μάλιστα δεῖ τὸν νέον ἐθίζεσθαι,
διδασκόμενον ὅτι τὴν πρᾶξιν οὐκ ἐπαινοῦμεν ἧς
γέγονεν ἡ μίμησις, ἀλλὰ τὴν τέχνην εἰ μεμίμηται
προσηκόντως τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν καὶ
ποιητικὴ πολλάκις ἔργα φαῦλα καὶ πάθη μοχθηρὰ
καὶ ἤθη μιμητικῶς ἀπαγγέλλει, δεῖ τὸ θαυμα-
ζόμενον ἐν τούτοις καὶ κατορθούμενον μήτ' ἀπο-
δέχεσθαι τὸν νέον ὡς ἀληθὲς μήτε δοκιμάζειν ὡς
καλόν, ἀλλ' ἐπαινεῖν μόνον ὡς ἐναρμόττον τῷ
ὑποκειμένῳ προσώπῳ καὶ οἰκεῖον. ὥσπερ γὰρ
ὑὸς βοὴν καὶ ψόφον τροχιλίας καὶ πνευμάτων
C ῥοῖζον καὶ θαλάττης κτύπον ἀκούοντες ἐνοχλούμεθα
καὶ δυσχεραίνομεν, ἂν δέ τις πιθανῶς ταῦτα
μιμῆται, καθάπερ Παρμένων τὴν ὗν καὶ Θεόδωρος
τὰς τροχιλίας, ἡδόμεθα· καὶ νοσώδη μὲν ἄνθρωπον

merely be acquainted with the oft-repeated saying that " poetry is articulate painting, and painting is inarticulate poetry," but let us teach him in addition that when we see a lizard or an ape or the face of Thersites in a picture, we are pleased with it and admire it, not as a beautiful thing, but as a likeness. For by its essential nature the ugly cannot become beautiful ; but the imitation, be it concerned with what is base or with what is good, if only it attain to the likeness, is commended. If, on the other hand, it produces a beautiful picture of an ugly body, it fails to give what propriety and probability require. Some painters even depict unnatural acts, as Timomachus painted a picture of Medea slaying her children, and Theon of Orestes slaying his mother, and Parrhasius of the feigned madness of Odysseus, and Chaerephanes of the lewd commerce of women with men. In these matters it is especially necessary that the young man should be trained by being taught that what we commend is not the action which is the subject of the imitation, but the art, in case the subject in hand has been properly imitated. Since, then, poetry also often gives an imitative recital of base deeds, or of wicked experiences and characters, the young man must not accept as true what is admired and successful therein, nor approve it as beautiful, but should simply commend it as fitting and proper to the character in hand. For just as when we hear the squealing of a pig, the creaking of a windlass, the whistling of the winds, and the booming of the sea, we are uneasy and annoyed ; but if anybody gives a plausible imitation of these, as Parmeno imitated a pig, and Theodorus a windlass, we are pleased ; and just as we avoid a diseased and ulcerous person

(18) καὶ ὕπουλον ὡς ἀτερπὲς θέαμα φεύγομεν, τὸν δ' Ἀριστοφῶντος Φιλοκτήτην καὶ τὴν Σιλανίωνος Ἰοκάστην ὁμοίους φθίνουσι καὶ ἀποθνήσκουσι πεποιημένους ὁρῶντες χαίρομεν· οὕτως ὁ νέος ἀναγιγνώσκων ἃ Θερσίτης ὁ γελωτοποιὸς ἢ Σίσυφος ὁ φθορεὺς ἢ Βάτραχος ὁ πορνοβοσκὸς λέγων
D ἢ πράττων πεποίηται, διδασκέσθω τὴν μιμουμένην ταῦτα δύναμιν καὶ τέχνην ἐπαινεῖν, ἃς δὲ διαθέσεις καὶ πράξεις μιμεῖται καὶ προβάλλεσθαι καὶ κακίζειν. οὐ γάρ ἐστι ταὐτὸ τὸ καλὸν καὶ καλῶς τι μιμεῖσθαι. καλῶς γάρ ἐστι τὸ πρεπόντως καὶ οἰκείως, οἰκεῖα δὲ καὶ πρέποντα τοῖς αἰσχροῖς τὰ αἰσχρά. καὶ γὰρ αἱ Δαμωνίδα τοῦ χωλοῦ κρηπῖδες, ἃς ἀπολέσας εὔχετο τοῖς τοῦ κλέψαντος ἐναρμόσαι ποσί, φαῦλαι μὲν ἦσαν ἐκείνῳ δ' ἥρμοττον. καὶ τὸ

> εἴπερ γὰρ ἀδικεῖν χρή, τυραννίδος πέρι
> κάλλιστον ἀδικεῖν

E καὶ τὸ

> τοῦ μὲν δικαίου τὴν δόκησιν ἄρνυσο
> τὰ δ' ἔργα τοῦ πᾶν δρῶντος· ἔνθα κερδανεῖς

καὶ

> τάλαντον ἡ προίξ. μὴ λάβω; ζῇν[1] δ' ἔστι μοι
> τάλαντον ὑπεριδόντι; τεύξομαι δ' ὕπνου
> προέμενος; οὐ δώσω δὲ κἂν Ἅιδου δίκην
> ὡς ἠσεβηκὼς εἰς τάλαντον ἀργυροῦν;

μοχθηροὶ μέν εἰσι λόγοι καὶ ψευδεῖς, Ἐτεοκλεῖ δὲ

[1] λάβω; ζῇν Grotius: λαβὼν καὶ ζῇν.

[a] Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 524.

as an unpleasant sight, but take delight in seeing Aristophon's Philoctetes and Silanion's Jocasta, who are represented on the stage as pining away or dying; so too the young man, as he reads what Thersites the buffoon, or Sisyphus the seducer of women, or Batrachus the bawd, is represented as saying or doing, must be taught to commend the faculty and art which imitates these things, but to repudiate and condemn the disposition and the actions which it imitates. For it is not the same thing at all to imitate something beautiful and something beautifully, since "beautifully" means "fittingly and properly" and ugly things are "fitting and proper" for the ugly. Witness the boots made for the crippled feet of Damonidas, who prayed once, when he had lost them, that the man who had stolen them might have feet which they would fit; they were sorry boots, it is true, but they fitted their owner. Consider the following lines:

> If one must needs do wrong, far best it were
> To do it for a kingdom's sake,[a]

and

> Achieve the just man's good repute, but deeds
> That fit the knave; therein shall be your gain,[b]

and

> A talent dowry! Shall I not accept?
> Can I still live if I should overlook
> A talent? Shall I ever sleep again
> If I should give it up? In Hell shall I
> Not suffer for impiety to gold?[c]

These, it is true, are wicked and fallacious sentiments,

[b] From lines spoken by Ixion in an unknown play; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag., adesp.* No. 4.

[c] From an unknown poet of the new comedy; *cf.* Kock, *Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta*, iii. 430.

καὶ Ἰξίονι καὶ τοκογλύφῳ πρεσβύτῃ πρέποντες. ἂν οὖν ὑπομιμνήσκωμεν τοὺς παῖδας ὅτι ταῦτ' οὐκ
F ἐπαινοῦντες οὐδὲ δοκιμάζοντες ἀλλ' ὡς ἄτοπα καὶ φαῦλα φαύλοις καὶ ἀτόποις ἤθεσι καὶ προσώποις περιτιθέντες γράφουσιν, οὐκ ἂν ὑπὸ τῆς δόξης βλάπτοιντο τῶν ποιητῶν. ἀλλὰ τοὐναντίον ἡ πρὸς τὸ πρόσωπον ὑποψία διαβάλλει καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα καὶ τὸν λόγον, ὡς φαῦλον ὑπὸ φαύλου καὶ λεγόμενον καὶ πραττόμενον. οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ τῆς συγκοιμήσεως τοῦ Πάριδος ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀποδράντος. οὐδένα γὰρ ἄλλον ἀνθρώπων ἡμέρας συγκοιμώμενον γυναικὶ ποιήσας ἢ τὸν ἀκόλαστον καὶ μοιχικὸν ἐν αἰσχύνῃ δῆλός ἐστι καὶ ψόγῳ τιθέμενος τὴν τοιαύτην ἀκρασίαν.

19 4. Ἐν δὲ τούτοις εὖ μάλα προσεκτέον εἴ τινας ὁ ποιητὴς αὐτὸς ἐμφάσεις δίδωσι κατὰ τῶν λεγομένων ὡς δυσχεραινομένων ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. καθάπερ ὁ Μένανδρος ἐν τῷ προλόγῳ τῆς Θαΐδος πεποίηκεν

> ἐμοὶ μὲν οὖν ἄειδε τοιαύτην, θεά,
> θρασεῖαν ὡραίαν δὲ καὶ πιθανὴν ἅμα,
> ἀδικοῦσαν ἀποκλείουσαν αἰτοῦσαν πυκνά,
> μηδενὸς ἐρῶσαν, προσποιουμένην δ' ἀεί.

B ἄριστα δ' Ὅμηρος τῷ γένει τούτῳ κέχρηται· καὶ γὰρ προδιαβάλλει τὰ φαῦλα καὶ προσυνίστησι τὰ χρηστὰ τῶν λεγομένων. προσυνίστησι μὲν οὕτως

> αὐτίκα μειλίχιον καὶ κερδαλέον φάτο μῦθον

καὶ

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[a] Homer, *Il.* iii. 369 ff. and 441 ff.

but fitting respectively for Eteocles, Ixion, and an old usurer. If then we remind our sons that authors write them, not because they commend or approve them, but with the idea of investing mean and unnatural characters and persons with unnatural and mean sentiments, they could not be harmed by the opinions of poets ; nay, on the contrary, the suspicion felt against the person in question discredits both his actions and words, as being mean because spoken or done by a mean man. Of such sort is the account of Paris in his wife's arms after his cowardly escape from battle.[a] For since the poet represents no other save this licentious and adulterous man as dallying with a woman in the daytime, it is clear that he classes such sensuality as a shame and reproach.

4. In these passages, close attention must be given to see whether the poet himself gives any hints against the sentiments expressed to indicate that they are distasteful to himself; just as Menander in the prologue of his *Thaïs* has written :

> Oh, sing to me, my muse, of such a girl,
> One bold and fair, and of persuasive tongue,
> Unjust, exclusive, and demanding much,
> In love with none, but always feigning love.[b]

But Homer has best employed this method ; for he in advance discredits the mean and calls our attention to the good in what is said. His favourable introductions are after this manner :

Then at once he spoke ; his words were gentle and winning [c]

and

[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.*, *Menander*, No. 217, and Allinson, *Menander* in L.C.L., p. 356.
[c] Homer, *Od.* vi. 148.

(19) τὸν δ' ἀγανοῖς ἐπέεσσιν ἐρητύσασκε παραστάς.

ἐν δὲ τῷ προδιαβάλλειν μονονοὺ μαρτύρεται καὶ διαγορεύει μήτε χρῆσθαι μήτε προσέχειν ὡς οὖσιν ἀτόποις καὶ φαύλοις. οἷον τόν τ' Ἀγαμέμνονα μέλλων διηγεῖσθαι τῷ ἱερεῖ χρώμενον ἀπηνῶς προείρηκεν

ἀλλ' οὐκ Ἀτρεΐδῃ Ἀγαμέμνονι ἤνδανε θυμῷ,
ἀλλὰ κακῶς ἀφίει,

C τουτέστιν ἀγρίως καὶ αὐθάδως καὶ παρὰ τὸ προσῆκον· τῷ τ' Ἀχιλλεῖ τοὺς θρασεῖς λόγους περιτίθησιν

οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο

τὴν αὑτοῦ κρίσιν ὑπειπών

Πηλεΐδης δ' ἐξαῦτις ἀταρτηροῖς ἐπέεσσιν
Ἀτρεΐδην προσέειπε, καὶ οὔ πω λῆγε χόλοιο·

καλὸν γὰρ εἰκὸς οὐδὲν εἶναι μετ' ὀργῆς καὶ αὐστηρῶς λεγόμενον. ὁμοίως καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν πράξεων

ἦ ῥα, καὶ Ἕκτορα δῖον ἀεικέα μήδετο ἔργα,
D πρηνέα πὰρ λεχέεσσι Μενοιτιάδαο τανύσσας.

εὖ δὲ καὶ ταῖς ἐπιρρήσεσι χρῆται, καθάπερ τινὰ ψῆφον ἰδίαν ἐπιφέρων τοῖς πραττομένοις ἢ λεγομένοις, ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς μοιχείας τοῦ Ἄρεος τοὺς θεοὺς ποιῶν λέγοντας

οὐκ ἀρετᾷ κακὰ ἔργα· κιχάνει τοι βραδὺς ὠκύν,

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς τοῦ Ἕκτορος ὑπερφροσύνης καὶ μεγαλαυχίας

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[a] Homer, *Il.* ii. 189.
[b] *Ibid.* i. 24.
[c] *Ibid.* i. 225.
[d] *Ibid.* i. 223.
[e] *Ibid.* xxiii. 24.
[f] Homer, *Od.* viii. 329.

He would stand by his side, and speak soft words to restrain him.[a]

But in discrediting in advance, he all but protests and proclaims that we are not to follow or heed the sentiments expressed, as being unjustifiable and mean. For example, when he is on the point of narrating Agamemnon's harsh treatment of the priest, he says in advance,

Yet Agamemnon, Atreus' son, at heart did not like it;
Harshly he sent him away; [b]

that is to say, savagely and wilfully and contrary to what he should have done; and in Achilles' mouth he puts the bold words,

Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer's courage,[c]

but he intimates his own judgement in saying,

Then once more with vehement words did the son of Peleus
Speak to the son of Atreus, nor ceased as yet from his anger; [d]

hence it is likely that nothing spoken with anger and severity can be good. In like manner also, he comments upon actions:

Thus he spoke, and Hector divine he treated unseemly,
Stretching him prone in the dust by the bier of the son of Menoetius.[e]

He also employs his closing lines to good purpose, as though adding a sort of verdict of his own to what is done or said. Of the adultery of Ares, he represents the gods as saying,

Evil deeds do not succeed: the swift by the slow is taken,[f]

and on the occasion of Hector's great arrogance and boasting he says,

ὣς ἔφατ' εὐχόμενος, νεμέσησε δὲ πότνια Ἥρη,
ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς Πανδάρου τοξείας
ὣς φάτ' Ἀθηναίη, τῷ δὲ φρένας ἄφρονι πεῖθεν.

E αὗται μὲν οὖν αἱ τῶν λόγων ἀποφάσεις καὶ δόξαι παντός εἰσι κατιδεῖν τοῦ προσέχοντος· ἑτέρας δ' ἐκ τῶν πραγμάτων αὐτῶν παρέχουσι μαθήσεις, ὥσπερ ὁ Εὐριπίδης εἰπεῖν λέγεται πρὸς τοὺς τὸν Ἰξίονα λοιδοροῦντας ὡς ἀσεβῆ καὶ μιαρόν, "οὐ μέντοι πρότερον αὐτὸν ἐκ τῆς σκηνῆς ἐξήγαγον ἢ τῷ τροχῷ προσηλῶσαι." παρὰ δ' Ὁμήρῳ σιωπώμενόν ἐστι τὸ τοιοῦτο γένος τῆς διδασκαλίας, ἔχον δ' ἀναθεώρησιν ὠφέλιμον ἐπὶ τῶν διαβεβλημένων μάλιστα μύθων, οὓς ταῖς πάλαι μὲν ὑπονοίαις
F ἀλληγορίαις δὲ νῦν λεγομέναις παραβιαζόμενοι καὶ διαστρέφοντες ἔνιοι μοιχευομένην φασὶν Ἀφροδίτην ὑπ' Ἄρεος μηνύειν Ἥλιον, ὅτι τῷ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης ἀστέρι συνελθὼν ὁ τοῦ Ἄρεος μοιχικὰς ἀποτελεῖ γενέσεις, Ἡλίου δ' ἐπαναφερομένου καὶ καταλαμβάνοντος οὐ λανθάνουσιν. τὸν δὲ τῆς Ἥρας καλλωπισμὸν ἐπὶ τὸν Δία καὶ τὰς περὶ τὸν κεστὸν γοητείας ἀέρος τινὰ[1] κάθαρσιν εἶναι βούλονται τῷ πυρώδει πλησιάζοντος, ὥσπερ οὐκ αὐτοῦ τὰς λύσεις τοῦ ποιητοῦ διδόντος. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς περὶ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης διδάσκει τοὺς προσέχοντας,
20 ὅτι μουσικὴ φαύλη καὶ ἄσματα πονηρὰ καὶ λόγοι μοχθηρὰς ὑποθέσεις λαμβάνοντες ἀκόλαστα ποιοῦσιν ἤθη καὶ βίους ἀνάνδρους καὶ ἀνθρώπους τρυφὴν καὶ μαλακίαν καὶ γυναικοκρασίαν ἀγαπῶντας

[1] τινὰ Hercher: τινὸς.

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[a] Homer, *Il.* viii. 198. [b] *Ibid.* iv. 104.
[c] *Ibid.* xiv. 166 ff.

Thus he spoke in boast ; queen Hera's wrath was kindled [a]
and regarding Pandarus's archery,
Thus Athena spoke, and the mind of the fool she persuaded.[b]

Now these declarations and opinions contained in the words of the text may be discovered by anybody who will pay attention, but from the actions themselves the poets supply other lessons : as, for example, Euripides is reported to have said to those who railed at his Ixion as an impious and detestable character, " But I did not remove him from the stage until I had him fastened to the wheel." In Homer this form of instruction is given silently, but it leaves room for a reconsideration, which is helpful in the case of those stories which have been most discredited. By forcibly distorting these stories through what used to be termed " deeper meanings," but are nowadays called " allegorical interpretations," some persons say that the Sun is represented as giving information about Aphrodite in the arms of Ares, because the conjunction of the planet Mars with Venus portends births conceived in adultery, and when the sun returns in his course and discovers these, they cannot be kept secret. And Hera's beautifying of herself for Zeus's eyes,[c] and the charms connected with the girdle, such persons will have it, are a sort of purification of the air as it draws near the fiery element ;—as though the poet himself did not afford the right solutions. For, in the account of Aphrodite, he teaches those who will pay attention that vulgar music, coarse songs, and stories treating of vile themes, create licentious characters, unmanly lives, and men that love luxury, soft living, intimacy with women, and

(20) εἵματά τ' ἐξημοιβὰ λοετρά τε θερμὰ καὶ εὐνάς.

διὸ καὶ τὸν Ὀδυσσέα τῷ κιθαρῳδῷ προστάττοντα πεποίηκεν

ἀλλ' ἄγε δὴ μετάβηθι καὶ ἵππου κόσμον ἄεισον,

καλῶς ὑφηγούμενος τὸ παρὰ τῶν φρονίμων καὶ νοῦν ἐχόντων χρῆναι λαμβάνειν τοὺς μουσικοὺς καὶ ποιητικοὺς τὰς ὑποθέσεις. ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ τῆς
B Ἥρας ἄριστα τὴν ἀπὸ φαρμάκων καὶ γοητείας καὶ μετὰ δόλου πρὸς τοὺς ἄνδρας ὁμιλίαν καὶ χάριν ἔδειξεν οὐ μόνον ἐφήμερον καὶ ἀψίκορον καὶ ἀβέβαιον οὖσαν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μεταβάλλουσαν εἰς ἔχθραν καὶ ὀργήν, ὅταν τὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς ἀπομαρανθῇ. τοιαῦτα γὰρ ὁ Ζεὺς ἀπειλεῖ καὶ λέγει πρὸς αὐτήν

ὄφρα ἴδῃς ἦν τοι χραίσμῃ φιλότης τε καὶ εὐνή,
ἣν ἐμίγης ἐλθοῦσα θεῶν ἄπο καί μ' ἀπάτησας.

ἡ γὰρ τῶν φαύλων διάθεσις ἔργων καὶ μίμησις ἂν προσαποδῷ τὴν συμβαίνουσαν αἰσχύνην καὶ βλάβην τοῖς ἐργασαμένοις, ὠφέλησεν οὐκ ἔβλαψε τὸν ἀκροώμενον. οἱ γοῦν φιλόσοφοι παραδείγμασι χρῶνται,
C νουθετοῦντες καὶ παιδεύοντες ἐξ ὑποκειμένων· οἱ δὲ ποιηταὶ ταὐτὰ[1] ποιοῦσι πλάττοντες αὐτοὶ πράγματα καὶ μυθολογοῦντες. ὁ μὲν οὖν Μελάνθιος εἴτε παίζων εἴτε σπουδάζων ἔλεγε διασῴζεσθαι τὴν Ἀθηναίων πόλιν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ῥητόρων διχοστασίας καὶ ταραχῆς· οὐ γὰρ ἀποκλίνειν ἅπαντας εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν τοῖχον, ἀλλὰ γίγνεσθαί τινα τοῦ

[1] ταὐτά F.C.B. : ταῦτα.

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[a] Homer, *Od.* viii. 239. [b] *Ibid.* viii. 492.
[c] Homer, *Il.* xv. 32.

> Changes of clothes, warm baths, and the genial bed of enjoyment.[a]

This too is the reason why he has represented Odysseus as bidding the harper

> Come now, change the theme and sing how the horse was builded,[b]

thus admirably indicating the duty of musicians and poets to take the subjects of their compositions from the lives of those who are discreet and sensible. And in his account of Hera, he has shown excellently well how the favour that women win by philters and enchantments and the attendant deceit in their relations with their husbands, not only is transitory and soon sated and unsure, but changes also to anger and enmity, so soon as the pleasurable excitement has faded away. Such, in fact, are Zeus's angry threats as he speaks to Hera in this wise :

> So you may see if aught you gain from the love and caresses
> Won by your coming afar from the gods to deceive me.[c]

For the description and portrayal of mean actions, if it also represent as it should the disgrace and injury resulting to the doers thereof, benefits instead of injuring the hearer. Philosophers, at any rate, for admonition and instruction, use examples taken from known facts ; but the poets accomplish the same result by inventing actions of their own imagination, and by recounting mythical tales. Thus it was Melanthius who said, whether in jest or in earnest, that the Athenian State was perpetually preserved by the quarrelling and disorder among its public speakers ; for they were not all inclined to crowd to the same side of the boat, and so, in the disagreement

(20) βλάπτοντος ἀνθολκὴν ἐν τῇ διαφορᾷ τῶν πολιτευομένων. αἱ δὲ τῶν ποιητῶν ὑπεναντιώσεις πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀναναφέρουσαι τὴν πίστιν οὐκ ἐῶσιν ἰσχυρὰν ῥοπὴν γενέσθαι πρὸς τὸ βλάπτον. ὅπου μὲν οὖν αὐτοῖς τὸ τιθέναι σύνεγγυς ἐκφανεῖς ποιεῖ τὰς ἀντιλογίας, δεῖ τῷ βελτίονι συνηγορεῖν ὥσπερ
D ἐν τούτοις

πόλλ', ὦ τέκνον, σφάλλουσιν ἀνθρώπους θεοί.
τὸ ῥᾷστον εἶπας, αἰτίασασθαι θεούς.

καὶ πάλιν

χρυσοῦ σὲ πλήθει, τούσδε δ' οὐ χαίρειν χρεών.
σκαιὸν τὸ[1] πλουτεῖν κἄλλο μηδὲν εἰδέναι

καί

τί δῆτα θύειν[2] δεῖ σε κατθανούμενον;
ἄμεινον· οὐδεὶς κάματος εὐσεβεῖν θεούς.

τὰ γὰρ τοιαῦτα τὰς λύσεις ἔχει προδήλους, ἄν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, πρὸς τὰ βελτίονα τῇ κρίσει τοὺς νέους κατευθύνωμεν. ὅσα δ' εἴρηται μὲν ἀτόπως
E εὐθὺς δ' οὐ λέλυται, ταῦτα δεῖ τοῖς ἀλλαχόθι πρὸς τοὐναντίον εἰρημένοις ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀναναιρεῖν, μὴ ἀχθομένους τῷ ποιητῇ μηδὲ χαλεπαίνοντας ἀλλ' ἐν ἤθει καὶ μετὰ παιδιᾶς λεγομένοις. εὐθύς, εἰ βούλει, πρὸς τὰς Ὁμηρικὰς τῶν θεῶν ῥίψεις ὑπ'

[1] τὸ Stobaeus, *Flor.* xciii. 7 : γε.
[2] θύειν Cobet : οὖσιν.

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[a] From Euripides, *Archelaus*; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 254. The second line is again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 1049 F.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 1069.
[c] *Ibid.*, *Adesp.*, No. 350.

of the politicians, there was ever some counterpoise to the harmful. And so the mutual contrarieties of the poets, restoring our belief to its proper balance, forbid any strong turning of the scale toward the harmful. When therefore a comparison of passages makes their contradictions evident, we must advocate the better side, as in the following examples :

Oft do the gods, my child, cause men to fail,[a]

as compared with

You've named the simplest way ; just blame the gods ;[a]

and again

You may rejoice in wealth, but these may not,[b]

as compared with

'Tis loutish to be rich, and know naught else ;[b]

and

What need to sacrifice when you must die ?[c]

as compared with

'Tis better thus ; God's worship is not toil.[c]

For such passages as these admit of solutions which are obvious, if, as has been said, we direct the young, by the use of criticism, toward the better side. But whenever anything said by such authors sounds preposterous, and no solution is found close at hand, we must nullify its effect by something said by them elsewhere to the opposite effect, and we should not be offended or angry at the poet, but with the words, which are spoken in character and with humorous intent. As an obvious illustration, if you wish, over against Homer's accounts of the gods

ἀλλήλων καὶ τρώσεις ὑπ' ἀνθρώπων καὶ διαφορὰς καὶ χαλεπότητας

οἶσθα καὶ ἄλλον μῦθον ἀμείνονα τοῦδε νοῆσαι

καὶ νοεῖς νὴ Δία καὶ λέγεις κρεῖττον ἀλλαχόθι καὶ βέλτιον τὰ τοιαῦτα

θεοὶ ῥεῖα ζώοντες

καὶ

τῷ ἔνι τέρπονται μάκαρες θεοὶ ἤματα πάντα

καὶ

F ὣς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι,
ζώειν ἀχνυμένοις· αὐτοὶ δέ τ' ἀκηδέες εἰσίν.

αὗται γάρ εἰσιν ὑγιαίνουσαι περὶ θεῶν δόξαι καὶ ἀληθεῖς, ἐκεῖναι δὲ πέπλασται πρὸς ἔκπληξιν ἀνθρώπων. πάλιν Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος

πολλαῖσι μορφαῖς οἱ θεοὶ σοφισμάτων
21 σφάλλουσιν ἡμᾶς κρείσσονες πεφυκότες

οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστιν ὑπενεγκεῖν τό

εἰ θεοί τι δρῶσι φαῦλον,[1] οὔκ εἰσιν θεοί,

βέλτιον εἰρημένον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ. καὶ τοῦ Πινδάρου σφόδρα πικρῶς καὶ παροξυντικῶς εἰρηκότος

χρὴ δὲ πᾶν ἔρδοντ' ἀμαυρῶσαι τὸν ἐχθρόν,

ἀλλ' αὐτός γε σὺ λέγεις ὅτι

[1] *φαῦλον* Justin, *De monarch.* 148 : *αἰσχρόν* also in Stobaeus, *Flor.* c. 4; Plutarch, *Moral.* 1049 f.

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[a] Homer, *Il.* vii. 358 and xii. 232.
[b] *Ibid.* vi. 138 ; *Od.* iv. 805 and v. 122.
[c] Homer, *Od.* vi. 46.

being cast forth by one another, their being wounded by men, their disagreements, and their displays of ill-temper, you may set the line:

> Surely you know how to think of a saying better than this one,[a]

and indeed elsewhere you do think of better things and say more seemly things, such as these:

> Gods at their ease ever living,[b]

and

> There the blessed gods pass all their days in enjoyment,[c]

and

> Thus the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals
> Ever to live in distress, but themselves are free from all trouble.[d]

These, then, are sound opinions about gods, and true, but those other accounts have been fabricated to excite men's astonishment. Again, when Euripides says,

> By many forms of artifice the gods
> Defeat our plans, for they are stronger far,[e]

it is not bad to subjoin,

> If gods do aught that's base, they are no gods,[f]

which is a better saying of his. And when Pindar very bitterly and exasperatingly has said,

> Do what you will, so you vanquish your foe,[g]

"Yet," we may reply, "you yourself say that

[a] Homer, *Il.* xxiv. 525 (again quoted, *infra*, 22 B).
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 972.
[c] From Euripides, *Bellerophon*, according to Stobaeus, *Florilegium*, c. 3, who quotes also six preceding lines; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 292. 7.
[d] Pindar, *Isthmian Odes*, iv. 48.

(21) τὸ πὰρ δίκαν
γλυκὺ[1] πικροτάτα μένει τελευτά,

καὶ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους

τὸ κέρδος ἡδύ, κἂν ἀπὸ ψευδῶν ἴῃ,[2]

καὶ μὴν σοῦ γ' ἀκηκόαμεν ὡς

οὐκ ἐξάγουσι καρπὸν οἱ ψευδεῖς λόγοι.

B πρὸς δ' ἐκεῖνα τὰ περὶ τοῦ πλούτου

δεινὸς γὰρ ἔρπειν πλοῦτος ἔς[3] τε τἄβατα
καὶ πρὸς βέβηλα, χὠπόθεν[4] πένης ἀνὴρ
οὐδ' ἐντυχὼν δύναιτ' ἂν ὧν ἐρᾷ τυχεῖν.
καὶ γὰρ δυσειδὲς σῶμα καὶ δυσώνυμον
γλώσσῃ σοφὸν τίθησιν εὔμορφόν τ' ἰδεῖν

ἀντιπαραθήσει πολλὰ τῶν Σοφοκλέους, ὧν καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ

γένοιτο κἂν ἄπλουτος ἐν τιμαῖς ἀνήρ

καὶ

οὐδὲν κακίων πτωχός, εἰ καλῶς φρονεῖ[5]

καὶ

C ἀλλὰ τῶν πολλῶν καλῶν
τίς χάρις, εἰ κακόβουλος
φροντὶς ἐκτρέφει τὸν εὐαίωνα πλοῦτον;

ὁ δὲ Μένανδρος ἐπῆρε μὲν ἀμέλει τὴν φιληδονίαν

[1] γλυκὺ Pindar: γλυκεῖ. [2] ἴῃ Brunck: εἴη.
[3] ἔς Stobaeus, *Flor.* xci. 27: πρός.
[4] The text of the MSS. is unmetrical. Several emendations have been suggested, but none thoroughly satisfactory. The reading adopted is that given by Jebb-Pearson (Soph. *Frags.*) which does not disturb the sense. τἄβατα καὶ πρὸς τὰ βατὰ Stephanus: τὰ βατὰ καὶ πρός τ' ἄβατα καὶ ὀπόθεν.
[5] φρονεῖ: φρονοῖ most MSS.

Most bitter the end
Must surely await
Sweet joys that are gained
By a means unfair."[a]

And when Sophocles has said,

Sweet is the pelf though gained by falsity.[b]

"Indeed," we may say, "but we have heard from you that

False words unfruitful prove when harvested."[c]

And over against those statements about wealth:

Clever is wealth at finding ways to reach
Both hallowed and unhallowed ground, and where
A poor man, though he even gain access,
Could not withal attain his heart's desire.
An ugly body, hapless with its tongue,
Wealth makes both wise and comely to behold,[d]

he will set many of Sophocles' words, among which are the following:

E'en without wealth a man may be esteemed,[e]

and

To beg doth not degrade a noble mind,[f]

and

In the blessings of plenty
What enjoyment is there,
If blest wealth owe its increase
To base-brooding care?[g]

And Menander certainly exalted the love of pleasure,

[a] Pindar, *Isthmian Odes*, vii. 47.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 749.
[c] *Ibid.*, No. 750.
[d] From Sophocles, *Aleadae*; quoted with additional lines by Stobaeus, *Florilegium*, xci. 27; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No 85.
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 751.
[f] *Ibid.*, No. 752.
[g] Perhaps from the *Tereus* of Sophocles; *cf.* Nauck, *Tray. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 534.

(21) καὶ ὑπεχαύνωσε τοῖς ἐρωτικοῖς καὶ διαπύροις ἐκείνοις

ἄπανθ' ὅσα ζῇ καὶ τὸν ἥλιον βλέπει
τὸν κοινὸν ἡμῖν, δοῦλα ταῦτ' ἔσθ' ἡδονῆς.

πάλιν δ' ἐπέστρεψε καὶ περιέσπασε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν θρασύτητα τῆς ἀκολασίας ἐξέκοψεν εἰπών

ὄνειδος αἰσχρὸς βίος ὅμως κἂν ἡδὺς ᾖ.

D ταῦτα γὰρ ἐκείνοις μέν ἐστιν ὑπεναντία, βελτίω δὲ καὶ χρησιμώτερα. δυεῖν οὖν θάτερον ἡ τοιαύτη τῶν ἐναντίων ποιήσει παράθεσις καὶ κατανόησις, ἢ παράξει πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἢ καὶ τοῦ χείρονος ἀποστήσει τὴν πίστιν.

Ἂν δ' αὐτοὶ μὴ διδῶσι τῶν ἀτόπως εἰρημένων λύσεις, οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστιν ἑτέρων ἐνδόξων ἀποφάσεις ἀντιτάττοντας ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ ῥέπειν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον. οἷον τοῦ Ἀλέξιδος κινοῦντος ἐνίους ὅταν λέγῃ

τὰς ἡδονὰς δεῖ συλλέγειν τὸν σώφρονα.
τρεῖς δ' εἰσὶν αἵ γε τὴν δύναμιν κεκτημέναι
E τὴν ὡς ἀληθῶς συντελοῦσαν τῷ βίῳ,
τὸ φαγεῖν τὸ πιεῖν[1] τὸ τῆς Ἀφροδίτης τυγχάνειν·
τὰ δ' ἄλλα προσθήκας ἅπαντα χρὴ καλεῖν,

ὑπομνηστέον ὅτι Σωκράτης τοὐναντίον ἔλεγε, τοὺς μὲν φαύλους ζῆν τοῦ ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἕνεκα, τοὺς

[1] τὸ φαγεῖν τὸ πιεῖν Hercher from 445 f. : τὸ πιεῖν τὸ φαγεῖν.

with a suggestion of boastfulness too, in these glowing lines that refer to love :

> All things that live and see the self-same sun
> That we behold, to pleasure are enslaved.[a]

But at another time he turns us about and draws us towards the good, and uproots the boldness of licentiousness, by saying :

> A shameful life, though pleasant, is disgrace.[b]

The latter sentiment is quite opposed to the former, and it is better and more useful. Such comparison and consideration of opposing sentiments will result in one of two ways : it will either guide the youth over toward the better side, or else cause his belief to revolt from the worse.

In case the authors themselves do not offer solutions of their unjustifiable sayings, it is not a bad idea to put on the other side declarations of other writers of repute, and, as in a balance, make the scales incline toward the better side. For example, if Alexis stirs some people when he says,

> The man of sense must gather pleasure's fruits,
> And three there are which have the potency
> Truly to be of import for this life—
> To eat and drink and have one's way in love,
> All else must be declared accessory,[c]

we must recall to their minds that Socrates used to say just the opposite—that " base men live to eat

[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii., *Menander*, No. 611, and Allinson, *Menander* in L.C.L. p. 506.
[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii., *Menander*, No. 756.
[c] *Ibid.* ii., *Alexis*, No. 271.

δ' ἀγαθοὺς ἐσθίειν καὶ πίνειν ἕνεκα τοῦ ζῆν. πρὸς δὲ τὸν γράψαντα

ποτὶ τὸν πονηρὸν οὐκ ἄχρηστον ὅπλον ἁ πονηρία,

τρόπον τινὰ συνεξομοιοῦσθαι κελεύοντα τοῖς πονηροῖς, τὸ τοῦ Διογένους παραβαλεῖν ἔστιν· ἐρωτη-
F θεὶς γὰρ ὅπως ἄν τις ἀμύναιτο τὸν ἐχθρόν, "αὐτός," ἔφη, "καλὸς κἀγαθὸς γενόμενος." δεῖ δὲ τῷ Διογένει καὶ πρὸς τὸν Σοφοκλέα χρήσασθαι· πολλὰς γὰρ ἀνθρώπων μυριάδας ἐμπέπληκεν ἀθυμίας περὶ τῶν μυστηρίων ταῦτα γράψας

ὡς τρισόλβιοι
κεῖνοι βροτῶν, οἳ ταῦτα δερχθέντες τέλη
μόλωσ' ἐς Ἅιδου· τοῖσδε γὰρ μόνοις ἐκεῖ
ζῆν ἔστι, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοισι πάντ' ἐκεῖ κακά.

Διογένης δ' ἀκούσας τι τοιοῦτο "τί λέγεις;" ἔφη· "κρείττονα μοῖραν ἕξει Παταικίων ὁ κλέπτης ἀποθανὼν ἢ Ἐπαμεινώνδας ὅτι μεμύηται;"
22 Τιμοθέῳ μὲν γὰρ ᾄδοντι τὴν Ἄρτεμιν ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ

μαινάδα θυιάδα[1] φοιβάδα λυσσάδα

Κινησίας εὐθὺς ἀντεφώνησε "τοιαύτη σοι θυγάτηρ γένοιτο." χαρίεν δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Βίωνος πρὸς τὸν Θέογνιν λέγοντα

[1] θυιάδα Bergk, confirmed by Aesch. *Pers.* 75: θυάδα.

and drink, and good men eat and drink to live." And he who wrote

> Not useless 'gainst the knave is knavery,[a]

thus bidding us, in a way, to make ourselves like knaves, may be confronted with the saying of Diogenes; for, being asked how one might defend himself against his adversary, he said, "By proving honourable and upright himself." We should use Diogenes against Sophocles, too; for Sophocles has filled hosts of men with despondency by writing these lines about the mysteries:

> Thrice blest are they
> Who having seen these mystic rites shall pass
> To Hades' house; for them alone is life
> Beyond; for others all is evil there.[b]

But Diogenes, hearing some such sentiment as this, said, "What! Do you mean to say that Pataecion, the robber, will have a better portion after death than Epaminondas, just because he is initiate?" And when Timotheus, in a song in the theatre, spoke of Artemis as

> Ecstatic Bacchic frantic fanatic,[c]

Cinesias at once shouted back, "May you have a daughter like that!" Neat too is Bion's retort to Theognis, who said:

[a] Source unknown; quoted again by Plutarch in *Moralia*, 534 A.

[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 753.

[c] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. p. 620; *cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 170A.

(22) *πᾶς γὰρ ἀνὴρ πενίῃ δεδμημένος οὔτε τι εἰπεῖν*
οὔτ' ἔρξαι δύναται, γλῶσσα δέ οἱ δέδεται

"πῶς οὖν σὺ πένης ὢν φλυαρεῖς τοσαῦτα καὶ καταδολεσχεῖς ἡμῶν;"

B 5. Δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τὰς ἐκ τῶν παρακειμένων ἢ συμφραζομένων παραλιπεῖν ἀφορμὰς πρὸς τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἰατροὶ τῆς κανθαρίδος οὔσης θανασίμου τοὺς πόδας ὅμως καὶ τὰ πτερὰ βοηθεῖν οἴονται καὶ ἀναλύειν τὴν δύναμιν, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασι, κἂν ὄνομα κἂν ῥῆμα παρακείμενον ἀμβλυτέραν ποιῇ τὴν πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον ἀπαγωγήν, ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι καὶ προσδιασαφεῖν, ὡς ἐπὶ τούτων ἔνιοι ποιοῦσι

τοῦτό νύ που γέρας ἐστὶν ὀιζυροῖσι βροτοῖσι,
κείρασθαί τε κόμην βαλέειν τ' ἀπὸ δάκρυ παρειῶν

καὶ

ὣς γὰρ ἐπεκλώσαντο θεοὶ δειλοῖσι βροτοῖσι,
ζώειν ἀχνυμένοις.

C οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς εἶπε καὶ πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὑπὸ θεῶν ἐπικεκλῶσθαι λυπηρὸν βίον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις, οὓς δειλαίους καὶ οἰκτροὺς διὰ μοχθηρίαν ὄντας εἴωθε "δειλοὺς" καὶ "ὀιζυροὺς" προσαγορεύειν.

6. Ἄλλος τοίνυν τρόπος ἐστὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ὑποψίας πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐκ τοῦ χείρονος μεθιστὰς ὃ διὰ τῶν ὀνομάτων τῆς συνηθείας, περὶ ὧν δεῖ τὸν νέον γεγυμνάσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ περὶ τὰς

[a] Theognis, 177.

Any man that is subject to poverty never is able
Either to speak or to act; nay, but his tongue is tied.[a]

"How is it, then," said Bion, "that you, who are poor, can talk much nonsense, and weary us with this rubbish?"

5. We must not neglect, either, the means for rectifying a statement which are afforded by the words that lie near, or by the context; but just as physicians, in spite of the fact that the blister-fly is deadly, think that its feet and wings are helpful to counteract its potent effect, so in poetry if a noun or adjective or a verb by its position next to another word blunts the point which the passage, in its worse interpretation, would have, we should seize upon it and add explanation, as some do in the case of the following:

Thus, at the last, can honour be paid by miserable mortals
Cutting the hair from their heads while the tears stream
down their faces,[b]

and

Thus, then, the gods have spun the fate of unhappy mortals
Ever to live in distress.[c]

For he did not say that absolutely and to all mankind a grievous life has been allotted by the gods, but to the silly and foolish, whom, since they are wretched and pitiable on account of wickedness, he is wont to call by the name of "unhappy" and "miserable."

6. Another method, again, which transfers from the worse to the better sense suspicious passages in poetry, is that which works through the normal usage of words, in which it were better to have the

[b] Homer, *Od.* iv. 197.
[c] Homer, *Il.* xxiv. 525 (quoted *supra*, 20 F).

(22) λεγομένας γλώττας. ἐκεῖνο μὲν γὰρ φιλόλογον καὶ οὐκ ἀηδὲς ὅτι "ῥιγεδανὸς" κακοθάνατός ἐστιν εἰδέναι ("δάνον" γὰρ Μακεδόνες τὸν θάνατον καλοῦσι), "καμμονίαν[1]" δὲ νίκην Αἰολεῖς τὴν ἐξ
D ἐπιμονῆς καὶ καρτερίας, Δρύοπες δὲ "πόπους" τοὺς δαίμονας. τουτὶ δ' ἀναγκαῖον καὶ χρήσιμον, εἰ μέλλομεν[2] ἐκ τῶν ποιημάτων ὠφεληθήσεσθαι καὶ μὴ βλαβήσεσθαι, τὸ γιγνώσκειν πῶς τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ χρῶνται καὶ πάλιν τοῖς τῶν κακῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν, καὶ τί τὴν Τύχην τί τὴν Μοῖραν νοοῦντες ὀνομάζουσι, καὶ πότερον ταῦτα τῶν ἁπλῶς ἢ τῶν πολλαχῶς λεγομένων ἐστὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς, ὥσπερ ἄλλα πολλά. καὶ γὰρ "οἶκον" ποτὲ μὲν τὴν οἰκίαν καλοῦσιν

οἶκον ἐς ὑψόροφον

E ποτὲ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν

ἐσθίεταί μοι οἶκος,

καὶ[3] "βίοτον[4]" ποτὲ μὲν τὸ ζῆν

ἀμενήνωσεν δέ οἱ αἰχμὴν
κυανοχαῖτα Ποσειδάων, βιότοιο μεγήρας

ποτὲ δὲ τὰ χρήματα

βίοτον δέ μοι ἄλλοι ἔδουσι,

καὶ τῷ "ἀλύειν" ποτὲ μὲν ἀντὶ τοῦ δάκνεσθαι καὶ ἀπορεῖσθαι κέχρηται

[1] καμμονίαν is required for Aeolic: καμμονίην MSS. from Homer, *Il.* xxii. 257, and xxiii. 661.
[2] μέλλομεν Madvig: μέλλοιμεν.
[3] καὶ Hercher: καὶ τὸν. [4] βίοτον Wyttenbach: βίον.

[a] Strange or obsolete words. [b] Homer, *Il.* xix. 325.
[c] *Ibid.* xxii. 257 and xxiii. 661.

young man trained than in what are called "glosses."[a] It is indeed learned, and not unpleasing, to know that "rhigedanos"[b] means "dying miserably" (for the Macedonians call death "danos"), that the Aeolians call a victory won by patience and perseverance an "outlasting,"[c] that the Dryopians call the divinities "popoi."[d] But it is necessary and useful, if we are to be helped and not harmed by poetry, to know how the poets employ the names of the gods, and again the names of bad and of good things, and what they mean when they speak of Fortune or of Fate, and whether these belong to the class of words which in their writings are used in one sense only or in several senses, as the case is with many other words. For, to illustrate, they apply the term "house" sometimes to a dwelling house, as

Into the lofty house,[e]

and sometimes to property, as

My house is being devoured;[f]

and the term "living" they apply sometimes to life, as

But dark-haired Poseidon
Thwarted his spear, nor would let him end his foeman's living,[g]

and sometimes to possessions, as

And others are eating my living;[h]

and the expression "be distraught" is used sometimes instead of "be chagrined" and "be at one's wits' end":

[a] There was a tradition, preserved in the scholia, that ὦ πόποι, often found in Homer, was the equivalent of ὦ θεοί "gods."

[e] Homer, *Od.* v. 42, vii. 77, and perhaps x. 474.

[f] *Ibid.* iv. 318.

[g] Homer, *Il.* xiii. 562.

[h] Homer, *Od.* xiii. 419.

ὡς ἔφαθ', ἡ δ' ἀλύουσ' ἀπεβήσετο, τείρετο δ' αἰνῶς

ποτὲ δ' ἀντὶ τοῦ γαυριᾶν καὶ χαίρειν

ἦ ἀλύεις ὅτι Ἶρον ἐνίκησας τὸν ἀλήτην;

καὶ τῷ "θοάζειν" ἢ τὸ κινεῖσθαι σημαίνουσιν, ὡς Εὐριπίδης

κῆτος θοάζον ἐξ Ἀτλαντικῆς ἁλός,

ἢ τὸ καθέζεσθαι καὶ θάσσειν,[1] ὡς Σοφοκλῆς

F τίνας πόθ' ἕδρας τάσδε μοι θοάζετε
ἱκτηρίοις κλάδοισιν ἐξεστεμμένοι;

χάριεν δὲ καὶ τὸ τὴν χρείαν τῶν ὀνομάτων συνοικειοῦν τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις πράγμασιν, ὡς οἱ γραμματικοὶ διδάσκουσιν, ἄλλοτε[2] πρὸς ἄλλην δύναμιν λαμβάνοντες, οἷόν ἐστι

νῆ' ὀλίγην αἰνεῖν, μεγάλῃ δ' ἐνὶ φορτία θέσθαι.

τῷ μὲν γὰρ "αἰνεῖν" σημαίνεται τὸ ἐπαινεῖν, αὐτῷ δὲ τῷ ἐπαινεῖν ἀντὶ τοῦ παραιτεῖσθαι νῦν κέχρηται, καθάπερ ἐν τῇ συνηθείᾳ "καλῶς" φαμὲν "ἔχειν"
23 καὶ "χαίρειν" κελεύομεν, ὅταν μὴ δεώμεθα μηδὲ λαμβάνωμεν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὴν "ἐπαινὴν Περσεφόνειαν" ἔνιοί φασιν ὡς παραιτητὴν εἰρῆσθαι.

Ταύτην δὴ τὴν διαίρεσιν καὶ διάκρισιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐν τοῖς μείζοσι καὶ σπουδαιοτέροις παραφυλάττοντες ἀπὸ τῶν θεῶν ἀρχώμεθα δι-

[1] θάσσειν : θαάσειν. [2] ἄλλοτε Hartman : ἄλλο.

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[a] Homer, *Il.* v. 352. [b] Homer, *Od.* xviii. 332, 392.
[c] From the *Andromeda* of Euripides, Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 145.

> Thus he spoke, and she departed distraught and sore troubled [a]

and at other times, instead of " to be arrogant " and " be delighted," as

> Are you now distraught since you vanquished Irus, the vagrant ? [b]

and by " huddle " they mean either " be in motion," as Euripides says : [c]

> A monster huddling from th' Atlantic's surge,

or " sit down " and " be seated," as Sophocles [d] says :

> What means your huddling in these places here
> With suppliant garlands on the boughs ye bear ?

It is a graceful accomplishment also to adapt the usage of the words to fit the matter in hand, as the grammarians teach us to do, taking a word for one signification at one time, and at another time for another, as for example,

> Better commend a small ship, but put your goods on a big one.[e]

For by " commend " is meant " recommend," and the very expression of " recommend " to another is used nowadays instead of deprecating for one's self, as in everyday speech we say, " It's very kind," and " Very welcome," when we do not want a thing and do not accept it. In this way also some persons will have it that it must be " commendable Persephone " because she is deprecated.

Let us then observe closely this distinction and discrimination of words in greater and more serious matters, and let us begin with the gods, in teaching

[d] *Oedipus Tyrannus*, 2. [e] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 643.

(23) δάσκειν τοὺς νέους ὅτι χρῶνται τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν οἱ ποιηταὶ ποτὲ μὲν αὐτῶν ἐκείνων ἐφαπτόμενοι τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, ποτὲ δὲ δυνάμεις τινὰς ὧν οἱ θεοὶ δοτῆρές εἰσι καὶ καθηγεμόνες ὁμωνύμως προσαγορεύοντες. οἷον εὐθὺς ὁ Ἀρχίλοχος, ὅταν μὲν εὐχόμενος λέγῃ

B κλῦθ' ἄναξ Ἥφαιστε καί μοι σύμμαχος γου-
νουμένῳ
ἵλαος γενοῦ, χαρίζευ δ' οἷάπερ χαρίζεαι,

αὐτὸν τὸν θεὸν ἐπικαλούμενος δῆλός ἐστιν· ὅταν δὲ τὸν ἄνδρα τῆς ἀδελφῆς ἠφανισμένον ἐν θαλάττῃ καὶ μὴ τυχόντα νομίμου ταφῆς θρηνῶν λέγῃ μετριώτερον ἂν τὴν συμφορὰν ἐνεγκεῖν

εἰ κείνου κεφαλὴν καὶ χαρίεντα μέλεα
Ἥφαιστος καθαροῖσιν ἐν εἵμασιν ἀμφεπονήθη,

τὸ πῦρ οὕτως, οὐ τὸν θεὸν προσηγόρευσε. πάλιν δ' ὁ μὲν Εὐριπίδης εἰπὼν ἐν ὅρκῳ

μὰ τὸν μετ' ἄστρων Ζῆν' Ἄρη τε φοίνιον

αὐτοὺς τοὺς θεοὺς ὠνόμασε· τοῦ δὲ Σοφοκλέους λέγοντος

C τυφλὸς γάρ, ὦ γυναῖκες, οὐδ' ὁρῶν Ἄρης
συὸς προσώπῳ πάντα τυρβάζει κακά

τὸν πόλεμον ἔστιν ὑπακοῦσαι, καθάπερ αὖ τὸν χαλκὸν Ὁμήρου λέγοντος

τῶν νῦν αἷμα κελαινὸν ἐύρροον ἀμφὶ Σκάμανδρον
ἐσκέδασ' ὀξὺς Ἄρης.

πολλῶν οὖν οὕτω λεγομένων εἰδέναι δεῖ καὶ μνη-

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* ii. p. 703.
[b] *Ibid.* p. 687.

the young that when the poets employ the names of the gods, sometimes they apprehend in their conception the gods themselves, and at other times they give the same appellation to certain faculties of which the gods are the givers and authors. To take an obvious example, it is clear that Archilochus, when he says in his prayer,

> Hear my prayer, O Lord Hephaestus, and propitious
> Lend thy aid, and bestow what thy mercy bestows,[a]

is calling on the god himself; but when, lamenting his sister's husband who was lost at sea and received no formal burial, he says that he could have borne the calamity with greater moderation,

> If upon his head and his body so fair,
> All in garments clean, Hephaestus had done his office,[b]

it is fire that he called by this name and not the god. And again when Euripides[c] said in an oath,

> By Zeus amidst the stars and Ares murderous,

he named the gods themselves; but when Sophocles[d] says,

> Blind and unseeing Ares, worthy dames,
> With snout like that of swine upturns all ills,

the name is to be understood as meaning war; just as again it suggests weapons of bronze in the passage where Homer[e] says,

> Dark red blood of these men by the fair-flowing river Scamander
> Keen-edged Ares has shed.

Since, then, many words are used in this way, it is

[c] *Phoenissae*, 1006.

[d] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 754; again cited by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 757 B.

[e] Homer, *Il.* vii. 329.

(23) μονεύειν ὅτι καὶ τῷ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ Ζηνὸς ὀνόματι
D ποτὲ μὲν τὸν θεὸν ποτὲ δὲ τὴν τύχην πολλάκις δὲ
τὴν εἱμαρμένην προσαγορεύουσιν. ὅταν μὲν γὰρ
λέγωσι

Ζεῦ πάτερ, Ἰδηθεν μεδέων, κύδιστε μέγιστε,
δὸς νίκην Αἴαντι[1]

καὶ

ὦ Ζεῦ, τίς εἶναί φησι σοῦ σοφώτερος;

τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν λέγουσιν· ὅταν δὲ ταῖς αἰτίαις[2]
πάντων τῶν γιγνομένων ἐπονομάζωσι τὸν Δία καὶ
λέγωσι

πολλὰς δ' ἰφθίμους ψυχὰς Ἄϊδι προΐαψεν
ἡρώων, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἑλώρια τεῦχε κύνεσσι
οἰωνοῖσί τε δαῖτα,[3] Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή,

τὴν εἱμαρμένην. οὐ γὰρ τὸν θεὸν ὁ ποιητὴς
οἴεται κακὰ μηχανᾶσθαι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀλλὰ τὴν
E τῶν πραγμάτων ἀνάγκην ὀρθῶς ὑποδείκνυσιν, ὅτι
καὶ πόλεσι καὶ στρατοπέδοις καὶ ἡγεμόσιν, ἂν μὲν
σωφρονῶσιν, εὖ πράττειν πέπρωται καὶ κρατεῖν
τῶν πολεμίων, ἂν δ' εἰς πάθη καὶ ἁμαρτίας ἐμ-
πεσόντες ὥσπερ οὗτοι διαφέρωνται πρὸς ἀλλήλους
καὶ στασιάζωσιν, ἀσχημονεῖν καὶ ταράττεσθαι καὶ
κακῶς ἀπαλλάττειν, κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα·

εἱμαρμένον γὰρ τῶν κακῶν βουλευμάτων
κακὰς ἀμοιβὰς ἐστι καρποῦσθαι βροτοῖς.

καὶ μὴν ὁ Ἡσίοδος τὸν Προμηθέα ποιῶν τῷ Ἐπι-
μηθεῖ παρακελευόμενον

[1] *κύδιστε κτλ.* is omitted in most MSS.; see crit. note on 6 B.
[2] *ὅταν δ' ἐπὶ ταῖς αἰτίαις* Hirschig.
[3] *ἡρώων . . . δαῖτα* is omitted in most MSS., perhaps rightly; see crit. note on 6 B.

necessary to know and to remember that under the name Zeus also (or Zēn) the poets address sometimes the god, sometimes Fortune, and oftentimes Fate. For when they say,

> Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida, most glorious and mighty,
> Grant to Ajax victory,[a]

and

> O Zeus! who boasts to be more wise than thou?[b]

they mean the god himself; but when they apply the name of Zeus to the causes of all that happens, and say,

> Many valiant souls it sent to the realm of Hades,
> Goodly men, and their bodies gave to the dogs as ravin
> And to birds a feast—the design of Zeus in fulfilment,[c]

they mean Fate. For the poet does not imagine that it is the god who contrives evils for mankind, but by the name he rightly implies the compelling force of circumstances, that States and armies and leaders, if they show self-control, are destined to succeed and to prevail over their enemies, but if they fall into passions and errors, if they disagree and quarrel among themselves, as these heroes did, then are they destined to act discreditably and to become disorganized and to come to a bad end, as Sophocles says[d]:

> For fated is it that from evil plans
> An evil recompense shall mortals reap;

and certainly Hesiod[e] in representing Prometheus as exhorting Epimetheus

[a] Homer, *Il.* iii. 276, vii. 202, xxiv. 308.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 351.
[c] Homer, *Il.* i. 3.
[d] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 352.
[e] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 86.

μή ποτε δῶρα
δέξασθαι πὰρ Ζηνὸς Ὀλυμπίου ἀλλ' ἀποπέμπειν,

F ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς τύχης δυνάμει τῷ τοῦ Διὸς ὀνόματι κέχρηται· τὰ γὰρ τυχηρὰ τῶν ἀγαθῶν Διὸς δῶρα κέκληκε, πλούτους καὶ γάμους καὶ ἀρχὰς καὶ πάνθ' ὅλως τὰ ἐκτός, ὧν ἡ κτῆσις ἀνόνητός ἐστι τοῖς χρῆσθαι καλῶς μὴ δυναμένοις. διὸ καὶ τὸν Ἐπιμηθέα φαῦλον ὄντα καὶ ἀνόητον οἴεται δεῖν φυλάττεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι τὰς εὐτυχίας, ὡς βλαβησόμενον καὶ διαφθαρησόμενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν. καὶ πάλιν ὅταν λέγῃ

μηδέ ποτ' οὐλομένην πενίην θυμοφθόρον ἀνδρὶ
τέτλαθ' ὀνειδίζειν, μακάρων δόσιν αἰὲν ἐόντων,

θεόσδοτον νῦν τὸ τυχηρὸν εἴρηκεν, ὡς οὐκ ἄξιον ἐγκαλεῖν τοῖς διὰ τὴν τύχην πενομένοις, ἀλλὰ τὴν
24 μετ' ἀργίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ πολυτελείας ἀπορίαν κακίζειν αἰσχρὰν καὶ ἐπονείδιστον οὖσαν. οὕπω γὰρ αὐτὸ τοὔνομα τῆς τύχης λέγοντες, εἰδότες δὲ τὴν τῆς ἀτάκτως καὶ ἀορίστως περιφερομένης αἰτίας δύναμιν ἰσχυρὰν καὶ ἀφύλακτον οὖσαν ἀνθρωπίνῳ λογισμῷ τοῖς τῶν θεῶν ὀνόμασιν ἐξέφραζον, ὥσπερ ἡμεῖς καὶ πράγματα καὶ ἤθη καὶ νὴ Δία καὶ λόγους καὶ ἄνδρας εἰώθαμεν δαιμονίους καὶ θείους προσαγορεύειν. οὕτω δὴ τὰ πολλὰ τῶν ἀτόπως περὶ τοῦ Διὸς λέγεσθαι δοκούντων ἐπανορθωτέον, ὧν ἐστι καὶ ταῦτα

δοιοὶ γάρ τε πίθοι κατακείαται ἐν Διὸς οὔδει
B κηρῶν ἔμπλειοι, ὁ μὲν ἐσθλῶν, αὐτὰρ ὁ δειλῶν καὶ

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[a] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 717.

[b] The quotation follows Plato, *Republic*, 379 D, and not Homer, *Il.* xxiv. 528. The original, however, is quoted in the *Moralia*, 105 C.

Never to welcome
Any gifts from Zeus of Olympus, but always return them,

employs the name of Zeus as a synonym for the power of Fortune. For he has given the name of " gifts of Zeus " to the blessings of Fortune, such as wealth, marriage, office, and, in a word, all outward things, the possession of which is unprofitable to those who cannot make good use of them. Wherefore he thinks that Epimetheus, who is a worthless man and a fool, ought to be on his guard against any piece of good fortune, and be fearful of it, as he is likely to be injured and corrupted by it. And again when the poet says,

Never dare to reproach any man for accursed and woeful
Poverty, gift of the blessed gods whose life is for ever,[a]

he now speaks of what happens by chance as god-given, with the suggestion that it is not meet to impugn those who are poor through misfortune, but to reproach the penury that is accompanied by laziness, soft living, and extravagance, since then it is disgraceful and reprehensible. For at a time when men did not as yet use the name " Fortune," but knew the force of causation as it traverses its irregular and indeterminate course, so strong, so impossible for human reason to guard against, they tried to express this by the names of the gods, exactly as we are wont to call deeds and characters, and in fact even words and men, " divine " and " godlike." In this manner, then, a corrective is to be found for most of the seemingly unjustifiable statements regarding Zeus, among which are the following :

Fixed on Zeus' floor two massive urns stand ever,
Filled with happy lives the one, the other with sorrows,[b]

and

(24) ὅρκια μὲν Κρονίδης ὑψίζυγος οὐκ ἐτέλεσσεν,
ἀλλὰ κακὰ φρονέων τεκμαίρεται ἀμφοτέροισι

καὶ

τότε γάρ ῥα κυλίνδετο πήματος ἀρχὴ
Τρωσί τε καὶ Δαναοῖσι Διὸς μεγάλου διὰ βουλάς,

ὡς περὶ τῆς τύχης ἢ τῆς εἱμαρμένης λεγομένων, ἐν αἷς τὸ ἀσυλλόγιστον ἡμῖν τῆς αἰτίας σημαίνεται καὶ ὅλως οὐ καθ' ἡμᾶς. ὅπου δὲ τὸ προσῆκον καὶ κατὰ λόγον καὶ εἰκός ἐστιν, ἐνταῦθα κυρίως ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸν θεὸν νομίζωμεν,[1] ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις

C αὐτὰρ ὁ τῶν ἄλλων ἐπεπωλεῖτο στίχας ἀνδρῶν,
Αἴαντος δ' ἀλέεινε μάχην Τελαμωνιάδαο·
Ζεὺς γάρ οἱ νεμέσα ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιτο[2]

καὶ

Ζεὺς γὰρ τὰ μὲν μέγιστα φροντίζει βροτῶν,
τὰ μικρὰ δ' ἄλλοις δαίμοσιν παρεὶς ἐᾷ.

Σφόδρα δὲ δεῖ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὀνόμασι προσέχειν, κατὰ πολλὰ πράγματα κινουμένοις καὶ μεθισταμένοις ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν. οἷόν ἐστι καὶ τὸ τῆς ἀρετῆς. ἐπεὶ γὰρ οὐ μόνον ἔμφρονας παρέχεται καὶ D δικαίους καὶ ἀγαθοὺς ἐν πράξεσι καὶ λόγοις, ἀλλὰ καὶ δόξας ἐπιεικῶς καὶ δυνάμεις περιποιεῖται,

[1] *νομίζωμεν* Wyttenbach: *νομίζομεν*.
[2] The verse is not found in the MSS. of Homer. See the note on the opposite page.

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[a] Homer, *Il.* vii. 69.
[b] Homer, *Od.* viii. 81.
[c] Homer, *Il.* xi. 540, 542. The third line is not found

Cronos' son, enthroned on high, hath made naught of our pledges,
But for both our hosts with evil thought is planning,[a]

and

Then rolled forth the beginning of trouble
Both on Trojans and Greeks through designs of Zeus the almighty.[b]

These are to be interpreted as referring to Fortune or Fate, in which guise are denoted those phases of causation which baffle our logic, and are, in a word, beyond us. But wherever there is appropriateness, reason, and probability in the use of the name, let us believe that there the god himself is meant, as in the following :

But he ranged to and fro 'gainst the lines of the rest of the fighters;
Only with Ajax, Telamon's son, he avoided a conflict,
Seeing that Zeus was wroth if he fight with a man far better,[c]

and

For Zeus takes thought for mortals' greatest weal;
The little things he leaves to other gods.[d]

Particular attention must be paid to the other words also, when their signification is shifted about and changed by the poets according to various circumstances. An example is the word " virtue." For inasmuch as virtue not only renders men sensible, honest, and upright in actions and words, but also often enough secures for them repute and influence,

in the MSS. of Homer, but on the authority of this passage and 36 A and Aristotle, *Rhetoric*, ii. 9, and the life of Homer ascribed to Plutarch, it has commonly been printed as line 543 in the editions of Homer.

[d] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 353.

(24) παρὰ τοῦτο ποιοῦνται καὶ τὴν εὐδοξίαν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὴν[1] δύναμιν, ὀνομάζοντες ὥσπερ "ἐλαίαν" τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἐλαίας, καὶ "φηγὸν" τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς φηγοῦ καρπὸν ὁμωνύμως τοῖς φέρουσιν. οὐκοῦν ὁ νέος ἡμῖν, ὅταν μὲν λέγωσι

τῆς δ' ἀρετῆς ἱδρῶτα θεοὶ προπάροιθεν ἔθηκαν

καὶ

τῆμος σφῇ ἀρετῇ Δαναοὶ ῥήξαντο φάλαγγας

καὶ

εἰ δὲ θανεῖν θέμις, ὧδε θανεῖν καλόν,
εἰς ἀρετὴν καταλυσαμένους βίον,

E εὐθὺς οἰέσθω λέγεσθαι ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἀρίστης καὶ θειοτάτης ἕξεως ἐν ἡμῖν, ἣν ὀρθότητα λόγου καὶ ἀκρότητα λογικῆς φύσεως καὶ διάθεσιν ὁμολογουμένην ψυχῆς νοοῦμεν. ὅταν δ' ἀναγιγνώσκῃ πάλιν τό τε

Ζεὺς δ' ἀρετὴν ἄνδρεσσιν ὀφέλλει τε μινύθει τε

καὶ τὸ

πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὴ καὶ κῦδος ὀπηδεῖ,

μὴ "καθήσθω" τοὺς πλουσίους ἐκπεπληγμένος καὶ "τεθηπὼς" καθάπερ ὤνιον εὐθὺς ἀργυρίου τὴν ἀρετὴν ἔχοντας, μηδ' ἐπὶ τῇ τύχῃ κεῖσθαι τὴν αὐτοῦ[2] φρόνησιν αὔξειν ἢ κολούειν νομίζων, ἀλλ' ἀντὶ δόξης ἢ δυνάμεως ἢ εὐτυχίας ἤ τινος ὁμοίου F τῇ ἀρετῇ κεχρῆσθαι τὸν ποιητὴν ἡγείσθω. καὶ

[1] τὴν added by Reiske. [2] αὐτοῦ F.C.B.: αὐτοῦ.

[a] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 289. [b] Homer, *Il.* xi. 90.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 994. Again quoted by Plutarch, *Pelopidas*, 317 E.

the poets, following this notion, make good repute and influence to be virtue, giving them this name in exactly the same way that the products of the olive and the chestnut are called " olives " and " chestnuts," the same names as the trees that bear them. So then when poets say,

> Sweat the gods have set before the attainment of virtue,[a]

and

> Then the Greeks by their virtue broke the line of their foemen,[b]

and

> If to die be our fate,
> Thus to die is our right
> Merging our lives into virtue,[c]

let our young man at once feel that these sayings relate to the best and godliest estate to which we can attain, which we think of as correctness of reasoning, the height of good sense, and a disposition of soul in full agreement therewith. But when at another time, in his reading, he finds this line,

> Zeus makes virtue in men both to increase and diminish,[d]

or this,

> Virtue and glory are attendant on riches,[e]

let him not " sit " astounded and " amazed " at the rich, as though they were able to purchase virtue without ado for money, nor let him believe either that the increase or diminution of his own wisdom rests with Fortune, but let him consider that the poet has employed " virtue " instead of repute, or influence, or good fortune, or the like. For assuredly

[d] Homer, *Il.* xx. 242.
[e] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 313.

γὰρ τῇ κακότητι ποτὲ μὲν ἰδίως σημαίνουσι κακίαν καὶ μοχθηρίαν ψυχῆς, ὡς Ἡσίοδος

τὴν μὲν γὰρ[1] κακότητα καὶ ἰλαδὸν ἔστιν ἑλέσθαι,

ποτὲ δ' ἄλλην τινὰ κάκωσιν ἢ δυστυχίαν, ὡς Ὅμηρος

αἶψα γὰρ ἐν κακότητι βροτοὶ καταγηράσκουσιν.

ἐπεὶ καὶ τὴν εὐδαιμονίαν ἐξαπατηθείη τις ἂν οὕτω τοὺς ποιητὰς οἰόμενος λέγειν, ὡς οἱ φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι τὴν παντελῆ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἕξιν ἢ κτῆσιν ἢ καὶ τελειότητα βίου κατὰ φύσιν εὑροοῦντος, ἀλλ' οὐχὶ καταχρωμένους πολλάκις τὸν πλούσιον εὐδαίμονα καλεῖν ἢ μακάριον καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἢ τὴν δόξαν εὐδαιμονίαν. Ὅμηρος μὲν γὰρ ὀρθῶς κέχρηται τοῖς ὀνόμασιν

ὣς οὔ τοι χαίρων[2] τοῖσδε κτεάτεσσιν ἀνάσσω

καὶ Μένανδρος

ἔχω δὲ πολλὴν οὐσίαν καὶ πλούσιος
καλοῦμ' ὑπὸ πάντων, μακάριος δ' ὑπ' οὐδενός,

Εὐριπίδης δὲ πολλὴν ἐργάζεται ταραχὴν καὶ σύγχυσιν ὅταν λέγῃ

B μή μοι γένοιτο λυπρὸς εὐδαίμων βίος

καὶ

[1] τὴν μέν τοι Hesiod.

[2] It seems almost certain that Plutarch must have read ὣς οὐκ εὐδαίμων for ὣς οὔ τοι χαίρων.

[a] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 287.

by "evil" the poets sometimes signify badness in its strict sense, and wickedness of soul, as when Hesiod [a] says,

Evil may always be had by all mankind in abundance,

and sometimes some other affliction or misfortune, as when Homer [b] says,

Since full soon do mortals who live in evil grow aged.

And so too anybody would be sadly deceived, should he imagine that the poets give to "happiness" the sense which the philosophers give to it, namely, that of complete possession or attainment of good, or the perfection of a life gliding smoothly along in accord with nature, and that the poets do not oftentimes by a perversion of the word call the rich man happy and blessed, and call influence or repute happiness. Now Homer [c] has used the words correctly:

No delight [d] have I in ruling these possessions,

and so has Menander: [e]

A great estate have I, and rich am called
By all, but I am called by no man blest.

But Euripides [f] works much disturbance and confusion when he says,

May I ne'er have a painful happy life,

and

[b] Homer, *Od.* xix. 360. [c] *Ibid.* iv. 93.
[d] Logically we should expect here a word meaning "happy." See the critical note on the opposite page.
[e] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii. p. 184, and Allinson, *Menander* in L.C.L. p. 506.
[f] Euripides, *Medea*, 603.

(25) *τί τὴν τυραννίδ', ἀδικίαν εὐδαίμονα,*
τιμᾷς;

ἂν μή τις, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, ταῖς μεταφοραῖς καὶ καταχρήσεσι τῶν ὀνομάτων ἕπηται. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανὰ περὶ τούτων.

7. Ἐκεῖνο δ' οὐχ ἅπαξ ἀλλὰ πολλάκις ὑπομνηστέον ἐστὶ τοὺς νέους, ἐνδεικνυμένους αὐτοῖς ὅτι μιμητικὴν ἡ ποίησις ὑπόθεσιν ἔχουσα κόσμῳ μὲν καὶ λαμπρότητι χρῆται περὶ τὰς ὑποκειμένας πράξεις καὶ τὰ ἤθη, τὴν δ' ὁμοιότητα τοῦ ἀληθοῦς
C οὐ προλείπει, τῆς μιμήσεως ἐν τῷ πιθανῷ τὸ ἀγωγὸν ἐχούσης. διὸ καὶ κακίας καὶ ἀρετῆς σημεῖα μεμιγμένα ταῖς πράξεσιν ἡ μὴ παντάπασι τῆς ἀληθείας ὀλιγωροῦσα συνεκφέρει μίμησις, ὥσπερ ἡ Ὁμήρου πολλὰ πάνυ τοῖς Στωϊκοῖς χαίρειν φράζουσα, μήτε τι φαῦλον ἀρετῇ προσεῖναι μήτε κακίᾳ χρηστὸν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ πάντως μὲν ἐν πᾶσιν ἁμαρτωλὸν εἶναι τὸν ἀμαθῆ, περὶ πάντα δ' αὖ κατορθοῦν τὸν ἀστεῖον. ταῦτα γὰρ ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς ἀκούομεν· ἐν δὲ τοῖς πράγμασι καὶ τῷ βίῳ τῶν πολλῶν κατὰ τὸν Εὐριπίδην

οὐκ ἂν γένοιτο χωρὶς ἐσθλὰ καὶ κακά,
D *ἀλλ' ἔστι τις σύγκρασις.*

ἄνευ δὲ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς μάλιστα μὲν ἡ ποιητικὴ τῷ ποικίλῳ χρῆται καὶ πολυτρόπῳ. τὸ γὰρ ἐμπαθὲς καὶ παράλογον καὶ ἀπροσδόκητον, ᾧ πλείστη μὲν ἔκπληξις ἕπεται πλείστη δὲ χάρις, αἱ μεταβολαὶ παρέχουσι τοῖς μύθοις· τὸ δ' ἁπλοῦν ἀπαθὲς καὶ

[a] Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 549.

[b] From the *Aeolus* of Euripides; quoted again *Moralia*, 369 B and 474 A. *Cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 21.

> Why do you honour show to tyranny,
> Happy iniquity ? [a]

unless, as has been said, one follows the figurative and perverted use of the words. This, then, is enough on this subject.

7. There is a fact, however, which we must recall to the minds of the young not once merely, but over and over again, by pointing out to them that while poetry, inasmuch as it has an imitative basis, employs embellishment and glitter in dealing with the actions and characters that form its groundwork, yet it does not forsake the semblance of truth, since imitation depends upon plausibility for its allurement. This is the reason why the imitation that does not show an utter disregard of the truth brings out, along with the actions, indications of both vice and virtue commingled ; as is the case with that of Homer, which emphatically says good-bye to the Stoics, who will have it that nothing base can attach to virtue, and nothing good to vice, but that the ignorant man is quite wrong in all things, while, on the other hand, the man of culture is right in everything. These are the doctrines that we hear in the schools ; but in the actions and in the life of most men, according to Euripides,[b]

> The good and bad cannot be kept apart
> But there is some commingling.

But when poetic art is divorced from the truth, then chiefly it employs variety and diversity. For it is the sudden changes that give to its stories the elements of the emotional, the surprising, and the unexpected, and these are attended by very great astonishment and enjoyment ; but sameness is un-

(25) ἄμουσον.[1] ὅθεν οὔτε νικῶντας ἀεὶ πάντα ποιοῦσι τοὺς αὐτοὺς οὔτ' εὐημεροῦντας οὔτε κατορθοῦντας. ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τοῖς θεοῖς, ὅταν εἰς ἀνθρωπίνας ἐμπέσωσι πράξεις, ἀπαθέσι χρῶνται καὶ ἀναμαρτήτοις, ἵνα μηδαμοῦ τό τε ταράττον καὶ τὸ ἐκπλῆττον ἀργῇ τῆς ποιήσεως ἀκίνδυνον καὶ ἀναγώνιστον γιγνόμενον.

8. Οὕτως οὖν τούτων ἐχόντων ἐπάγωμεν τοῖς
E ποιήμασι τὸν νέον μὴ τοιαύτας ἔχοντα δόξας περὶ τῶν καλῶν ἐκείνων καὶ μεγάλων ὀνομάτων, ὡς ἄρα σοφοὶ καὶ δίκαιοι οἱ ἄνδρες ἦσαν, ἄκροι τε βασιλεῖς καὶ κανόνες ἀρετῆς ἁπάσης καὶ ὀρθότητος. ἐπεὶ βλαβήσεται μεγάλα δοκιμάζων πάντα καὶ τεθηπώς, μὴ δυσχεραίνων δὲ μηδὲν μηδ' ἀκούων μηδ' ἀποδεχόμενος τοῦ ψέγοντος αὖ τοὺς[2] τοιαῦτα πράττοντας καὶ λέγοντας

αἴ γάρ, Ζεῦ τε πάτερ καὶ Ἀθηναίη καὶ Ἄπολλον,
μήτε τις οὖν Τρώων θάνατον φύγοι, ὅσσοι ἔασι,
μήτε τις Ἀργείων, νῶιν δ' ἐκδῦμεν[3] ὄλεθρον,
F ὄφρ' οἷοι Τροίης ἱερὰ κρήδεμνα λύοιμεν

καὶ

οἰκτροτάτην δ' ἤκουσα ὅπα Πριάμοιο θυγατρὸς
Κασσάνδρης, τὴν κτεῖνε Κλυταιμνήστρη δολόμητις
ἀμφ' ἐμοί

καὶ

παλλακίδι προμιγῆναι, ἵν' ἐχθήρειε γέροντα.
τῇ πιθόμην καὶ ἔρεξα

καὶ

[1] ἄμουσον Kronenberg: ἄμυθον.
[2] αὖ τοὺς F.C.B.; αὐτοὺς.
[3] Probably νῶι δ' ἐκδῦμεν should be read in Homer.

emotional and prosaic. Therefore poets do not represent the same people as always victorious or prosperous or successful in everything ; no, not even the gods, when they project themselves into human activities, are represented in the poets' usage as free from emotion or fault, that the perturbing and exciting element in the poetry shall nowhere become idle and dull, for want of danger and struggle.

8. Now since this is so, let the young man, when we set him to reading poems, not be prepossessed with any such opinions about those good and great names, as, for instance, that the men were wise and honest, consummate kings, and standards of all virtue and uprightness. For he will be greatly injured if he approves everything, and is in a state of wonderment over it, but resents nothing, refusing even to listen or accept the opinion of him who, on the contrary, censures persons that do and say such things as these :

> This I would, O Zeus, Athena, and Apollo,
> That not one escape death of all the Trojans living
> And of the Greeks ; but that you and I elude destruction,
> So that we alone may raze Troy's sacred bulwarks,[a]

and

> Saddest of all the sad sounds that I heard was the cry
> of Cassandra,
> Priam's daughter, whom Clytemnestra craftily planning
> Slew o'er my body,[b]

and

> That I seduce the girl and ensure her hate for my father.
> So I obeyed her and did it,[c]

and

[a] Homer, *Il.* xvi. 97. [b] Homer, *Od.* xi. 421.
[c] Homer, *Il.* ix. 452.

Ζεῦ πάτερ, οὔ τις σεῖο θεῶν ὀλοώτερος ἄλλος.

μηδὲν οὖν ἐπαινεῖν ἐθιζέσθω τοιοῦτον ὁ νέος, μηδὲ
26 προφάσεις λέγων μηδὲ παραγωγάς τινας εὐπρεπεῖς
ἐπὶ πράγμασι φαύλοις μηχανώμενος πιθανὸς ἔστω
καὶ πανοῦργος, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνο μᾶλλον οἰέσθω, μίμησιν
εἶναι τὴν ποίησιν ἠθῶν καὶ βίων, καὶ ἀνθρώπων οὐ
τελείων οὐδὲ καθαρῶν οὐδ' ἀνεπιλήπτων παντάπασιν, ἀλλὰ μεμιγμένων πάθεσι καὶ δόξαις ψευδέσι
καὶ ἀγνοίαις, διὰ δ' εὐφυΐαν αὐτοὺς πολλάκις μετατιθέντων πρὸς τὸ κρεῖττον. ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη παρασκευὴ τοῦ νέου καὶ διάνοια, τοῖς μὲν εὖ λεγομένοις
καὶ πραττομένοις ἐπαιρομένου καὶ συνενθουσιῶντος,
B τὰ δὲ φαῦλα μὴ προσιεμένου καὶ δυσχεραίνοντος,
ἀβλαβῆ παρέξει τὴν ἀκρόασιν. ὁ δὲ πάντα θαυμάζων καὶ πᾶσιν ἐξοικειούμενος καὶ καταδεδουλωμένος τῇ δόξῃ τὴν κρίσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἡρωϊκῶν
ὀνομάτων, ὥσπερ οἱ τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀπομιμούμενοι κυρτότητα καὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους τραυλότητα,
λήσεται πρὸς πολλὰ τῶν φαύλων εὐχερὴς γενόμενος. δεῖ δὲ μὴ δειλῶς μηδ' ὥσπερ ὑπὸ δεισιδαιμονίας ἐν ἱερῷ φρίττειν ἅπαντα καὶ προσκυνεῖν,
ἀλλὰ θαρραλέως ἐθιζόμενον ἐπιφωνεῖν μηδὲν ἧττον
τοῦ "ὀρθῶς" καὶ "πρεπόντως" τὸ "οὐκ ὀρθῶς"
καὶ "οὐ προσηκόντως." οἷον ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἐκκλησίαν συνάγει τῶν στρατιωτῶν νοσούντων, ἀσχάλ-
C λων μὲν ἀργοῦντι τῷ πολέμῳ μάλιστα πάντων διὰ
τὴν ἐν ταῖς στρατείαις ἐπιφάνειαν αὐτοῦ καὶ
δόξαν, ἰατρικὸς δ' ὢν καὶ μεθ' ἡμέραν ἑνάτην ἤ

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[a] Homer, *Il.* iii. 365.

Father Zeus, none other of the gods is more baleful.[a]

Let the young man, then, not get into the habit of commending anything like this, nor let him be plausible and adroit in making excuses or in contriving some specious quibbles to explain base actions, but rather let him cherish the belief that poetry is an imitation of character and lives, and of men who are not perfect or spotless or unassailable in all respects, but pervaded by emotions, false opinions, and sundry forms of ignorance, who yet through inborn goodness frequently change their ways for the better. For if the young man is so trained, and his understanding so framed, that he feels elation and a sympathetic enthusiasm over noble words and deeds, and an aversion and repugnance for the mean, such training will render his perusal of poetry harmless. But the man who admires everything, and accommodates himself to everything, whose judgement, because of his preconceived opinion, is enthralled by the heroic names, will, like those who copy Plato's stoop or Aristotle's lisp, unwittingly become inclined to conform to much that is base. One ought not timorously, or as though under the spell of religious dread in a holy place, to shiver with awe at everything, and fall prostrate, but should rather acquire the habit of exclaiming with confidence " wrong " and " improper " no less than " right " and " proper." For example, Achilles summons an assembly of the soldiers, who are suffering from an illness, since he is most impatient of all over the slow progress of the war because of his conspicuous position and reputation on the field; moreover, because he has some knowledge of medicine, and perceives now after the ninth day, on

(26) *ταῦτα κρίνεσθαι πέφυκεν αἰσθόμενος οὐκ οὖσαν συνήθη τὴν νόσον οὐδὲ συνεστῶσαν ἀπὸ κοινῶν αἰτιῶν, ἀναστὰς οὐ δημαγωγεῖ πρὸς τὸν*[1] *ὄχλον, ἀλλὰ τῷ βασιλεῖ γίγνεται σύμβουλος*

Ἀτρείδη, νῦν ἄμμε πάλιν πλαγχθέντας ὀίω
ἆψ ἀπονοστήσειν,

D *ὀρθῶς ταῦτα καὶ μετρίως καὶ πρεπόντως. τοῦ δὲ μάντεως δεδιέναι φήσαντος τὴν ὀργὴν τοῦ δυνατωτάτου τῶν Ἑλλήνων, οὐκέτ' ὀρθῶς οὐδὲ μετρίως, ἐπομόσας μηδένα προσοίσειν χεῖρας αὐτῷ ζῶντος αὐτοῦ, προστίθησιν*

οὐδ' ἢν Ἀγαμέμνονα εἴπῃς,

ἐνδεικνύμενος ὀλιγωρίαν καὶ περιφρόνησιν τοῦ ἄρχοντος. ἐκ δὲ τούτου μᾶλλον παροξυνθεὶς ἐπὶ τὸ ξίφος φέρεται σφάττειν διανοούμενος, οὔτε πρὸς τὸ καλὸν ὀρθῶς οὔτε πρὸς τὸ συμφέρον. εἶτ' αὖθις μετανοήσας

ἆψ ἐς κουλεὸν ὦσε μέγα ξίφος, οὐδ' ἀπίθησε
E *μύθῳ Ἀθηναίης,*

ὀρθῶς πάλιν καὶ καλῶς, ὅτι τὸν θυμὸν ἐκκόψαι παντάπασι μὴ δυνηθείς, ὅμως πρὶν ἀνήκεστόν τι δρᾶσαι μετέστησε καὶ κατέσχεν εὐπειθῆ τῷ λογισμῷ γενόμενον. πάλιν ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων ἐν μὲν τοῖς περὶ τὴν ἐκκλησίαν γιγνομένοις καὶ λεγομένοις ὑπ' αὐτοῦ καταγέλαστός ἐστιν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς περὶ Χρυσηίδα σεμνότερος καὶ βασιλικώτερος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ἀχιλλεὺς ἀγομένης τῆς Βρισηίδος

[1] *πρὸς τὸν*] *τὸν* Aldine edition.

which these maladies naturally reach their crisis, that the disease is out of the ordinary and not the result of familiar causes, he does not harangue the multitude when he rises to speak, but makes himself an adviser to the king :

> Son of Atreus, now, as I think, are we destined to wander
> Back to seek our homes again.[a]

Rightly, moderately, and properly is this put. But after the seer has said that he fears the wrath of the most powerful of the Greeks, Achilles no longer speaks rightly and moderately, when he swears that nobody shall lay hands on the seer while he himself is alive,

> No, not though you name Agamemnon,[b]

thus making plain his slight regard and his contempt for the leader. A moment later his irritation becomes more acute, and his impulse is to draw his sword with intent to do murder ; not rightly, either for honour or for expediency. Again, later, repenting,

> Back he thrust his massive blade once more to its scabbard,
> Nor ignored Athena's words,[c]

this time rightly and honourably, because, although he could not altogether eradicate his anger, yet before doing anything irreparable he put it aside and checked it by making it obedient to his reason. Then again, although Agamemnon is ridiculous in his actions and words at the Assembly, yet in the incidents touching Chryseïs he is more dignified and kingly. For whereas Achilles, as Briseïs was being led away,

[a] Homer, *Il.* i. 59. [b] *Ibid.* 90. [c] *Ibid.* 220.

δακρύσας ἑτάρων ἄφαρ ἔζετο νόσφι λιασθείς,

οὗτος δ' αὐτὸς εἰς τὴν ναῦν ἐμβιβάζων καὶ παρα-
F διδοὺς καὶ ἀποπέμπων τὴν ἄνθρωπον ἣν ὀλίγῳ πρόσθεν εἴρηκε τῆς γαμετῆς τῇ εὐνοίᾳ προκρίνειν, οὐδὲν ἐρωτικὸν οὐδ' αἰσχρὸν ἐποίησε. καὶ μὴν ὁ Φοῖνιξ διὰ τὴν παλλακίδα κατάρατος ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς γενόμενος

"τὸν μὲν ἐγώ," φησί, "βούλευσα κατακτάμεν ὀξέι χαλκῷ·
ἀλλά τις ἀθανάτων παῦσεν χόλον, ὅς ῥ' ἐνὶ θυμῷ
δήμου θῆκε φάτιν καὶ ὀνείδεα πόλλ' ἀνθρώπων,
ὡς μὴ πατροφόνος μετ' Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίμην."

ὁ μὲν οὖν Ἀρίσταρχος ἐξεῖλε ταῦτα τὰ ἔπη φοβη-
θείς· ἔχει δὲ πρὸς τὸν καιρὸν ὀρθῶς, τοῦ Φοίνικος
τὸν Ἀχιλλέα διδάσκοντος οἷόν ἐστιν ὀργὴ καὶ ὅσα
27 διὰ θυμὸν ἄνθρωποι τολμῶσι, μὴ χρώμενοι λογισμῷ μηδὲ πειθόμενοι τοῖς παρηγοροῦσι. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Μελέαγρον ἐπεισάγει τοῖς πολίταις ὀργιζόμενον, εἶτα πραϋνόμενον, ὀρθῶς τὰ πάθη ψέγων, τὸ δὲ μὴ συνακολουθεῖν ἀλλ' ἀντιτάττεσθαι καὶ κρατεῖν καὶ μετανοεῖν ἐπαινῶν ὡς καλὸν καὶ συμφέρον.

Ἐνταῦθα μὲν οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ πρόδηλος· ὅπου δ' ἀσαφῆ τὰ τῆς γνώμης, διοριστέον οὕτω πως ἐφιστάντας τὸν νέον. εἰ μὲν ἡ Ναυσικάα ξένον ἄνδρα τὸν Ὀδυσσέα θεασαμένη καὶ παθοῦσα τὸ τῆς Καλυψοῦς πάθος πρὸς αὐτόν, ἅτε δὴ τρυφῶσα

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[a] Homer, *Il.* i. 349.

[b] These lines are not found in any MS. of Homer, but on the authority of this quotation they have been printed in practically all editions since that of Barnes (1711) as lines 458-61 of Book IX. of the *Iliad*. Plutarch cites the

Burst into tears and withdrawing apart sat aloof from his comrades,[a]

Agamemnon, as he in person put aboard the ship, and gave up and sent away, the woman of whom, a moment before, he has said that he cared more for her than for his wedded wife, committed no amorous or disgraceful act. Then again, Phoenix, cursed by his father on account of the concubine, says :

True in my heart I had purposed to slay him with keen-pointed dagger,
Save that one of the deathless gods put an end to my anger,
Bringing to mind the people's talk and men's many reproaches,
Lest I be known among the Greeks as my father's slayer.[b]

Now Aristarchus removed these lines from the text through fear, but they are right in view of the occasion, since Phoenix is trying to teach Achilles what sort of a thing anger is, and how many wild deeds men are ready to do from temper, if they do not use reason or hearken to those who try to soothe them. So also the poet introduces Meleager angry at his fellow-citizens, and later mollified, and he rightly finds fault with his emotions, but, on the other hand, his refusal to yield, his resistance, his mastery over them, and his change of heart the poet commends as good and expedient.

Now in these cases the difference is manifest ; but in cases where Homer's judgement is not made clear, a distinction is to be drawn by directing the young man's attention in some such manner as the following : If, on the one hand, Nausicaa, after merely looking at a strange man, Odysseus, and experiencing Calypso's emotions toward him, being, as she was,

second and part of the third line in the *Life of Coriolanus*, chap. 32 (229 B), and the last line in *Moralia*, 72 B.

(27) καὶ γάμων ὥραν ἔχουσα, τοιαῦτα μωραίνει πρὸς
B τὰς θεραπαινίδας

αἲ γὰρ ἐμεῦ[1] τοιόσδε πόσις κεκλημένος εἴη
ἐνθάδε ναιετάων, καί οἱ ἄδοι αὐτόθι μίμνειν,

ψεκτέον τὸ θράσος αὐτῆς καὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν· εἰ δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τοῦ ἀνδρὸς τὸ ἦθος ἐνιδοῦσα καὶ θαυμάσασα τὴν ἔντευξιν αὐτοῦ πολὺν νοῦν ἔχουσαν εὔχεται τοιούτῳ συνοικεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ πλωτικῷ τινι καὶ ὀρχηστικῷ τῶν πολιτῶν, ἄξιον ἄγασθαι. πάλιν τῆς Πηνελόπης τοῖς μνηστῆρσι προσδιαλεγομένης οὐκ ἀπανθρώπως, ἐκείνων δ' αὐτῇ χαριζομένων ἱμάτια καὶ κόσμον ἄλλον, ἡδόμενος Ὀδυσσεὺς
C οὕνεκα τῶν μὲν δῶρα παρέλκετο, θέλγε δὲ θυμόν,

εἰ μὲν ἐπὶ τῇ δωροδοκίᾳ καὶ πλεονεξίᾳ χαίρει, τὸν κωμῳδούμενον ὑπερβάλλει μαστροπείᾳ Πολίαγρον

εὐδαίμων Πολίαγρος
οὐράνιον[2] αἶγα πλουτοφόρον τρέφων·

εἰ δὲ μᾶλλον οἰόμενος ὑποχειρίους ἕξειν διὰ τὴν ἐλπίδα θαρροῦντας[3] καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐ προσδοκῶντας, λόγον ἔχει τὸ ἡδόμενον αὐτοῦ[4] καὶ θαρροῦν. ὁμοίως ἐπὶ τῇ διαριθμήσει τῶν χρημάτων, ἃ συνεξέθηκαν οἱ Φαίακες αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπέπλευσαν, εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς ἐν ἐρημίᾳ τοσαύτῃ καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὸν
D ἀσαφείᾳ καὶ ἀδηλότητι γεγονὼς περὶ τῶν χρημάτων φοβεῖται

[1] ἐμοὶ Homer, ζ 244. [2] Οὐράνιον Pantazides.
[3] θαρροῦντας Bernardakis: θαρροῦντες. [4] αὐτοῦ Hart.: αὐτῷ.

[a] Homer, *Od.* vi. 244. [b] *Ibid.* xviii. 282.
[c] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii. 399. *Cf.* Alciphro, *Epist.* iii. 62. The reference is probably to the goat Amalthea, the fabled nurse of the infant Zeus, but Pantazides thinks that Uranium (Οὐράνιον) may have been the woman's name.

a wanton child and at the age for marriage, utters such foolish words as these to her maid-servants,

> How I wish that a man like this might be called my husband,
> Living here with us, and be contented to tarry,[a]

then are her boldness and lack of restraint to be blamed. But if, on the other hand, she sees into the character of the man from his words, and marvels at his conversation, so full of good sense, and then prays that she may be the consort of such a person rather than of some sailor man or dancing man of her own townsmen, then it is quite right to admire her. And again, when Penelope enters into conversation with the suitors, not holding herself aloof, and they favour her with gifts of garments and other apparel, Odysseus is pleased

> Since she had coaxed all these gifts from them, and had cozened their senses.[b]

If, on the one hand, he rejoices at the receipt of the presents and the profit, then in his prostitution of his wife he outdoes Poliager, who is satirized in the comedy as

> Poliager blest
> Who keeps a Cyprian goat to yield him wealth.[c]

But if, on the other hand, he thinks that he shall have them more in his power, while they are confident because of their hopes and blind to the future, then his pleasure and confidence has a reasonable justification. Similarly, in the enumeration of his possessions which the Phaeacians had put ashore with him before they sailed away, if on the one hand, upon finding himself in such solitude and in such uncertainty and ambiguity regarding his surroundings, he really fears about his possessions,

(27) μή τί οἱ οἴχωνται κοίλης ἐπὶ νηὸς ἔχοντες,[1]

οἰκτίρειν ἄξιον ἢ βδελύττεσθαι νὴ Δία τὴν φιλοπλουτίαν· εἰ δ', ὥσπερ ἔνιοι λέγουσι, περὶ τῆς Ἰθάκης ἀμφιδοξῶν οἴεται τὴν τῶν χρημάτων σωτηρίαν ἀπόδειξιν εἶναι τῆς τῶν Φαιάκων ὁσιότητος (οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἀκερδῶς φέροντας αὐτὸν εἰς ἀλλοτρίαν ἐκβαλεῖν χώραν καὶ καταλιπεῖν, ἀποσχομένους τῶν χρημάτων), οὔτε φαύλῳ τεκμηρίῳ χρῆται καὶ τὴν πρόE νοιαν ἄξιον ἐπαινεῖν. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ τὴν ἔκθεσιν αὐτὴν εἰ μὲν ἀληθῶς ἐγένετο καθεύδοντος ψέγουσι, καὶ Τυρρηνοὺς ἱστορίαν τινά φασι διαφυλάττειν ὡς ὑπνώδους φύσει τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως γενομένου καὶ δυσεντεύκτου διὰ τοῦτο τοῖς πολλοῖς ὄντος. εἰ δ' οὐκ ἦν ἀληθὴς ὁ ὕπνος, ἀλλ' αἰδούμενος μὲν ἀποπέμψαι τοὺς Φαίακας ἄνευ ξενίων καὶ φιλοφροσύνης, μὴ δυνάμενος δὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς λαθεῖν ἐκείνων συμπαρόντων ἐχρήσατο τῇ ἀπορίας παρακαλύμματι, κοιμωμένῳ ποιήσας ὅμοιον ἑαυτόν, ἀποδέχονται.

Καὶ ταῦτα δὴ τοῖς νέοις ὑποδεικνύοντες οὐκ ἐάσομεν φορὰν πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα γίγνεσθαι τῶν ἠθῶν ἀλλὰ τῶν βελτιόνων ζῆλον καὶ προαίρεσιν, F εὐθὺς τοῖς μὲν τὸ ψέγειν τοῖς δὲ τὸ ἐπαινεῖν ἀποδιδόντες. μάλιστα δὲ τοῦτο ποιεῖν δεῖ ἐν ταῖς τραγῳδίαις ὅσαι λόγους ἔχουσι πιθανοὺς καὶ πανούργους ἐν πράξεσιν ἀδόξοις καὶ πονηραῖς. οὐ πάνυ γὰρ ἀληθὲς τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους λέγοντος

[1] ἄγοντες Homer, *ν* 216.

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[a] Homer, *Od.* xiii. 216.

[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 755.

Lest the men on the ship had sailed away with something,[a]

then it is quite right to pity or indeed even to loathe his avarice. But if, on the other hand, he, as some say, being of two minds whether he were in Ithaca, thinks that the safety of his possessions is a demonstration of the rectitude of the Phaeacians (for otherwise they would not have carried him for nothing, put him ashore in a strange land, and left him there, at the same time keeping their hands off his possessions), then he makes use of no mean proof, and it is quite right to praise his forethought. But some critics find fault also with the very act of putting him ashore, if this really was done while he was asleep, and assert that the Etruscans still preserve a tradition that Odysseus was naturally sleepy, and that for this reason most people found him difficult to converse with. Yet if his sleep was not real, but if, being ashamed to send away the Phaeacians without gifts and entertainment, and at the same time unable to elude his enemies if the Phaeacians were in company with him, he provided himself with a cloak for his embarrassment in feigning himself asleep, then they find this acceptable.

By indicating these things to the young, we shall not allow them to acquire any leaning toward such characters as are mean, but rather an emulation of the better, and a preference for them, if we unhesitatingly award censure to the one class and commendation to the other. It is particularly necessary to do this with tragedies in which plausible and artful words are framed to accompany disreputable and knavish actions. For the statement of Sophocles [b] is not altogether true when he says :

οὐκ ἔστ' ἀπ' ἔργων μὴ καλῶν ἔπη καλά·

καὶ γὰρ οὗτος[1] εἴωθεν ἥθεσι φαύλοις καὶ ἀτόποις πράγμασι λόγους ἐπιγελῶντας καὶ φιλανθρώπους αἰτίας πορίζειν. καὶ ὁ σύσκηνος αὐτοῦ πάλιν ὁρᾷς
28 ὅτι τήν τε Φαίδραν καὶ προσεγκαλοῦσαν τῷ Θησεῖ πεποίηκεν ὡς διὰ τὰς ἐκείνου παρανομίας ἐρασθεῖσαν τοῦ Ἱππολύτου. τοιαύτην δὲ καὶ τῇ Ἑλένῃ παρρησίαν κατὰ τῆς Ἑκάβης ἐν ταῖς Τρῳάσι δίδωσιν, οἰομένῃ δεῖν ἐκείνην κολάζεσθαι μᾶλλον ὅτι μοιχὸν αὐτῆς ἔτεκε. μηδὲν οὖν τούτων κομψὸν ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ πανοῦργον ὁ νέος ἐθιζέσθω, μηδὲ προσμειδιάτω ταῖς τοιαύταις εὑρησιλογίαις, ἀλλὰ βδελυττέσθω τοὺς λόγους μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ ἔργα τῆς ἀκολασίας.

9. Ἐπὶ πᾶσι τοίνυν καὶ τὸ τὴν αἰτίαν ἑκάστου
B τῶν λεγομένων ἐπιζητεῖν χρήσιμόν ἐστιν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κάτων ἔτι παιδάριον ὢν ἔπραττε μὲν ὃ προστάξειεν ὁ παιδαγωγός, αἰτίαν δὲ καὶ λόγον ἀπῄτει τοῦ προστάγματος· τοῖς δὲ ποιηταῖς οὐ πειστέον ὥσπερ παιδαγωγοῖς ἢ νομοθέταις, ἂν μὴ λόγον ἔχῃ τὸ ὑποκείμενον. ἔξει δέ, ἄνπερ χρηστὸν ᾖ· ἂν δὲ μοχθηρόν, ὀφθήσεται κενὸν καὶ μάταιον. ἀλλ' οἱ πολλοὶ τῶν μὲν τοιούτων τὰς αἰτίας πικρῶς ἀπαιτοῦσι καὶ διαπυνθάνονται πῶς λέλεκται

μηδέ ποτ' οἰνοχόην τιθέμεν κρητῆρος ὕπερθεν πινόντων

[1] αὐτὸς Emperius.

[a] Presumably in the *Hippolytus Veiled*; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag., Eurip.*, 491.
[b] Euripides, *The Trojan Women*, 919.
[c] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 744.

From unfair deed fair word cannot proceed.

For, as a fact, he is wont to provide for mean characters and unnatural actions alluring words and humane reasons. And you observe also that his companion-at-arms in the dramatic art has represented Phaedra[a] as preferring the charge against Theseus that it was because of his derelictions that she fell in love with Hippolytus. Of such sort, too, are the frank lines, aimed against Hecuba, which in the *Trojan Women*[b] he gives to Helen, who there expresses her feeling that Hecuba ought rather to be the one to suffer punishment because she brought into the world the man who was the cause of Helen's infidelity. Let the young man not form the habit of regarding any one of these things as witty and adroit, and let him not smile indulgently, either, at such displays of verbal ingenuity, but let him loathe the words of licentiousness even more than its deeds.

9. Now in all cases it is useful also to seek after the cause of each thing that is said. Cato, for example, used, even as a child, to do whatever the attendant in charge of him ordered, yet he also demanded to know the ground and reason for the order. And so the poets are not to be obeyed as though they were our keepers or law-givers, unless their subject matter be reasonable; and this it will be if it be good, but if it be vile, it will be seen to be vacuous and vain. But most people are sharp in demanding the reasons for trivial things like the following, and insist on knowing in what sense they are intended:

> Never ought the ladle atop of the bowl to be rested
> While the bout is on,[c]

(28) καὶ

ὃς δέ κ' ἀνὴρ ἀπὸ ὦν ὀχέων ἔτερ' ἄρμαθ'
ἵκηται,
C ἔγχει ὀρεξάσθω.

τῶν δὲ μειζόνων ἀβασανίστως δέχονται τὴν πίστιν, οἷα καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶν

δουλοῖ γὰρ ἄνδρα, κἂν θρασύσπλαγχνός τις ᾖ,
ὅταν συνειδῇ μητρὸς ἢ πατρὸς κακά,

καὶ

σμικρὸν φρονεῖν χρὴ τὸν κακῶς πεπραγότα.[1]

καίτοι ταῦτα τῶν ἠθῶν ἅπτεται καὶ τοὺς βίους διαταράττει, κρίσεις ἐμποιοῦντα φαύλας καὶ δόξας
D ἀγεννεῖς, ἂν μὴ πρὸς ἕκαστον αὐτῶν εἰθισμένοι λέγωμεν "διὰ τί σμικρὸν φρονεῖν χρὴ τὸν κακῶς πεπραγότα[1] καὶ μὴ μᾶλλον ἀνταίρειν τῇ τύχῃ καὶ ποιεῖν ὑψηλὸν ἑαυτὸν καὶ ἀταπείνωτον; διὰ τί δέ, ἂν ἐκ πατρὸς φαύλου καὶ ἀνοήτου γεγονὼς αὐτὸς ὢ χρηστὸς καὶ φρόνιμος, οὐ προσήκει μοι διὰ τὴν ἐμὴν ἀρετὴν μέγα φρονεῖν ἀλλὰ καταπεπλῆχθαι καὶ ταπεινὸν εἶναι διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἀμαθίαν;" ὁ γὰρ οὕτως ἀπαντῶν καὶ ἀντερείδων καὶ μὴ παντὶ λόγῳ πλάγιον ὥσπερ πνεύματι παραδιδοὺς ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς ἔχειν νομίζων τὸ "βλὰξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ φιλεῖ ἐπτοῆσθαι," πολλὰ διακρούσεται τῶν οὐκ ἀληθῶς οὐδ' ὠφελίμως λεγομένων. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀβλαβῆ παρέξει τὴν τῶν ποιημάτων ἀκρόασιν.

[1] πεπραγότα the usual Attic form read here by Wagner and Hercher respectively: πεπραχότα.

[a] Homer, *Π.* iv. 306.

and

> Whoso from his car can reach the car of another
> Let him thrust with his spear.[a]

But in far weightier matters they take things on faith without testing them at all, such, for example, as these :

> A man, though bold, is made a slave whene'er
> He learns his mother's or his sire's disgrace,[b]

and

> Who prospers not must be of humble mind.[c]

And yet these sentiments affect our characters and disorder our lives, by engendering in us mean judgements and ignoble opinions, unless from habit we can say in answer to each of them, " Why must the man who has ' not prospered be of humble mind,' and why must he not rather rise up against Fortune, and make himself exalted and not humbled ? And why, though I be the son of a bad and foolish father, yet if I myself am good and sensible, is it unbecoming for me to take pride in my good qualities, and why should I be dejected and humble on account of my father's crassness ? " For he who thus meets and resists, and refuses to entrust himself broadside on to every breath of doctrine, as to a wind, but believes in the correctness of the saying that " a fool is wont to be agog at every word that's said "[d] will thrust aside a good deal of what is not true or profitable therein. This, then, will take away all danger of harm from the perusal of poetry.

[b] Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 424 ; cited also by Plutarch in *Moralia*, 1 c.

[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 957.

[d] A dictum of Heracleitus. It is again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 41 A ; *cf.* Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, i. p. 95.

10. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ἀμπέλου φύλλοις καὶ
E κλήμασιν εὐθαλοῦσι πολλάκις ὁ καρπὸς ἀποκρύπτεται καὶ λανθάνει κατασκιαζόμενος, οὕτως ἐν ποιητικῇ λέξει καὶ μυθεύμασι περικεχυμένοις πολλὰ διαφεύγει τὸν νέον ὠφέλιμα καὶ χρήσιμα (δεῖ δὲ τοῦτο μὴ πάσχειν μηδ' ἀποπλανᾶσθαι τῶν πραγμάτων, ἀλλ' ἐμφύεσθαι μάλιστα τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν φέρουσι καὶ δυναμένοις πλάττειν τὸ ἦθος), οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ περὶ τούτων διελθεῖν ἐν βραχέσιν, ἁψάμενον ὡς ἐν τύπῳ τῶν πραγμάτων, μήκη δὲ
F καὶ κατασκευὰς καὶ παραδειγμάτων ὄχλον ἐῶντα τοῖς ἐπιδεικτικώτερον γράφουσι. πρῶτον μὲν οὖν τὰ χρηστὰ καὶ τὰ φαῦλα γιγνώσκων ὁ νέος ἤθη καὶ πρόσωπα τοῖς λεγομένοις προσεχέτω καὶ ταῖς πράξεσιν ἃς ὁ ποιητὴς ἑκατέροις προσηκόντως ἀποδίδωσιν· οἷον ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς πρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα λέγει, καίπερ λέγων μετ' ὀργῆς

οὐ γὰρ[1] σοί ποτε ἶσον ἔχω γέρας, ὁππότ' Ἀχαιοὶ
Τρώων ἐκπέρσωσ' εὖ ναιόμενον πτολίεθρον,

ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης τῷ αὐτῷ λοιδορούμενος λέγει

πλεῖαί τοι χαλκοῦ κλισίαι, πολλαὶ δὲ γυναῖκες
εἰσὶν ἐνὶ κλισίῃς[2] ἐξαίρετοι, ἅς τοι Ἀχαιοὶ
29 πρωτίστῳ δίδομεν, εὖτ' ἂν πτολίεθρον ἕλωμεν,

καὶ πάλιν ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς

αἴ κέ ποθι Ζεὺς
δῷσι πόλιν Τροίην εὐτείχεον ἐξαλαπάξαι,

ὁ δὲ Θερσίτης

[1] *οὐ μὲν* Homer, A 163. [2] *κλισίῃς* Homer, B 226: *κλισίῃ*.

[a] Homer, *Il.* i. 163. [b] *Ibid.* ii. 226. [c] *Ibid.* i. 128.

10. But, just as amid the luxuriant foliage and branches of a vine the fruit is often hidden and unnoticed from being in the shadow, so also amid the poetic diction and the tales that hang clustered about, much that is helpful and profitable escapes a young man. This, however, ought not to happen to him, nor should he allow his attention to be diverted from the facts, but he should cling especially close to those that lead toward virtue and have the power to mould character. In which regard it may not be a bad thing to treat this topic briefly, touching summarily the principal points, but leaving any extended and constructive treatment, and long list of examples, to those who write more for display. In the first place, then, as the young man takes note of good and bad characters and personages, let him pay attention to the lines and the actions which the poet assigns to them as respectively befitting. For example, Achilles says to Agamemnon, although he speaks with anger :

> Never a prize like yours is mine whene'er the Achaeans
> Capture and sack some goodly and populous town of the Trojans.[a]

But Thersites in reviling the same man says :

> Full of bronze are your quarters, and many, too, are the women,
> Chosen from all the captives for you, and these we Achaeans
> Give to you first of all whenever we capture a city.[b]

And on another occasion Achilles says,

> If perchance Zeus ever
> Grants to us that we plunder Troy, the well-walled city,[c]

but Thersites,

(29) ὅν κεν ἐγὼ δήσας ἀγάγω ἢ ἄλλος Ἀχαιῶν.

πάλιν τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος ἐν τῇ ἐπιπωλήσει τὸν Διομήδην λοιδορήσαντος ὁ μὲν οὐδὲν ἀντεῖπεν

αἰδεσθεὶς βασιλῆος ἐνιπὴν αἰδοίοιο,

ὁ δὲ Σθένελος, οὗ μηδεὶς λόγος,

"Ἀτρείδη," φησί, "μὴ ψεύδε' ἐπιστάμενος σάφα εἰπεῖν.

B ἡμεῖς τοι πατέρων μέγ' ἀμείνονες εὐχόμεθ' εἶναι."

ἡ γὰρ τοιαύτη διαφορὰ μὴ παρορωμένη διδάξει τὸν νέον ἀστεῖον ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀτυφίαν καὶ μετριότητα, τὴν δὲ μεγαλαυχίαν καὶ περιαυτολογίαν ὡς φαῦλον εὐλαβεῖσθαι. χρήσιμον δὲ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ἀγαμέμνονος κατανοεῖν ἐνταῦθα· τὸν μὲν γὰρ Σθένελον ἀπροσαύδητον παρῆλθε, τοῦ δ' Ὀδυσσέως οὐκ ἠμέλησεν ἀλλ' ἠμείψατο καὶ προσηγόρευσεν,

ὡς γνῶ χωομένοιο· πάλιν δ' ὅ γε λάζετο μῦθον·

τὸ μὲν γὰρ πᾶσιν ἀπολογεῖσθαι θεραπευτικὸν καὶ
C οὐκ ἀξιωματικόν· τὸ δὲ πάντων καταφρονεῖν ὑπερήφανον καὶ ἀνόητον. ἄριστα δ' ὁ Διομήδης ἐν μὲν τῇ μάχῃ σιωπᾷ κακῶς ἀκούων ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως, μετὰ δὲ τὴν μάχην παρρησίᾳ χρῆται πρὸς αὐτόν

ἀλκὴν μέν μοι πρῶτον ὀνείδισας ἐν Δαναοῖσιν.

Εὖ δ' ἔχει καὶ φρονίμου διαφορὰν ἀνδρὸς καὶ μάντεως πανηγυρικοῦ μὴ παραλιπεῖν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Κάλχας οὐ συνεῖδε τὸν καιρόν, ἀλλ' ἐν πλήθει παρ' οὐδὲν ἐποιήσατο κατηγορῆσαι τοῦ βασιλέως ὡς

> One that I or another Achaean may bring in as captive.[a]

At another time, in the Inspection, when Agamemnon upbraided Diomede, the latter made no answer,

> Showing respect for the stern rebuke of a king so respected.[b]

But Sthenelus, a man of no account, says :

> Son of Atreus, speak not to deceive, knowing how to speak clearly ;
> We can avow ourselves to be better far than our fathers.[c]

A difference of this sort then, if not overlooked, will teach the young man to regard modesty and moderation as a mark of refinement, but to be on his guard against boasting and self-assertion as a mark of meanness. It is useful to note also the behaviour of Agamemnon in this case ; for Sthenelus he passed by without a word, but Odysseus he did not disregard, but made answer and addressed him,

> When he saw he was wroth, and tried to retract his saying.[d]

For to defend one's actions to everybody smacks of servility, not of dignity, while to despise everybody is arrogant and foolish. And most excellently does Diomede in the battle hold his peace, although upbraided by the king, but after the battle he uses plain speech to him :

> First let me say that you 'mid the Danaans slighted my prowess.[e]

It is well, too, not to miss a difference that exists between a man of sense and a seer who courts popularity. For example, Calchas[f] had no regard to the occasion, and made nothing of accusing the king before the multitude, alleging that he had

[a] Homer, *Il.* ii. 231. [b] *Ibid.* iv. 402. [c] *Ibid.* 404.
[d] *Ibid.* 357. [e] *Ibid.* ix. 34. [f] *Ibid.* i. 94-5.

(29) τὸν λοιμὸν αὐτοῖς ἐπαγαγόντος·[1] ὁ δὲ Νέστωρ βουλόμενος ἐμβάλλειν λόγον ὑπὲρ τῶν πρὸς τὸν
D Ἀχιλλέα διαλλαγῶν, ἵνα μὴ διαβάλλειν δοκῇ τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα πρὸς τὸ πλῆθος ὡς ἁμαρτόντα καὶ χρησάμενον ὀργῇ,

δαίνυ δαῖτα γέρουσιν· ἔοικέ τοι, οὔ τοι ἀεικές.
πολλῶν δ' ἀγρομένων τῷ πείσεαι ὅς κεν ἀρίστην
βουλὴν βουλεύσῃ.

καὶ μετὰ τὸ δεῖπνον ἐξαποστέλλει τοὺς πρέσβεις· τοῦτο γὰρ ἦν ἐπανόρθωσις ἁμαρτίας, ἐκεῖνο δὲ κατηγορία καὶ προπηλακισμός.

Ἔτι δὲ καὶ τὰς ἐν τοῖς γένεσι διαφορὰς σκεπτέον, ὧν τοιοῦτός ἐστιν ὁ τρόπος. οἱ μὲν Τρῶες ἐπίασι μετὰ κραυγῆς καὶ θράσους, οἱ δ' Ἀχαιοί

σιγῇ δειδιότες σημάντορας.

E τὸ γὰρ ἐν χερσὶ τῶν πολεμίων ὄντων φοβεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας ἀνδρείας ἅμα καὶ πειθαρχίας σημεῖον. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν Πλάτων ἐθίζει τοὺς ψόγους φοβεῖσθαι καὶ τὰ αἰσχρὰ μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς πόνους καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους, ὁ δὲ Κάτων ἔλεγε φιλεῖν τοὺς ἐρυθριῶντας μᾶλλον ἢ τοὺς ὠχριῶντας.

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἐπαγγελιῶν ἴδιος χαρακτήρ. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Δόλων ἐπαγγέλλεται

τόφρα γὰρ ἐς στρατὸν εἶμι διαμπερές, ὄφρ' ἂν ἵκωμαι
νῆ' Ἀγαμεμνονέην,

F ὁ δὲ Διομήδης ἐπαγγέλλεται μὲν οὐδέν, ἧττον δ' ἄν φησι φοβηθῆναι μεθ' ἑτέρου πεμπόμενος. Ἑλλη-

[1] ἐπαγαγόντος Hercher: ἐπαγόντος.

brought the pestilence upon them; but Nestor, though anxious to put in a word for the reconciliation with Achilles, yet, in order that he may not seem to discredit Agamemnon with the multitude as having made a mistake and indulged in anger, says,

> Give a feast for the elders; 'tis fitting and not unbefitting;
> Then, when many are gathered, whoever shall offer best counsel
> Him you will follow,[a]

and after the dinner he sends forth the envoys. For this was the way to amend an error; the other was arraignment and foul abuse.

Moreover, the difference between the two peoples should be observed, their behaviour being as follows: the Trojans advance with shouting and confidence, but the Achaeans

> Silently, fearing their captains.[b]

For to fear one's commanders when at close quarters with the enemy is a sign of bravery and of obedience to authority as well. Wherefore Plato[c] tries to establish the habit of fearing blame and disgrace more than toils and dangers, and Cato[d] used to say that he liked people that blushed better than those that blanched.

There is also in the promises of the heroes a special character. For Dolon promises:

> Straight to the midst of their host shall I go till I come to the vessel
> Which Agamemnon commands.[e]

Diomede,[f] however, promises nothing, but says that he should be less frightened if he were sent in company with another man. Prudence, then, is

[a] Homer, *Il.* ix. 70, and 74-5. [b] *Ibid.* iv. 431.
[c] *Cf.* Plato, *Apology*, 28 F and E.
[d] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Cato*, chap. 9 (341 c).
[e] Homer, *Il.* x. 325. [f] *Ibid.* 222.

νικὸν οὖν καὶ ἀστεῖον ἡ πρόνοια, βαρβαρικὸν δὲ καὶ φαῦλον ἡ θρασύτης· καὶ δεῖ τὸ μὲν ζηλοῦν τὸ δὲ δυσχεραίνειν. ἔχεται δέ τινος οὐκ ἀχρήστου θεωρίας καὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς Τρῶας καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα πάθος, τοῦ Αἴαντος αὐτῷ μονομαχεῖν μέλλοντος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Αἰσχύλος Ἰσθμοῖ πύκτου πληγέντος εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον καὶ κραυγῆς γενομένης, "οἷον" εἶπεν "ἡ ἄσκησίς ἐστιν. οἱ θεώμενοι βοῶσιν, ὁ δὲ πληγεὶς σιωπᾷ." τοῦ δὲ ποιητοῦ λέγοντος ὅτι τὸν Αἴαντα τῶν ὅπλων ποιούντων λαμπρὸν οἱ μὲν Ἕλληνες ἔχαιρον ὁρῶντες,

30 Τρῶας δὲ τρόμος αἰνὸς ἐπήλυθε γυῖα ἕκαστον,
Ἕκτορί τ' αὐτῷ θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι πάτασσε,

τίς οὐκ ἂν ἀγάσαιτο τὴν διαφοράν; τοῦ μὲν κινδυνεύοντος ἡ καρδία πηδᾷ μόνον, ὥσπερ παλαίειν νὴ Δί' ἢ σταδιοδρομεῖν μέλλοντος, τῶν δὲ θεωμένων τρέμει καὶ πάλλεται τὸ σῶμα δι' εὔνοιαν καὶ φόβον ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέως. ἐνταῦθα δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ κρατίστου πρὸς τὸν κάκιστον διαφορὰν ἀποθεωρητέον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Θερσίτης

ἔχθιστος δ' Ἀχιλῆι μάλιστ' ἦν ἠδ' Ὀδυσῆι,

B ὁ δ' Αἴας ἀεί τε τῷ Ἀχιλλεῖ προσφιλὴς καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἕκτορα λέγει περὶ αὐτοῦ

νῦν μὲν δὴ σάφα εἴσεαι οἰόθεν οἷος
οἷοι καὶ Δαναοῖσιν ἀριστῆες μετέασι,
καὶ μετ' Ἀχιλλῆα ῥηξήνορα θυμολέοντα.

καὶ τοῦτο μὲν Ἀχιλλέως τὸ ἐγκώμιόν ἐστι, τὰ δ' ἑξῆς ὑπὲρ ἁπάντων εἴρηται χρησίμως

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[a] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 79 D. [b] Homer, *Il.* vii. 214.

characteristic of a Greek and of a man of refinement, while presumption is barbaric and cheap: the one should be emulated and the other detested. And it is not unprofitable to consider how the Trojans and Hector were affected, at the time when Ajax was about to engage with him in single combat. Once when a boxer at the Isthmian games was struck in the face, and a clamour arose, Aeschylus [a] said, "What a thing is training. The onlookers cry out; it is the man who is struck who says nothing." In like manner, when the poet says [b] that when Ajax appeared resplendent in his armour, the Greeks rejoiced at seeing him, whereas

> Dreadful trembling seized on the limbs of every Trojan;
> Even Hector himself felt his heart beat quick in his bosom,

who could fail to admire the difference? For the heart of the man who is facing the danger only throbs, as though indeed he were simply going to wrestle or run a race, while the onlookers tremble and shiver in their whole bodies through loyalty and fear for their king. Here, too, one should carefully consider the difference between the very valiant man and the craven. For Thersites

> Hateful was most of all to Achilles as well as Odysseus,[c]

while Ajax was always friendly to Achilles, and says to Hector regarding him—

> Now alone from one man alone shall you learn quite clearly
> What sort of men with us are the Danaans' chieftains
> Even after the smiter of men, lion-hearted Achilles.[d]

This is the compliment paid to Achilles, but these succeeding lines in behalf of all are put in such a way as to be useful:

[c] *Ibid.* ii. 220. [d] *Ibid.* vii. 226.

(30) ἡμεῖς δ' εἰμὲν τοῖοι οἷ ἂν σέθεν ἀντιάσαιμεν καὶ πολέες,

οὔτε μόνον οὔτ' ἄριστον ἀποφαίνων ἑαυτὸν ἀλλὰ μετὰ πολλῶν ὁμοίως δυναμένων ἀμύνασθαι.

C Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανὰ περὶ διαφορᾶς, ἂν μὴ κἀκεῖνο βουλώμεθα προσλαβεῖν, ὅτι τῶν Τρώων ἑαλώκασι καὶ πολλοὶ ζῶντες, οὐδεὶς δὲ τῶν Ἀχαιῶν, καὶ τῶν μὲν ὑποπεπτώκασιν ἔνιοι τοῖς πολεμίοις, ὥσπερ ὁ Ἄδραστος, οἱ Ἀντιμάχου παῖδες, ὁ Λυκάων, αὐτὸς ὁ Ἕκτωρ δεόμενος περὶ ταφῆς τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως, ἐκείνων δ' οὐδείς, ὡς βαρβαρικοῦ τοῦ ἱκετεύειν καὶ ὑποπίπτειν ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν ὄντος, Ἑλληνικοῦ δὲ τοῦ νικᾶν μαχόμενον ἢ ἀποθνήσκειν.

11. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς νομαῖς ἡ μὲν μέλιττα D διώκει τὸ ἄνθος, ἡ δ' αἴξ τὸν θαλλόν, ἡ δ' ὗς τὴν ῥίζαν, ἄλλα δὲ ζῷα τὸ σπέρμα καὶ τὸν καρπόν, οὕτως ἐν ταῖς ἀναγνώσεσι τῶν ποιημάτων ὁ μὲν ἀπανθίζεται τὴν ἱστορίαν, ὁ δ' ἐμφύεται τῷ κάλλει καὶ τῇ κατασκευῇ τῶν ὀνομάτων, καθάπερ ὁ Ἀριστοφάνης περὶ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου φησί

χρῶμαι γὰρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ στόματος τῷ στρογγύλῳ·

οἷ[1] δὲ τῶν πρὸς τὸ ἦθος εἰρημένων ὠφελίμως ἔχονται, πρὸς οὓς δὴ νῦν ἡμῖν ὁ λόγος ἐστίν, ὑπομιμνήσκωμεν αὐτοὺς ὅτι δεινόν ἐστι τὸν μὲν φιλόμυθον μὴ λανθάνειν τὰ καινῶς ἱστορούμενα καὶ περιττῶς, μηδὲ τὸν φιλόλογον ἐκφεύγειν τὰ E καθαρῶς πεφρασμένα καὶ ῥητορικῶς, τὸν δὲ φιλότιμον καὶ φιλόκαλον καὶ μὴ παιγνίας[2] ἀλλὰ

[1] οἷ F.C.B.: οἱ.
[2] παιδιᾶς Reiske.

Yet are we of such sort as are ready to face you,
Yea, and many of us,[a]

thereby declaring himself not the only man or the best, but only one among many equally capable of offering defence.

This is enough on the subject of differences, unless perhaps we desire to add, that of the Trojans many were taken alive, but none of the Achaeans; and that of the Trojans some fell down at the feet of the enemy, as did Adrastus,[b] the sons[c] of Antimachus, Lycaon,[d] and Hector[e] himself begging Achilles for burial, but of the Achaeans none, because of their conviction that it is a trait of barbarian peoples to make supplication and to fall at the enemy's feet in combat, but of Greeks to conquer or to die fighting.

11. Now just as in pasturage the bee seeks the flower, the goat the tender shoot, the swine the root, and other animals the seed and the fruit, so in the reading of poetry one person culls the flowers of the story, another rivets his attention upon the beauty of the diction and the arrangement of the words, as Aristophanes[f] says of Euripides,

I use the rounded neatness of his speech;

but as for those who are concerned with what is said as being useful for character (and it is to these that our present discourse is directed), let us remind them how strange it is if the lover of fables does not fail to observe the novel and unusual points in the story, and the student of language does not allow faultless and elegant forms of expression to escape him, whereas he that affects what is honourable and good,

[a] Homer, *Il.* vii. 231. [b] *Ibid.* vi. 37.
[c] *Ibid.* xi. 122. [d] *Ibid.* xxi. 64.
[e] *Ibid.* xxii. 337. [f] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* i. p. 513.

παιδείας ἕνεκα ποιημάτων ἁπτόμενον ἀργῶς καὶ ἀμελῶς ἀκούειν τῶν πρὸς ἀνδρείαν ἢ σωφροσύνην ἢ δικαιοσύνην ἀναπεφωνημένων, οἷα καὶ ταῦτ' ἐστὶ

Τυδείδη, τί παθόντε λελάσμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς;
ἀλλ' ἄγε δεῦρο, πέπον, παρ' ἔμ' ἵστασο· δὴ γὰρ ἔλεγχος
ἔσσεται, εἴ κεν νῆας ἕλῃ κορυθαίολος Ἕκτωρ.

τὸ γὰρ ἐν κινδύνῳ τοῦ διαφθαρῆναι καὶ ἀπολέσθαι μετὰ πάντων ὄντα τὸν φρονιμώτατον ὁρᾶν τὸ αἰσχρὸν δεδοικότα καὶ τὸ ἐπονείδιστον ἀλλὰ μὴ τὸν θάνατον, ἐμπαθῆ ποιήσει πρὸς ἀρετὴν τὸν νέον. καὶ τῷ[1]

χαῖρε δ' Ἀθηναίη πεπνυμένῳ ἀνδρὶ δικαίῳ

F τοιοῦτον ἐπιλογισμὸν δίδωσι, μήτε πλουσίῳ τινὶ μήτε καλῷ τὸ σῶμα μήτ' ἰσχυρῷ τὴν θεὸν χαίρουσαν ἀλλὰ φρονίμῳ καὶ δικαίῳ ποιήσας. καὶ πάλιν τὸν Ὀδυσσέα φάσκουσα μὴ περιορᾶν μηδὲ προλείπειν

οὔνεκ' ἐπητής ἐστι καὶ ἀγχίνοος καὶ ἐχέφρων,

ἐνδείκνυται μόνον εἶναι τῶν ἡμετέρων θεοφιλὲς καὶ θεῖον ἀρετήν, εἴγε δὴ τὰ ὅμοια χαίρειν τοῖς ὁμοίοις πέφυκεν.

31 Ἐπεὶ δὲ μεγάλου δοκοῦντος εἶναι καὶ ὄντος τοῦ κρατεῖν ὀργῆς μεῖζόν ἐστιν ἡ φυλακὴ καὶ ἡ πρόνοια τοῦ μὴ περιπεσεῖν ὀργῇ μηδ' ἁλῶναι, καὶ ταῦτα

[1] τῷ Wyttenbach: τό.

[a] Homer, *Il.* xi. 313; the first line is quoted *infra*, 71 F.

who takes up poetry not for amusement but for education, should give but a slack and careless hearing to utterances that look toward manliness or sobriety or uprightness, such, for example, as the following :

> Son of Tydeus, what has made us forget our swift prowess ?
> Hither, stand, my friend, by me. Disgrace will befall us
> If yon Hector, gleaming-helmed, shall capture our vessels.[a]

For to observe that the most wise and prudent man, when he is in danger of being destroyed and lost, together with the whole host, fears shame and disapprobation, but not death, will make the young man keenly alive to the moral virtues. And by the line,

> Glad was Athena because of the man that was prudent and honest,[b]

the poet permits us to draw a similar conclusion in that he represents the goddess as taking delight, not in some rich man or in one who is physically handsome or strong, but in one who is wise and honest. And again when she says that she does not overlook Odysseus, much less desert him,

> Since he is courteous and clever of mind and prudent,[c]

her words indicate that the only one of our attributes that is dear to the gods and divine is a virtuous mind, if it be true that it is the nature of like to delight in like.

Since it seems to be, and really is, a great thing to master one's anger, and since a greater thing is the exercise of precaution and forethought so as not to become involved in anger or to be made captive by

[b] Homer, *Od.* iii. 52. [c] *Ibid.* xiii. 332.

(31) δεῖ τοῖς ἀναγιγνώσκουσιν ὑποδεικνύειν μὴ παρέργως, ὅτι τὸν Πρίαμον ὁ Ἀχιλλεὺς οὐκ ἀνασχετικὸς ὢν οὐδὲ πρᾶος ἡσυχίαν ἄγειν κελεύει καὶ μὴ παροξύνειν αὐτόν, οὕτως

μηκέτι νῦν μ' ἐρέθιζε, γέρον (νοέω δὲ καὶ αὐτὸς
Ἕκτορά τοι λῦσαι, Διόθεν δέ μοι ἄγγελος ἦλθε)
μή σε, γέρον, οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἐνὶ κλισίῃσιν ἐάσω,
B καὶ ἱκέτην περ ἐόντα, Διὸς δ' ἀλίτωμαι ἐφετμάς,

καὶ τὸν Ἕκτορα λούσας καὶ περιστείλας αὐτὸς ἐπὶ τὴν ἀπήνην τίθησι, πρὶν ἠκισμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς ὀφθῆναι,

μὴ ὁ μὲν ἀχνυμένῃ κραδίῃ χόλον οὐκ ἐρύσαιτο,
παῖδα ἰδών, Ἀχιλῆι δ' ὀρινθείη φίλον ἦτορ
καί ἑ κατακτείνειε, Διὸς δ' ἀλίτηται ἐφετμάς.

τὸ γὰρ ἐπισφαλῶς πρὸς ὀργὴν ἔχοντα καὶ φύσει τραχὺν ὄντα καὶ θυμοειδῆ μὴ λανθάνειν ἑαυτὸν ἀλλ' ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ φυλάττεσθαι τὰς αἰτίας καὶ
C προκαταλαμβάνειν τῷ λογισμῷ πόρρωθεν ὅπως οὐδ' ἄκων τῷ πάθει περιπεσεῖται, θαυμαστῆς ἐστι προνοίας. οὕτω δὲ δεῖ καὶ πρὸς μέθην τὸν φίλοινον ἔχειν καὶ πρὸς ἔρωτα τὸν ἐρωτικόν· ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀγησίλαος οὐχ ὑπέμεινεν ὑπὸ τοῦ καλοῦ φιληθῆναι προσιόντος, ὁ δὲ Κῦρος οὐδ' ἰδεῖν τὴν Πάνθειαν ἐτόλμησε, τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων τοὐναντίον ὑπεκκαύματα τοῖς πάθεσι συλλεγόντων καὶ πρὸς ἃ μάλιστα κακῶς καὶ ὀλισθηρῶς ἔχουσιν αὐτοὺς προϊεμένων. ὁ δ' Ὀδυσσεὺς οὐ μόνον ἑαυτὸν

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[a] Homer, *Il.* xxiv. 560-1, 569-70. [b] *Ibid.* 584.
[c] Xenophon, *Agesilaus*, v. 4.
[d] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, v. 1. 4.

it, we must make a point of indicating to our young readers such matters as this: that Achilles, being not tolerant or mild in temper, bids Priam in these words to be quiet and not to exasperate him:

> Anger me now no more, old man (to ransom your Hector
> I myself am disposed; from Zeus has come such a message),
> Lest, old man, even here 'neath my roof I leave you not scatheless
> Suppliant though you are, and sin against Zeus's commandments,[a]

and having washed and shrouded the body of Hector, he places it with his own hands on the wagon before its disfigurement was seen by the father,

> Lest with heart so distressed he fail to master his anger,
> Seeing his son, and Achilles' heart be stirred with resentment,
> So that he slay him there, and sin against Zeus's commandments.[b]

For it is mark of a wondrous foresight for a man whose hold on his temper is uncertain, who is naturally rough and quick-tempered, not to be blind to his own weakness, but to exercise caution, and to be on his guard against possible grounds for anger, and to forestall them by reason long beforehand, so that he may not even inadvertently become involved in such emotions. After the same manner should he that is fond of wine be on his guard against drunkenness, and he that is amorous against love. So did Agesilaus,[c] who would not submit to being kissed by the handsome boy who approached him, so did Cyrus,[d] who durst not even to look at Pantheia; but the uneducated, on the contrary, gather fuel to kindle their passions, casting themselves headlong into those wherein they are weakest and least sure of themselves. Yet Odysseus not only restrains himself when en-

(31) ἀνέχει θυμούμενον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Τηλέμαχον ἐκ
D τοῦ λόγου συνιδὼν χαλεπὸν ὄντα καὶ μισοπόνηρον
ἀμβλύνει καὶ παρασκευάζει πόρρωθεν ἡσυχίαν
ἄγειν καὶ ἀνέχεσθαι, κελεύων

εἰ δέ μ' ἀτιμήσουσι δόμον κάτα, σὸν δὲ φίλον κῆρ
τετλάτω ἐν στήθεσσι κακῶς πάσχοντος ἐμεῖο,
ἤν περ καὶ διὰ δῶμα ποδῶν ἕλκωσι θύραζε
ἢ βέλεσιν βάλλωσι· σὺ δ' εἰσορόων ἀνέχεσθαι.

ὥσπερ γὰρ τοὺς ἵππους οὐκ ἐν τοῖς δρόμοις χαλι-
νοῦσιν ἀλλὰ πρὸ τῶν δρόμων, οὕτω τοὺς δυσκαθ-
έκτους πρὸς τὰ δεινὰ καὶ θυμοειδεῖς προκατα-
λαμβάνοντες τοῖς λογισμοῖς καὶ προκαταρτύοντες
ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀγῶνας ἄγουσιν.

Δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἀμελῶς ἀκούειν,
E ἀλλὰ τὴν μὲν Κλεάνθους παιδιὰν παραιτεῖσθαι·
κατειρωνεύεται γὰρ ἔστιν ὅτε προσποιούμενος
ἐξηγεῖσθαι τὸ

Ζεῦ πάτερ Ἰδηθεν μεδέων

καὶ τὸ

Ζεῦ ἄνα Δωδωναῖε

κελεύων ἀναγιγνώσκειν ὑφ' ἕν, ὡς τὸν ἐκ τῆς γῆς
ἀναθυμιώμενον ἀέρα διὰ τὴν ἀνάδοσιν ἀναδωδω-
ναῖον ὄντα. καὶ Χρύσιππος δὲ πολλαχοῦ γλίσχρος
ἐστίν, οὐ παίζων ἀλλ' εὐρησιλογῶν ἀπιθάνως, καὶ
παραβιαζόμενος εὐρύοπα Κρονίδην εἶναι τὸν δεινὸν
ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι καὶ διαβεβηκότα τῇ δυνάμει τοῦ
λόγου.

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[a] Homer, *Od.* xvi. 274.
[b] Homer, *Il.* iii. 320; vii. 202; xxiv. 308.
[c] *Ibid.* xvi. 233. It is of interest that this reading is attested also in scholia on the passage. [d] *Ibid.* i. 498.

raged, but perceiving from some words of Telemachus that he too is angry and filled with hatred of the wicked, labours to mitigate his feelings and prepares him well beforehand to keep quiet and restrain himself, bidding him,

> Even if they within my own house shall dishonour me sorely,
> Let your heart within you endure all the wrongs that I suffer:
> Though through the house they should drag me out by the feet to the open,
> Yea, or with missiles smite me, still you must patient behold it.[a]

For just as drivers do not curb their horses during the race, but before the race, so with those persons who are quick-tempered and hard to hold back when dangers threaten, we first gain control over them by reasoning, and make them ready beforehand, and then lead them into the strife.

While it is also necessary not to pass over the words carelessly, yet one should eschew the puerility of Cleanthes; for there are times when he uses a mock seriousness in pretending to interpret the words,

> Father Zeus, enthroned on Ida,[b]

and

> Zeus, lord of Dodona,

bidding us in the latter case to read the last two words as one[c] (taking the word "lord" as the preposition "up") as though the vapour exhaled from the earth were "updonative" because of its being rendered up! And Chrysippus also is often quite petty, although he does not indulge in jesting, but wrests the words ingeniously, yet without carrying conviction, as when he would force the phrase "wide-seeing" son of Cronos[d] to signify "clever in conversation," that is to say, with a widespread power of speech.

Βέλτιον δὲ ταῦτα τοῖς γραμματικοῖς παρέντας
F ἐκεῖνα μᾶλλον πιέζειν οἷς ἅμα τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ πιθανὸν ἔνεστιν[1]

οὐδέ με θυμὸς ἄνωγεν, ἐπεὶ μάθον ἔμμεναι ἐσθλὸς

καὶ

πᾶσιν γὰρ ἐπίστατο μείλιχος εἶναι.

τήν τε γὰρ ἀνδρείαν ἀποφαίνων μάθημα καὶ τὸ προσφιλῶς ἅμα καὶ κεχαρισμένως ἀνθρώποις ὁμιλεῖν ἀπ' ἐπιστήμης καὶ κατὰ λόγον γίγνεσθαι νομίζων προτρέπει μὴ ἀμελεῖν ἑαυτῶν, ἀλλὰ μανθάνειν τὰ καλὰ καὶ προσέχειν τοῖς διδάσκουσιν, ὡς καὶ τὴν σκαιότητα καὶ τὴν δειλίαν ἀμαθίαν καὶ ἄγνοιαν οὖσαν. σφόδρα δὲ τούτοις κἀκεῖνα σύμφωνά ἐστιν ἃ λέγει περὶ τοῦ Διὸς καὶ τοῦ Ποσειδῶνος

ἦ μὰν ἀμφοτέροισιν ὁμὸν γένος ἠδ' ἴα πάτρη,
32 ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς πρότερος γεγόνει καὶ πλείονα ἴδει.

θειότατον γὰρ ἀποφαίνει τὴν φρόνησιν καὶ βασιλικώτατον, ἐν ᾗ τίθεται τὴν μεγίστην ὑπεροχὴν τοῦ Διός, ἅτε δὴ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας ἀρετὰς ἕπεσθαι ταύτῃ νομίζων.

Ἐθιστέον δ' ἅμα καὶ τούτων ἐγρηγορότως τὸν νέον ἀκούειν

ψεῦδος δ' οὐκ ἐρέει· μάλα γὰρ πεπνυμένος ἐστὶ

καὶ

[1] ἔνεστιν Hercher: ἐστιν.

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[a] Homer, *Il.* vi. 444. [b] *Ibid.* xvii. 671.
[c] *Ibid.* xiii. 354. [d] Homer, *Od.* iii. 20 and 328.

It is better, however, to turn these matters over to the grammarians, and to hold fast rather to those in which is to be found both usefulness and probability, such as

> Nor does my heart so bid me, for I have learned to be valiant,[a]

and

> For towards all he understood the way to be gentle.[b]

For by declaring that bravery is a thing to be learned, and by expressing the belief that friendly and gracious intercourse with others proceeds from understanding, and is in keeping with reason, the poet urges us not to neglect our own selves, but to learn what is good, and to give heed to our teachers, intimating that both boorishness and cowardice are but ignorance and defects of learning. With this agrees very well what he says regarding Zeus and Poseidon :

> Both, indeed, were of one descent and of the same birthplace,
> Yet was Zeus the earlier born and his knowledge was wider.[c]

For he declares understanding to be a most divine and kingly thing, to which he ascribes the very great superiority of Zeus, inasmuch as he believes that all the other virtues follow upon this one.

At the same time, the young man must get the habit of perusing with a mind wide awake such sayings as these :

> Falsehood he will not utter because he is very prudent,[d]

and

(32) *Ἀντίλοχε, πρόσθεν πεπνυμένε, ποῖον ἔρεξας;*
ἦ σχυνας μὲν ἐμὴν ἀρετήν, βλάψας δέ μοι ἵππους
καὶ

B *Γλαῦκε, τίη δὲ σὺ τοῖος ἐὼν ὑπέροπλον ἔειπας;*
ὤ πέπον, ἦ τ' ἐφάμην σε περὶ φρένας ἔμμεναι ἄλλων,

ὡς οὔτε ψευδομένων τῶν φρονίμων οὔτε κακομαχούντων ἐν τοῖς ἀγῶσιν οὔτε παρ' ἀξίαν ἑτέροις ἐγκαλούντων. καὶ τὸν Πάνδαρον δὲ πεισθῆναι λέγων διὰ τὴν ἀφροσύνην τὰ ὅρκια συγχέαι δῆλός ἐστιν οὐκ ἂν ἀδικῆσαι τὸν φρόνιμον ἡγούμενος. ὅμοια δ' ἔστι καὶ περὶ σωφροσύνης ὑποδεικνύειν ἐφιστάντα τοῖς οὕτω λεγομένοις

τῷ δὲ γυνὴ Προίτου ἐπεμήνατο, δῖ' Ἄντεια,
κρυπταδίῃ φιλότητι μιγήμεναι· ἀλλὰ τὸν οὔ τι
C *πεῖθ' ἀγαθὰ φρονέοντα, δαΐφρονα Βελλεροφόντην*
καὶ

ἦ δ' ἤτοι τὸ πρὶν μὲν ἀναίνετο ἔργον ἀεικές,
δῖα Κλυταιμνήστρη· φρεσὶ γὰρ κέχρητ' ἀγαθῇσιν·

ἐν μὲν οὖν τούτοις τῇ φρονήσει τὴν τοῦ σωφρονεῖν αἰτίαν ἀποδίδωσιν, ἐν δὲ ταῖς παρὰ τὰς μάχας κελεύσεσιν ἑκάστοτε λέγων

αἰδώς, ὦ Λύκιοι. πόσε φεύγετε; νῦν θοοὶ ἔστε
καὶ

ἀλλ' ἐν φρεσὶ θέσθε ἕκαστος
αἰδῶ καὶ νέμεσιν· δὴ γὰρ μέγα νεῖκος ὄρωρεν

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[a] Homer, *Il.* xxiii. 570. [b] *Ibid.* xvii. 170.
[c] *Ibid.* vi. 104. [d] *Ibid.* vi. 160. [e] Homer, *Od.* iii. 265.
[f] Homer, *Il.* xvi. 422. [g] *Ibid.* xiii. 121.

What an act is this, Antilochus, prudent aforetime!
You have put my skill to disgrace and hindered my horses,[a]

and

Glaucus, what cause has a man like you for words so disdainful?
Truly I thought, my friend, that in sense you excelled all the others,[b]

the implication being that men of sense do not lie or contend unfairly in games, or make unwarranted accusations against other people. And from the poet's saying [c] that Pandarus was persuaded because of his want of sense to bring to naught the sworn agreement, he clearly shows his opinion that the man of sense would not do wrong. It is also possible to give similar intimations in regard to self-control, by directing the young man's attention to statements like these:

Mad for him was Proetus' royal wife Anteia
Lusting to make him her lover in secret, but could not persuade him,
Since the wise Bellerophon thought more of virtue,[d]

and

She at the first would not consent to a deed so unseemly,
Royal Clytemnestra, since her thoughts were for virtue.[e]

In these lines the poet attributes to understanding the cause of self-control; and in his exhortations to battle he says on the several occasions:

Shame, men of Lycia, whither now flee ye? Now be ye valiant,[f]

and

But let all your minds be imbued with
Shame and resentment, for now, as you see, great strife has arisen,[g]

(32) ἀνδρείους ἔοικε ποιεῖν τοὺς σώφρονας διὰ τὸ αἰδεῖ-
D σθαι τὰ αἰσχρὰ καὶ τὰς ἡδονὰς δυναμένους ὑπερ-
βαίνειν καὶ τοὺς κινδύνους ὑφίστασθαι. ἀφ' ὧν
καὶ Τιμόθεος ὁρμηθεὶς οὐ κακῶς ἐν τοῖς Πέρσαις
τοὺς Ἕλληνας παρεκάλει

σέβεσθ' αἰδῶ συνεργὸν ἀρετᾶς δοριμάχου,

Αἰσχύλος δὲ καὶ τὸ πρὸς δόξαν ἔχειν ἀτύφως καὶ
μὴ διασοβεῖσθαι μηδ' ἐπαίρεσθαι τοῖς παρὰ τῶν
πολλῶν ἐπαίνοις ἐν τῷ φρονεῖν τίθεται περὶ τοῦ
Ἀμφιαράου γράφων

οὐ γὰρ δοκεῖν ἄριστος ἀλλ' εἶναι θέλει,
E βαθεῖαν ἄλοκα διὰ φρενὸς καρπούμενος,
ἀφ' ἧς τὰ κεδνὰ βλαστάνει βουλεύματα.

τὸ γὰρ ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει τῇ περὶ αὐτὸν
οὔσῃ κρατίστῃ μεγαλοφρονεῖν νοῦν ἔχοντος ἀνδρός
ἐστι. πάντων οὖν ἀναγομένων εἰς τὴν φρόνησιν
ἀποδείκνυται πᾶν εἶδος ἀρετῆς ἐπιγιγνόμενον ἐκ
λόγου[1] καὶ διδασκαλίας.

12. Ἡ μὲν οὖν μέλιττα φυσικῶς ἐν τοῖς δριμυ-
τάτοις ἄνθεσι καὶ ταῖς τραχυτάταις ἀκάνθαις ἐξ-
ανευρίσκει τὸ λειότατον μέλι καὶ χρηστικώτατον, οἱ
δὲ παῖδες, ἂν ὀρθῶς ἐντρέφωνται τοῖς ποιήμασιν,
F καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φαύλους καὶ ἀτόπους ὑποψίας ἐχόν-
των ἕλκειν τι χρήσιμον ἀμωσγέπως μαθήσονται καὶ
ὠφέλιμον. αὐτίκα γοῦν ὕποπτός ἐστιν ὁ Ἀγα-
μέμνων ὡς διὰ δωροδοκίαν ἀφεὶς τῆς στρατείας
τὸν πλούσιον ἐκεῖνον τὸν[2] τὴν Αἴθην χαρισάμενον
αὐτῷ

[1] ἐκ λόγου Krebs: ἑκάστου. [2] τὸν added by Hercher.

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. 622; Timotheus, *Frag.* 14 ed. Wilamowitz.

and thereby he appears to represent the men of self-control as brave because of their being ashamed of disgrace, and as able to overcome pleasures and to undergo dangerous adventures. Timotheus [a] also adopted this point of view, when in his *Persians* he urged the Greeks, not infelicitously, to have

> Respect for shame that helps the brave in war;

and Aeschylus [b] sets it down as a point of good sense not to be puffed up with fame, nor to be excited and elated by popular praise, when he writes of Amphiaraüs,

> His wish is not to seem, but be, the best,
> Reaping the deep-sown furrow of his mind
> In which all goodly counsels have their root.

For to take pride in oneself and in one's state of mind when it is altogether good, marks the man of good sense; and since everything may be referred to understanding, it follows that every form of virtue is added unto him from reason and instruction.

12. Now the bee, in accordance with nature's laws, discovers amid the most pungent flowers and the roughest thorns the smoothest and most palatable honey; so children, if they be rightly nurtured amid poetry, will in some way or other learn to draw some wholesome and profitable doctrine even from passages that are suspect of what is base and improper. For example, Agamemnon is suspected of having, for a bribe, released from service in the army the rich man who made him a present of the mare Aetha,

[b] Aeschylus, *Seven against Thebes*, 599: the lines are quoted also, in whole or in part, by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 88 B, 186 B, and the *Life of Aristeides*, chap. iii. (320 B).

δῶρ', ἵνα μή οἱ ἔποιθ' ὑπὸ Ἴλιον ἠνεμόεσσαν
ἀλλ' αὐτοῦ τέρποιτο μένων· μέγα γάρ οἱ ἔδωκεν
Ζεὺς ἄφενος.

ὀρθῶς δέ γ' ἐποίησεν, ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης φησίν, ἵππον ἀγαθὴν ἀνθρώπου τοιούτου προτιμήσας· οὐδὲ γὰρ κυνὸς ἀντάξιος οὐδ' ὄνου μὰ Δία δειλὸς ἀνὴρ καὶ ἄναλκις, ὑπὸ πλούτου καὶ μαλακίας
33 διερρυηκώς. πάλιν αἴσχιστα δοκεῖ τὸν υἱὸν ἡ Θέτις ἐφ' ἡδονὰς παρακαλεῖν καὶ ἀναμιμνήσκειν ἀφροδισίων. ἀλλὰ κἀνταῦθα δεῖ παραθεωρεῖν τὴν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως ἐγκράτειαν, ὅτι τῆς Βρισηίδος ἐρῶν ἠκούσης πρὸς αὐτόν, εἰδὼς τὴν τοῦ βίου τελευτὴν ἐγγὺς οὖσαν οὐ σπεύδει τῶν ἡδονῶν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσιν οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ πενθεῖ τὸν φίλον ἀπραξίᾳ καὶ παραλείψει τῶν καθηκόντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ἡδονῶν διὰ τὴν λύπην ἀπέχεται, ταῖς δὲ πράξεσι καὶ ταῖς στρατηγίαις ἐνεργός ἐστι. πάλιν ὁ Ἀρχίλοχος οὐκ ἐπαινεῖται λυπούμενος μὲν ἐπὶ τῷ ἀνδρὶ τῆς ἀδελφῆς διεφθαρμένῳ
B κατὰ θάλατταν, οἴνῳ δὲ καὶ παιδιᾷ πρὸς τὴν λύπην μάχεσθαι διανοούμενος. αἰτίαν μέντοι λόγον ἔχουσαν εἴρηκεν

οὔτε τι γὰρ κλαίων ἰήσομαι οὔτε κάκιον
θήσω τερπωλὰς καὶ θαλίας ἐφέπων.

εἰ γὰρ ἐκεῖνος οὐδὲν ἐνόμιζεν ποιήσειν κάκιον τερπωλὰς καὶ θαλίας ἐφέπων, πῶς ἡμῖν τὰ παρόντα χεῖρον ἔξει φιλοσοφοῦσι καὶ πολιτευομένοις καὶ
C προιοῦσιν εἰς ἀγορὰν καὶ καταβαίνουσιν εἰς Ἀκαδήμειαν καὶ γεωργίαν ἐφέπουσιν; ὅθεν οὐδ' αἱ παραδιορθώσεις φαύλως ἔχουσιν αἷς καὶ Κλεάνθης

[a] Homer, *Il.* xxiii. 297.

Gift so he fare not with him to Troy where the wind never ceaseth,
But enjoy himself at home; for wealth in abundance
Zeus had bestowed upon him.[a]

But, as Aristotle[b] observes, he did quite right in preferring a good mare to a man of that type. For a coward, and a weakling, made dissolute by wealth and soft living, is not, I swear, worth a dog or even an ass. Again, it appears most shameful in Thetis[c] when she incites her son to pleasures and reminds him of love. But even there we must contrast Achilles' mastery of himself, that although he is in love with Briseïs, who has come back to him, and although he knows that the end of his life is near, yet he does not make haste to enjoy love's pleasures, nor, like most men, mourn for his friend by inactivity and omission of his duties, but as he refrains from such pleasures because of his grief, so he bestirs himself in the business of his command. Again, Archilochus cannot be commended, because while grieving over his sister's husband, who was lost at sea, he is minded to fight against his grief by means of wine and amusement; he has, however, alleged a cause that has some appearance of reason,

By my tears I shall not cure it, nor worse make it
By pursuing joys, yea, and festivities.[d]

For if he thought that he should not make matters "worse by pursuing joys, yea, and festivities," how shall our present condition be any the worse if we engage in the study of philosophy or take part in public life, if we go out to the market-place or down to the Academy, or if we pursue our farming? Wherefore the corrected versions which Cleanthes

[b] Presumably in his *Homeric Questions*.
[c] Homer, *Il.* xxiv. 130. [d] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* ii. p. 687.

(33) ἐχρήσατο καὶ Ἀντισθένης, ὁ μὲν εὖ μάλα τοὺς Ἀθηναίους ἰδὼν θορυβήσαντας ἐν τῷ θεάτρῳ

τί δ' αἰσχρὸν εἰ μὴ τοῖσι χρωμένοις δοκεῖ;

παραβάλλων εὐθὺς

αἰσχρὸν τό γ' αἰσχρόν, κἂν δοκῇ κἂν μὴ δοκῇ,

ὁ δὲ Κλεάνθης περὶ τοῦ πλούτου

φίλοις τε δοῦναι σῶμά τ' εἰς νόσους πεσὸν
δαπάναισι σῶσαι

μεταγράφων οὕτω

D πόρναις τε δοῦναι σῶμά τ' εἰς νόσους πεσὸν
δαπάναις ἐπιτρῖψαι.

καὶ ὁ Ζήνων ἐπανορθούμενος τὸ τοῦ Σοφοκλέους

ὅστις δὲ πρὸς τύραννον ἐμπορεύεται,
κείνου 'στὶ δοῦλος, κἂν ἐλεύθερος μόλῃ

μετέγραφεν

οὐκ ἔστι δοῦλος, ἢν ἐλεύθερος μόλῃ,

τῷ ἐλευθέρῳ νῦν συνεκφαίνων τὸν ἀδεᾶ καὶ μεγαλόφρονα καὶ ἀταπείνωτον. τί δὴ κωλύει καὶ ἡμᾶς ταῖς τοιαύταις ὑποφωνήσεσι τοὺς νέους παρακαλεῖν πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, οὕτω πως χρωμένους τοῖς λεγομένοις;

E τόδ' ἐστὶ τὸ ζηλωτὸν ἀνθρώποις, ὅτῳ
τόξον μερίμνης εἰς ὃ βούλεται πέσῃ.

οὔκ, ἀλλ'

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[a] From the *Aeolus* of Euripides, Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 17.

and Antisthenes employed are themselves not without value. Antisthenes, observing that the Athenians had raised an uproar in the theatre at the line,

> What's shameful if its doer think not so ?[a]

at once interpolated,

> A shame's a shame, though one think so or no

and Cleanthes, taking the lines about riches,

> Give to your friends, and when your body's ill,
> Save it by spending,[b]

rewrote them in this manner,

> To harlots give, and when your body's ill
> Waste it by spending.

And Zeno in amending the lines of Sophocles,

> Whoever comes to traffic with a king
> To him is slave however free he come,[c]

rewrote it thus :

> Is not a slave if only free he come,

by the word " free " as he now uses it designating the man who is fearless, high-minded, and unhumbled. What, then, is to hinder us also from encouraging the young to take the better course by means of similar rejoinders, dealing with the citations something like this :

> Most enviable is the lot of him
> The shaft of whose desire hits what he would.[d]

" Not so," will be our retort, " but

[b] Euripides, *Electra*, 428.

[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 789 ; quoted by Plutarch also in *Moralia*, 204 D and the *Life of Pompey* chap. lxxviii. (661 A).

[d] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 354.

(33) ὅτῳ
τόξον μερίμνης εἰς ὃ συμφέρει πέσῃ.

τὸ γὰρ ἃ μὴ δεῖ βουλόμενον λαμβάνειν καὶ τυγχάνειν οἰκτρόν ἐστι καὶ ἄζηλον. καὶ

οὐκ ἐπὶ πᾶσίν σ' ἐφύτευσ' ἀγαθοῖς,
Ἀγάμεμνον, Ἀτρεύς.
δεῖ δέ σε χαίρειν καὶ λυπεῖσθαι.

μὰ Δία, φήσομεν, ἀλλὰ δεῖ σε χαίρειν, μὴ λυπεῖσθαι, τυγχάνοντα μετρίων·

οὐ γὰρ ἐπὶ πᾶσίν σ ἐφύτευσ' ἀγαθοῖς,
Ἀγάμεμνον, Ἀτρεύς.

αἰαῖ τόδ' ἤδη θεῖον ἀνθρώποις κακόν,
F ὅταν τις εἰδῇ τἀγαθόν, χρῆται δὲ μή.

θηριῶδες μὲν οὖν καὶ ἄλογον καὶ οἰκτρὸν εἰδότα τὸ βέλτιον ὑπὸ τοῦ χείρονος ἐξ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας ἄγεσθαι.

τρόπος ἔσθ' ὁ πείθων τοῦ λέγοντος, οὐ λόγος.

καὶ τρόπος μὲν οὖν καὶ λόγος ἢ τρόπος διὰ λόγου, καθάπερ ἱππεὺς[1] διὰ χαλινοῦ καὶ διὰ[2] πηδαλίου κυβερνήτης, οὐδὲν οὕτω φιλάνθρωπον οὐδὲ συγγενὲς ἐχούσης τῆς ἀρετῆς ὄργανον ὡς τὸν λόγον.

[1] ἱππεὺς Grotius: ἵππος.
[2] καὶ διὰ Hercher: καὶ.

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[a] Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 29; quoted also in *Moralia*, 103 B.

The shaft of whose desire hits what is good."

For to gain and achieve one's wish, if what one wishes is not right, is pitiable and unenviable. Again,

> Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire,
> Agamemnon, but joy
> Thou shalt find interwoven with grief.[a]

"No, indeed," we shall say, "but you must find joy and not grief if your lot be but moderate, since

> Not for good and no ill came thy life from thy sire,
> Agamemnon;"

and:

> Alas, from God this evil comes to men,
> When, knowing what is good, one does it not.[b]

"No, rather is it bestial," we reply, "and irrational and pitiable that a man who knows the better should be led astray by the worse as a result of a weak will and soft living."

And again:

> 'Tis character persuades, and not the speech.[c]

"No, rather it is both character and speech, or character by means of speech, just as a horseman uses a bridle, or a helmsman uses a rudder, since virtue has no instrument so humane or so akin to itself as speech." And:

[b] From the *Chrysippus* of Euripides; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 841; again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 446 A.

[c] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii. p. 135; again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 801 C.

34 *πρὸς θῆλυ νεύει μᾶλλον ἢ 'πὶ τἄρρενα;*
ὅπου προσῇ τὸ κάλλος, ἀμφιδέξιος.

ἦν δὲ βέλτιον εἰπεῖν

ὅπου προσῇ τὸ σῶφρον, ἀμφιδέξιος

ὡς ἀληθῶς καὶ ἰσόρροπος· ὁ δ' ὑφ' ἡδονῆς καὶ ὥρας ὧδε κἀκεῖ μετοιακιζόμενος ἐπαρίστερος καὶ ἀβέβαιος.

φόβος τὰ θεῖα τοῖσι σώφροσιν βροτῶν.

καὶ μὴν οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ

θάρσος τὰ θεῖα τοῖσι σώφροσιν βροτῶν,

φόβος δὲ τοῖς ἄφροσι καὶ ἀνοήτοις καὶ ἀχαρίστοις,
B *ὅτι καὶ τὴν παντὸς αἰτίαν ἀγαθοῦ δύναμιν καὶ ἀρχὴν ὡς βλάπτουσαν ὑφορῶνται καὶ δεδίασι. τὸ μὲν οὖν τῆς ἐπανορθώσεως γένος τοιοῦτόν ἐστι.*

13. *Τὴν δ' ἐπὶ πλέον τῶν λεγομένων χρῆσιν ὑπέδειξεν ὀρθῶς ὁ Χρύσιππος, ὅτι δεῖ μετάγειν καὶ διαβιβάζειν ἐπὶ τὰ ὁμοειδῆ τὸ χρήσιμον. ὅ τε γὰρ Ἡσίοδος εἰπὼν*

οὐδ' ἂν βοῦς ἀπόλοιτ', εἰ μὴ γείτων κακὸς εἴη

καὶ περὶ κυνὸς ταὐτὸ καὶ περὶ ὄνου λέγει καὶ περὶ πάντων ὁμοίως τῶν ἀπολέσθαι δυναμένων. καὶ πάλιν τοῦ Εὐριπίδου λέγοντος

τίς δ' ἐστὶ δοῦλος τοῦ θανεῖν ἄφροντις ὤν;

C *ὑπακουστέον ὅτι καὶ περὶ πόνου καὶ νόσου ταὐτὰ*

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[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 355; again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 766 F.

[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 356.

[c] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 348.

To women more than men is he inclined ?
Where there is beauty, either suits him best.[a]

But it were better to say

"Where there is virtue, either suits him best,

of a truth, and there is no difference in his inclination ; but the man who is influenced by pleasure or outward beauty to shift his course hither and thither is incompetent and inconstant." Again :

God's doings make the wise to feel afraid.[b]

" Not so by any means, but

God's doings make the wise to feel assured,

but they do make the silly and foolish and ungrateful to feel afraid, because such persons suspect and fear the power which is the cause and beginning of every good thing, as though it did harm." Such then is the system of amendment.

13. Chrysippus has rightly indicated how the poet's statements can be given a wider application, saying that what is serviceable should be taken over and made to apply to like situations. For when Hesiod [c] says,

Nor would even an ox disappear were there not a bad neighbour,

he says the same thing also about a dog and about an ass and about all things which in a similar way can " disappear." And again when Euripides [d] says,

What man who recks not death can be a slave ?

we must understand that he makes the same state-

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 958 ; again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 106 D. *Cf.* Cicero, *Ad Atticum*, ix. 2a, 2.

(34) εἴρηκεν. ὡς γὰρ φαρμάκου πρὸς ἓν ἁρμόσαντος νόσημα τὴν δύναμιν καταμαθόντες οἱ ἰατροὶ μετάγουσι καὶ χρῶνται πρὸς ἅπαν τὸ παραπλήσιον, οὕτω καὶ λόγον κοινοῦν καὶ δημοσιεύειν τὴν χρείαν δυνάμενον οὐ χρὴ περιορᾶν ἑνὶ πράγματι συνηρτημένον ἀλλὰ κινεῖν ἐπὶ πάντα τὰ ὅμοια, καὶ τοὺς νέους ἐθίζειν τὴν κοινότητα συνορᾶν καὶ μεταφέρειν ὀξέως τὸ οἰκεῖον, ἐν πολλοῖς παραδείγμασι ποιουμένους μελέτην καὶ ἄσκησιν ὀξυηκοΐας, ἵνα τοῦ Μενάνδρου λέγοντος

μακάριος ὅστις οὐσίαν καὶ νοῦν ἔχει

τοῦτο καὶ περὶ δόξης καὶ περὶ ἡγεμονίας καὶ περὶ
D λόγου δυνάμεως εἰρῆσθαι νομίζωσι, τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸν Ἀχιλλέα τὸν ἐν Σκύρῳ καθήμενον ἐν ταῖς παρθένοις γεγενημένην ἐπίπληξιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως

σὺ δ', ὦ τὸ λαμπρὸν φῶς ἀποσβεννὺς[1] γένους,
ξαίνεις, ἀρίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων γεγώς;

καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἄσωτον οἴωνται[2] λέγεσθαι καὶ πρὸς τὸν αἰσχροκερδῆ καὶ πρὸς τὸν ἀμελῆ καὶ ἀπαίδευτον

πίνεις, ἀρίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων γεγώς,

ἢ κυβεύεις ἢ ὀρτυγοκοπεῖς ἢ καπηλεύεις ἢ τοκογλυφεῖς, μηδὲν μέγα φρονῶν μηδ' ἄξιον τῆς εὐγενείας;

[1] καταισχύνων *Moralia*, 72 E.
[2] οἴωνται Hercher: οἴονται (οἶόν τε).

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[a] From the *Bridal Manager* of Menander; *cf.* Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii. *Menander*, No. 114, and Allinson, *Menander* in L.C.L. p. 342.

[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 9; again quoted by Plutarch with variant reading, *Moralia*, 72 E.

[c] The Greeks were very fond, not only of cock-fights,

ment also about trouble and disease. For, as physicians who have learnt the efficacy of a drug adapted to one malady take it over and use it for every similar malady, so also when a statement has a general and universal value, we ought not to suffer it to be fixed upon one matter alone, but we ought to apply it to all the like, and inure the young men to see its general value, and quickly to carry over what is appropriate, and by many examples to give themselves training and practice in keen appreciation; so that when Menander says,

> Blest is the man who has both wealth and sense,[a]

they may think of the statement as holding good also about repute and leadership and facility in speaking; and so also that when they hear the rebuke which was administered by Odysseus to Achilles as he sat among the maidens in Scyrus,

> Dost thou, to dim the glory of thy race,
> Card wool, son of the noblest man in Greece?[b]

they may imagine it to be addressed also to the profligate and the avaricious and the heedless and the ill-bred, as, for example,

> Dost drink, son of the noblest man in Greece,

or gamble, or follow quail-fighting,[c] or petty trading, or the exacting of usury, without a thought of what is magnanimous or worthy of your noble parentage?

but also of quail-fights. Another form of the latter sport known as ὀρτυγοκοπία is often referred to by Greek writers and is perhaps best described by Pollux ix. 102 and 107. The quails were put into an enclosed ring, and their courage was tested by tapping them on the head with the finger or by pulling the feathers on top of their heads. If a bird showed fight, its owner won. Plutarch in the present passage, without doubt, uses ὀρτυγοκοπία to cover all forms of the sport.

μὴ πλοῦτον εἴπῃς. οὐχὶ θαυμάζω θεὸν
ὃν χὠ[1] κάκιστος ῥᾳδίως ἐκτήσατο.

οὐκοῦν μηδὲ δόξαν εἴπῃς μηδὲ σώματος εὐμορφίαν μηδὲ στρατηγικὴν χλαμύδα μηδ' ἱερατικὸν στέφανον, ὧν καὶ τοὺς κακίστους ὁρῶμεν τυγχάνοντας.

τῆς δειλίας γὰρ αἰσχρὰ γίγνεται τέκνα

καὶ ναὶ μὰ Δία τῆς ἀκολασίας καὶ τῆς δεισιδαιμονίας καὶ τοῦ φθόνου καὶ τῶν ἄλλων νοσημάτων ἁπάντων. ἄριστα δ' εἰρηκότος Ὁμήρου τὸ

Δύσπαρι εἶδος ἄριστε

καὶ τὸ

F Ἕκτορ εἶδος ἄριστε

(ψόγου γὰρ ἀποφαίνει καὶ λοιδορίας ἄξιον ᾧ μηδέν ἐστιν ἀγαθὸν εὐμορφίας κάλλιον) ἐφαρμοστέον τοῦτο καὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις, κολούοντα τοὺς μεγαλοφρονοῦντας ἐπὶ τοῖς μηδενὸς ἀξίοις, καὶ διδάσκοντα τοὺς νέους ὄνειδος ἡγεῖσθαι καὶ λοιδορίαν τὸ "χρήμασιν ἄριστε" καὶ "δείπνοις ἄριστε" καὶ "παισὶν ἢ ὑποζυγίοις ἄριστε" καὶ νὴ Δία τὸ
35 λέγειν ἐφεξῆς "ἄριστε." δεῖ γὰρ ἐκ τῶν καλῶν διώκειν τὴν ὑπεροχὴν καὶ περὶ τὰ πρῶτα πρῶτον εἶναι καὶ μέγαν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις· ἡ δ' ἀπὸ μικρῶν δόξα καὶ φαύλων ἄδοξός ἐστι καὶ ἀφιλότιμος.

Τοῦτο δ' ἡμᾶς εὐθὺς ὑπομιμνήσκει τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ τοὺς ψόγους ἀποθεωρεῖν καὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους ἐν τοῖς Ὁμήρου μάλιστα ποιήμασιν· ἔμφασις γὰρ γίγνεται μεγάλη τοῦ τὰ σωματικὰ καὶ τυχηρὰ μὴ

[1] χὠ: καὶ ὁ.

[a] From the *Aeolus* of Euripides. Nauck, *TGF.*, *Euripides*, No. 20; *cf.* Cicero, *Tusculan Disputations*, v. 16.

Speak not of Wealth. I can't admire a god
Whose ready favour basest men secure.[a]

Therefore speak not of repute, either, or of personal beauty, or the general's cloak, or the priestly crown, to all which we see the worst of men attaining.

For ugly is the brood of cowardice,[b]

and the same we may also aver of licentiousness, superstition, envy, and all the other pestilent disorders. Most excellently has Homer said

Paris, poor wretch, excelling in looks,[c]

and

Hector, excelling in looks[d]

(for he declares the man deserving of censure and reproach who is endowed with no good quality better than personal comeliness), and this we must make to apply to similar cases, thereby curtailing the pride of those who plume themselves on things of no worth, and teaching the young to regard as a disgrace and reproach such phrases as " excelling in wealth " and " excelling in dinners " and " excelling in children " or " oxen," and in fact even the use of the word " excelling " in such a connexion. For we ought to aim at the pre-eminence which comes from noble qualities, and we should strive to be first in matters of first importance, and to be great in the greatest: but the repute which comes from small and petty things is disreputable and paltry.

This illustration at once reminds us to consider carefully instances of censure and commendation, particularly in Homer's poems. For he gives us expressly to understand that bodily and adventitious

[b] Nauck, *TGF.*, *Adesp.* No. 357.
[c] Homer, *Il.* iii. 39. [d] *Ibid.* xvii. 142.

(35) μεγάλης ἄξια σπουδῆς νομίζειν. πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς δεξιώσεσι καὶ ἀνακλήσεσιν οὐ καλοὺς οὐδὲ πλουσίους οὐδ' ἰσχυροὺς προσαγορεύουσιν, ἀλλὰ τοιαύταις εὐφημίαις χρῶνται

B διογενὲς Λαερτιάδη, πολυμήχαν' Ὀδυσσεῦ

καὶ

Ἕκτορ υἱὲ Πριάμοιο, Διὶ μῆτιν ἀτάλαντε

καὶ

ὦ Ἀχιλεῦ Πηλέος υἱέ, μέγα κῦδος[1] Ἀχαιῶν

καὶ

δῖε Μενοιτιάδη, τῷ ἐμῷ κεχαρισμένε θυμῷ.

ἔπειτα λοιδοροῦσιν οὐδὲν ἐφαπτόμενοι τῶν σωματικῶν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τοὺς ψόγους ἐπιφέροντες

οἰνοβαρές, κυνὸς ὄμματ' ἔχων, κραδίην δ' ἐλάφοιο

καὶ

C Αἶαν νεῖκος ἄριστε, κακοφραδὲς

καὶ

Ἰδομενεῦ, τί πάρος λαβρεύεαι; οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ λαβραγόρην ἔμεναι

καὶ

Αἶαν ἁμαρτοεπὲς βουγάιε.

καὶ τέλος ὁ Θερσίτης ὑπὸ τοῦ Ὀδυσσέως οὐ χωλὸς οὐ φαλακρὸς οὐ κυρτὸς ἀλλ' ἀκριτόμυθος λοιδορεῖται, τὸν δ' Ἥφαιστον ἡ τεκοῦσα φιλοφρονουμένη προσηγόρευσεν ἀπὸ τῆς χωλότητος

[1] κῦδος: φέρτατ' most Homeric mss. A few have φίλτατ'.

characteristics are unworthy of serious attention. For, to begin with, in their greetings and salutations, they do not call one another handsome or rich or strong, but they employ such fair words as these—

Heaven-sprung son of Laertes, Odysseus of many devices,[a]

and

Hector, son of Priam, peer of Zeus in counsel,[b]

and

Son of Peleus, Achilles, great glory to the Achaeans,[c]

and

Noble son of Menoetius, in whom my soul finds pleasure.[d]

In the second place they reproach without touching at all upon bodily characteristics, but they direct their censure to faults :

Drunken sot, with eyes of a dog and the wild deer's courage,[e]

and

Ajax, excelling at wrangling, ill advised,[f]

and

Why, Idomeneus do you brag so soon ? Unfitting
Is it for you to be braggart,[g]

and

Ajax, blundering boaster,[h]

and finally Thersites is reproached[i] by Odysseus, not as lame or bald or hunchbacked, but as indiscreet in his language, while on the other hand the mother of Hephaestus affectionately drew an epithet from his lameness when she addressed him thus :

[a] Homer, *Il.* ii. 173. [b] *Ib.* vii. 47. [c] *Ib.* xix. 216.
[d] *Ib.* xi. 608. [e] *Ib.* i. 225. [f] *Ib.* xxiii. 483.
[g] *Ib.* xxiii. 474, 478. [h] *Ib.* xiii. 824. [i] *Ib.* ii. 246.

(35) ὄρσεο κυλλοπόδιον, ἐμὸν τέκος.

οὕτως Ὅμηρος καταγελᾷ τῶν αἰσχυνομένων ἐπὶ χωλότησιν ἢ τυφλότησιν, οὔτε ψεκτὸν ἡγούμενος τὸ μὴ αἰσχρὸν οὔτ' αἰσχρὸν τὸ μὴ δι' ἡμᾶς ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τύχης γιγνόμενον.

D Δύο δὴ περιγίγνεται μεγάλα τοῖς τῶν ποιημάτων ἐπιμελῶς ἐθιζομένοις ἀκούειν, τὸ μὲν εἰς μετριότητα, μηδενὶ τύχην ἐπαχθῶς καὶ ἀνοήτως ὀνειδίζειν, τὸ δ' εἰς μεγαλοφροσύνην, αὐτοὺς χρησαμένους τύχαις μὴ ταπεινοῦσθαι μηδὲ ταράττεσθαι, φέρειν δὲ πράως καὶ σκώμματα καὶ λοιδορίας καὶ γέλωτας, μάλιστα μὲν τὸ τοῦ Φιλήμονος ἔχοντας πρόχειρον

ἥδιον οὐδὲν οὐδὲ μουσικώτερον
ἔστ' ἢ δύνασθαι λοιδορούμενον φέρειν.

ἂν δὲ φαίνηταί τις ἐπιλήψεως δεόμενος, τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ τῶν παθῶν ἐπιλαμβάνεσθαι, ὥσπερ ὁ τραγικὸς Ἄδραστος, τοῦ Ἀλκμέωνος εἰπόντος πρὸς αὐτὸν

E ἀνδροκτόνου γυναικὸς ὁμογενὴς ἔφυς,

ἀπεκρίνατο

σὺ δ' αὐτόχειρ γε μητρὸς ἦ σ' ἐγείνατο.

καθάπερ γὰρ οἱ τὰ ἱμάτια μαστιγοῦντες οὐχ ἅπτον-

Up with you, club-foot, my child ![a]

Thus Homer ridicules those who feel ashamed of lameness or blindness, in that he does not regard as blameworthy that which is not shameful, or as shameful that which is brought about, not through our own acts, but by fortune.

Plainly, then, two great advantages accrue to those who accustom themselves carefully to peruse works of poetry: the first is conducive to moderation, that we do not odiously and foolishly reproach anybody with his fortune; while the second is conducive to magnanimity, that when we ourselves have met with chances and changes we be not humiliated or even disturbed, but bear gently with scoffings and revilings and ridicule, having especially before us the words of Philemon:

There's naught more pleasing or in better taste
Than having strength to bear when men revile.[b]

But if anybody is plainly in need of reprehension, we should reprehend his faults and his giving way to emotion, after the fashion in which Adrastus of the tragedy, when Alcmaeon said to him,

You are the kin of her who slew her spouse,[c]

replied

And you have murdered her who gave you birth.[d]

For just as those who scourge the clothes do not

[a] Homer, *Il.* xxi. 331.
[b] From the *Epidicazomenus* of Philemon; *cf.* Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* ii. p. 484.
[c] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 358; again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 88 F. [d] *Ibidem.*

ται τοῦ σώματος, οὕτως οἱ δυστυχίας τινὰς ἢ δυσγενείας ὀνειδίζοντες εἰς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἐντείνονται κενῶς καὶ ἀνοήτως, τῆς ψυχῆς δ' οὐ θιγγάνουσιν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀληθῶς ἐπανορθώσεως δεομένων καὶ δήξεως.

14. Καὶ μὴν ὥσπερ ἐπάνω πρὸς τὰ φαῦλα καὶ
F βλαβερὰ ποιήματα λόγους καὶ γνώμας ἀντιτάττοντες ἐνδόξων καὶ πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐδοκοῦμεν ἀφιστάναι καὶ ἀνακρούειν τὴν πίστιν, οὕτως ὅ τι ἂν ἀστεῖον εὕρωμεν παρ' αὐτοῖς καὶ χρηστόν, ἐκτρέφειν χρὴ καὶ αὔξειν ἀποδείξεσι καὶ μαρτυρίαις φιλοσόφοις, ἀποδιδόντας τὴν εὕρεσιν ἐκείνοις. καὶ γὰρ δίκαιον καὶ ὠφέλιμον, ἰσχὺν τῆς πίστεως καὶ ἀξίωμα προσλαμβανούσης, ὅταν τοῖς ἀπὸ σκηνῆς λεγομένοις καὶ πρὸς λύραν ᾀδομένοις καὶ μελετωμένοις ἐν διδασκαλείῳ τὰ Πυθαγόρου δόγματα καὶ τὰ Πλάτωνος ὁμολογῇ, καὶ τὰ Χίλωνος παραγγέλματα καὶ τὰ Βίαντος ἐπὶ τὰς αὐτὰς ἄγῃ γνώμας ἐκείνοις τοῖς
36 παιδικοῖς ἀναγνώσμασιν. ὅθεν οὐ παρέργως ὑποδεικτέον ὅτι τὸ μὲν

τέκνον ἐμόν, οὔ τοι[1] δέδοται πολεμήια ἔργα,
ἀλλὰ σύ γ' ἱμερόεντα μετέρχεο ἔργα γάμοιο

καὶ τὸ

Ζεὺς γάρ τοι νεμεσᾷ, ὅτ' ἀμείνονι φωτὶ μάχοιο

οὐδὲν διαφέρει τοῦ "γνῶθι σαυτόν," ἀλλὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἔχει διάνοιαν ἐκείνῳ· τὸ δὲ

[1] *τέκνον ἐμόν, οὔ τοι* is the reading also in Cicero, *Ad Att.* xiv. 13. 2: *οὔ τοι τέκνον ἐμὸν* Homer, E 428.

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[a] Plutarch says (*Moralia*, 173 D) that Artaxerxes (Long-

touch the body,[a] so those who scoff at misfortune or low birth, do but vainly and foolishly assail externals, never touching the soul or even such matters as really need correction and stinging reproof.

14. Moreover, just as in what we have said above we felt that by setting against cheap and harmful poems the sayings and maxims of statesmen and men of repute, we were inducing a revolt and revulsion of faith from such poetry, so whenever we find any edifying sentiment neatly expressed in the poets we ought to foster and amplify it by means of proofs and testimonies from the philosophers, at the same time crediting these with the discovery. For this is right and useful, and our faith gains an added strength and dignity whenever the doctrines of Pythagoras and of Plato are in agreement with what is spoken on the stage or sung to the lyre or studied at school, and when the precepts of Chilon and of Bias lead to the same conclusions as our children's readings in poetry. Hence it is a duty to make a point of indicating that the lines

> You, my child, have not the gift of arms in battle,
> Your concern must be for loving arms in wedlock,[b]

and

> Seeing that Zeus is wroth if you fight with a man far better,[c]

do not differ from "Know thyself," but have the same purport as this; and the lines,

hand) ordained that nobles who had offended should lay off their clothes, and their clothes should be scourged instead of their bodies. Considerable corroborative evidence is cited by Wyttenbach in his note on *Moralia*, 565 A.

[b] Homer, *Il.* v. 428.

[c] Not found in the MSS. of Homer but often printed as *Iliad*, xi. 543. See note on 24 C *supra*.

(36) *νήπιοι, οὐδ' ἴσασιν ὅσῳ πλέον ἥμισυ παντὸς*

καὶ τὸ

ἡ δὲ κακὴ βουλὴ τῷ βουλεύσαντι κακίστη

ταὐτόν ἐστι τοῖς Πλάτωνος ἐν Γοργίᾳ καὶ Πολιτείᾳ
B *δόγμασι περὶ τοῦ "τὸ ἀδικεῖν κάκιον εἶναι τοῦ ἀδικεῖσθαι" καὶ τοῦ κακῶς πάσχειν τὸ ποιεῖν κακῶς βλαβερώτερον. ἐπιρρητέον δὲ καὶ τῷ τοῦ Αἰσχύλου*

θάρσει· πόνου γὰρ ἄκρον οὐκ ἔχει χρόνον

ὅτι τοῦτ' ἐστὶ τὸ παρ' Ἐπικούρου θρυλούμενον ἀεὶ καὶ θαυμαζόμενον, ὡς "οἱ μεγάλοι πόνοι συντόμως ἐξάγουσιν, οἱ δὲ χρόνιοι μέγεθος οὐκ ἔχουσιν." ὧν τὸ μὲν εἴρηκεν ὁ Αἰσχύλος ἐναργῶς, τὸ δὲ τῷ εἰρημένῳ παρακείμενόν ἐστιν· εἰ γὰρ ὁ μέγας καὶ σύντονος οὐ παραμένει πόνος, οὐκ ἔστι μέγας ὁ παραμένων οὐδὲ δυσκαρτέρητος. τὰ δὲ τοῦ Θέσπιδος ταυτί

ὁρᾷς ὅτι Ζεὺς τῷδε πρωτεύει θεῶν,
οὐ ψεῦδος οὐδὲ κόμπον οὐ μῶρον γέλων
C *ἀσκῶν· τὸ δ' ἡδὺ μοῦνος οὐκ ἐπίσταται*

τί διαφέρει τοῦ "πόρρω γὰρ ἡδονῆς καὶ λύπης ἵδρυται τὸ θεῖον," ὡς Πλάτων ἔλεγε; τὸ δὲ

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[a] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 40.
[b] *Ibid.* 265.
[c] Plato, *Gorgias*, 473 A ff.
[d] Plato, *Republic*, end of Book I. and Book IV.; *cf.* also 335 B.
[e] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Aeschylus*, No. 352.

Fools! They know not how much more than all a half is,[a]

and

Evil counsel is the worst for him who gives it [b]

are identical with the doctrines of Plato in the *Gorgias* [c] and the *Republic* [d] upon the principle that "to do wrong is worse than to be wronged" and "to do evil is more injurious than to suffer evil." And on the words of Aeschylus,[e]

Fear not; great stress of pain is not for long,

we ought to remark that this is the oft repeated and much admired statement originating with Epicurus,[f] namely "that great pains shortly spend their force, and long continued pains have no magnitude." Of these two ideas Aeschylus has perspicuously stated the one and the other is a corollary thereto; for if great and intense pain is not lasting, then that which does not last is not great or hard to endure. Take these lines of Thespis [g]:

You see that Zeus is first of gods in this,
Not using lies or boast or silly laugh;
With pleasure he alone is unconcerned.

What difference is there between this and the statement, "for the Divine Being sits throned afar from pleasure and pain," as Plato [h] has put it? Consider what is said by Bacchylides [i]:

[f] One of the "leading principles" of Epicurus; *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, x. 140.

[g] Nothing by Thespis has been preserved, although a few lines attributed to him were current. See Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.* p. 833.

[h] Plato, *Letters*, iii. 315 c. [i] Bacchylides, i. 21.

(36) φάσω μέγιστον[1]
κῦδος ἔχειν ἀρετάν· πλοῦ-
τος δὲ καὶ δειλοῖσιν ἀνθρώπων ὁμιλεῖ

λεγόμενον ὑπὸ τοῦ Βακχυλίδου καὶ πάλιν ὑπὸ τοῦ Εὐριπίδου παραπλησίως

ἐγὼ δ'
οὐδὲν πρεσβύτερον νομί-
ζω τᾶς σωφροσύνας, ἐπεὶ
τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς ἀεὶ ξύνεστι

καὶ τὸ

τί μάταν πέπασθε,[2] πλούτῳ δ' ἀρετὰν κατεργά-
σεσθαι δοκεῖτ'[2]; ἐν ἐσθλοῖς δὲ καθήσεσθ' ἄν-
ολβοι

D ἆρ' οὐκ ἀπόδειξίς ἐστιν ὧν οἱ φιλόσοφοι λέγουσι περὶ πλούτου καὶ τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀγαθῶν, ὡς χωρὶς ἀρετῆς ἀνωφελῶν ὄντων καὶ ἀνονήτων τοῖς ἔχουσι; Τὸ γὰρ οὕτω συνάπτειν καὶ συνοικειοῦν τοῖς δόγμασιν ἐξάγει τὰ ποιήματα τοῦ μύθου καὶ τοῦ προσωπείου, καὶ σπουδὴν περιτίθησιν αὖ τοῖς χρησίμως λεγομένοις· ἔτι δὲ προανοίγει καὶ προκινεῖ τὴν τοῦ νέου ψυχὴν τοῖς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγοις. ἔρχεται γὰρ οὐκ ἄγευστος αὐτῶν παντάπασιν
E οὐδ' ἀνήκοος, οὐδ' ἀκρίτως ἀνάπλεως ὢν ἥκουε τῆς μητρὸς ἀεὶ καὶ τίτθης καὶ νὴ Δία τοῦ πατρὸς

[1] φάσω [μέ]γιστον Bacchylides i. 21: φάσωμεν πιστόν.
[2] τί μάταν βροτοὶ δ[ὲ] πολλ[ὰ π]έπασθε, πλο[ύτ]ῳ τε δοκε[ῖτ' ἀρετὰν [κατε]ργάσεσθα[ι; τί] δ', εἴ τιν' Αἴτν[α]ς πάγον Π[αρ]ίαν τε πέτραν χρυσήλατον ἐν θαλάμοις ἔχοιτε πασ[ά]μενοι πατρίοις; *Papy. Oxyr.* ix. 142: τιμᾶν τὰν τέτασθε . . . κατεργάσασθαι.

I shall assert that virtue hath the highest fame,
But wealth with even wretched men is intimate,

and again by Euripides [a] to much the same effect:

There's naught that I hold
In a higher esteem
Than a virtuous life;
'Twill ever be joined
With those that are good.

and

Why seek vain possessions? Do ye think
Virtue by wealth to compass?
Wretched amid your comforts shall ye sit.[b]

Is not this a proof of what the philosophers say regarding wealth and external advantages, that without virtue they are useless and unprofitable for their owners?

This method of conjoining and reconciling such sentiments with the doctrines of philosophers brings the poet's work out of the realm of myth and impersonation, and, moreover, invests with seriousness its helpful sayings. Besides, it opens and stimulates in advance the mind of the youth by the sayings in philosophy. For he comes to it thus not altogether without a foretaste of it, nor without having heard of it, nor indiscriminately stuffed with what he has heard always from his mother and nurse, and, I

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 959.

[b] Plutarch, as was often his practice (*e.g. Moralia*, 35 c or 646 c), seems to have condensed this quotation. The original of the first portion appears to have been given by Satyrus in his Life of Euripides (*Oxyrhynchus Papyri*, ix. 142), "Why have you mortals acquired in vain many possessions, and think that by wealth you shall compass virtue? What boots it, should you have in your ancestral halls some fragment of Aetna's cliff or Parian stone, gold-wrought, which you have secured?" *Cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 960.

καὶ τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ, τοὺς πλουσίους εὐδαιμονιζόντων καὶ σεβομένων, φριττόντων δὲ τὸν θάνατον καὶ τὸν πόνον, ἄζηλον δὲ τὴν ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ μηδὲν ἄνευ χρημάτων καὶ δόξης ἀγόντων. οἷς ἀντίφωνα τὰ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἀκούοντας αὐτοὺς τὸ πρῶτον ἔκπληξις ἴσχει καὶ ταραχὴ καὶ θάμβος, οὐ προσιεμένους οὐδ' ὑπομένοντας, ἂν μὴ καθάπερ ἐκ σκότους πολλοῦ μέλλοντες ἥλιον ὁρᾶν ἐθισθῶσιν οἷον ἐν νόθῳ φωτὶ κεκραμένης μύθοις ἀληθείας αὐγὴν ἔχοντι μαλακὴν ἀλύπως διαβλέπειν τὰ τοιαῦτα καὶ μὴ φεύγειν. προακηκοότες γὰρ ἐν
F τοῖς ποιήμασι καὶ προανεγνωκότες

τὸν φύντα θρηνεῖν εἰς ὅσ' ἔρχεται κακά,
τὸν δ' αὖ θανόντα καὶ πόνων πεπαυμένον
χαίροντας εὐφημοῦντας ἐκπέμπειν δόμων

καὶ

ἐπεὶ τί δεῖ βροτοῖσι πλὴν δυεῖν μόνον,
Δήμητρος ἀκτῆς πώματός θ' ὑδρηχόου;

καὶ

37 ἰὼ τυραννὶ βαρβάρων ἀνδρῶν φίλη

καὶ

ἡ βροτῶν τ' εὐπραξία
τῶν τἀλάχιστα γίγνεται λυπουμένων

ἧττον ταράττονται καὶ δυσκολαίνουσι παρὰ τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀκούοντες ὡς "ὁ θάνατος οὐδὲν πρὸς ἡμᾶς" καὶ "ὁ τῆς φύσεως πλοῦτος ὥρισται" καὶ

[a] The whole passage is a reminiscence of Plato, *Republic*, vii. chap. 2 (515 E).

[b] Celebrated lines from the *Cresphontes* of Euripides. Nauck, *TGF.*, *Eurip.* No. 449; *cf.* Cicero, *Tusc. Disp.* i. 48. 115.

[c] Nauck, *ibid.*, *Eurip.* No. 892 (again quoted by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 1043 E, 1044 B and F).

dare say, from his father and his tutor as well, who all beatify and worship the rich, who shudder at death and pain, who regard virtue without money and repute as quite undesirable and a thing of naught. But when they hear the precepts of the philosophers, which go counter to such opinions, at first astonishment and confusion and amazement take hold of them, since they cannot accept or tolerate any such teaching, unless, just as if they were now to look upon the sun after having been in utter darkness, they have been made accustomed, in a reflected light, as it were, in which the dazzling rays of truth are softened by combining truth with fable, to face facts of this sort without being distressed, and not to try to get away from them.[a] For if they have previously heard or read in poetry such thoughts as these :

> To mourn the babe for th' ills to which he comes ;
> But him that's dead, and from his labours rests,
> To bear from home with joy and cheering words,[b]

and

> What needs have mortals save two things alone,
> Demeter's grain and draught from water-jar ? [c]

and

> O Tyranny, beloved of barbarous folk,[d]

and

> And mortal men's felicity
> Is gained by such of them as feel least grief,[e]

they are less confused and disquieted upon hearing at the lectures of the philosophers that " Death is nothing to us," [f] and " The wealth allowed by Nature

[a] *Ibid.*, *Adesp.* No. 359. [c] *Ibid.*, *Adesp.* No. 360.
[f] One of Epicurus's " leading principles," Diogenes Laertius, x. 139.

(37) "τὸ εὔδαιμον καὶ μακάριον οὐ χρημάτων πλῆθος οὐδὲ πραγμάτων ὄγκος οὐδ' ἀρχαί τινες ἔχουσιν οὐδὲ δυνάμεις, ἀλλ' ἀλυπία καὶ πραότης παθῶν καὶ διάθεσις ψυχῆς τὸ κατὰ φύσιν ὁρίζουσα.

B Διὸ καὶ τούτων ἕνεκα καὶ τῶν προειρημένων ἁπάντων ἀγαθῆς δεῖ τῷ νέῳ κυβερνήσεως περὶ τὴν ἀνάγνωσιν, ἵνα μὴ προδιαβληθεὶς ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον προπαιδευθεὶς εὐμενὴς καὶ φίλος καὶ οἰκεῖος ὑπὸ ποιητικῆς ἐπὶ φιλοσοφίαν προπέμπηται.

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[a] Another of Epicurus's "leading principles," Diogenes Laertius, x. 144.

[b] Also from Epicurus, without much doubt, but not to

is definitely limited," [a] and " Happiness and blessedness do not consist in vast possessions or exalted occupations or offices or authority, but on impassivity, calmness, and a disposition of the soul that sets its limitations to accord with Nature." [b]

Wherefore, both because of these considerations and because of those already adduced, the young man has need of good pilotage in the matter of reading, to the end that, forestalled with schooling rather than prejudice, in a spirit of friendship and goodwill and familiarity, he may be convoyed by poetry into the realm of philosophy.

be found in just this form; *cf.*, however, Diogenes Laertius, x. 139, 141, 144.

ON LISTENING TO LECTURES

(DE RECTA RATIONE AUDIENDI)

INTRODUCTION

THE essay on listening to lectures was first delivered as a formal lecture, and afterwards written out for the benefit of the young Nicander, who had just assumed the *toga virilis*, and was about to take up the serious study of philosophy. One can see in Terence, *Andria*, i. 1. 24, for example, how the young men of good family, suddenly released from the care of tutors by assuming the *toga virilis*, conventionally took up a more or less serious avocation. Some took to horses or hunting, while others went on to the higher studies.

It must be quite evident that this essay is, in a way, a supplement and corollary to the preceding essay on the study of poetry. The former is concerned with the young, the latter with the more mature who are undertaking serious study, and particularly the study of philosophy, in which Plutarch was intensely interested. But it is quite clear that the lectures to which he refers dealt with many other subjects besides philosophy.

The essay has an astonishingly modern tone. The different types of students — the diffident student, the lazy student, the contemptuous student, the over-enthusiastic student who makes a nuisance of himself, the over-confident student who likes to ask questions to show off his own scrappy knowledge,

the student who has no appreciation of his privilege in hearing a great scholar—all these are portrayed in a thoroughly realistic manner.

Stress is laid on the great contrast between the scholar (particularly the philosopher) and the popular lecturer (the sophist). Then as now, it seems, people were not always willing to listen patiently to the scholar, but more often inclined to resort to lectures of the lighter and more entertaining sort. In this matter, as in many others, Plutarch marks the distinction of character—the character of the lecturer, and the effect of the lecture on the character of the hearer. The sophists, having no particular character themselves and being below the general average of mankind, can do little or nothing to improve the character of their hearers, but, on the other hand, practically everything that the scholar says or does has its value for the upbuilding of character if only one have the ability to profit by it.

Proper behaviour in the lecture-room is the main theme of the essay. No lecture can be so bad that it contains nothing good, and while the lecture itself must be subjected to unsparing criticism, the lecturer must always be treated with kindly consideration, and must not be disturbed by any improper behaviour on the part of his audience.

It is worth while to compare Pliny's *Letters*, vi. 17 and i. 13 for the record of certain improprieties committed by audiences in Rome. On the general subject of higher education and the wide diffusion of knowledge at this time and later, reference may be made to W. W. Capes, *University Life in Ancient*

Athens, and J. W. H. Walden, *The Universities of Ancient Greece* (New York, 1909).

In the catalogue of Lamprias, in which this essay is No. 102, the title is given as Περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν τῶν φιλοσόφων, "On Listening to the Lectures of Philosophers," but it is probable that this title is merely explanatory, for Plutarch himself uses ἀκούειν alone in this sense in the very first line of the essay.

ΠΕΡΙ ΤΟΥ ΑΚΟΥΕΙΝ

(37) 1. Τὴν γενομένην μοι σχολὴν περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν,
C ὦ Νίκανδρε, ἀπέσταλκά σοι γράψας, ὅπως εἰδῇς
τοῦ πείθοντος ὀρθῶς ἀκούειν, ὅτε τῶν προστατ-
τόντων ἀπήλλαξαι τὸ ἀνδρεῖον ἀνειληφὼς ἱμάτιον.
ἀναρχία μὲν γάρ, ἣν ἔνιοι τῶν νέων ἐλευθερίαν
D ἀπαιδευσίᾳ νομίζουσι, χαλεπωτέρους ἐκείνων τῶν
ἐν παισὶ διδασκάλων καὶ παιδαγωγῶν δεσπότας
ἐφίστησι τὰς ἐπιθυμίας ὥσπερ ἐκ δεσμῶν λυθεί-
σας· καὶ καθάπερ Ἡρόδοτός φησιν ἅμα τῷ χιτῶνι
συνεκδύεσθαι τὴν αἰδῶ τὰς γυναῖκας, οὕτως ἔνιοι
τῶν νέων ἅμα τῷ τὸ παιδικὸν ἱμάτιον ἀπο-
θέσθαι συναποθέμενοι τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ φοβεῖσθαι
καὶ λύσαντες τὴν κατασχηματίζουσαν αὐτοὺς περι-
βολὴν εὐθὺς ἐμπίπλανται τῆς ἀναγωγίας. σὺ δὲ
πολλάκις ἀκηκοὼς ὅτι ταὐτόν ἐστι τὸ ἕπεσθαι
θεῷ καὶ τὸ πείθεσθαι λόγῳ, νόμιζε τὴν εἰς ἄνδρας
ἐκ παίδων ἀγωγὴν οὐκ ἀρχῆς εἶναι τοῖς εὖ φρο-
E νοῦσιν ἀποβολήν, ἀλλὰ μεταβολὴν ἄρχοντος, ἀντὶ
μισθωτοῦ τινος ἢ ἀργυρωνήτου θεῖον ἡγεμόνα
τοῦ βίου λαμβάνουσι τὸν λόγον, ᾧ τοὺς ἑπομένους
ἄξιόν ἐστι μόνους ἐλευθέρους νομίζειν. μόνοι γὰρ
ἃ δεῖ βούλεσθαι μαθόντες, ὡς βούλονται ζῶσι·

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[a] Herodotus, i. 8; again referred to in *Moralia*, 139 c.

ON LISTENING TO LECTURES

1. The discourse which I gave on the subject of listening to lectures I have written out and sent to you, my dear Nicander, so that you may know how rightly to listen to the voice of persuasion, now that you are no longer subject to authority, having assumed the garb of a man. Now absence of control, which some of the young men, for want of education, think to be freedom, establishes the sway of a set of masters, harsher than the teachers and attendants of childhood, in the form of the desires, which are now, as it were, unchained. And just as Herodotus [a] says that women put off their modesty along with their undergarments, so some of our young men, as soon as they lay aside the garb of childhood, lay aside also their sense of modesty and fear, and, undoing the habit that invests them, straightway become full of unruliness. But you have often heard that to follow God and to obey reason are the same thing, and so I ask you to believe that in persons of good sense the passing from childhood to manhood is not a casting off of control, but a recasting of the controlling agent, since instead of some hired person or slave purchased with money they now take as the divine guide of their life reason, whose followers alone may deservedly be considered free. For they alone, having learned to wish for what they

ταῖς δ' ἀπαιδεύτοις καὶ παραλόγοις ὁρμαῖς καὶ πράξεσιν ἀγεννὲς ἔνεστί τι[1] καὶ μικρὸν ἐν πολλῷ τῷ μετανοοῦντι τὸ ἑκούσιον.

2. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ τῶν ἐγγραφομένων εἰς τὰς πολιτείας οἱ μὲν ἀλλοδαποὶ καὶ ξένοι κομιδῇ πολλὰ
F μέμφονται καὶ δυσκολαίνουσι τῶν γιγνομένων, οἱ δ' ἐκ μετοίκων σύντροφοι καὶ συνήθεις τῶν νόμων ὄντες οὐ χαλεπῶς προσδέχονται τὰ ἐπιβάλλοντα καὶ στέργουσιν, οὕτω σε δεῖ[2] πολὺν χρόνον ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ παρατρεφόμενον καὶ πᾶν μάθημα καὶ ἄκουσμα παιδικὸν ἀπ' ἀρχῆς ἐθισθέντα προσφέρεσθαι λόγῳ φιλοσόφῳ μεμιγμένον, εὐμενῆ καὶ οἰκεῖον ἥκειν εἰς φιλοσοφίαν, ἣ μόνη τὸν ἀνδρεῖον καὶ τέλειον ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐκ λόγου τοῖς νέοις περιτίθησι κόσμον.

Οὐκ ἂν ἀηδῶς δ' οἶμαί σε προακοῦσαι[3] περὶ τῆς
38 ἀκουστικῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἣν ὁ Θεόφραστος παθητικωτάτην εἶναί φησι πασῶν. οὔτε γὰρ ὁρατὸν οὐδὲν οὔτε γευστὸν οὔθ' ἁπτὸν ἐκστάσεις ἐπιφέρει καὶ ταραχὰς καὶ πτοίας τηλικαύτας ἡλίκαι καταλαμβάνουσι τὴν ψυχὴν κτύπων τινῶν καὶ πατάγων καὶ ἤχων τῇ ἀκοῇ προσπεσόντων. ἔστι δὲ λογικωτέρα μᾶλλον ἢ παθητικωτέρα. τῇ μὲν γὰρ κακίᾳ πολλὰ χωρία καὶ μέρη τοῦ σώματος παρέχει δι' αὐτῶν ἐνδῦσαν ἅψασθαι τῆς ψυχῆς, τῇ δ' ἀρετῇ
B μία λαβὴ τὰ ὦτα τῶν νέων ἐστίν, ἂν ᾖ[4] καθαρὰ καὶ ἄθρυπτα κολακείᾳ καὶ λόγοις ἄθικτα φαύλοις

[1] ἔνεστί τι F.C.B.: ἔνεστι.
[2] οὕτω σε δεῖ Duebner: οὕτως ἔδει.
[3] προακοῦσαι Madvig: προσακοῦσαι.
[4] ἂν ᾖ] Reiske would read ἂν.

[a] The statement is not elsewhere preserved.

ought, live as they wish; but in untrained and irrational impulses and actions there is something ignoble, and changing one's mind many times involves but little freedom of will.

2. We may find a comparison in the case of newly naturalized citizens; those among them who were alien born and perfect strangers find fault with many of the things that are done, and are discontented; whereas those who come from the class of resident aliens, having been brought up under our laws and grown to be well acquainted with them, have no difficulty in accepting what devolves upon them and are content. And so you, who have been brought up for a long time in contact with philosophy, and have from the beginning been accustomed to philosophic reasoning as an ingredient in every portion of early instruction and information, ought to feel like an old friend and familiar when you come to philosophy, which alone can array young men in the manly and truly perfect adornment that comes from reason.

I think you may not find unwelcome some preliminary remarks about the sense of hearing, which Theophrastus [a] asserts is the most emotional of all the senses. For nothing which can be seen or tasted or touched brings on such distractions, confusions, and excitements, as take possession of the soul when certain crashing, clashing, and roaring noises assail the hearing. Yet this sense is more rational than emotional. For while many places and parts of the body make way for vice to enter through them and fasten itself upon the soul, virtue's only hold upon the young is afforded by the ears, if they be uncontaminated and kept from the outset unspoiled by

(38) ἀπ' ἀρχῆς φυλάττηται. διὸ καὶ Ξενοκράτης τοῖς παισὶ μᾶλλον ἢ τοῖς ἀθληταῖς ἐκέλευε περιάπτειν ἀμφωτίδας, ὡς ἐκείνων μὲν τὰ ὦτα ταῖς πληγαῖς, τούτων δὲ τοῖς λόγοις τὰ ἤθη διαστρεφομένων, οὐκ ἀνηκοΐαν οὐδὲ κωφότητα προμνώμενος, ἀλλὰ τῶν λόγων τοὺς φαύλους φυλάττεσθαι παραινῶν, πρὶν ἑτέρους χρηστούς, ὥσπερ φύλακας ἐντραφέντας ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας τῷ ἤθει, τὴν μάλιστα κινουμένην αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀναπειθομένην χώραν κατασχεῖν. καὶ Βίας ὁ παλαιὸς Ἀμάσιδι, κελευσθεὶς τὸ χρηστότατον ὁμοῦ καὶ φαυλότατον ἐκπέμψαι κρέας τοῦ ἱερείου, τὴν γλῶτταν ἐξελὼν ἀπέπεμψεν, ὡς καὶ βλάβας καὶ ὠφελείας τοῦ λέγειν ἔχοντος μεγίστας. C οἵ τε πολλοὶ τὰ μικρὰ παιδία καταφιλοῦντες αὐτοί τε τῶν ὤτων ἅπτονται κἀκεῖνα τοῦτο ποιεῖν κελεύουσιν, αἰνιττόμενοι μετὰ παιδιᾶς ὅτι δεῖ φιλεῖν μάλιστα τοὺς διὰ τῶν ὤτων ὠφελοῦντας. ἐπεὶ ὅτι γε πάσης ἀκροάσεως ἀπειργόμενος ὁ νέος καὶ λόγου μηδενὸς γευόμενος οὐ μόνον ἄκαρπος ὅλως καὶ ἀβλαστὴς διαμένει πρὸς ἀρετήν, ἀλλὰ καὶ διαστρέφοιτ' ἂν πρὸς κακίαν, ὥσπερ ἐκ χώρας ἀκινήτου καὶ ἀργῆς ἄγρια πολλὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀναδιδούς, δῆλόν ἐστι. τὰς γὰρ ἐφ' ἡδονὴν ὁρμὰς D καὶ πρὸς πόνον ὑποψίας (οὐ θυραίους οὐδ' ὑπὸ λόγων ἐπεισάκτους, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ αὐτόχθονας οὔσας μυρίων παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων πηγάς) ἂν ἐᾷ τις

[a] Again referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 706 c.
[b] *Ibid.* 146 F.

flattery and untouched by vile words. For this reason Xenocrates [a] advised putting ear-protectors on children rather than on athletes, on the ground that the latter have only their ears disfigured by the blows they receive, while the former have their characters disfigured by the words they hear; not that he would thus court heedlessness or deafness, but he advises vigilance against vile words, until such time as other words, of good sort, fostered in the character by philosophy, should, like watchmen, have taken under their charge the post chiefly exposed to influence and persuasion. And Bias [b] of old, on receiving orders to send to Amasis the portion of the sacrificial animal which was at the same time the best and the worst, cut out the tongue and sent it to him, on the ground that speech contains both injuries and benefits in the largest measure. Most people in bestowing an affectionate kiss on little children not only take hold of the children by the ears but bid the children to do the same by them, thus insinuating in a playful way that they must love most those who confer benefit through the ears. For surely the fact is plain, that the young man who is debarred from hearing all instruction and gets no taste of speech not only remains wholly unfruitful and makes no growth towards virtue, but may also be perverted towards vice, and the product of his mind, like that of a fallow and untilled piece of ground, will be a plentiful crop of wild oats. For if the impulses towards pleasure and the feelings of suspicion towards hard work (which are not of external origin nor imported products of the spoken word, but indigenous sources, as it were, of pestilent emotions and disorders without number) be allowed to

(38) ἀφέτους ᾗ πεφύκασι χωρεῖν καὶ μὴ λόγοις χρηστοῖς ἀφαιρῶν ἢ παρατρέπων καταρτύῃ τὴν φύσιν, οὐκ ἔστιν ὃ τῶν θηρίων οὐκ ἂν ἡμερώτερον ἀνθρώπου φανείη.

3. Διὸ δὴ μεγάλην μὲν ὠφέλειαν οὐκ ἐλάττω δὲ κίνδυνον τοῖς νέοις τοῦ ἀκούειν ἔχοντος, οἶμαι καλῶς ἔχειν καὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀεὶ καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον
E διαλέγεσθαι περὶ τοῦ ἀκούειν. ἐπεὶ καὶ τούτῳ κακῶς τοὺς πλείστους χρωμένους ὁρῶμεν, οἳ λέγειν ἀσκοῦσι πρὶν ἀκούειν ἐθισθῆναι· καὶ λόγων μὲν οἴονται μάθησιν εἶναι καὶ μελέτην, ἀκροάσει δὲ καὶ τοὺς ὁπωσοῦν χρωμένους ὠφελεῖσθαι. καίτοι τοῖς μὲν σφαιρίζουσιν ἅμα τοῦ βαλεῖν καὶ τοῦ λαβεῖν τὴν σφαῖραν ἡ μάθησις· ἐν δὲ τῇ τοῦ λόγου χρείᾳ τὸ δέξασθαι καλῶς τοῦ προέσθαι πρότερόν ἐστιν, ὥσπερ τοῦ τεκεῖν τὸ συλλαβεῖν καὶ κατασχεῖν τι τῶν γονίμων. ταῖς μὲν οὖν ὄρνισι τὰς ὑπηνεμίους λοχείας καὶ ὠδῖνας ἀτελῶν τινων καὶ ἀψύχων ὑπολειμμάτων ὀχείας[1] λέγουσιν εἶναι· τῶν δ' ἀκούειν μὴ δυναμένων νέων μηδ'
F ὠφελεῖσθαι δι' ἀκοῆς ἐθισθέντων ὑπηνέμιος ὄντως ὁ λόγος ἐκπίπτων

ἀκλειὴς ἀίδηλος ὑπαὶ νεφέεσσι κεδάσθη.

τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἀγγεῖα πρὸς τὴν ὑποδοχὴν τῶν ἐγχεομένων ἐπικλίνουσι καὶ συνεπιστρέφουσιν, ἵν' ἔγχυσις ἀληθῶς, μὴ ἔκχυσις γένηται, αὐτοὺς δὲ τῷ λέγοντι παρέχειν καὶ συναρμόττειν τῇ προσοχῇ τὴν ἀκρόα-

[1] ὀχείας F.C.B. from Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* vi. 2: ἀρχάς.

[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Laws*, 808 D.
[b] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Hist. Animal.* vi. 2.
[c] Author unknown; possibly Empedocles.

continue unconstrained along their natural channels, and if they be not either removed or diverted another way through the agency of goodly discourse, thus putting the natural endowments in a fit condition, there is not one of the wild beasts but would be found more civilized than man.[a]

3. Therefore, since listening to lectures is attended by great benefit, but by no less danger, to the young, I think it is a good thing to discuss the matter continually both with oneself and with another person. The reason for so doing is because we observe that a poor use is made of this by the great majority of persons, who practise speaking before they have acquired the habit of listening. They think that there must be study and practice in discourse, but as for hearing, benefit will come however it be used. It is true that, in the case of persons playing ball, learning to throw and learning to catch take place at the same time ; but in the use of discourse its proper reception comes before its delivery, just as conception and pregnancy come before parturition. It is said that when fowls labour and bring forth wind-eggs,[b] these result from some imperfect and infertile residue from conception ; and if young men have not the power to listen, or the habit of getting some profit through listening, the speech brought forth by them is windy indeed, and

> Void of repute and unheeded beneath the clouds it is scattered.[c]

For although they can incline and turn vessels properly to receive any liquid which is being poured into them, in order that there may actually be a filling and not a spilling, they never learn to apply themselves to a speaker and to accord attention to

σιν, ὡς μηδὲν ἐκφύγῃ[1] τῶν χρησίμως λεγομένων,
οὐ μανθάνουσιν, ἀλλ' ὃ πάντων καταγελαστότατόν
39 ἐστιν, ἂν μέν τινι προστύχωσι διηγουμένῳ δεῖπνον
ἢ πομπὴν ἢ ὄνειρον ἢ λοιδορίαν γεγενημένην
αὐτῷ πρὸς ἄλλον, ἀκροῶνται σιωπῇ καὶ προσλιπα-
ροῦσιν· ἂν δέ τις αὐτοὺς ἐπισπασάμενος διδάσκῃ
τι τῶν χρησίμων ἢ παραινῇ τῶν δεόντων ἢ νουθετῇ
πλημμελοῦντας ἢ καταπραΰνῃ χαλεπαίνοντας, οὐχ
ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλ' ἂν μὲν δύνωνται, περιγενέσθαι
φιλοτιμούμενοι διαμάχονται πρὸς τὸν λόγον· εἰ δὲ
μή, φεύγοντες ἀπίασι πρὸς ἑτέρους λόγους καὶ
φλυάρους, ὡς ἀγγεῖα φαῦλα καὶ σαθρὰ τὰ ὦτα
πάντων μᾶλλον ἢ τῶν ἀναγκαίων ἐμπιπλάντες.
B τοὺς μὲν οὖν ἵππους οἱ καλῶς τρέφοντες εὐστόμους
τῷ χαλινῷ, τοὺς δὲ παῖδας εὐηκόους τῷ λόγῳ
παρέχουσι, πολλὰ μὲν ἀκούειν μὴ πολλὰ δὲ λέγειν
διδασκομένους. καὶ γὰρ τὸν Ἐπαμεινώνδαν ὁ
Σπίνθαρος ἐπαινῶν ἔφη μήτε πλείονα γιγνώσκοντι
μήτ' ἐλάττονα φθεγγομένῳ ῥᾳδίως ἐντυχεῖν ἑτέρῳ.
καὶ τὴν φύσιν ἡμῶν ἑκάστῳ λέγουσι δύο μὲν ὦτα
δοῦναι, μίαν δὲ γλῶτταν, ὡς ἐλάττονα λέγειν ἢ
ἀκούειν ὀφείλοντι.

4. Πανταχοῦ μὲν οὖν τῷ νέῳ κόσμος ἀσφαλής
ἐστιν ἡ σιωπή, μάλιστα δ' ὅταν ἀκούων ἑτέρου μὴ
C συνταράττηται μηδ' ἐξυλακτῇ πρὸς ἕκαστον, ἀλλὰ
κἂν ὁ λόγος ᾖ μὴ λίαν ἀρεστός, ἀνέχηται καὶ περι-
μένῃ παύσασθαι τὸν διαλεγόμενον, καὶ παυσαμένου
μὴ εὐθέως ἐπιβάλλῃ τὴν ἀντίρρησιν, ἀλλ' ὡς
Αἰσχίνης φησί, διαλείπῃ χρόνον, εἴτε προσθεῖναί

[1] ἐκφύγῃ or perhaps ἐκφυγεῖν : ἐκφύγοι most MSS.

[a] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 592 F.

his lecture so that none of its good points may escape them. But here is the most ridiculous thing in the world: if they chance upon somebody who is giving an account of a dinner or a procession or a dream or a wordy brawl which he has had with another man, they listen in silence, and importune him to continue; yet if anybody draws them to one side and tries to impart something useful, or to advise them of some duty, or to admonish them when in the wrong, or to mollify them when incensed, they have no patience with him; but, eager to get the better of him if they can, they fight against what he says, or else they beat a hasty retreat in search of other foolish talk, filling their ears like worthless and rotten vessels with anything rather than the things they need. As skilful horse-trainers give us horses with a good mouth for the bit, so too skilful educators give us children with a good ear for speech, by teaching them to hear much and speak little. Indeed, Spintharus [a] declared in commendation of Epameinondas that it was not easy to find a man who knew more and spoke less. And it is a common saying that nature has given to each of us two ears and one tongue, because we ought to do less talking than listening.

4. In all cases, then, silence is a safe adornment for the young man, and especially so, when in listening to another he does not get excited or bawl out every minute, but even if the remarks be none too agreeable, puts up with them, and waits for the speaker to pause, and, when the pause comes, does not at once interpose his objection, but, as Aeschines puts [b] it, allows an interval to elapse, in case the

[b] There is something like this in Aeschines, *De falsa legatione* § 7, but more likely the reference is to a lost oration.

(39) τι βούλοιτο τοῖς λελεγμένοις ὁ εἰρηκώς, εἴτε μεταθέσθαι καὶ ἀφελεῖν. οἱ δ' εὐθὺς ἀντικόπτοντες, οὔτ' ἀκούοντες οὔτ' ἀκουόμενοι λέγοντες δὲ πρὸς λέγοντας, ἀσχημονοῦσιν· ὁ δ' ἐγκρατῶς καὶ μετ' αἰδοῦς ἀκούειν ἐθισθεὶς τὸν μὲν ὠφέλιμον λόγον ἐδέξατο καὶ κατέσχε, τὸν δ' ἄχρηστον ἢ ψευδῆ
D μᾶλλον διεῖδε καὶ κατεφώρασε, φιλαλήθης φανείς, οὐ φιλόνεικος οὐδὲ προπετὴς καὶ δύσερις. ὅθεν οὐ κακῶς ἔνιοι λέγουσιν ὅτι δεῖ τῶν νέων μᾶλλον ἐκπνευματοῦν τὸ οἴημα καὶ τὸν τῦφον ἢ τῶν ἀσκῶν τὸν ἀέρα τοὺς ἐγχέαι τι βουλομένους χρήσιμον· εἰ δὲ μή, γέμοντες ὄγκου καὶ φυσήματος οὐ προσδέχονται.

5. Φθόνος τοίνυν μετὰ βασκανίας καὶ δυσμενείας οὐδενὶ μὲν ἔργῳ παρὼν ἀγαθόν, ἀλλὰ πᾶσιν ἐμπόδιος τοῖς καλοῖς, κάκιστος δ' ἀκροωμένῳ πάρεδρος καὶ σύμβουλος, ἀνιαρὰ καὶ ἀηδῆ καὶ δυσπρόσδεκτα ποιῶν τὰ ὠφέλιμα διὰ τὸ πᾶσι μᾶλλον ἥδεσθαι τοὺς
E φθονοῦντας ἢ τοῖς εὖ λεγομένοις. καίτοι πλοῦτος μὲν ὄντινα δάκνει καὶ δόξα καὶ κάλλος, ἑτέροις ὑπάρχοντα, φθονερός ἐστι μόνον· ἄχθεται γὰρ ἄλλων εὐτυχούντων· ὁ δὲ λόγῳ καλῶς λεγομένῳ δυσχεραίνων ὑπὸ τῶν ἰδίων ἀγαθῶν ἀνιᾶται. ὡς γὰρ τὸ φῶς τῶν βλεπόντων, καὶ ὁ λόγος τῶν ἀκουόντων ἀγαθόν ἐστιν, ἂν βούλωνται δέχεσθαι.

Τὸν μὲν οὖν ἐφ' ἑτέροις φθόνον ἄλλαι τινὲς ἀπαίδευτοι καὶ κακαὶ διαθέσεις ἐμποιοῦσιν, ὁ δὲ πρὸς

speaker may desire to add something to what he has said, or to alter or unsay anything. But those who instantly interrupt with contradictions, neither hearing nor being heard, but talking while others talk, behave in an unseemly manner; whereas the man who has the habit of listening with restraint and respect, takes in and masters a useful discourse, and more readily sees through and detects a useless or false one, showing himself thus to be a lover of truth and not a lover of disputation, nor froward and contentious. Wherefore it is sometimes said not unaptly that it is even more necessary to take the wind of self-opinion and conceit out of the young, than to deflate wine-skins, if you wish to fill them with something useful; otherwise, being full of bombast and inflation, they have no room to receive it.

5. Now the presence of envy, attended by malice and hostility, is not a good thing for any undertaking, but it stands in the way of all that is honourable; and it is the very worst associate and counsellor for one that would listen to a lecture, inasmuch as it makes what is profitable to be vexatious, unpleasing, and unacceptable, because envious persons are pleased with anything rather than with the good points of a discourse. Now the man that is stung by the wealth, or repute, or beauty possessed by another, is merely envious; for he is depressed by the good fortune of others; but one who feels discontentment at an excellent discourse is vexed by what is for his own good. For just as light is a good thing for those who can see, so is discourse for those who can hear, if they be willing to receive it.

Now while envy in other matters is engendered by certain untrained and evil dispositions of a man,

τοὺς λέγοντας ἐκ φιλοδοξίας ἀκαίρου καὶ φιλοτιμίας ἀδίκου γεννώμενος οὐδὲ προσέχειν ἐᾷ τοῖς λεγο-
F μένοις τὸν οὕτω διακείμενον, ἀλλὰ θορυβεῖ καὶ περισπᾷ τὴν διάνοιαν, ἅμα μὲν τὴν ἑαυτῆς ἕξιν ἐπισκοποῦσαν εἰ λείπεται τῆς τοῦ λέγοντος, ἅμα δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐπιβλέπουσαν εἰ ἄγανται καὶ θαυμάζουσιν, ἐκπληττομένην τε ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπαίνων καὶ ἀγριαίνουσαν πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας ἂν ἀποδέχωνται τὸν λέγοντα, τῶν δὲ λόγων τοὺς μὲν εἰρημένους ἐῶσαν καὶ προϊεμένην, ὅτι λυποῦσι μνημονευόμενοι, πρὸς δὲ τοὺς λείποντας ταραττομένην καὶ τρέμουσαν μὴ τῶν εἰρημένων βελτίονες γένωνται, σπεύδουσαν δὲ τάχιστα παύσασθαι τοὺς λέγοντας ὅταν κάλ-
40 λιστα λέγωσι, λυθείσης δὲ τῆς ἀκροάσεως πρὸς οὐδενὶ τῶν εἰρημένων οὖσαν ἀλλὰ τὰς φωνὰς καὶ διαθέσεις τῶν παρόντων ἐπιψηφίζουσαν, καὶ τοὺς μὲν ἐπαινοῦντας ὥσπερ ἐμμανῆ φεύγουσαν καὶ ἀποπηδῶσαν, προστρέχουσαν δὲ καὶ συναγελαζομένην τοῖς ψέγουσι τὰ εἰρημένα καὶ διαστρέφουσιν· ἂν δὲ μηδὲν ᾖ διαστρέψαι, παραβάλλουσαν ἑτέρους τινὰς ὡς ἄμεινον εἰρηκότας εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ δυνατώτερον, ἕως διαφθείρασα καὶ λυμηναμένη τὴν ἀκρόασιν ἀχρεῖον ἑαυτῇ καὶ ἀνόνητον ἀπεργάσηται.

B 6. Διὸ δεῖ τῇ φιλησκοΐᾳ πρὸς τὴν φιλοδοξίαν σπεισάμενον ἀκροᾶσθαι τοῦ λέγοντος ἵλεων καὶ πρᾶον, ὥσπερ ἐφ' ἑστίασιν ἱερὰν καὶ θυσίας ἀπαρχὴν παρειληλυθότα μὲν ἐν[1] οἷς ἐπιτυγχάνει

[1] ἐν added by Reiske.

the envy that is directed against a speaker is the offspring of an unseasonable desire for repute and a dishonest ambition, and it does not suffer the person in such a mood even to pay attention to what is being said, but it confuses and distracts his mind which at one moment is engaged in reviewing its own condition to see whether it be inferior to that of the speaker, then anon it turns to dwell on the other persons present to see whether they are showing any pleasure or admiration; it is disconcerted by their approval, and irritated at the audience if they find the speaker acceptable; disregards and dismisses the part of the discourse already delivered because the memory of it is painful, but for what still remains trembles with anxiety lest that part prove better than the part already delivered; eager that the speakers may most quickly have done when they are speaking most excellently; and when the lecture is over, it does not ponder upon any point of the discussion, but proceeds to count as votes the comments and attitudes of those present; if any approve, fleeing and recoiling from these as though frantic; if any disapprove or distort the things said, hastening to join their company; and if it be impossible to distort, then it falls to making comparisons with others who could have spoken better and more forcibly to the same purport—until by spoiling and maltreating the lecture it has succeeded in making the whole thing useless and unprofitable to itself.

6. Therefore a man must let his desire to hear make truce with his desire for repute, and listen cheerfully and affably as though he were a guest at some dinner or ceremonial banquet, commending the speaker's ability in those parts wherein he

(40) τὴν δύναμιν, ἀγαπῶντα δὲ τὴν προθυμίαν αὐτὴν τοῦ φέροντος εἰς μέσον ἃ γιγνώσκει καὶ πείθοντος ἑτέρους δι' ὧν αὐτὸς πέπεισται. τοῖς μὲν οὖν κατορθουμένοις ἐπιλογιστέον ὡς οὐκ ἀπὸ τύχης οὐδ' αὐτομάτως ἀλλ' ἐπιμελείᾳ καὶ πόνῳ καὶ μαθήσει κατορθοῦνται, καὶ μιμητέον γε ταῦτα θαυμάζοντάς γε δὴ καὶ ζηλοῦντας· τοῖς δ' ἁμαρτανομένοις ἐφιστάναι χρὴ τὴν διάνοιαν, ὑφ' ὧν αἰτιῶν καὶ ὅθεν
C ἡ παρατροπὴ γέγονεν. ὡς γὰρ ὁ Ξενοφῶν φησι τοὺς οἰκονομικοὺς καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν φίλων ὀνίνασθαι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐχθρῶν, οὕτω τοὺς ἐγρηγορότας καὶ προσέχοντας οὐ μόνον κατορθοῦντες ἀλλὰ καὶ διαμαρτάνοντες ὠφελοῦσιν οἱ λέγοντες· καὶ γὰρ διανοήματος εὐτέλεια καὶ ῥήματος κενότης καὶ σχῆμα φορτικὸν καὶ πτόησις μετὰ χαρᾶς ἀπειροκάλου πρὸς ἔπαινον καὶ ὅσα τοιαῦτα μᾶλλον ἀκροωμένοις ἐφ' ἑτέρων ἢ λέγουσιν ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν καταφαίνεται. διὸ δεῖ μεταφέρειν τὴν εὔθυναν ἐφ' ἑαυτοὺς ἀπὸ τοῦ λέγοντος, ἀνασκοποῦντας εἴ τι τοιοῦτο λανθάνομεν
D ἁμαρτάνοντες. ῥᾷστον γάρ ἐστι τῶν ὄντων τὸ μέμψασθαι τὸν πλησίον, ἀχρήστως τε καὶ κενῶς γιγνόμενον, ἂν μὴ πρός τινα διόρθωσιν ἢ φυλακὴν ἀναφέρηται τῶν ὁμοίων. καὶ τὸ τοῦ Πλάτωνος οὐκ ὀκνητέον ἀεὶ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐπὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων ἀναφθέγγεσθαι, "μή[1] που ἄρ' ἐγὼ τοιοῦτος;" ὡς γὰρ ἐν τοῖς ὄμμασι τῶν πλησίον ἐλλάμποντα τὰ ἑαυτῶν ὁρῶμεν, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων δεῖ τοὺς ἑαυτῶν ἐνεικονίζεσθαι τοῖς ἑτέρων, ἵνα μήτ' ἄγαν

[1] μή as usually quoted in the passages referred to on the opposite page: ἦ.

[a] Xenophon, *Oeconomicus*, i. 15.

achieves a success, and favourably accepting the goodwill, if nothing else, of the speaker who propounds his opinions and tries to persuade others by the reasons which have persuaded himself. Where he is successful we must reflect that the success is not due to chance or accident, but to care, diligence, and study, and herein we should try to imitate him in a spirit of admiration and emulation ; but where there are mistakes, we should direct our intelligence to these, to determine the reasons and origin of the error. For as Xenophon [a] asserts that good householders derive benefit both from their friends and from their enemies, so in the same way do speakers, not only when they succeed, but also when they fail, render a service to hearers who are alert and attentive. For poverty of thought, emptiness of phrase, an offensive bearing, fluttering excitement combined with a vulgar delight at commendation, and the like, are more apparent to us in others when we are listening than in ourselves when we are speakers. Wherefore we ought to transfer our scrutiny from the speaker to ourselves, and examine whether we unconsciously commit such mistakes. For it is the easiest thing in the world to find fault with one's neighbour, and also a useless and inane proceeding unless it be applied in some way to correcting or avoiding similar faults. And everyone ought to be ready ever to repeat to himself, as he observes the faults of others, the utterance of Plato,[b] " Am I not possibly like them ? " For as we see our own eyes brightly reflected in the eyes of those near us, so we must get a picture of our own discourses in the discourses of others, that we may not too rashly

[b] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 88 E, 129 D, and 463 E.

θρασέως καταφρονῶμεν ἄλλων, αὑτοῖς τε προσ-
E ἔχωμεν ἐν τῷ λέγειν ἐπιμελέστερον. χρήσιμον δὲ
πρὸς τοῦτο καὶ τὸ τῆς παραβολῆς, ὅταν γενόμενοι
καθ' αὑτοὺς ἀπὸ τῆς ἀκροάσεως καὶ λαβόντες τι
τῶν μὴ καλῶς ἢ μὴ ἱκανῶς εἰρῆσθαι δοκούντων
ἐπιχειρῶμεν εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ προάγωμεν αὑτοὺς τὰ
μὲν ὥσπερ ἀναπληροῦν, τὰ δ' ἐπανορθοῦσθαι, τὰ δ'
ἑτέρως φράζειν, τὰ δ' ὅλως ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εἰσφέρειν
πειρώμενοι πρὸς τὴν ὑπόθεσιν. ὃ καὶ Πλάτων
ἐποίησε πρὸς τὸν Λυσίου λόγον. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀντ-
ειπεῖν οὐ χαλεπὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ πάνυ ῥᾴδιον εἰρημένῳ
λόγῳ· τὸ δ' ἕτερον ἀνταναστῆσαι βελτίονα παντά-
πασιν ἐργῶδες. ὥσπερ ὁ Λακεδαιμόνιος ἀκούσας
ὅτι Φίλιππος Ὄλυνθον κατέσκαψεν "ἀλλ' οὐκ
ἀναστῆσαί γε τοιαύτην" ἔφη "πόλιν ἐκεῖνος ἂν
F δυνηθείη." ὅταν οὖν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι πρὸς τὴν
τοιαύτην ὑπόθεσιν μὴ πολὺ φαινώμεθα τῶν εἰρη-
κότων διαφέροντες, πολὺ τοῦ καταφρονεῖν ἀφαιροῦ-
μεν, καὶ τάχιστα κολούεται τὸ αὔθαδες ἡμῶν καὶ
φίλαυτον ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις ἐλεγχόμενον ἀντιπαρα-
βολαῖς.

7. Τῷ τοίνυν καταφρονεῖν τὸ θαυμάζειν ἀντι-
κείμενον εὐγνωμονεστέρας μέν ἐστι δήπου καὶ ἡμε-
ρωτέρας φύσεως, δεῖταί γε μὴν οὐδ' αὐτὸ μικρᾶς
εὐλαβείας, τάχα δὲ καὶ μείζονος· οἱ μὲν γὰρ κατα-
41 φρονητικοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς ἧττον ὠφελοῦνται ὑπὸ τῶν
λεγόντων, οἱ δὲ θαυμαστικοὶ καὶ ἄκακοι μᾶλλον
βλάπτονται, καὶ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον οὐκ ἐλέγχουσιν
εἰπόντα "βλὰξ ἄνθρωπος ἐπὶ παντὶ λόγῳ ἐπτοῆσθαι[1]

[1] ἐπτοῆσθαι Xylander, *cf.* 28 D: παιδεύεσθαι.

[a] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 237 B ff.

disdain others, and may give more careful attention to ourselves in the matter of speaking. To this end the process of comparison is useful, if, when we have come away from the lecture and are by ourselves, we take some topic that seems to have been ineffectually or inadequately treated, and try our hand at the same thing, and address ourselves to supplying a deficiency here, or amending there, to saying the same thing in other words, or attempting to treat the subject in a wholly new way ; and this is what Plato [a] actually did for the discourse of Lysias. For to offer objections against a discourse which has been delivered is not difficult, but very easy ; but to set up a better against it is a very laborious task. As the Spartan [b] said, on hearing that Philip had razed the city of Olynthus to the ground, " Yes, but even he could not possibly set up such another." Whenever, therefore, in discoursing thus upon a given subject, we find that we do not much excel those who have already spoken, we abate much of our disdain, and our presumption and self-esteem are very speedily cut short by being put to the test in such comparisons.

7. Now admiration, which is the antithesis of disdain, obviously betokens a kindlier and gentler nature, but even this requires certainly no little caution, perhaps even more. For while it is true that disdainful and self-confident persons are less apt to get benefit from the speakers, yet the enthusiastic and ingenuous are more apt to get harm ; and they cause no one to question the saying of Heracleitus,[c] that " A fool is wont to be agog at

[b] Agesipolis ; *cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 215 B and 458 B.
[c] *Cf.* the note on 28 D *supra*.

(41) φιλεῖ." δεῖ δὲ τὸν μὲν ἔπαινον ἀφελῶς τοῖς λέγουσι τὴν δὲ πίστιν εὐλαβῶς προΐεσθαι τοῖς λόγοις, καὶ τῆς μὲν λέξεως καὶ προφορᾶς τῶν ἀγωνιζομένων εὐμενῆ καὶ ἁπλοῦν εἶναι θεατήν, τῆς δὲ χρείας καὶ τῆς ἀληθείας τῶν λεγομένων ἀκριβῆ καὶ πικρὸν
B ἐξεταστήν, ἵν' οἱ μὲν λέγοντες μὴ μισῶσιν, οἱ δὲ λόγοι μὴ βλάπτωσιν· ὡς πολλὰ ψευδῆ καὶ πονηρὰ δόγματα λανθάνομεν εὐνοίᾳ καὶ πίστει τῇ πρὸς τοὺς λέγοντας ἐνδεχόμενοι. οἱ μὲν οὖν Λακεδαιμονίων ἄρχοντες ἀνδρὸς οὐκ εὖ βεβιωκότος γνώμην δοκιμάσαντες ἑτέρῳ προσέταξαν εἰπεῖν εὐδοκιμοῦντι περὶ τὸν βίον καὶ τὸ ἦθος, ὀρθῶς πάνυ καὶ πολιτικῶς ἐθίζοντες τὸν δῆμον ὑπὸ τοῦ τρόπου μᾶλλον ἢ τοῦ λόγου τῶν συμβουλευόντων ἄγεσθαι. τοὺς δ' ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγους ἀφαιροῦντα χρὴ τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος δόξαν αὐτοὺς ἐφ' ἑαυτῶν ἐξετάζειν.
ὡς γὰρ πολέμου, καὶ ἀκροάσεως πολλὰ τὰ κενά[1]
ἐστι. καὶ γὰρ πολιὰ τοῦ λέγοντος καὶ πλάσμα καὶ
C ὀφρῦς καὶ περιαυτολογία, μάλιστα δ' αἱ κραυγαὶ καὶ οἱ θόρυβοι καὶ τὰ πηδήματα τῶν παρόντων συνεκπλήττει τὸν ἄπειρον ἀκροατὴν καὶ νέον ὥσπερ ὑπὸ ῥεύματος παραφερόμενον. ἔχει δέ τι καὶ ἡ λέξις ἀπατηλόν, ὅταν ἡδεῖα καὶ πολλὴ καὶ μετ' ὄγκου τινὸς καὶ κατασκευῆς ἐπιφέρηται τοῖς πράγμασιν. ὡς γὰρ τῶν ὑπ' αὐλοῖς ᾀδόντων αἱ πολλαὶ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ἁμαρτίαι διαφεύγουσιν, οὕτω περιττὴ καὶ σοβαρὰ λέξις ἀντιλάμπει τῷ ἀκροατῇ πρὸς τὸ
D δηλούμενον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Μελάνθιος, ὡς ἔοικε, περὶ

[1] Hatzidakis would read καινά, "novelties, surprises," a more familiar phrase.

[a] Again referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 233 B and 801 B.

every word that's said." In praising a speaker we must be generous, but in believing his words cautious; as touching the style and the delivery of the performers, we should observe with a kindly and simple mind; but as for the utility and the truth of what they say, we must play the keen and heartless critics, that the speakers may feel no hatred, yet their words may do no harm. For we unwittingly receive into our minds a great many false and vicious doctrines by feeling goodwill and confidence towards the speakers. Upon a time the Spartan officials, after approving the proposal made by a man whose life had not been good, appointed another man of good repute in his life and character to present it, thus quite rightly and for the good of the State trying to accustom the people to being influenced more by the behaviour than by the speech of their counsellors.[a] But in a philosophic discussion we must set aside the repute of the speaker, and examine what he says quite apart. For as in war so also in lectures there is plenty of empty show. For example, a speaker's grey hair, his formality, his serious brow, his self-assertion, and above all the clamour and shouting of the audience as he brings them to their feet, combine to disconcert the young and inexperienced listener, who is, as it were, swept away by the current. The speaker's style also has a spice of deception when it is pleasing and copious, and is applied to the subject with dignity and artfulness. For as most of the mistakes of persons singing to the flute escape the audience, so an exuberant and impressive style flashed upon the listener blinds him to the matter set forth. It seems to have been Melanthius, who being asked about Diogenes'

(41) τῆς Διογένους τραγῳδίας ἐρωτηθεὶς οὐκ ἔφη κατιδεῖν αὐτὴν ὑπὸ τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐπιπροσθουμένην· αἱ δὲ τῶν πολλῶν διαλέξεις καὶ μελέται σοφιστῶν οὐ μόνον τοῖς ὀνόμασι παραπετάσμασι χρῶνται τῶν διανοημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν φωνὴν ἐμμελείαις τισὶ καὶ μαλακότησι καὶ παρισώσεσιν ἐφηδύνοντες ἐκβακχεύουσι καὶ παραφέρουσι τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, κενὴν ἡδονὴν διδόντες καὶ κενοτέραν δόξαν ἀντιλαμβάνοντες. ὥστ' αὐτοῖς συμβαίνει τὸ ὑπὸ Διονυσίου ῥηθέν. ἐκεῖνος γάρ, ὡς ἔοικεν, εὐδοκιμοῦντι
E κιθαρῳδῷ παρὰ τὴν θέαν ἐπαγγειλάμενος δωρεάς τινας μεγάλας ὕστερον οὐδὲν ἔδωκεν ὡς ἀποδεδωκὼς τὴν χάριν· "ὅσον γάρ," ἔφη, "χρόνον εὔφραινες ἄδων, τοσοῦτον ἔχαιρες ἐλπίζων." τοῦτον δὲ τὸν ἔρανον αἱ τοιαῦται πληροῦσιν ἀκροάσεις τοῖς λέγουσι· θαυμάζονται γὰρ ἐφ' ὅσον τέρπουσιν, εἶθ' ἅμα τῆς ἀκοῆς ἐξερρύη τὸ ἡδὺ κἀκείνους προλέλοιπεν ἡ δόξα, καὶ μάτην τοῖς μὲν ὁ χρόνος τοῖς δὲ καὶ ὁ βίος ἀνάλωται.

8. Διὸ δεῖ τὸ πολὺ καὶ κενὸν ἀφαιροῦντα τῆς
F λέξεως αὐτὸν διώκειν τὸν καρπὸν καὶ μιμεῖσθαι μὴ τὰς στεφανηπλόκους[1] ἀλλὰ τὰς μελίττας. αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐπιοῦσαι[2] τὰ ἀνθηρὰ καὶ εὐώδη τῶν φύλλων συνείρουσι καὶ διαπλέκουσιν ἡδὺ μὲν ἐφήμερον δὲ καὶ ἄκαρπον ἔργον· αἱ δὲ πολλάκις ἴων καὶ ῥόδων καὶ ὑακίνθων διαπετόμεναι λειμῶνας ἐπὶ τὸν τραχύτατον καὶ δριμύτατον θύμον καταίρουσι καὶ τούτῳ προσκάθηνται

[1] στεφανηπλόκους Hercher: στεφηπλόκους.
[2] ἐπιλέγουσαι is perhaps the right reading: ἐπινοοῦσαι Wyttenbach.

[a] Again referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 333 F.

tragedy, said he could not get a sight of it, there were so many words in the way ; and the discussions and exercises of most popular lecturers not only use words to conceal their thoughts, but they so sweeten their voice by certain harmonious modulations and softenings and rhythmic cadences, as to ravish away and transport their hearers. It is an empty pleasure they give, and an even more empty renown they acquire, so that the remark of Dionysius [a] fits their case exactly. For he, as it appears, at some performance promised to a harp-player of great repute certain large gifts, but afterwards gave him nothing, on the ground that he had already discharged his obligation. " For," said he, " all the time that you were giving pleasure to us with your singing, you were enjoying the pleasure of your hopes." And this is just the meed that such lectures have for those who deliver them ; for the speakers are admired in as far as they are entertaining, and afterwards, no sooner has the pleasure of listening passed away, than their repute deserts them, and so the time of their hearers and the life of the speakers is simply wasted.

8. One ought therefore to strip off the superfluity and inanity from the style, and to seek after the fruit itself, imitating not women that make garlands, but the bees. For those women, culling flower-clusters and sweet-scented leaves, intertwine and plait them, and produce something which is pleasant enough, but short-lived and fruitless ; whereas the bees in their flight frequently pass through meadows of violets, roses, and hyacinths, and come to rest upon the exceeding rough and pungent thyme, and on this they settle close,

ξανθὸν μέλι μηδόμεναι,

καὶ λαβοῦσαί τι τῶν χρησίμων ἀποπέτονται πρὸς τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔργον. οὕτως οὖν δεῖ τὸν φιλότεχνον καὶ καθαρὸν ἀκροατὴν τὰ μὲν ἀνθηρὰ καὶ τρυφερὰ τῶν
42 ὀνομάτων καὶ τῶν πραγμάτων τὰ δραματικὰ καὶ πανηγυρικὰ κηφήνων βοτάνην σοφιστιώντων ἡγούμενον ἐᾶν, αὐτὸν δὲ τῇ προσοχῇ καταδυόμενον εἰς τὸν νοῦν τοῦ λόγου καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν τοῦ λέγοντος ἕλκειν ἀπ' αὐτῆς τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ ὠφέλιμον, μεμνημένον ὡς οὐκ εἰς θέατρον οὐδ' ᾠδεῖον ἀλλ' εἰς σχολὴν καὶ διδασκαλεῖον ἀφῖκται, τῷ λόγῳ τὸν βίον ἐπανορθωσόμενος. ὅθεν δὴ καὶ ποιητέον ἐπίσκεψιν καὶ κρίσιν τῆς ἀκροάσεως ἐξ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῆς περὶ αὐτὸν διαθέσεως, ἀναλογιζόμενον εἴ τι τῶν παθῶν γέγονε μαλακώτερον, εἴ τι τῶν ἀνιαρῶν κουφότερον,
B εἰ θάρσος εἰ φρόνημα βέβαιον, εἰ πρὸς ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἐνθουσιασμός. οὐ γὰρ ἐκ κουρείου μὲν ἀναστάντα δεῖ τῷ κατόπτρῳ παραστῆναι καὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς ἅψασθαι, τὴν περικοπὴν τῶν τριχῶν ἐπισκοποῦντα καὶ τῆς κουρᾶς τὴν διαφοράν, ἐκ δὲ ἀκροάσεως ἀπιόντα καὶ σχολῆς οὐκ εὐθὺς ἀφορᾶν χρὴ πρὸς ἑαυτόν, καταμανθάνοντα τὴν ψυχὴν εἴ τι τῶν ὀχληρῶν ἀποτεθειμένη καὶ περιττῶν ἐλαφροτέρα γέγονε καὶ ἡδίων. "οὔτε γὰρ βαλανείου," φησὶν ὁ Ἀρίστων, "οὔτε λόγου μὴ καθαίροντος ὄφελός ἐστιν."

C 9. Ἡδέσθω μὲν οὖν ὑπὸ λόγων ὠφελούμενος ὁ

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[a] From Simonides, as Plutarch tells us, *Moralia*, 79 c (*cf.* also 494 c). *Cf.* Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. p. 411.

Making the yellow honey their care,[a]

and when they have got something of use, they fly away home to their own special work. In such wise, then, the sincere and single-minded student ought to regard flowery and dainty language and theatrical and spectacular subject matter as the pasturage of drones who practise the popular lecture; these he should leave alone and use all diligence to sound the deep meaning of the words and the intention of the speaker, drawing from it what is useful and profitable, and remembering that he has not come to a theatre or music-hall, but to a school and class-room with the purpose of amending his life by what is there said. Hence it follows that in making his examination and forming his judgement of the lecture he should begin with himself and his own state of mind, endeavouring to estimate whether any one of his emotions has become less intense, whether any one of his troubles weighs less heavily upon him, whether his confidence and his high purpose have become firmly rooted, whether he has acquired enthusiasm for virtue and goodness. As a matter of course, when he rises to leave the barber's shop, he stands by the mirror and feels his head, examining the cut of his hair and the difference made by its trimming; so on his way home from a lecture or an academic exercise, it would be a shame not to direct his gaze forthwith upon himself and to note carefully his own spirit, whether it has put from it any of its encumbrances and superfluities, and has become lighter and more cheerful. "For," as Ariston says, "neither a bath nor a discourse is of any use unless it removes impurity."

9. Let the young man, then, find pleasure when

(42) νέος· οὐ δεῖ δὲ τὸ ἡδὺ τῆς ἀκροάσεως ποιεῖσθαι τέλος, οὐδ' οἴεσθαι δεῖν ἐκ σχολῆς ἀπιέναι φιλοσόφου μινυρίζοντα καὶ γεγανωμένον, οὐδὲ ζητεῖν μυρίζεσθαι δεόμενον ἐμβροχῆς καὶ καταπλάσματος, ἀλλὰ χάριν ἔχειν, ἄν τις ὥσπερ καπνῷ σμῆνος λόγῳ δριμεῖ τὴν διάνοιαν ἀχλύος πολλῆς καὶ ἀμβλύτητος γέμουσαν ἐκκαθήρῃ. καὶ γὰρ εἰ τοῖς λέγουσι προσήκει μὴ παντάπασιν ἡδονὴν ἐχούσης καὶ πιθανότητα λέξεως παραμελεῖν, ἐλάχιστα τούτου φροντιστέον τῷ νέῳ, τό γε πρῶτον. ὕστερον δέ
D που, καθάπερ οἱ πίνοντες, ὅταν παύσωνται διψῶντες, τότε τὰ τορεύματα τῶν ἐκπωμάτων ὑποθεωροῦσι καὶ στρέφουσιν, οὕτως ἐμπλησθέντι δογμάτων καὶ ἀναπνεύσαντι δοτέον τὴν λέξιν εἴ τι κομψὸν ἔχει καὶ περιττὸν ἐπισκοπεῖν. ὁ δ' εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς μὴ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐμφυόμενος ἀλλὰ τὴν λέξιν Ἀττικὴν ἀξιῶν εἶναι καὶ ἰσχνὴν ὅμοιός ἐστι μὴ βουλομένῳ πιεῖν ἀντίδοτον, ἂν μὴ τὸ ἀγγεῖον ἐκ τῆς Ἀττικῆς κωλιάδος ᾖ κεκεραμευμένον, μηδ' ἱμάτιον περιβαλέσθαι χειμῶνος, εἰ μὴ προβάτων Ἀττικῶν εἴη τὸ ἔριον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τρίβωνι Λυσιακοῦ λόγου λεπτῷ καὶ ψιλῷ καθήμενος
E ἄπρακτος καὶ ἀκίνητος. ταῦτα γὰρ τὰ νοσήματα πολλὴν μὲν ἐρημίαν νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν ἀγαθῶν, πολλὴν δὲ τερθρείαν καὶ στωμυλίαν ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς πεποίηκε, τῶν μειρακίων οὔτε βίον οὔτε πρᾶξιν οὔτε πολιτείαν φιλοσόφου παραφυλαττόντων ἀνδρός,

he finds profit from a discourse ; but he should not hold that the pleasure derived from the lecture is an end in itself, nor would I have him hum a merry note or show a jovial face as he leaves the philosopher's school, any more than he should seek to be sprinkled with perfume when he needs a fomentation and a hot poultice ; but he should feel grateful if by pungent discourse someone has cleansed his mind teeming with fogginess and dullness, as a beehive is cleared by smoke. For even though it is quite right for a speaker not to be altogether neglectful of pleasantness and persuasion in his style, yet the young man should make least concern of this, at any rate at first. Afterwards no doubt he may have an eye to that ; for just as those who drink, after they have quenched their thirst, begin then to observe the ornamentation of the drinking-cups and to turn them about, so the young man, when he is well replenished with doctrines and has some respite, may be allowed to inspect the style to see whether it contains anything elegant and exquisite. But he who at the very outset does not stick to the subject matter, but insists that the style shall be pure Attic and severely plain, is like the man who is unwilling to swallow an antidote for a poison unless the cup be of the finest Attic ware, or unwilling to put on an overcoat in winter unless the wool be from Attic sheep, but must needs sit still and inactive, with a delicate thin jacket of Lysias's language cast over him. Indeed, this sort of unhealthiness has produced much barrenness of mind and of good sense, much foolery and bibble-babble in the schools, since younger men do not keep in view the life, the actions, and the public conduct of a man who follows philosophy, but rate

ἀλλὰ λέξεις καὶ ῥήματα καὶ τὸ καλῶς ἀπαγγέλλειν ἐν ἐπαίνῳ τιθεμένων, τὸ δ' ἀπαγγελλόμενον εἴτε χρήσιμον εἴτ' ἄχρηστον εἴτ' ἀναγκαῖον εἴτε κενόν ἐστι καὶ περιττὸν οὐκ ἐπισταμένων οὐδὲ βουλομένων ἐξετάζειν.

10. Ἀκολουθεῖ δὲ τούτοις τὸ περὶ τῶν προ-
F βλημάτων παράγγελμα. δεῖ γὰρ τὸν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον ἥκοντα τοῖς παρακειμένοις χρῆσθαι καὶ μηδὲν αἰτεῖν ἄλλο μηδ' ἐξελέγχειν· ὁ δ' ἐπὶ λόγων ἀφιγμένος ἑστίασιν, ἂν μὲν ἐπὶ ῥητοῖς, ἀκροάσθω σιωπῇ τοῦ λέγοντος (οἱ γὰρ εἰς ἄλλας ὑποθέσεις ἐξάγοντες καὶ παρεμβάλλοντες ἐρωτήματα καὶ προσδιαποροῦντες, οὐχ ἡδεῖς οὐδ' εὐσυνάλλακτοι πρὸς ἀκρόασιν ὄντες, ὠφελοῦνται μὲν οὐδέν, τὸν δὲ λέγοντα καὶ τὸν λόγον ὁμοῦ συνταράττουσιν)· ὅταν δὲ τοὺς ἀκούοντας ὁ λέγων ἐρωτᾶν καὶ προβάλλειν κελεύσῃ, χρήσιμόν τι δεῖ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον ἀεὶ προβάλλοντα φαίνεσθαι. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Ὀδυσσεὺς καταγελᾶται παρὰ τοῖς μνηστῆρσιν

43 αἰτίζων ἀκόλους, οὐκ ἄορας οὐδὲ λέβητας·[a]

μεγαλοψυχίας γὰρ ἡγοῦνται σημεῖον, ὡς τὸ διδόναι τι τῶν μεγάλων, καὶ τὸ αἰτεῖν. μᾶλλον δ' ἄν τις ἀκροατοῦ καταγελάσειεν εἰς μικρὰ καὶ γλίσχρα προβλήματα τὸν διαλεγόμενον κινοῦντος, οἷα τερθρευόμενοί τινες τῶν νέων καὶ παρεπιδεικνύμενοι διαλεκτικὴν ἢ μαθηματικὴν ἕξιν εἰώθασι προβάλλειν περὶ τῆς τῶν ἀορίστων τομῆς, καὶ τίς ἡ
B κατὰ πλευρὰν ἢ κατὰ διάμετρον κίνησις. πρὸς οὓς

[a] Homer, *Odyssey*, xvii. 222.

[b] Apparently a quibble in logic: "Man lives and breathes"; which man lives and which man breathes?

[c] When a body moves are its various positions determined

as matters for commendation points of style and phrasing, and a fine delivery, while as for what is being delivered, whether it be useful or useless, whether essential or empty and superfluous, they neither understand nor wish to inquire.

10. This leads up to the matter of proposing problems. Now the person who comes to a dinner is bound to eat what is set before him and not to ask for anything else or to be critical; so he who comes to a feast of reason, if it be on a specified subject, must feel bound to listen to the speaker in silence. For those persons who lead the speaker to digress to other topics, and interject questions, and raise new difficulties, are not pleasant or agreeable company at a lecture; they get no benefit from it, and they confuse both the speaker and his speech. However, when the speaker requests his hearers to ask questions or to propose problems, one should always manifestly propose some problem which is useful and essential. Now Odysseus among the suitors is derided for

> Asking for morsels of food and not for swords or for cauldrons,[a]

for they regard it just as much a sign of magnanimity to ask for something great as to give it. But there is more reason for ridiculing a hearer who diverts the speaker to petty and frivolous problems, such as some of the young men are in the habit of proposing when they are only fooling and withal showing off their skill in logic or mathematics; take, for example, the question about the division of indeterminate propositions[b] or "What is movement as determined by the bounding side or by the diagonal?"[c] To such

by the position of its diagonal (*i.e.* interior lines) or of its exterior lines?

(43) ἔστιν εἰπεῖν τὸ ὑπὸ Φιλοτίμου πρὸς τὸν ἔμπυον καὶ φθισιῶντα ῥηθέν. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἐλάλησεν αὐτῷ φαρμάκιον αἰτῶν πρὸς παρωνυχίαν, αἰσθόμενος ἀπὸ τῆς χρόας καὶ τῆς ἀναπνοῆς τὴν διάθεσιν "οὐκ ἔστι σοι," φησίν, "ὦ βέλτιστε, περὶ παρωνυχίας ὁ λόγος." οὐδὲ σοὶ τοίνυν, ὦ νεανία, περὶ τοιούτων ζητημάτων ὥρα σκοπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πῶς οἰήματος καὶ ἀλαζονείας ἐρώτων τε καὶ φλυαρίας ἀπολυθεὶς εἰς βίον ἄτυφον καὶ ὑγιαίνοντα καταστήσεις σαυτόν.

11. Εὖ μάλα δὲ χρὴ καὶ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ λέγοντος ἐμπειρίαν ἢ φυσικὴν δύναμιν ἡρμοσμένον, ἐν οἷς αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ κράτιστός ἐστι, ποιεῖσθαι τὰς ἐρωτήσεις, καὶ μὴ παραβιάζεσθαι τὸν μὲν ἠθικώτερον φιλοσοφοῦντα φυσικὰς ἐπάγοντα καὶ μαθηματικὰς ἀπορίας, τὸν δὲ τοῖς φυσικοῖς σεμνυνόμενον εἰς συνημμένων ἐπικρίσεις ἕλκοντα καὶ ψευδομένων λύσεις. ὡς γὰρ ὁ τῇ κλειδὶ τὰ ξύλα σχίζειν τῇ δ' ἀξίνῃ τὴν θύραν ἀνοίγειν πειρώμενος οὐκ ἐκεῖνα δόξειεν ἂν ἐπηρεάζειν, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἀποστερεῖν τῆς ἑκατέρου χρείας καὶ δυνάμεως, οὕτως οἱ παρὰ τοῦ λέγοντος ὃ μὴ πέφυκε μηδ' ἤσκηκεν αἰτοῦντες, ὃ δ' ἔχει καὶ δίδωσι μὴ δρεπόμενοι μηδὲ λαμβάνοντες, οὐ τοῦτο βλάπτονται μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ κακοήθειαν καὶ δυσμένειαν προσοφλισκάνουσι.

12. Φυλακτέον δὲ καὶ τὸ πολλὰ καὶ πολλάκις

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[a] Again referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 73 B.

[b] An adaptation of a line from the *Antiope* of Euripides. (Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Eurip.*, No. 183).

[c] Such as: "If Plato walks, Plato moves." "If it is daytime, the sun is in the sky."

[d] "If I say that I lie when I am lying, do I lie or tell the truth?"

persons we may retort with the remark of Philotimus [a] to the man who was dying of consumption. When he had addressed the physician, asking him for something to cure a sore finger, Philotimus, perceiving his condition from his colour and respiration, said, "My dear sir, your concern is not about a sore finger." And so for you, young man, it is not the time to be inquiring about such questions, but how you may be rid of self-opinion and pretension, love affairs and nonsense, and settle down to a modest and wholesome mode of living.

11. It is quite necessary that in formulating questions the questioner should accommodate himself to the proficiency or natural capacity of the speaker, to those matters "in which he is at his best" [b]; not forcibly to divert one who is more concerned with the ethical side of philosophy, by plying him with questions in natural science or mathematics, or to drag the man who poses as an authority on natural science into passing judgement on the hypothetical propositions [c] of logic or solutions of quibbles like the Liar Problem.[d] For just as one who should go about to split wood with a key, or to open his door with an axe, would not be thought to offer an indignity to those instruments but to deprive himself of the proper use and function of each, so those persons who ask of a speaker something for which he is not apt by nature or by practice, and do not gather and take what he has to offer, not only suffer harm thereby, but also incur the name and blame of malice and hostility as well.

12. A man must also guard against proposing many problems or proposing them often himself. For this

(43) αὐτὸν[1] προβάλλειν· ἔστι γὰρ καὶ τοῦτο τρόπον τινὰ παρεπιδεικνυμένου. τὸ δ' ἑτέρου προτείνοντος ἀκροᾶσθαι μετ' εὐκολίας φιλόλογον καὶ κοινωνικόν, ἂν μή τι τῶν ἰδίων ἐνοχλῇ καὶ κατεπείγῃ πάθος ἐπισχέσεως δεόμενον ἢ νόσημα παρηγορίας. τάχα μὲν γὰρ οὐδ' "ἀμαθίην κρύπτειν ἄμεινον," ὥς φησιν Ἡράκλειτος, ἀλλ' εἰς μέσον τιθέναι καὶ θεραπεύειν. ἂν δ' ὀργή τις ἢ προσβολὴ δεισιδαιμονίας ἢ διαφορὰ πρὸς οἰκείους σύντονος ἢ περιμανὴς ἐξ ἔρωτος ἐπιθυμία

E κινοῦσα χορδὰς τὰς ἀκινήτους φρενῶν

ἐπιταράξῃ τὴν διάνοιαν, οὐ φευκτέον εἰς ἑτέρους λόγους ἀποδιδράσκοντας τὸν ἔλεγχον, ἀλλὰ περὶ αὐτῶν τούτων ἀκουστέον ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς, καὶ μετὰ τὰς διατριβὰς ἰδίᾳ προσιόντας αὐτοὺς καὶ προσανακρίνοντας. ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὐναντίον, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοὶ χαίρουσι τοῖς φιλοσόφοις περὶ ἄλλων διαλεγομένοις καὶ θαυμάζουσιν· ἂν δὲ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐάσας ὁ φιλόσοφος αὐτοῖς ἐκείνοις ἰδίᾳ παρρησιάζηται περὶ τῶν διαφερόντων καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκῃ, δυσ-

F χεραίνουσι καὶ περίεργον νομίζουσιν. ἐπιεικῶς γάρ, ὥσπερ τῶν τραγῳδῶν ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις, καὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐν ταῖς σχολαῖς οἴονται δεῖν ἀκούειν, ἐν δὲ τοῖς ἔξω πράγμασιν οὐδὲν αὐτοὺς ἑαυτῶν διαφέρειν ἡγοῦνται, πρὸς μὲν τοὺς σοφιστὰς εἰκότως τοῦτο πεπονθότες (ἀναστάντες γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ θρόνου καὶ ἀποθέμενοι τὰ βιβλία καὶ τὰς

[1] αὐτὸν Aldine edition: αὑτὸν.

[a] Again referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 439 D and 644 F. *Cf.* Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, i. 99.

[b] Again quoted, *Moralia*, 456 C, 501 A, 502 D, and 657 D; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp.* No. 361.

is, in a way, the mark of a man who is taking occasion to show himself off. But to listen good-naturedly when another advances them, marks the considerate gentleman and the scholar. The only exception is in case some matter of his own is troublesome and urgent, some emotion requiring repression, or a disorder requiring relief. For perhaps it may not even be "better to conceal ignorance," as Heracleitus [a] puts it, but to set it forth in public, and cure it. And if some fit of temper, or attack of superstition, or an intense disagreement with members of our own household, or a mad desire born of love,

Stirring the heart-strings never stirred before,[b]

brings confusion to our thoughts, we must not run away to other kinds of discourse to escape being taken to task, but we must listen to the discussion of these very matters both at the formal exercises, and after the exercises, when we approach the men privately and question them further. But save us from the contrary course, followed by the majority, who are delighted with the philosophers and admire them when they are discoursing about other people; but if the philosopher leaves the other people alone, and addresses himself frankly and freely to them, and sets them in mind of matters that much concern them, they are annoyed and think him officious. For, as a rule, they imagine that they ought to listen to the philosophers in the schools as they listen to the tragedians in the theatres; but in matters out of school they think the philosophers are no better men than themselves. Now there is some reason that they should feel thus towards the popular lecturers; for when these get up from the speaker's chair, and

εἰσαγωγὰς ἐν τοῖς ἀληθινοῖς τοῦ βίου μέρεσι μικροὶ καὶ ὑπὸ χεῖρα φαίνονται τοῖς πολλοῖς), πρὸς δὲ τοὺς ὄντως φιλοσόφους οὐ καλῶς, ἀγνοοῦντες ὅτι καὶ σπουδὴ καὶ παιδιὰ καὶ νεῦμα καὶ μειδίαμα καὶ σκυθρωπασμὸς αὐτῶν, μάλιστα
44 δ' ὁ πρὸς ἕκαστον ἰδίᾳ περαινόμενος λόγος ἔχει τινὰ καρπὸν ὠφέλιμον τοῖς ὑπομένειν καὶ προσέχειν ἐθισθεῖσι.

13. Δεῖται δὲ καὶ τὸ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους καθῆκον εὐλαβείας τινὸς καὶ μετριότητος διὰ τὸ μήτε τὴν ἔλλειψιν αὐτοῦ μήτε τὴν ὑπερβολὴν ἐλευθέριον εἶναι. βαρὺς μὲν γὰρ ἀκροατὴς καὶ φορτικὸς ὁ πρὸς πᾶν ἄτεγκτος καὶ ἀτενὴς τὸ λεγόμενον, οἰήματος ὑπούλου καὶ περιαυτολογίας ἐνδιαθέτου μεστός, ὡς ἔχων τι τῶν λεγομένων βέλτιον εἰπεῖν, μήτ' ὀφρῦν κατασχηματίζων[1] μήτε φωνὴν εὐγνώ-
B μονος μάρτυρα φιληκοΐας προϊέμενος, ἀλλὰ σιγῇ καὶ βαρύτητι καταπλάστῳ καὶ σχηματισμῷ θηρώμενος δόξαν εὐσταθοῦς καὶ βάθος ἔχοντος ἀνδρός, ὥσπερ χρημάτων τῶν ἐπαίνων ὅσον ἄλλῳ μεταδίδωσιν αὐτοῦ δοκῶν ἀφαιρεῖσθαι. πολλοὶ γάρ εἰσιν οἱ κακῶς καὶ παρὰ μέλος τὴν Πυθαγόρου φωνὴν ὑπολαμβάνοντες. ἐκεῖνος μὲν γὰρ ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἔφησεν αὐτῷ περιγεγονέναι τὸ μηδὲν θαυμάζειν· οὗτοι δὲ τὸ μηδὲν ἐπαινεῖν μηδὲ τιμᾶν, ἐν τῷ καταφρονεῖν τιθέμενοι καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν ὑπεροψίᾳ διώκοντες. ὁ γὰρ φιλόσοφος λόγος τὸ μὲν ἐξ ἀπορίας καὶ ἀγνοίας θαῦμα καὶ θάμβος ἐξαιρεῖ[2]

[1] κατασχηματίζων F.C.B.: κατὰ σχῆμα κινῶν. Lobeck would write ὀφρύος κατάστημα κινῶν.

[2] ἐξαιρεῖ Wyttenbach: ἐξαίρει.

[a] *Cf.* the " nil admirari " of Horace, *Epistles*, i. 6. 1.

put away their books and lecture notes, it is apparent that in the real pursuits of life they are small men and rank lower than the average; but towards philosophers of the real sort it is not right that they have such a feeling, not realizing that seriousness and jest in them, nod, or smile, or frown, and, above all, what they say to each person apart, may yield a return which is profitable for those who have acquired the habit of patient attention.

13. The proprieties in regard to bestowing commendation also require some caution and moderation, for the reason that neither deficiency nor excess therein befits the free man. An offensive and tiresome listener is the man who is not to be touched or moved by anything that is said, full of festering presumption and ingrained self-assertion, as though convinced that he could say something better than what is being said, who neither moves his brow nor utters a single word to bear witness that he is glad to listen, but by means of silence and an affected gravity and pose, seeks to gain a reputation for poise and profundity; as though commendation were money, he feels that he is robbing himself of every bit that he bestows on another. For there are many who take that saying of Pythagoras wrongly and out of harmony with his meaning. He declared that he had gained this advantage from philosophy, to wonder at nothing;[a] but these men think that their advantage gained is to commend nothing, to show respect for nothing, holding that immunity from wonder lies in disdain, and seeking to attain to dignity by means of contempt. Now it is true that philosophic reasoning, through knowledge and acquaintance with the cause in every case, does away

(44) γνώσει καὶ ἱστορίᾳ τῆς περὶ ἕκαστον αἰτίας, τὸ δ'
C εὔκολον καὶ μέτριον[1] καὶ φιλάνθρωπον οὐκ ἀπόλλυσι. τοῖς γὰρ ἀληθινῶς καὶ βεβαίως ἀγαθοῖς τιμή τε καλλίστη τὸ τιμῆσαί τινα τῶν ἀξίων, καὶ κόσμος εὐπρεπέστατος τὸ ἐπικοσμῆσαι, περιουσίᾳ δόξης καὶ ἀφθονίᾳ γιγνόμενον. οἱ δὲ γλίσχροι περὶ τοὺς ἑτέρων ἐπαίνους ἔτι πένεσθαι καὶ πεινῆν ἐοίκασι τῶν ἰδίων.

Ὁ δ' ἐναντίος αὖ πάλιν τούτων, μηδὲν ἐπικρίνων ἀλλὰ κατὰ ῥῆμα καὶ συλλαβὴν ἐφιστάμενος καὶ κεκραγώς, ἐλαφρός τις ὢν καὶ ὀρνεώδης,
D πολλάκις μὲν οὐδ' αὐτοῖς ἀρέσκει τοῖς ἀγωνιζομένοις, ἀεὶ δὲ λυπεῖ τοὺς ἀκροωμένους, ἀνασοβῶν καὶ συνεξανιστὰς παρὰ γνώμην, οἷον ἑλκομένους βίᾳ δι' αἰδῶ καὶ συνεπηχοῦντας. οὐδὲν δ' ὠφεληθεὶς διὰ τὸ ταραχώδη καὶ πολυπτόητον αὐτῷ περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους γεγονέναι τὴν ἀκρόασιν ἀπέρχεται τῶν τριῶν ἓν φερόμενος· εἴρων γὰρ ἢ κόλαξ ἢ περὶ λόγους ἀπειρόκαλος ἔδοξεν εἶναι.

E Δίκην μὲν οὖν δικάζοντα δεῖ μήτε πρὸς ἔχθραν τινὰ μήτε πρὸς χάριν ἀκούειν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ γνώμης πρὸς τὸ δίκαιον· ἐν δὲ ταῖς φιλολόγοις ἀκροάσεσιν οὔτε νόμος οὐδεὶς οὔθ' ὅρκος ἡμᾶς ἀπείργει μὴ μετ' εὐνοίας ἀποδέχεσθαι τὸν διαλεγόμενον. ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν Ἑρμῆν ταῖς Χάρισιν οἱ παλαιοὶ συγκαθίδρυσαν, ὡς μάλιστα τοῦ λόγου τὸ κεχαρισμένον καὶ προσφιλὲς ἀπαιτοῦντος. οὐδὲ γὰρ οἷόν τε

[1] μέτριον Bernardakis: μέγα.

with the wonder and amazement that spring from blindness and ignorance, but at the same time it does not destroy our serenity, moderation, or human interest. For to persons who are truly and consistently good it is the highest credit to bestow credit upon someone deserving of credit, and the most conspicuous honour to honour such a man, since this argues a superabundant and generous store of repute ; whereas those who are niggardly in their commendation of others give the impression of being pinched and starving for their own.

On the other hand, however, the opposite type of person, light-minded and flighty, who uses no judgement, but hangs intent on every word and syllable with an ejaculation ready on his lips, is frequently no satisfaction to the disputants themselves, and is always a painful affliction for the audience, startling them as he does and exciting them to join him contrary to their judgement, as though they for shame could not help being dragged into the applause. He gets no benefit from the lecture because for him it has been made full of confusion and fluttering excitement by his continual applaudings, and he departs with the name of being one of three things : a dissembler, a flatterer, or a boor in all that relates to discourse.

Now a man sitting as a judge in court is bound to listen without regard either to enmity or favour, but in sober judgement with regard to justice ; but at scholarly lectures no law and no oath prohibits us from receiving the lecturer with goodwill. Indeed, the ancients gave Hermes a place beside the Graces from a feeling that discourse demands, above all, graciousness and friendliness. For it is not possible

παντελῶς οὕτως ἐκβόλιμον εἶναι τὸν λέγοντα καὶ διημαρτημένον, ὥστε μήτε νοῦν τινα παρασχεῖν ἄξιον ἐπαίνου μήτ' ἀπομνημόνευσιν ἑτέρων μήτ' αὐτὴν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν τοῦ λόγου καὶ προαίρεσιν, ἀλλὰ μηδὲ λέξιν ἢ διάθεσιν τῶν λεγομένων,

F ὡς ἀν' ἐχινόποδας καὶ ἀνὰ τρηχεῖαν ὄνωνιν
φύονται μαλακῶν ἄνθεα λευκοΐων.

ὅπου γὰρ ἐμέτου τινὲς ἐγκώμια καὶ πυρετοῦ καὶ νὴ Δία χύτρας ἐπιδεικνύμενοι πιθανότητος οὐκ ἀμοιροῦσιν, ἢ που λόγος ὑπ' ἀνδρὸς ἀμωσγέπως[1] δοκοῦντος ἢ καλουμένου φιλοσόφου περαινόμενος οὐκ ἂν ὅλως ἀναπνοήν τινα καὶ καιρὸν ἀκροαταῖς εὐμενέσι καὶ φιλανθρώποις παράσχοι πρὸς ἔπαινον; οἱ γοῦν ἐν ὥρᾳ πάντες, ὥς φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, ἀμηγέπη δάκνουσι τὸν ἐρωτικόν, καὶ λευκοὺς μὲν
45 θεῶν παῖδας ἀνακαλῶν μέλανας δ' ἀνδρικούς, καὶ τὸν γρυπὸν βασιλικὸν καὶ τὸν σιμὸν ἐπίχαριν τὸν δ' ὠχρὸν μελίχρουν[2] ὑποκοριζόμενος ἀσπάζεται καὶ ἀγαπᾷ· δεινὸς γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἔρως ὥσπερ κιττὸς αὐτὸν ἐκ πάσης ἀναδῆσαι προφάσεως. πολὺ δὴ μᾶλλον ὁ φιλήκοος καὶ φιλόλογος ἀεί τινος αἰτίας εὑρετικὸς ἔσται, δι' ἣν οὐκ ἀπὸ τρόπου τῶν λεγόντων ἕκαστον ἐπαινῶν φανεῖται. καὶ γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων τὸν Λυσίου λόγον οὔτε κατὰ τὴν εὕρεσιν ἐπαινῶν καὶ τῆς ἀταξίας αἰτιώμενος ὅμως αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀπαγγελίαν ἐπαινεῖ, καὶ ὅτι "τῶν ὀνομάτων σαφῶς καὶ στρογγύλως ἕκαστον ἀποτετόρνευται."

[1] ἀμωσγέπως Reiske: ἄλλως γέ πως.
[2] μελιχλώρους Plato, *Rep.* 474 E.

[a] Source unknown; *cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 485 A and 621 E.

for a speaker to be a failure so abject and complete that he does not afford something meriting commendation, an original thought, a reminiscence from others, the very subject and purpose of his discourse, or at least the style and arrangement of his remarks,

> Just as amid urchin's foot and the rough rest-harrow
> Flowering snowdrops grow, delicate in their bloom.[a]

For when some have declaimed a panegyric upon vomiting or fever, nay I vow, even upon a kitchen-pot, not without a certain amount of plausibility, how could it be that a discourse delivered by a man who in some sort bears the repute and name of philosopher, should not offer, at some point, to benevolent and humane hearers some respite and opportunity for commendation? We know, at any rate, that all persons in the bloom of youth do somehow or other, as Plato [b] says, act as a stimulus upon the man inclined to love; the fair ones he names "children of the gods," the dark "manly," while the hook-nosed he endearingly terms "kingly," the snub-nosed "fetching," the sallow "honey-hued," and so welcomes and likes them all; for love, like ivy, is clever in attaching itself to any support. Much more, then, will the scholar and diligent hearer always be ready to discover some cause for which he may openly bestow on every speaker some commendation not inappropriate. So Plato,[c] although he cannot commend Lysias's speech for invention, and although he condemns its arrangement as disorderly, nevertheless commends the style, and that "each word was clearly and roundly turned." One

[b] Plato, *Republic*, 474 D.
[c] Plato, *Phaedrus*, 234 E.

(45) μέμψαιτο δ' ἄν τις Ἀρχιλόχου μὲν τὴν ὑπόθεσιν,
B Παρμενίδου δὲ τὴν στιχοποιίαν, Φωκυλίδου δὲ τὴν εὐτέλειαν, Εὐριπίδου δὲ τὴν λαλιάν, Σοφοκλέους δὲ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν ῥητόρων ἐστὶν ὁ μὲν οὐκ ἔχων ἦθος, ὁ δὲ πρὸς πάθος ἀργός, ὁ δ' ἐνδεὴς χαρίτων· ἕκαστός γε μὴν ἐπαινεῖται κατὰ τὸ ἴδιον τῆς δυνάμεως, ᾧ κινεῖν καὶ ἄγειν πέφυκεν. ὥστε καὶ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν εὐπορίαν εἶναι καὶ ἀφθονίαν τοῦ φιλοφρονεῖσθαι τοὺς λέγοντας. ἐνίοις γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ, κἂν μὴ διὰ φωνῆς ἐπιμαρτυρῶμεν, ὄμματος πραότητα καὶ γαλήνην προσώπου καὶ διάθεσιν εὐμενῆ καὶ ἄλυπον ἐμπαρασχεῖν.

C Ἐκεῖνα μὲν γὰρ ἤδη καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ὅλως ἀποτυγχάνοντας ὥσπερ ἐγκύκλια καὶ κοινὰ πάσης ἀκροάσεώς ἐστι, καθέδρα τέ τις ἄθρυπτος καὶ ἀκλινὴς ἐν ὀρθῷ σχήματι καὶ πρόσβλεψις αὐτῷ τῷ λέγοντι καὶ τάξις ἐνεργοῦ προσοχῆς, καὶ προσώπου κατάστασις καθαρὰ καὶ ἀνέμφαντος οὐχ ὕβρεως οὐδὲ δυσκολίας μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ φροντίδων ἄλλων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν· ὡς ἐν ἔργῳ γε παντὶ τὸ μὲν καλὸν ἐκ πολλῶν οἷον ἀριθμῶν εἰς ἕνα καιρὸν ἡκόντων ὑπὸ συμμετρίας τινὸς καὶ ἁρμονίας ἐπιτελεῖται, τὸ δ' αἰσχρὸν ἐξ ἑνὸς τοῦ τυχόντος ἐλλείποντος ἢ προσόντος ἀτόπως εὐθὺς ἑτοίμην ἔχει τὴν γένεσιν, ὥσπερ
D ἐπ' αὐτῆς τῆς ἀκροάσεως οὐ μόνον βαρύτης ἐπισκυνίου καὶ ἀηδία προσώπου καὶ βλέμμα ῥεμβῶδες καὶ περίκλασις σώματος καὶ μηρῶν ἐπάλλαξις ἀπρεπὴς ἀλλὰ καὶ νεῦμα καὶ ψιθυρισμὸς πρὸς ἕτερον καὶ μειδίαμα χάσμαι τε ὑπνώδεις καὶ κατήφειαι καὶ

might find fault with Archilochus for his subject matter, Parmenides for his versification, Phocylides as commonplace, Euripides for his loquacity, and Sophocles for his unevenness; and it is equally true of the orators that one of them has no power to portray character, another is slow to rouse emotion, another is lacking in grace; yet it is a fact that each one of them is commended for the special faculty with which Nature has taught him to move us and draw us on. It follows, then, that there is ample and abundant opportunity for hearers to show friendliness toward those who are speaking. For some it is quite enough, even if we do not attest this by the voice, that we vouchsafe to them a gentleness of glance, a serenity of countenance, and a disposition kindly and free from annoyance.

Finally, the following matters, even with speakers who make a complete failure, are, as it were, general and common requirements at every lecture: to sit upright without any lounging or sprawling, to look directly at the speaker, to maintain a pose of active attention, and a sedateness of countenance free from any expression, not merely of arrogance or displeasure, but even of other thoughts and preoccupations. Now in every piece of work, beauty is achieved through the congruence of numerous factors, so to speak, brought into union under the rule of a certain due proportion and harmony, whereas ugliness is ready to spring into being if only a single chance element be omitted or added out of place. And so in the particular case of a lecture, not only frowning, a sour face, a roving glance, twisting the body about, and crossing the legs, are unbecoming, but even nodding, whispering to another, smiling, sleepy

(45) πᾶν εἴ τι τούτοις ἔοικεν ὑπεύθυνόν ἐστι καὶ δεῖται πολλῆς εὐλαβείας.

14. Οἱ δὲ τοῦ μὲν λέγοντος οἴονταί τι ἔργον εἶναι, τοῦ δ' ἀκούοντος οὐδέν, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνον μὲν ἀξιοῦσιν ἥκειν πεφροντικότα καὶ παρεσκευασμένον, αὐτοὶ δ' ἄσκεπτοι καὶ ἀφρόντιδες τῶν καθηκόντων ἐμβαλόντες καθέζονται καθάπερ ἀτεχνῶς ἐπὶ δεῖπνον
E ἥκοντες, εὖ παθεῖν πονουμένων ἑτέρων. καίτοι καὶ συνδείπνου τι χαρίεντος ἔργον ἐστί, πολὺ δὲ μᾶλλον ἀκροατοῦ. κοινωνὸς γάρ ἐστι τοῦ λόγου καὶ συνεργὸς τοῦ λέγοντος, καὶ οὐ τὰ μὲν ἐκείνου πλημμελήματα πικρῶς ἐξετάζειν ὀφείλει κατὰ ῥῆμα καὶ πρᾶγμα προσάγων[1] τὴν εὔθυναν, αὐτὸς δ' ἀνευθύνως ἀσχημονεῖν καὶ πολλὰ σολοικίζειν περὶ τὴν ἀκρόασιν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τῷ σφαιρίζειν τῷ βάλλοντι δεῖ συγκινούμενον εὐρύθμως φέρεσθαι τὸν δεχόμενον, οὕτως ἐπὶ τῶν λόγων ἔστι τις εὐρυθμία καὶ περὶ τὸν λέγοντα καὶ περὶ τὸν ἀκροώμενον, ἂν
F ἑκάτερος τὸ προσῆκον αὑτῷ φυλάττῃ.

15. Δεῖ δὲ μηδὲ ταῖς φωναῖς τῶν ἐπαίνων ὡς ἔτυχε χρῆσθαι. καὶ γὰρ Ἐπίκουρος ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν φίλων ἐπιστολίοις κροτοθορύβους γίγνεσθαι παρ' αὐτῶν λέγων ἀηδής ἐστιν. οἱ δὲ τὰς ξένας φωνὰς τοῖς ἀκροατηρίοις νῦν ἐπεισάγοντες οὗτοι, καὶ "θείως" καὶ "θεοφορήτως" καὶ "ἀπροσίτως" ἐπιλέγοντες, ὡς οὐκέτι τοῦ "καλῶς" καὶ τοῦ "σοφῶς" καὶ τοῦ "ἀληθῶς" ἐξαρκοῦντος, οἷς οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Σωκράτη καὶ Ὑπερείδην ἐχρῶντο

[1] προσάγων Reiske: προάγων.

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[a] *Cf.* Diogenes Laertius, x. 5.

yawns, bowing down the head, and all like actions, are culpable and need to be carefully avoided.

14. There are others who think that the speaker has a function to perform, and the hearer none. They think it only right that the speaker shall come with his discourse carefully thought out and prepared, while they, without consideration or thought of their obligations, rush in and take their seats exactly as though they had come to dinner, to have a good time while others toil. And yet even a well-bred guest at dinner has a function to perform, much more a hearer; for he is a participant in the discourse and a fellow-worker with the speaker, and he ought not rigorously to examine the speaker's little slips, applying his criticism to every word and action, while he himself, without being subject to any criticism, acts unhandsomely and commits many gross improprieties in the matter of listening. On the contrary, just as in playing ball it is necessary for the catcher to adapt his movements to those of the thrower and to be actively in accord with him, so with discourses, there is a certain accord between the speaker and the hearer, if each is heedful of his obligation.

15. Then also the terms used in commendations must not be indiscriminate. For Epicurus [a] himself is displeasing when he says of his friends' letters that they give rise to hullabaloos. And those persons who nowadays introduce into our lecture-rooms outlandish expressions, who are wont to exclaim over a lecture "Divine," and "Inspired," and "Unapproachable," as though it were no longer enough to say "Hear, Hear!" and "Good!" and "Right!" as Plato and Socrates and Hypereides and their friends used to do to show their com-

σημείοις τῶν ἐπαίνων, ὑπερασχημονοῦσι καὶ διαβάλλουσι τοὺς λέγοντας ὡς ὑπερηφάνων τινῶν καὶ
46 περιττῶν δεομένους ἐπαίνων. σφόδρα δ' ἀηδεῖς εἰσι καὶ οἱ μεθ' ὅρκου τοῖς λέγουσιν ὥσπερ ἐν δικαστηρίῳ τὰς μαρτυρίας ἀποδιδόντες. οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτων οἱ περὶ τὰς ποιότητας ἀστοχοῦντες, ὅταν φιλοσόφῳ μὲν ἐπιφωνῶσι "δριμέως," γέροντι δ' "εὐφυῶς" ἢ "ἀνθηρῶς," τὰς τῶν παιζόντων καὶ πανηγυριζόντων ἐν ταῖς σχολαστικαῖς μελέταις φωνὰς ἐπὶ τοὺς φιλοσόφους μετακομίζοντες καὶ λόγῳ σωφρονοῦντι προσφέροντες ἔπαινον ἑταιρικόν,
B ὥσπερ ἀθλητῇ κρίνων ἢ ῥόδων στέφανον, οὐ δάφνης οὐδὲ κοτίνου περιτιθέντες. Εὐριπίδης μὲν οὖν ὁ ποιητής, ὡς ὑπολέγοντος αὐτοῦ τοῖς χορευταῖς ᾠδήν τινα πεποιημένην ἐφ' ἁρμονίας εἷς ἐγέλασεν, "εἰ μή τις ἦς ἀναίσθητος" εἶπε "καὶ ἀμαθής, οὐκ ἂν ἐγέλασας ἐμοῦ μιξολυδιστὶ ᾄδοντος." ἀνὴρ δ' ἂν οἶμαι φιλόσοφος καὶ πολιτικὸς ἀκροατοῦ διακεχυμένου τρυφὴν ἐκκόψειεν εἰπών "σύ μοι δοκεῖς ἀνόητος εἶναι καὶ ἀνάγωγος· οὐ γὰρ ἂν ἐμοῦ διδάσκοντος ἢ νουθετοῦντος ἢ διαλεγομένου περὶ θεῶν
C ἢ πολιτείας ἢ ἀρχῆς ἐτερέτιζες καὶ προσωρχοῦ τοῖς λόγοις." ὅρα γὰρ ἀληθῶς οἷόν ἐστι φιλοσόφου λέγοντος ἀπορεῖν τοὺς ἔξωθεν ὑπὸ τῶν ἔνδον βοώντων καὶ ἀλαλαζόντων πότερον αὐλοῦντος ἢ κιθαρίζοντος ἢ ὀρχουμένου τινὸς ὁ ἔπαινός ἐστι.

16. Καὶ μὴν τῶν γε νουθεσιῶν καὶ τῶν ἐπι-

mendation, behave in a most unseemly manner, and traduce the speakers, as though these desired such high-flown and excessive commendations. Exceedingly displeasing also are those who use an oath in testifying to their approval of the speakers as though in a law court. No less so are those who fail to respect the quality of persons, and cry aloud to a philosopher "Smart!" or to an aged man "Clever!" or "Flowery!", thus transferring to the philosophers the expressions of those who make a sport and an opportunity to show off out of their scholastic exercises, and applying meretricious commendation to sober discourse, as though they should put on an athlete's head a crown of lilies or roses instead of laurel or wild olive! Once when Euripides the poet was going over for the members of his chorus a lyric passage set to music one of them burst out laughing; whereat Euripides remarked, "If you were not so stupid and ignorant, you would not have laughed while I was singing in most solemn measure."[a] And so, as I think, one who is a philosopher and statesman might repress the exuberance of a graceless hearer by saying, "You seem to me to be an ill-bred fool; else, while I am giving instruction or admonition, or discoursing upon the gods or the State or its government, you would not be whistling and dancing a jig to my words." Just consider what it really means, if, when a philosopher is speaking, the people outside, by reason of the clamour and shouting of those within, are unable to make out whether the applause is for some flute-player, or harper, or dancer.

16. Moreover, admonitions and rebukes must be

[a] The mixed Lydian. See Plutarch, *Moralia*, 1136 c D.

(46) πλήξεων οὔτ' ἀναλγήτως οὔτ' ἀνάνδρως ἀκουστέον. οἱ[1] γὰρ εὐκόλως καὶ ὀλιγώρως τὸ κακῶς ἀκούειν ὑπὸ τῶν φιλοσόφων φέροντες, ὥστε γελᾶν ἐλεγχόμενοι καὶ τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας ἐπαινεῖν, ὥσπερ οἱ παράσιτοι τοὺς τρέφοντας, ὅταν ὑπ' αὐτῶν λοιδορῶνται, παντάπασιν ἰταμοὶ καὶ θρασεῖς ὄντες, οὐ καλὴν οὐδ' ἀληθῆ διδόασιν ἀπόδειξιν ἀνδρείας τὴν ἀναισχυν-
D τίαν. σκῶμμα μὲν γὰρ ἀνύβριστον ἐν παιδιᾷ τινι μετ' εὐτραπελίας ἀφειμένον ἐνεγκεῖν ἀλύπως καὶ ἱλαρῶς οὐκ ἀγεννὲς οὐδ' ἀπαίδευτον ἀλλ' ἐλευθέριον πάνυ καὶ Λακωνικόν ἐστιν· ἐπαφῆς δὲ καὶ νουθεσίας πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους ὥσπερ φαρμάκῳ δάκνοντι λόγῳ χρωμένης ἐλέγχοντι μὴ συνεσταλμένον ἀκούειν μηδ' ἱδρῶτος καὶ ἰλίγγου μεστόν, αἰσχύνῃ φλεγόμενον τὴν ψυχήν, ἀλλ' ἄτρεπτον καὶ σεσηρότα καὶ κατειρωνευόμενον, ἀνελευθέρου τινὸς δεινῶς καὶ ἀπαθοῦς πρὸς τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι νέου διὰ συνήθειαν ἁμαρτημάτων καὶ συνέχειαν, ὥσπερ ἐν σκληρᾷ σαρκὶ καὶ τυλώδει τῇ ψυχῇ μώλωπα μὴ λαμβάνοντος.

E Τούτων δὲ τοιούτων ὄντων οἱ τὴν ἐναντίαν διάθεσιν ἔχοντες νέοι κἂν ἅπαξ ποτὲ ἀκούσωσι κακῶς, φεύγοντες ἀνεπιστρεπτὶ καὶ δραπετεύοντες ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, καλὴν ἀρχὴν πρὸς τὸ σωθῆναι τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ἔχοντες, ἀπολλύουσι διὰ τρυφὴν καὶ μαλακίαν, οὐκ ἐγκαρτεροῦντες τοῖς ἐλέγχοις οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπανορθώσεις δεχόμενοι γεννικῶς, ἀλλ' ἐπὶ τὰς προσηνεῖς καὶ ἁπαλὰς ἀποστρέφοντες ὁμιλίας

[1] οἱ Hercher: οἵ τε.

listened to neither with stolid indifference nor with unseemly emotion. For those who can submit to being reproved by philosophers so light-heartedly and heedlessly as to laugh when being taken to task and to commend those who take them to task, as parasites do when abused by those at whose expense they live, are utterly froward and bold, and they give no good or genuine proof of manliness by their shameless behaviour. As for a pleasant scoff, wittily delivered and in pure fun, if a man know how to take it cheerfully and without offence, his conduct argues no ignoble or uncultured mind, but one altogether generous and Spartan. On the other hand, to hear a reprehension or admonition to reform character, delivered in words that penetrate like a biting drug, and not to be humbled at hearing it, not to run into a sweating and dizziness, not to burn with shame in the soul, but, on the contrary to listen unmoved, grinning, dissembling in the face of it all, is a notable sign of an illiberal nature in the young, dead to all modesty because of an habitual and continued acquaintance with wrongdoing, with a soul like hard and calloused flesh, upon which no lash can leave a weal.

Such is the behaviour of those who belong to this class. But young men of the opposite temperament, if they ever hear a single word directed against themselves, run away without looking back, and try to desert philosophy; and, although the sense of modesty which Nature has bestowed upon them is an admirable beginning for their salvation, they lose it through effeminacy and weakness, since they display no firmness under reproof, nor do they accept corrections with the proper spirit, but they turn away their ears toward the agreeable and gentle converse

τὰ ὦτα κολάκων τινῶν ἢ σοφιστῶν ἀνωφελεῖς καὶ ἀνονήτους ἡδείας δὲ φωνὰς καταδόντων. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ μετὰ τὴν τομὴν φεύγων τὸν ἰατρὸν καὶ τὸν ἐπίδεσμον μὴ προσιέμενος τὸ μὲν ἀλγεινὸν ἀνεδέ-
F ξατο, τὸ δ' ὠφέλιμον οὐχ ὑπέμεινε τῆς θεραπείας, οὕτως ὁ τῷ χαράξαντι καὶ τρώσαντι λόγῳ τὴν ἀβελτερίαν ἀπουλῶσαι καὶ καταστῆσαι μὴ παρασχὼν ἀπῆλθε δηχθεὶς καὶ ἀλγήσας ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, ὠφεληθεὶς δὲ μηδέν. οὐ γὰρ μόνον, ὡς Εὐριπίδης φησί, τὸ Τηλέφου τραῦμα

πριστοῖσι λόγχης θέλγεται ῥινήμασιν,

47 ἀλλὰ καὶ τὸν ἐκ φιλοσοφίας ἐμφυόμενον εὐφυέσι νέοις δηγμὸν αὐτὸς ὁ τρώσας λόγος ἰᾶται. διὸ δεῖ πάσχειν μέν τι καὶ δάκνεσθαι, μὴ συντρίβεσθαι δὲ μηδ' ἀθυμεῖν τὸν ἐλεγχόμενον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τελετῇ κατηργμένης αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφίας τοὺς πρώτους καθαρμοὺς καὶ θορύβους ἀνασχόμενον ἐλπίζειν τι γλυκὺ καὶ λαμπρὸν ἐκ τῆς παρούσης ἀδημονίας καὶ ταραχῆς. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀδίκως ἡ ἐπιτίμησις γίγνεσθαι δοκῇ, καλὸν ἀνασχέσθαι καὶ διακαρτερῆσαι λέγοντος· παυσαμένῳ δ' αὐτὸν ἐντυχεῖν ἀπολογούμενον
B καὶ δεόμενον τὴν παρρησίαν ἐκείνην καὶ τὸν τόνον, ᾧ νῦν κέχρηται πρὸς αὐτόν, εἴς τι τῶν ἀληθῶς ἁμαρτανομένων φυλάττειν.

17. Ἔτι τοίνυν ὥσπερ ἐν γράμμασι καὶ περὶ λύραν καὶ παλαίστραν αἱ πρῶται μαθήσεις πολὺν ἔχουσι θόρυβον καὶ πόνον καὶ ἀσάφειαν, εἶτα προιόντι κατὰ μικρὸν ὥσπερ πρὸς ἀνθρώπους συνήθεια

[a] Nauck, *Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta*, *Euripides*, No. 724; *cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 89 c.

of sundry flatterers or voluble talkers, who enchant them with useless and unprofitable but nevertheless pleasant utterances. Just as one who runs away from the physician after an operation, and will not submit to be bandaged, sustains all the pain of the treatment, but waits not for its benefits: so when the word has cut and wounded a man's foolishness, if he give it no chance to heal and quiet the wound, he comes away from philosophy with a smart and pain but with no benefit. For not only the wound of Telephus, as Euripides [a] says,

Is soothed by fine-rasped filings from the spear,

but the smart from philosophy which sinks deep in young men of good parts is healed by the very words which inflicted the hurt. For this reason he who is taken to task must feel and suffer some smart, yet he should not be crushed or dispirited, but, as though at a solemn rite of novitiate which consecrates him to philosophy, he should submit to the initial purifications and commotions, in the expectation that something delectable and splendid will follow upon his present distress and perturbation. Indeed, even if the reproof seems to be given unjustly, it is an admirable thing to endure it with continued patience while the man is speaking; and when he has come to the end, to go to him with an explanation, and beg him to reserve for some real misconduct the frankness and earnestness that he has employed in the present instance.

17. Moreover, just as in learning to read and write, or in taking up music or physical training, the first lessons are attended with much confusion, hard work, and uncertainty, but later, as the learner makes progress, by slow degrees, just as in his

(47) πολλὴ καὶ γνῶσις ἐγγενομένη πάντα φίλα καὶ χειροήθη καὶ ῥᾴδια λέγειν τε καὶ πράττειν παρέσχεν, οὕτω δὴ καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐχούσης τι καὶ γλίσχρον ἀμέλει καὶ ἀσύνηθες ἐν τοῖς πρώτοις ὀνόμασι καὶ πράγμασιν οὐ δεῖ φοβηθέντα τὰς ἀρχὰς ψοφοδεῶς
C καὶ ἀτόλμως ἐγκαταλιπεῖν, ἀλλὰ πειρώμενον ἑκάστου καὶ προσλιπαροῦντα καὶ γλιχόμενον τοῦ πρόσω τὴν πᾶν τὸ καλὸν ἡδὺ ποιοῦσαν ἀναμένειν συνήθειαν. ἥξει γὰρ οὐ διὰ μακροῦ πολὺ φῶς ἐπιφέρουσα τῇ μαθήσει καὶ δεινοὺς ἔρωτας ἐνδιδοῦσα πρὸς τὴν ἀρετήν, ὧν ἄνευ πάνυ τλήμονος ἀνδρός ἐστιν ἢ δειλοῦ τὸν ἄλλον ὑπομένειν βίον, ἐκπεσόντα δι' ἀνανδρίαν φιλοσοφίας.

Ἴσως μὲν οὖν ἔχει τι καὶ τὰ πράγματα τοῖς ἀπείροις καὶ νέοις ἐν ἀρχῇ δυσκατανόητον· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ τῇ γε πλείστῃ περιπίπτουσιν ἀσαφείᾳ καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ δι' αὑτούς, ἀπ' ἐναντίων φύσεων ταὐτὸν ἁμαρ-
D τάνοντες. οἱ μὲν γὰρ αἰσχύνῃ τινὶ καὶ φειδοῖ τοῦ λέγοντος ὀκνοῦντες ἀνερέσθαι καὶ βεβαιώσασθαι τὸν λόγον, ὡς ἔχοντες ἐν νῷ συνεπινεύουσιν, οἱ δ' ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας ἀώρου καὶ κενῆς πρὸς ἑτέρους ἀμίλλης ὀξύτητα καὶ δύναμιν εὐμαθείας ἐπιδεικνύμενοι, πρὶν ἢ λαβεῖν ἔχειν ὁμολογοῦντες, οὐ λαμβάνουσιν. εἶτα

relations with human beings, a full familiarity is engendered and knowledge which renders everything attractive, feasible, and easy, both to say and to do, so also is it with philosophy, which undoubtedly has something knotty and unfamiliar in its terms and subject matter at the outset; yet one ought not to take fright at its beginnings, and to abandon it in timorous and craven fashion; rather should he examine each point, and persist and stick to the task of getting on, while awaiting that familiarity which makes every noble thing a pleasure. For come it will without long delay, bringing with it abundant light for the subject of study; it will inspire also a passionate love for virtue; and anyone who could endure to pass the rest of his life without this passion, because he has exiled himself from philosophy for want of true manliness, brands himself either as a very presumptuous man or else a coward.

It is quite possible that the subject of philosophy contains some matter which is difficult for young and inexperienced students to apprehend at the outset. But, at the same time, they must hold themselves responsible for most of the uncertainty and misunderstanding in which they find themselves involved, since quite opposite characters come to fall into the same error. Some, because of a feeling of shame and a desire to spare the speaker, hesitate to ask questions and to get the argument firmly fixed in their minds, nodding their heads in assent as though they comprehended it; others, led by an unseasonable ambition and inane rivalry with their fellow-students, to show off their acuteness and their ability to learn easily, avow that they have the meaning before they have grasped it, and so do not

(47) συμβαίνει τοῖς μὲν αἰδήμοσι καὶ σιωπηλοῖς ἐκείνοις, ὅταν ἀπέλθωσι, λυπεῖν αὑτοὺς καὶ ἀπορεῖσθαι, καὶ τέλος αὖθις ὑπ' ἀνάγκης ἐλαυνομένους σὺν αἰσχύνῃ μείζονι τοῖς εἰποῦσιν ἐνοχλεῖν ἀναπυνθανομένους καὶ μεταθέοντας, τοῖς δὲ φιλοτίμοις καὶ θρασέσιν ἀεὶ περιστέλλειν καὶ ἀποκρύπτειν συνοικοῦσαν τὴν ἀμαθίαν.

E 18. Πᾶσαν οὖν ἀπωσάμενοι τὴν τοσαύτην βλακείαν καὶ ἀλαζονείαν καὶ πρὸς τὸ μαθεῖν ἰόντες καὶ περὶ τὸ λαβεῖν τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ χρησίμως λεγόμενον ὄντες, ὑπομένωμεν τοὺς τῶν εὐφυῶν δοκούντων γέλωτας, ὥσπερ ὁ Κλεάνθης καὶ ὁ Ξενοκράτης βραδύτεροι δοκοῦντες εἶναι τῶν συσχολαστῶν οὐκ ἀπεδίδρασκον ἐκ τοῦ μανθάνειν οὐδ' ἀπέκαμνον, ἀλλὰ φθάνοντες εἰς ἑαυτοὺς ἔπαιζον, ἀγγείοις τε βραχυστόμοις καὶ πινακίσι χαλκαῖς ἀπεικάζοντες, ὡς μόλις μὲν παραδεχόμενοι τοὺς λόγους, ἀσφαλῶς δὲ καὶ βεβαίως τηροῦντες. οὐ γὰρ μόνον, ὥς φησι Φωκυλίδης,

πόλλ' ἀπατηθῆναι διζήμενον ἔμμεναι ἐσθλόν,

F ἀλλὰ καὶ γελασθῆναι δεῖ πολλὰ καὶ ἀδοξῆσαι, καὶ σκώμματα καὶ βωμολοχίας ἀναδεξάμενον ὥσασθαι παντὶ τῷ θυμῷ καὶ καταθλῆσαι τὴν ἀμαθίαν.

Οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ τῆς πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἁμαρτίας ἀμελητέον, ἣν ἁμαρτάνουσιν οἱ μὲν ὑπὸ νωθείας, ἀηδεῖς

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* ii. p. 448, *Phocyl.* No. 14.

grasp it at all. Then the result is that those modest and silent persons, after leaving the lecture, distress themselves over their difficulties, and finally, driven by necessity, with even greater shame this time, they trouble the lecturers with questions which they should have asked before, and try to catch up ; but with the ambitious and self-confident young men, the result is that they are all the time trying to cover up and conceal the ignorance that abides with them.

18. Let us therefore put from us all such foolishness and pretension, and, as we go onward to the task of learning, let us take pains thoroughly to comprehend all profitable discourses ; let us submit with patience to the laughter of those reputed to be clever, as did Cleanthes and Xenocrates, who, although they seemed to be slower than their schoolmates, yet did not try to escape learning or give it up in despair, but were the first to make jokes at themselves by comparing themselves to narrow-necked bottles and bronze tablets, as much as to say that they found great difficulty in taking in what was said, yet they kept it safely and securely. For not only is one bound, as Phocylides says,

> Many a time to be cheated of hope when he seeks to be noble,[a]

but he is bound also many a time to be laughed at and to be in disrepute, and to put up with joking and buffoonery as he struggles with might and main against his ignorance and overthrows it.

On the other hand, however, we certainly must not neglect the mistake that leads to the opposite extreme, which some persons are led to commit by laziness, thus making themselves unpleasant and

48 καὶ κοπώδεις ὄντες· οὐ γὰρ ἐθέλουσι γενόμενοι καθ' αὑτοὺς πράγματα ἔχειν, ἀλλὰ παρέχουσι τῷ λέγοντι, πολλάκις ἐκπυνθανόμενοι περὶ τῶν αὐτῶν, ὥσπερ ἀπτῆνες νεοσσοὶ κεχηνότες ἀεὶ πρὸς ἀλλότριον στόμα καὶ πᾶν ἕτοιμον ἤδη καὶ διαπεπονημένον ὑπ' ἄλλων ἐκλαμβάνειν ἐθέλοντες. ἕτεροι δὲ προσοχῆς καὶ δριμύτητος ἐν οὐ δέοντι θηρώμενοι δόξαν ἀποκναίουσι λαλιᾷ καὶ περιεργίᾳ τοὺς λέγοντας, ἀεί τι προσδιαποροῦντες τῶν οὐκ ἀναγκαίων καὶ ζητοῦντες ἀποδείξεις τῶν οὐ δεομένων·

οὕτως ὁδὸς βραχεῖα γίγνεται μακρά,

B ὡς φησι Σοφοκλῆς, οὐκ αὐτοῖς μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις. ἀντιλαμβανόμενοι γὰρ ἑκάστοτε κεναῖς καὶ περιτταῖς ἐρωτήσεσι τοῦ διδάσκοντος, ὥσπερ ἐν συνοδίᾳ, τὸ ἐνδελεχὲς ἐμποδίζουσι τῆς μαθήσεως, ἐπιστάσεις καὶ διατριβὰς λαμβανούσης. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν κατὰ τὸν Ἱερώνυμον ὥσπερ οἱ δειλοὶ καὶ γλίσχροι[1] σκύλακες τὰ δέρματα δάκνοντες οἴκοι καὶ τὰ τίλματα τίλλοντες τῶν θηρίων αὐτῶν οὐχ ἅπτονται· τοὺς δ' ἀργοὺς ἐκείνους παρακαλῶμεν, ὅταν τὰ κεφάλαια τῇ νοήσει περιλάβωσιν, αὐτοὺς δι' αὑτῶν τὰ λοιπὰ συντιθέναι, καὶ τῇ μνήμῃ χειραγωγεῖν τὴν εὕρεσιν, καὶ τὸν
C ἀλλότριον λόγον οἷον ἀρχὴν καὶ σπέρμα λαβόντας ἐκτρέφειν καὶ αὔξειν. οὐ γὰρ ὡς ἀγγεῖον ὁ νοῦς ἀποπληρώσεως ἀλλ' ὑπεκκαύματος μόνον ὥσπερ ὕλη δεῖται, ὁρμὴν ἐμποιοῦντος εὑρετικὴν καὶ

[1] λίχνοι Wyttenbach.

[a] Sophocles, *Antigone*, 237.

irksome. For when they are by themselves they are not willing to give themselves any trouble, but they give trouble to the speaker by repeatedly asking questions about the same things, like unfledged nestlings always agape toward the mouth of another, and desirous of receiving everything ready prepared and predigested. There is another class, who, eager to be thought astute and attentive out of due place, wear out the speakers with loquacity and officiousness, by continually propounding some extraneous and unessential difficulty and asking for demonstrations of matters that need no demonstration, and so, as Sophocles [a] puts it,

Much time it takes to go a little way,

not only for themselves but for the rest of the company too. For holding back the speaker on every possible occasion by their inane and superfluous questions, as in a company of persons travelling together, they impede the regular course of the lecture, which has to put up with halts and delays. Now such persons are, according to Hieronymus, like cowardly and persistent puppies which, at home, bite at the skins of wild animals, and tear off what bits they can, but never touch the animals themselves. But as for those lazy persons whom we have mentioned, let us urge them that, when their intelligence has comprehended the main points, they put the rest together by their own efforts, and use their memory as a guide in thinking for themselves, and, taking the discourse of another as a germ and seed, develop and expand it. For the mind does not require filling like a bottle, but rather, like wood, it only requires kindling to create in it an impulse to think independently and an ardent desire for the

(48) ὄρεξιν ἐπὶ τὴν ἀλήθειαν. ὥσπερ οὖν εἴ τις ἐκ γειτόνων πυρὸς δεόμενος, εἶτα πολὺ καὶ λαμπρὸν εὑρὼν αὐτοῦ καταμένοι διὰ τέλους θαλπόμενος, οὕτως εἴ τις ἥκων λόγου μεταλαβεῖν πρὸς ἄλλον οὐκ οἴεται δεῖν φῶς οἰκεῖον ἐξάπτειν καὶ νοῦν ἴδιον, ἀλλὰ χαίρων τῇ ἀκροάσει κάθηται θελγό-
D μενος, οἷον ἔρευθος ἕλκει καὶ γάνωμα τὴν δόξαν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων, τὸν δ' ἐντὸς εὐρῶτα τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ζόφον οὐκ ἐκτεθέρμαγκεν οὐδ' ἐξέωκε διὰ φιλοσοφίας.

Εἰ δεῖ τινος οὖν πρὸς ἀκρόασιν ἑτέρου παραγγέλματος, δεῖ καὶ τοῦ νῦν εἰρημένου μνημονεύοντας ἀσκεῖν ἅμα τῇ μαθήσει τὴν εὕρεσιν, ἵνα μὴ σοφιστικὴν ἕξιν μηδ' ἱστορικὴν ἀλλ' ἐνδιάθετον καὶ φιλόσοφον λαμβάνωμεν, ἀρχὴν τοῦ καλῶς βιῶναι τὸ καλῶς ἀκοῦσαι νομίζοντες.

truth. Imagine, then, that a man should need to get fire from a neighbour, and, upon finding a big bright fire there, should stay there continually warming himself; just so it is if a man comes to another to share the benefit of a discourse, and does not think it necessary to kindle from it some illumination for himself and some thinking of his own, but, delighting in the discourse, sits enchanted; he gets, as it were, a bright and ruddy glow in the form of opinion imparted to him by what is said, but the mouldiness and darkness of his inner mind he has not dissipated nor banished by the warm glow of philosophy.

Finally, if there be need of any other instruction in regard to listening to a lecture, it is that it is necessary to keep in mind what has here been said, and to cultivate independent thinking along with our learning, so that we may acquire a habit of mind that is not sophistic or bent on acquiring mere information, but one that is deeply ingrained and philosophic, as we may do if we believe that right listening is the beginning of right living.

HOW TO TELL A FLATTERER FROM A FRIEND

(QUOMODO ADULATOR AB AMICO INTERNOSCATUR)

BEER FROM A FRIEND
MODO ADJUVATOR AB AMICO
(NUTRIMENTUM)

INTRODUCTION

PLUTARCH'S essay on flatterers is addressed to C. Julius Antiochus Philopappus, a descendant of the kings of Commagene, whose monument still stands on the Museum Hill at Athens. He was a patron of art and literature, and on friendly terms with Plutarch.[a]

The essay is not concerned with the impecunious and dependent adherents (parasites) of the rich, but with the adroit flatterers of a higher standing, who worm their way into the confidence of great men, and exercise a pernicious influence upon them. That Philopappus may have stood in need of such a warning may readily be inferred.

The essay, at the close, digresses into a disquisition on frank speech (*παρρησία*) that might easily have been made into a separate treatise, but which is developed naturally from the attempt to distinguish the genuineness of a friend from the affectation of a flatterer. Frank speech was regarded in classical times as the birthright of every Athenian citizen, but under the political conditions existent in Plutarch's day it was probably safer to cultivate it as a private virtue.

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 628 B, which gives a brief account of a great dinner given by King Philopappus at which both he and Plutarch were present.

E

ΠΩΣ ΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΔΙΑΚΡΙΝΕΙΕ ΤΟΝ ΚΟΛΑΚΑ ΤΟΥ ΦΙΛΟΥ

1. Τῷ σφόδρα φιλεῖν ἑαυτόν, ὦ Ἀντίοχε Φιλόπαππε, φάσκοντι συγγνώμην μὲν ἅπαντας ὁ ΠλάF των διδόναι φησί, κακίαν δὲ σὺν πολλαῖς ἄλλαις ἐγγίγνεσθαι μεγίστην, ὑφ' ἧς οὐκ ἔστιν αὐτοῦ κριτὴν δίκαιον οὐδ' ἀδέκαστον εἶναι· "τυφλοῦται γὰρ τὸ φιλοῦν περὶ τὸ φιλούμενον," ἂν μή τις μαθὼν ἐθισθῇ τὰ καλὰ τιμᾶν καὶ διώκειν μᾶλλον ἢ τὰ συγγενῆ καὶ οἰκεῖα. τοῦτο τῷ κόλακι πολλὴν μεταξὺ τῆς φιλίας εὐρυχωρίαν δίδωσιν, ὁρμητήριον ἐφ' ἡμᾶς εὐφυὲς ἔχοντι τὴν φιλαυτίαν, δι' ἣν αὐτὸς
49 αὑτοῦ κόλαξ ἕκαστος ὢν πρῶτος καὶ μέγιστος οὐ χαλεπῶς προσίεται τὸν ἔξωθεν ὢν οἴεται καὶ βούλεται μάρτυν ἅμ' αὐτῷ καὶ βεβαιωτὴν προσγιγνόμενον. ὁ γὰρ λοιδορούμενος φιλοκόλαξ σφόδρα φίλαυτός ἐστι, δι' εὔνοιαν ἑαυτῷ πάντα μὲν ὑπάρχειν βουλόμενος πάντα δ' οἰόμενος ὧν ἡ μὲν βούλησις οὐκ ἄτοπος ἡ δ' οἴησις ἐπισφαλὴς καὶ δεομένη

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[a] *Laws*, 731 D, E.

[b] *Ibid.*; cited also in *Moralia*, 90 A, 92 E, and 1000 A.

[c] True friendship is, of course, proof against flattery, but friendship weakened by self-love is a sort of borderland between true friendship and flattery in which the flatterer can work.

HOW TO TELL A FLATTERER FROM A FRIEND

1. Plato[a] says, my dear Antiochus Philopappus, that everyone grants forgiveness to the man who avows that he dearly loves himself, but he also says that along with many other faults which are engendered thereby the most serious is that which makes it impossible for such a man to be an honest and unbiased judge of himself. "For Love is blind as regards the beloved,"[b] unless one, through study, has acquired the habit of respecting and pursuing what is honourable rather than what is inbred and familiar. This fact affords to the flatterer a very wide field within the realm of friendship,[c] since in our love of self he has an excellent base of operations against us. It is because of this self-love that everybody is himself his own foremost and greatest flatterer, and hence finds no difficulty in admitting the outsider to witness with him and to confirm his own conceits and desires. For the man who is spoken of with opprobrium as a lover of flatterers is in high degree a lover of self, and, because of his kindly feeling toward himself, he desires and conceives himself to be endowed with all manner of good qualities; but although the desire for these is not unnatural, yet the conceit that one possesses them is dangerous and must be carefully avoided. Now

(49) πολλῆς εὐλαβείας. εἰ δὲ δὴ θεῖον ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ "πάντων μὲν ἀγαθῶν θεοῖς πάντων δ' ἀνθρώποις"
B ἀρχὴ κατὰ Πλάτωνα, κινδυνεύει θεοῖς ἐχθρὸς ὁ κόλαξ εἶναι, τῷ δὲ Πυθίῳ διαφερόντως. ἀντιτάττεται γὰρ ἀεὶ πρὸς τὸ "γνῶθι σαυτόν," ἀπάτην ἑκάστῳ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐμποιῶν καὶ ἄγνοιαν ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτὸν ἀγαθῶν καὶ κακῶν, τὰ μὲν ἐλλιπῆ καὶ ἀτελῆ τὰ δ' ὅλως ἀνεπανόρθωτα ποιῶν.

2. Εἰ μὲν οὖν, ὡς τὰ πλεῖστα τῶν ἄλλων κακῶν, ὁ κόλαξ ἥπτετο μόνον ἢ μάλιστα τῶν ἀγεννῶν καὶ φαύλων, οὐκ ἂν ἦν οὕτω δεινὸν οὐδὲ δυσφύλακτον· ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ οἱ θρῖπες ἐνδύονται μάλιστα τοῖς ἁπαλοῖς καὶ γλυκέσι ξύλοις, οὕτω τὰ φιλότιμα
C τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ χρηστὰ καὶ ἐπιεικῆ τὸν κόλακα δέχεται καὶ τρέφει προσφυόμενον, ἔτι δ' ὥσπερ ὁ Σιμωνίδης τὴν

"ἱπποτροφίαν," φησίν, "οὐ Ζακύνθῳ ὀπαδεῖν
ἀλλ' ἀρούραισι πυροφόροις,"

οὕτω τὴν κολακείαν ὁρῶμεν οὐ πένησιν οὐδ' ἀδόξοις οὐδ' ἀδυνάτοις ἀκολουθοῦσαν, ἀλλ' οἴκων τε καὶ πραγμάτων μεγάλων ὀλίσθημα καὶ νόσημα γιγνομένην, πολλάκις δὲ καὶ βασιλείας καὶ ἡγεμονίας ἀνατρέπουσαν, οὐ μικρὸν ἔργον ἐστὶν οὐδὲ φαύλης δεόμενον προνοίας ἡ περὶ αὐτὴν ἐπίσκεψις, ὡς ἂν μάλιστα περίφωρος οὖσα μὴ βλάπτῃ[1] μηδὲ διαβάλλῃ[1] τὴν φιλίαν. οἱ μὲν γὰρ φθεῖρες ἀπίασιν
D ἀπὸ τῶν τελευτώντων καὶ ἀπολείπουσι τὰ σώματα σβεννυμένου τοῦ αἵματος ἐξ οὗ τρέφονται, τοὺς δὲ κόλακας οὐδ' ὅλως ἰδεῖν ἔστι πράγμασι ξηροῖς

[1] βλάπτῃ . . . διαβάλλῃ Hercher: βλάπτοι . . . διαβάλλοι.

[a] *Laws*, 730 c.

if Truth is a thing divine, and, as Plato [a] puts it, the origin " of all good for gods and all good for men," then the flatterer is in all likelihood an enemy to the gods and particularly to the Pythian god. For the flatterer always takes a position over against the maxim " Know thyself," by creating in every man deception towards himself and ignorance both of himself and of the good and evil that concerns himself; the good he renders defective and incomplete, and the evil wholly impossible to amend.

2. If the flatterer, then, like most other evils, attacked solely or mostly the ignoble and mean, he would not be so formidable or so hard to guard against. But the fact is, that as bore-worms make their entrance chiefly into the delicate and sweet-scented kinds of wood, so it is ambitious, honest, and promising characters that receive and nourish the flatterer as he hangs upon them. Moreover, just as Simonides [b] says,

> The rearing of horses consorts not with Zacynthus,
> But with wheat-bearing acres,

so we observe that flattery does not attend upon poor, obscure, or unimportant persons, but makes itself a stumbling-block and a pestilence in great houses and great affairs, and oftentimes overturns kingdoms and principalities. Wherefore it is no small task, nor a matter requiring but slight foresight, to subject it to examination, so that, being thoroughly exposed, it may be prevented from injuring or discrediting friendship. Vermin depart from dying persons and forsake their bodies, as the blood, from which the vermin derive their sustenance, loses its vitality; and so flatterers are never so much

[b] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. 393.

(49) καὶ κατεψυγμένοις προσιόντας, ἀλλὰ ταῖς δόξαις καὶ ταῖς δυνάμεσιν ἐπιτίθενται καὶ αὔξονται, ταχὺ δ' ἐν ταῖς μεταβολαῖς ὑπορρέουσιν. ἀλλὰ τὴν τότε πεῖραν οὐ δεῖ περιμένειν ἀνωφελῆ, μᾶλλον δὲ βλαβερὰν καὶ οὐκ ἀκίνδυνον οὖσαν. χαλεπὴ γὰρ ἐν καιρῷ δεομένῳ φίλων ἡ τῶν μὴ φίλων αἴσθησις, ἀντικαταλλαγὴν οὐκ ἔχουσα χρήστου καὶ βεβαίου πρὸς ἀβέβαιον καὶ κίβδηλον. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ νόμισμα δεῖ τὸν φίλον ἔχειν πρὸ τῆς χρείας
E δεδοκιμασμένον, μὴ ὑπὸ τῆς χρείας ἐλεγχόμενον. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ βλαβέντας αἰσθέσθαι, ἀλλ' ὅπως μὴ βλαβῶμεν ἐμπειρίαν λαβεῖν καὶ κατανόησιν τοῦ κόλακος· εἰ δὲ μή, ταὐτὸ πεισόμεθα τοῖς αἰσθανομένοις τῷ προγεγεῦσθαι τῶν θανασίμων φαρμάκων, εἰς τὴν κρίσιν ἀπολλύντες ἑαυτοὺς καὶ διαφθείροντες. οὔτε γὰρ δὴ τούτους ἐπαινοῦμεν οὔθ' ὅσοι τὸν φίλον εἰς τὸ καλὸν τιθέμενοι καὶ ὠφέλιμον οἴονται τοὺς κεχαρισμένως ὁμιλοῦντας εὐθὺς ἔχειν ἐπ' αὐτοφώρῳ κόλακας εἰλημμένους. οὐδὲ γὰρ ἀηδὴς ὁ φίλος οὐδ' ἄκρατος, οὐδὲ τῷ
F πικρῷ σεμνὸν ἡ φιλία καὶ αὐστηρῷ, ἀλλ' αὐτὸ δὴ τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν καὶ τὸ σεμνὸν αὐτῆς ἡδὺ καὶ ποθούμενόν ἐστι,

πὰρ δ' αὐτῇ Χάριτές τε καὶ Ἵμερος οἰκί' ἔθεντο,

καὶ οὐ δυστυχοῦντι μόνον

εἰς ὄμματ' εὔνου φωτὸς ἐμβλέψαι γλυκὺ

κατ' Εὐριπίδην, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον τοῖς ἀγαθοῖς

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[a] Adapted from Hesiod, *Theogony*, 64.
[b] *Ion*, 732 ; again cited in *Moralia*, 69 A.

as to be seen coming near where succulence and warmth are lacking, but where renown and power attend, there do they throng and thrive; but if a change come, they slink away quickly and are gone. But we must not wait until that experience shall befall, which is a thing profitless, or rather injurious and not devoid of danger. For it is cruel to discover friends that are no friends at a crucial time which calls for friends, since there is then no exchanging one that is untrustworthy and spurious for the true and trustworthy. But one's friend, like a coin, should have been examined and approved before the time of need, not proved by the need to be no friend. For we must not wait for injury to open our eyes, but to avoid injury we must gain acquaintance with the flatterer and learn how to detect him; otherwise we shall be in the same case with those who try to learn about deadly drugs by tasting them first, and so ruin and destroy themselves in order to reach their decision. We do not, of course, commend such persons, nor again those who rate the friend as something noble and beneficial, and so imagine that all who are socially agreeable at once stand openly convicted of being flatterers. For a friend is not unpleasant or absolute, nor is it bitterness and sternness that give dignity to friendship, but this very nobility and dignity in it is sweet and desirable.

> Close by its side have the Graces and Longing established their dwelling,[a]

and not merely for one who is in misfortune

> 'Tis sweet to gaze into a kind man's eyes,

as Euripides [b] has it, but when friendship attends us,

ἡδονὴν ἐπιφέρουσα καὶ χάριν ἢ τῶν κακῶν ἀφ-
αιροῦσα τὰς λύπας καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας παρέπεται.
50 καὶ καθάπερ ὁ Εὔηνος εἶπε, τῶν ἡδυσμάτων τὸ
πῦρ εἶναι κράτιστον, οὕτω τῷ βίῳ μείξας τὴν
φιλίαν ὁ θεὸς ἅπαντα φαιδρὰ καὶ γλυκέα καὶ
προσφιλῆ ταύτης παρούσης καὶ συναπολαυούσης
ἐποίησεν. ἐπεὶ πῶς ἂν ὁ κόλαξ ὑπεδύετο ταῖς
ἡδοναῖς, εἰ τὴν φιλίαν ἑώρα τὸ ἡδὺ μηδαμοῦ
προσιεμένην, οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ τὰ
ψευδόχρυσα καὶ τὰ κίβδηλα τὴν λαμπρότητα τοῦ
χρυσοῦ καὶ τὸ γάνωμα μιμεῖται μόνον, οὕτως
B ἔοικεν ὁ κόλαξ τοῦ φίλου τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ κεχαρισμένον
ἐκμιμούμενος ἀεὶ παρέχειν ἱλαρὸν καὶ ἀνθηρὸν
καὶ πρὸς μηδὲν ἀντιβαίνοντα μηδ' ὑπεναντιούμενον
ἑαυτόν. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τοὺς ἐπαινοῦντας εὐθὺς ὡς
κολακεύοντας ἁπλῶς ὑφορατέον· ἔπαινος γὰρ οὐχ
ἧττον ἐν καιρῷ ψόγου φιλίᾳ προσήκει, μᾶλλον δὲ
τὸ μὲν δύσκολον ὅλως καὶ μεμψίμοιρον ἄφιλον
καὶ ἀνομίλητον, τῆς δ' ἀφθόνως καὶ προθύμως
τὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς ἀποδιδούσης ἔπαινον εὐνοίας
καὶ τὸ νουθετοῦν αὖθις καὶ παρρησιαζόμενον
ἐλαφρῶς καὶ ἁλύπως ὑπομένομεν, πιστεύοντες
καὶ ἀγαπῶντες ὡς ἀναγκαίως ψέγοντα τὸν ἡδέως
ἐπαινοῦντα.

C 3. Χαλεπὸν οὖν φαίη τις ἄν ἐστι διακρῖναι τὸν
κόλακα καὶ τὸν φίλον, εἰ μήθ' ἡδονῇ μήτ' ἐπαίνῳ
διαφέρουσι· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὑπουργίαις καὶ διακονίαις
πολλάκις ἰδεῖν ἐστι τὴν φιλίαν ὑπὸ τῆς κολακείας
παρατρεχομένην. τί δ' οὐ μέλλει, φήσομεν, ἂν τὸν

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[a] Again cited in *Moralia*, 126 D, 697 D, and 1010 C.

it brings pleasure and delight to our prosperity no less than it takes away the griefs and the feeling of helplessness from adversity. As Evenus [a] has remarked that fire is the best of sauce, so God, by commingling friendship with our life, has made everything cheerful, sweet and agreeable, when friendship is there to share in our enjoyment. Indeed, how the flatterer could use pleasures to insinuate himself, if he saw that friendship was nowhere ready to welcome what is pleasant, no man can explain. But just as false and counterfeit imitations of gold imitate only its brilliancy and lustre, so apparently the flatterer, imitating the pleasant and attractive characteristics of the friend, always presents himself in a cheerful and blithe mood, with never a whit of crossing or opposition. But that is no reason why persons who express commendation should instantly be suspected of being simply flatterers. For commendation at the right time is no less becoming to friendship than is censure, or we may express it better by saying that complaining and fault-finding generally is unfriendly and unsociable, whereas the kindly feeling that ungrudgingly and readily bestows commendation for noble acts inclines us, at some later time, cheerfully and without distress to bear admonishment and frankness of speech, since we believe, and are content, that the man who is glad to commend blames only when he must.

3. One might say, then, that it is difficult to distinguish flatterer and friend, if neither pleasure nor praise shows the difference; indeed, in services and courtesies we may often observe that friendship is outstripped by flattery. How can it be helped, will

(50) ἀληθινὸν κόλακα καὶ μετὰ δεινότητος καὶ τέχνης ἁπτόμενον τοῦ πράγματος διώκωμεν, ἀλλὰ μή, καθάπερ οἱ πολλοί, τοὺς αὐτοληκύθους τούτους λεγομένους καὶ τραπεζέας καὶ μετὰ τὸ κατὰ χειρὸς ὕδωρ ἀκουομένους ὥς τις εἶπε κόλακας νομίζωμεν, D ὧν ἐν μιᾷ λοπάδι καὶ κύλικι μετὰ βωμολοχίας καὶ βδελυρίας ἡ ἀνελευθερία γίγνεται κατάδηλος; οὐ γὰρ δήπου Μελάνθιον ἔδει τὸν Ἀλεξάνδρου τοῦ Φεραίου παράσιτον ἐξελέγχειν, ὃς τοῖς ἐρωτῶσι πῶς Ἀλέξανδρος ἐσφάγη "διὰ τῆς πλευρᾶς" ἔλεγεν "εἰς τὴν γαστέρα τὴν ἐμήν," οὐδὲ τοὺς ἀμφὶ πλουσίαν τράπεζαν ἐγκυκλουμένους, οὓς

οὐ πῦρ[1] οὐδὲ[2] σίδαρος
οὐδὲ χαλκὸς εἴργει
μὴ φοιτᾶν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον,

οὐδὲ τὰς ἐν Κύπρῳ κολακίδας, ἐπειδὴ διέβησαν εἰς Συρίαν, κλιμακίδας προσαγορευθείσας, ὅτι ταῖς E γυναιξὶ τῶν βασιλέων ἀναβαίνειν ἐπὶ τὰς ἁμάξας δι' αὐτῶν ὑποκατακλινόμεναι παρεῖχον.

4. Τίνα οὖν δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι; τὸν μὴ δοκοῦντα μηδ' ὁμολογοῦντα κολακεύειν, ὃν οὐκ ἔστι λαβεῖν περὶ τοὐπτάνιον, οὐδ' ἁλίσκεται σκιὰν καταμετρῶν ἐπὶ δεῖπνον, οὐδ' ἔρριπται μεθυσθεὶς ὅπως ἔτυχεν, ἀλλὰ νήφει τὰ πολλὰ καὶ πολυπραγμονεῖ καὶ πράξεων μετέχειν οἴεται δεῖν καὶ λόγων ἀπορρήτων βούλεται κοινωνὸς εἶναι, καὶ ὅλως τραγικός ἐστιν

[1] οὐ πῦρ 778 E: οὔτε πῦρ. [2] οὐδὲ Meineke: οὐ.

[a] Men too poor to afford a servant, and hence obliged to carry their own bottle of oil to the bath. *Cf.* Demosthenes, *Against Conon*, § 16 (p. 1262).

[b] The ceremonial washing of the hands immediately before eating.

be our answer, if we are in quest of the real flatterer, who takes hold of the business with adroitness and skill, and if we do not, like most people, regard as flatterers merely those self-ministering[a] trencher-slaves, so called, whose tongue will be wagging, as one man has put it, as soon as the water is brought for the hands,[b] for whom one dish and one glass of wine is enough to show their ill breeding with its display of vulgarity and offensiveness? Surely there was no need to press the case against Melanthius, the parasite of Alexander of Pherae, who, in answer to those who asked how Alexander was slain, said, "By a stab through his ribs that hit me in my belly"; nor those who throng round a rich man's table whom

> Not fire, nor steel,
> Nor bronze can keep
> From coming each day to dine.[c]

nor the flatteresses in Cyprus,[d] who when they had crossed over into Syria, acquired the nickname of "ladderesses," because by prostrating themselves they afforded by their bodies a means for the women of the royal household to mount their carriages.

4. Against whom, then, must we be on our guard? Against the man who does not seem to flatter and will not admit that he does so, the man who is never to be found hanging round the kitchen, never caught noting the shadow on the sun-dial to see if it is getting towards dinner-time, never gets drunk and drops down in a heap on the floor; he is usually sober, he is always busy, and must have a hand in everything; he has a mind to be in all secrets, and in general plays the part of friend with the gravity of a tragedian and

[c] From the *Flatterers* of Eupolis according to Plutarch, *Moralia*, 778 E; *cf.* Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* i. p. 303.

[d] *Cf.* Athenaeus, 256 D.

οὐ σατυρικὸς φιλίας ὑποκριτὴς οὐδὲ κωμικός. ὡς γὰρ ὁ Πλάτων φησίν, "ἐσχάτης ἀδικίας εἶναι
F δοκεῖν δίκαιον μὴ ὄντα," καὶ κολακείαν ἡγητέον χαλεπὴν τὴν λανθάνουσαν οὐ τὴν ὁμολογοῦσαν, οὐδὲ τὴν παίζουσαν ἀλλὰ τὴν σπουδάζουσαν· αὕτη γὰρ ἀναπίμπλησι καὶ τὴν ἀληθινὴν φιλίαν ἀπιστίας, συνεμπίπτουσαν αὐτῇ πολλάκις, ἂν μὴ προσέχωμεν. ὁ μὲν οὖν Γωβρύας εἰς σκοτεινὸν οἴκημα τῷ μάγῳ φεύγοντι συνεισπεσὼν καὶ γενόμενος ἐν διαπάλαις ἐπιστάντα καὶ διαποροῦντα τὸν Δαρεῖον ἐκέλευσεν ὠθεῖν καὶ δι' ἀμφοτέρων· ἡμεῖς δέ, εἰ μηδαμῆ μηδαμῶς ἐπαινοῦμεν τὸ "ἐρρέτω φίλος σὺν ἐχθρῷ," διὰ πολλῶν ὁμοιοτήτων τὸν κόλακα τῷ φίλῳ συμπεπλεγμένον ἀπο-
51 σπάσαι ζητοῦντες ὀφείλομεν εὖ μάλα φοβεῖσθαι μή πως ἢ τῷ κακῷ τὸ χρήσιμον συνεκβάλωμεν ἢ φειδόμενοι τοῦ οἰκείου τῷ βλάπτοντι περιπέσωμεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἶμαι τῶν ἀγρίων σπερμάτων ὅσα καὶ σχῆμα καὶ μέγεθος παραπλήσιον ἔχοντα τῷ πυρῷ συμμέμικται χαλεπὴν ἔχει τὴν ἀποκάθαρσιν (ἢ γὰρ οὐ διεκπίπτει τῶν στενοτέρων πόρων ἢ συνεκπίπτει διὰ τῶν ἀραιῶν), οὕτως ἡ κολακεία τῆς φιλίας εἰς πᾶν πάθος καὶ πᾶν κίνημα καὶ χρείαν καὶ συνήθειαν ἑαυτὴν καταμιγνύουσα δυσχώριστός ἐστιν.

5. Ὅτι μέντοι γε πάντων ἥδιστόν ἐστιν ἡ φιλία
B καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο μᾶλλον εὐφραίνει, διὰ τοῦτο καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἡδοναῖς ὑπάγεται καὶ περὶ ἡδονάς ἐστιν.

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[a] *Republic*, 361 A.
[b] Herodotus, iii. 78.
Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 362.

not like a comedian or a buffoon. For as Plato [a] says, " it is the height of dishonesty to seem to be honest when one is not," and so the flattery which we must regard as difficult to deal with is that which is hidden, not that which is openly avowed, that which is serious, not that which is meant as a joke. For such flattery infects even true friendship with distrust, unless we give heed, for in many respects it coincides with friendship. Now it is true that Gobryas, having forced his way into a dark room along with the fleeing Magian, and finding himself engaged in a desperate struggle, called upon Darius, who had stopped beside them and was in doubt what to do, to strike even though he should pierce them both [b]; but we, if we can by no means approve the sentiment, " Down with a foe though a friend go too," [c] have great cause to fear in seeking to detach the flatterer, who through many similarities is closely interlocked with the friend, lest in some way we either cast out the useful along with the bad, or else, in trying to spare what is close to our hearts, we fall upon what is injurious. So, I think, when wild seeds which have a shape and size approximating to wheat have got mixed with it, the process of cleaning is difficult (for either they do not pass out through a finer sieve, or else they do pass out through a coarser, and the wheat along with them); in like manner, flattery which blends itself with every emotion, every movement, need, and habit, is hard to separate from friendship.

5. For the very reason, however, that friendship is the most pleasant thing in the world, and because nothing else gives greater delight, the flatterer allures by means of pleasures and concerns himself

(51) ὅτι δ' ἡ χάρις καὶ ἡ χρεία τῇ φιλίᾳ παρέπεται (καθ' ὃ δὴ καὶ λέγεται πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ὁ φίλος ἀναγκαιότερος εἶναι), διὰ τοῦτ' ἐμβάλλων εἰς τὰς ὑπουργίας ἑαυτὸν ὁ κόλαξ ἁμιλλᾶται σπουδαστικὸς ἀεὶ φαίνεσθαι καὶ ἄοκνος καὶ πρόθυμος. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ μάλιστα φιλίας ἀρχὴν συνέχον ὁμοιότης ἐστὶν ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ ἠθῶν, καὶ ὅλως τὸ χαίρειν τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ τὸ ταὐτὰ φεύγειν πρῶτον εἰς ταὐτὸ συνάγει καὶ συνίστησι διὰ τῆς ὁμοιοπαθείας,
C τοῦτο κατιδὼν ὁ κόλαξ αὐτὸν ὥσπερ ὕλην τινὰ ῥυθμίζει καὶ σχηματίζει, περιαρμόσαι καὶ περιπλάσαι ζητῶν οἷς ἂν ἐπιχειρῇ διὰ μιμήσεως, ὑγρὸς ὢν μεταβάλλεσθαι καὶ πιθανὸς ἐπὶ τὰς ἐξομοιώσεις, ὥστ' εἰπεῖν

οὐ παῖς Ἀχιλλέως, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος αὐτὸς εἶ.

Ὁ δὲ πάντων ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ πανουργότατον, αἰσθανόμενος τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ λεγομένην καὶ δοκοῦσαν ἰδίαν εἶναι φωνὴν ὥσπερ τινὸς ζῴου τῆς φιλίας, τὸ δ' ἀπαρρησίαστον ἄφιλον καὶ ἀγεννές, οὐδὲ ταύτην ἀμίμητον ἀπολέλοιπεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοὶ τῶν ὀψοποιῶν τοῖς πικροῖς χυμοῖς καὶ αὐστηροῖς ἡδύσμασι χρῶνται, τῶν γλυκέων ἀφ-
D αιροῦντες τὸ πλήσμιον, οὕτως οἱ κόλακες οὐκ ἀληθινὴν οὐδ' ὠφέλιμον ἀλλ' οἷον ἐπιλλώπτουσαν ἐξ ὀφρύος καὶ γαργαλίζουσαν ἀτεχνῶς παρρησίαν προσφέρουσιν. ἔστι μὲν οὖν διὰ ταῦτα δυσφώρατος ὁ ἀνήρ, ὥσπερ τῶν θηρίων ὅσα πεφυκότα τὴν χρόαν τρέπεσθαι συναφομοιοῦται τοῖς ὑποκειμένοις

[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 363; quoted by Plutarch also in the *Life of Alcibiades*, 203 c.

with pleasures. And just because graciousness and usefulness go with friendship (which is the reason why they say that a friend is more indispensable than fire and water), the flatterer thrusts himself into services for us, striving always to appear earnest, unremitting, and diligent. And inasmuch as that which most especially cements a friendship begun is a likeness of pursuits and characters, and since to take delight in the same things and avoid the same things is what generally brings people together in the first place, and gets them acquainted through the bond of sympathy, the flatterer takes note of this fact, and adjusts and shapes himself, as though he were so much inert matter, endeavouring to adapt and mould himself to fit those whom he attacks through imitation; and he is so supple in changes and so plausible in his copyings that we may exclaim:

Achilles' self thou art and not his son.[a]

But the most unprincipled trick of all that he has is this: perceiving that frankness of speech, by common report and belief, is the language of friendship especially (as an animal has its peculiar cry), and, on the other hand, that lack of frankness is unfriendly and ignoble, he does not allow even this to escape imitation, but, just as clever cooks employ bitter extracts and astringent flavourings to remove the cloying effect of sweet things, so flatterers apply a frankness which is not genuine or beneficial, but which, as it were, winks while it frowns, and does nothing but tickle. For these reasons, then, the man is hard to detect, as is the case with some animals to which Nature has given the faculty of changing their hue, so that they exactly conform to

(51) χρώμασι[1] καὶ χωρίοις· ἐπεὶ δ' ἐκεῖνος ἐξαπατᾷ τε καὶ περικαλύπτεται ταῖς ὁμοιότησιν, ἡμέτερον ἔργον ἐστὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς ἀνακαλύπτειν καὶ ἀπογυμνοῦν αὐτὸν "ἀλλοτρίοις χρώμασι καὶ σχήμασιν,[2]" ᾗ φησιν ὁ Πλάτων, "χήτει οἰκείων κοσμούμενον."

6. Εὐθὺς οὖν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρχῆς σκοπῶμεν. ἀρχὴν δὴ[3] φιλίας ἔφαμεν εἶναι τοῖς πλείστοις τὴν ταὐτὰ
E μὲν ἐπιεικῶς ἀσπαζομένην ἔθη καὶ ἤθη τοῖς δ' αὐτοῖς χαίρουσαν ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ πράγμασι καὶ διατριβαῖς ὁμοιοπαθῆ διάθεσιν καὶ φύσιν, ἐφ' ἧς καὶ ταῦτ' εἴρηται·

> γέρων γέροντι γλῶσσαν ἡδίστην ἔχει,
> παῖς παιδί, καὶ γυναικὶ πρόσφορον γυνή,
> νοσῶν τ' ἀνὴρ νοσοῦντι, καὶ δυσπραξίᾳ
> ληφθεὶς ἐπῳδός ἐστι τῷ πειρωμένῳ.[4]

εἰδὼς οὖν ὁ κόλαξ ὅτι τῷ[5] χαίρειν τοῖς ὁμοίοις καὶ τὸ χρῆσθαι καὶ ἀγαπᾶν ἔμφυτόν ἐστι, ταύτῃ πρῶ-
F τον ἐπιχειρεῖ πλησιάζειν ἑκάστῳ καὶ παρασκηνοῦν, ὥσπερ ἔν τισι νομαῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἐπιτηδεύμασι καὶ διατριβαῖς περὶ ταὐτὰ καὶ σπουδαῖς καὶ διαίταις ἀτρέμα παραβάλλων καὶ προσαναχρωννύμενος, ἄχρι οὗ λαβὴν παραδῷ καὶ ψαύοντι τιθασὸς γένηται καὶ συνήθης, ψέγων μὲν οἷς ἐκεῖνον αἰσθάνεται πράγμασι καὶ βίοις καὶ ἀνθρώποις ἀχθόμενον, ἐπαινέτης δὲ τῶν ἀρεσκόντων οὐ μέτριος ἀλλ' ὥσθ'

[1] χρώμασι] ὑλήμασι most mss.
[2] σχήμασιν] κόσμοις Plato, *Phaedr.* 239 D.
[3] δὴ F.C.B.: δὲ.
[4] τἀπορουμένῳ, "to the man perplexed," Herwerden.
[5] τῷ Hartman: τό.

[a] *Phaedrus*, 239 D.

the colours and objects beneath them. And since the flatterer uses resemblances to deceive and to wrap about him, it is our task to use the differences in order to unwrap him and lay him bare, in the act, as Plato [a] puts it, of "adorning himself with alien colours and forms for want of any of his own."

6. Let us, then, consider this matter from the beginning. We have previously said that with most people the beginning of friendship is their congenial disposition and nature, which welcomes the same habits and traits, as nearly as may be, and takes delight in the same pursuits, activities, and avocations; on the subject of this it has also been said:

> An old man hath the sweetest tongue for old,
> And child for child, and woman suits her kind,
> A sick man suits the sick; misfortune's thrall
> Hath charms for him who hath just met mischance.[b]

So then the flatterer, knowing that when people take delight in the same things it is only natural that they find enjoyment and satisfaction in each other's company, adopts this course in making his first attempts to approach each victim and to secure a lodgement near him; he acts as though the man were some animal running at large in a pasture,[c] and by affecting the same pursuits, the same avocations, interests and manner of life, he gradually gets close to him, and rubs up against him so as to take on his colouring, until his victim gives him some hold and becomes docile and accustomed to his touch: he is ever disapproving actions and lives and persons which he perceives his victim to dislike, while if anything pleases the other he commends, not with

[b] *Cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 364, and Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii. 606.

[c] A reminiscence of Plato's *Republic*, 493 A.

52 ὑπερβάλλειν σὺν ἐκπλήξει καὶ θαύματι φαινόμενος, βεβαιῶν δὲ τὸ φιλοῦν καὶ τὸ μισοῦν ὡς κρίσει μᾶλλον ἢ πάθει γιγνόμενον.

7. Πῶς οὖν ἐλέγχεται καὶ τίσιν ἁλίσκεται διαφοραῖς, οὐκ ὢν ὅμοιος οὐδὲ γιγνόμενος ἀλλὰ μιμούμενος ὅμοιον; πρῶτον μὲν ὁρᾶν δεῖ τὴν ὁμαλότητα τῆς προαιρέσεως καὶ τὸ ἐνδελεχές, εἰ χαίρει τε τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἀεὶ καὶ ταὐτὰ ἐπαινεῖ καὶ πρὸς ἓν ἀπευθύνει καὶ καθίστησι παράδειγμα τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον, ὥσπερ ἐλευθέρῳ φιλίας ὁμοιοτρόπου καὶ συνηθείας ἐραστῇ προσήκει. τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ φίλος. ὁ δὲ κόλαξ ἅτε δὴ μίαν ἑστίαν ἤθους οὐκ ἔχων μόνιμον οὐδ' ἑαυτῷ
B βίον ζῶν αἱρετὸν ἀλλ' ἑτέρῳ, καὶ πρὸς ἕτερον πλάττων καὶ προσαρμόττων ἑαυτὸν οὐχ ἁπλοῦς οὐδ' εἷς ἀλλὰ παντοδαπός ἐστι καὶ ποικίλος, εἰς ἄλλον ἐξ ἄλλου τόπον ὥσπερ τὸ μετερώμενον[1] ὕδωρ περιρρέων ἀεὶ καὶ συσχηματιζόμενος τοῖς ὑποδεχομένοις.

Ὁ μὲν γὰρ πίθηκος, ὡς ἔοικε, μιμεῖσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπιχειρῶν ἁλίσκεται συγκινούμενος καὶ συνορχούμενος, ὁ δὲ κόλαξ αὐτὸς ἑτέρους ἐπάγεται καὶ παλεύει, μιμούμενος οὐχ ὁμοίως ἅπαντας ἀλλὰ
C τῷ μὲν συνορχούμενος καὶ συνᾴδων, τῷ δὲ συμπαλαίων καὶ συγκονιόμενος· θηρατικοῦ δὲ καὶ κυνηγετικοῦ λαβόμενος μονονοὺ τὰ τῆς Φαίδρας ἀναβοῶν ἔπεται

> πρὸς θεῶν ἔραμαι κυσὶ θωΰξαι
> βαλιαῖς ἐλάφοις ἐγχριμπτόμενος,[a]

[1] μετερώμενων Lobeck: μεταιρόμενον.

[a] Euripides, *Hippolytus*, 218.

moderation, but so as plainly to outdo him in amazement and wonder, and at the same time he stoutly maintains that his affection and hatred are the result of judgement rather than of emotion.

7. What, then, is the method of exposing him, and by what differences is it possible to detect that he is not really like-minded, or even in a fair way to become like-minded, but is merely imitating such a character? In the first place, it is necessary to observe the uniformity and permanence of his tastes, whether he always takes delight in the same things, and commends always the same things, and whether he directs and ordains his own life according to one pattern, as becomes a free-born man and a lover of congenial friendship and intimacy; for such is the conduct of a friend. But the flatterer, since he has no abiding-place of character to dwell in, and since he leads a life not of his own choosing but another's, moulding and adapting himself to suit another, is not simple, not one, but variable and many in one, and, like water that is poured into one receptacle after another, he is constantly on the move from place to place, and changes his shape to fit his receiver.

The capture of the ape, as it seems, is effected while he is trying to imitate man by moving and dancing as the man does: but the flatterer himself leads on and entices others, not imitating all persons alike, but with one he joins in dancing and singing, and with another in wrestling and getting covered with dust; if he gets hold of a huntsman fond of the chase, he follows on, all but shouting out the words of Phaedra [a]:

> Ye gods, but I yearn to encourage the hounds,
> As I haste on the track of the dapple deer.

(52) καὶ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ πρᾶγμα πρὸς τὸ θηρίον, ἀλλ' αὐτὸν ἐκσαγηνεύει καὶ περιβάλλεται τὸν κυνηγόν. ἂν δὲ θηρεύῃ φιλόλογον καὶ φιλομαθῆ νέον, αὖθις ἐν βιβλίοις ἐστὶ καὶ πώγων ποδήρης καθεῖται καὶ τριβωνοφορία τὸ χρῆμα καὶ ἀδιαφορία, καὶ διὰ στόματος οἵ τε ἀριθμοὶ καὶ τὰ ὀρθογώνια τρίγωνα Πλάτωνος. εἴ τε[1] ῥᾴθυμός τις ἐμπέπαικεν αὖθις καὶ φιλοπότης καὶ πλούσιος,

αὐτὰρ ὁ γυμνώθη ῥακέων πολύμητις Ὀδυσσεύς,[a]

D ἔρριπται μὲν ὁ τρίβων, κατακείρεται δ' ὁ πώγων ὥσπερ ἄκαρπον θέρος, ψυκτῆρες δὲ καὶ φιάλαι καὶ γέλωτες ἐν περιπάτοις καὶ σκώμματα πρὸς τοὺς φιλοσοφοῦντας. ὥσπερ ἐν Συρακούσαις φασίν, ὁπηνίκα Πλάτων ἀφίκετο, καὶ Διονύσιον ζῆλος ἔσχε περιμανὴς φιλοσοφίας, τὰ βασίλεια κονιορτοῦ γέμειν ὑπὸ πλήθους τῶν γεωμετρούντων· ἐπεὶ δὲ προσέκρουσε Πλάτων, καὶ Διονύσιος ἐκπεσὼν φιλοσοφίας πάλιν εἰς πότους καὶ γύναια καὶ τὸ ληρεῖν
E καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν ἦκε φερόμενος, ἀθρόως ἅπαντας ὥσπερ ἐν Κίρκης μεταμορφωθέντας ἀμουσία καὶ λήθη καὶ εὐήθεια κατέσχε. μαρτυρεῖ δὲ καὶ τὰ τῶν μεγάλων ἔργα κολάκων καὶ τὰ τῶν δημαγωγῶν, ὧν ὁ μέγιστος Ἀλκιβιάδης, Ἀθήνησι μὲν σκώπτων καὶ ἱπποτροφῶν καὶ μετ' εὐτραπελίας ζῶν καὶ χάριτος, ἐν δὲ Λακεδαίμονι κειρόμενος ἐν χρῷ καὶ τριβωνοφορῶν καὶ ψυχρολουτῶν, ἐν δὲ Θρᾴκῃ πολεμῶν καὶ πίνων, ἐπεὶ δὲ πρὸς Τισσαφέρνην ἀφίκετο,

[1] εἴ τε Hercher : εἴτε.

[a] Homer, *Od.* xxii. 1.

He does not trouble himself in regard to the quarry, but he goes about to net and ensnare the huntsman himself. But if he is on the track of a scholarly and studious young man, now again he is absorbed in books, his beard grows down to his feet, the scholar's gown is the thing now and a stoic indifference, and endless talk about Plato's numbers and right-angled triangles. At another time, if some easy-tempered man fall in his way, who is a hard drinker and rich,

Then stands forth the wily Odysseus stripped of his tatters;[a]

off goes the scholar's gown, the beard is mowed down like an unprofitable crop ; it's wine-coolers and glasses now, bursts of laughter while walking in the streets, and frivolous jokes against the devotees of philosophy. Just so at Syracuse, it is said, after Plato had arrived, and an insane ardour for philosophy laid hold on Dionysius, the king's palace was filled with dust by reason of the multitude of men that were drawing their geometrical diagrams in it : but when Plato fell out of favour, and Dionysius, shaking himself free from philosophy, returned post-haste to wine and women and foolish talk and licentiousness, then grossness and forgetfulness and fatuity seized upon the whole people as though they had undergone a transformation in Circe's house. A further testimony is to be found in the action of the great flatterers and the demagogues, of whom the greatest was Alcibiades. At Athens he indulged in frivolous jesting, kept a racing-stable, and led a life full of urbanity and agreeable enjoyment ; in Lacedaemon he kept his hair cropped close, he wore the coarsest clothing, he bathed in cold water ; in Thrace he was a fighter and a hard drinker : but when he came to

τρυφῇ καὶ ἁβρότητι καὶ ἀλαζονείᾳ χρώμενος, ἐδη-
μαγώγει καὶ καθωμίλει τῷ συναφομοιοῦν καὶ συν-
F οικειοῦν ἑαυτὸν ἅπασιν. οὐ μὴν τοιοῦτος Ἐπα-
μεινώνδας οὐδ' Ἀγησίλαος, ἀλλὰ πλείστοις ὁμιλή-
σαντες ἀνθρώποις καὶ πόλεσι καὶ βίοις τὸ προσῆκον
ἦθος αὐτοῖς πανταχοῦ καὶ στολῇ καὶ διαίτῃ καὶ
λόγῳ καὶ βίῳ διεφύλαττον. οὕτω καὶ Πλάτων ἐν
Συρακούσαις οἷος ἐν Ἀκαδημείᾳ, καὶ πρὸς Διονύ-
σιον οἷος πρὸς Δίωνα.

8. Τὰς δὲ τοῦ κόλακος ὥσπερ πολύποδος τροπὰς
ῥᾷστα φωράσειεν ἄν τις αὐτὸς ἐπὶ πολλὰ δοκῶν
τρέπεσθαι, καὶ ψέγων μὲν ὃν ἐπῄνει πρότερον βίον,
οἷς δ' ἤχθετο πράγμασιν ἢ διαίταις ἢ λόγοις ὡς
53 ἀρέσκοντας ἐξαίφνης προσιέμενος. ὄψεται γὰρ
αὐτὸν οὐδαμοῦ βέβαιον οὐδ' ἴδιον οὐδ' οἰκείῳ πάθει
φιλοῦντα καὶ μισοῦντα καὶ χαίροντα καὶ λυπού-
μενον, ἀλλὰ δίκην κατόπτρου παθῶν ὀθνείων καὶ
βίων καὶ κινημάτων εἰκόνας ἀναδεχόμενον. τοιοῦ-
τος γὰρ οἷος, εἰ ψέγοις τινὰ τῶν φίλων πρὸς αὐτόν,
εἰπεῖν "βραδέως πεφώρακας τὸν ἄνθρωπον· ἐμοὶ
μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲ πρότερον ἤρεσκεν." ἂν δ' αὖ πάλιν
ἐπαινῇς μεταβαλόμενος, νὴ Δία φήσει συνήδεσθαι
καὶ χάριν ἔχειν αὐτὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου καὶ πι-
B στεύειν. ἂν δὲ βίον ἀλλακτέον ἕτερον εἴπῃς, οἷον
εἰς ἀπραγμοσύνην καὶ ἡσυχίαν ἐκ πολιτείας μετα-
βαλόμενος, "πάλαι γ' ἐχρῆν," φησί, "θορύβων

Tissaphernes, he took to soft living, and luxury, and pretentiousness. So by making himself like to all these people and conforming his way to theirs he tried to conciliate them and win their favour. Not of this type, however, was Epameinondas or Agesilaus, who, although they had to do with a very large number of men and cities and modes of life, yet maintained everywhere their own proper character in dress, conduct, language, and life. So, too, Plato in Syracuse was the same sort of man as in the Academy, and to Dionysius he was the same as to Dion.

8. The changes of the flatterer, which are like those of a cuttle-fish, may be most easily detected if a man pretends that he is very changeable himself and disapproves the mode of life which he previously approved, and suddenly shows a liking for actions, conduct, or language which used to offend him. For he will see that the flatterer is nowhere constant, has no character of his own, that it is not because of his own feelings that he loves and hates, and rejoices and grieves, but that, like a mirror, he only catches the images of alien feelings, lives and movements. For he is the kind of man, who, if you chance to blame one of your friends before him, will exclaim, "You've been slow in discovering the man's character; for my part I took a dislike to him long ago." But if, on the next occasion, you change about again and commend the man, then you may be sure the flatterer will avow that he shares your pleasure and thanks you for the man's sake, and that he believes in him. If you say that you must adopt some other sort of life, as, for example, by changing from public life to ease and quietness, then he says, "Yes, we

(53) ἡμᾶς ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ φθόνων." ἂν δὲ πάλιν ὁρμᾶν δοκῇς ἐπὶ τὸ πράττειν καὶ λέγειν, ὑπεφώνησεν "ἄξια σαυτοῦ φρονεῖς· ἡ δ' ἀπραγμοσύνη γλυκὺ μέν, ἀλλ' ἄδοξον καὶ ταπεινόν." εὐθὺς οὖν λέγειν χρὴ πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον

ἀλλοῖός μοι, ξεῖν', ἐφάνης[1] νέον ἠὲ πάροιθεν,

οὐ δέομαι φίλου συμμεθισταμένου καὶ συνεπινεύοντος (ἢ γὰρ σκιὰ ταῦτα ποιεῖ μᾶλλον), ἀλλὰ συναληθεύοντος καὶ συνεπικρίνοντος.

Εἷς μὲν οὖν τῶν ἐλέγχων τρόπος τοιοῦτός ἐστιν·
C (9) ἕτέραν δὲ δεῖ ταῖς ὁμοιώσεσι τοιαύτην παραφυλάττειν διαφοράν. ὁ μὲν ἀληθὴς φίλος οὔτε μιμητής ἐστι πάντων οὔτ' ἐπαινέτης πρόθυμος, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀρίστων μόνων·

οὐ γὰρ συνέχθειν ἀλλὰ συμφιλεῖν ἔφυ

κατὰ τὸν Σοφοκλέα, καὶ νὴ Δία συγκατορθοῦν καὶ συμφιλοκαλεῖν, οὐ συναμαρτάνειν οὐδὲ συρραδιουργεῖν, ἂν μή τις οἷον ὀφθαλμίας ἀπορροὴ καὶ ἀνάχρωσις ἄκοντα δι' ὁμιλίαν καὶ συνήθειαν ἀναπλήσῃ φαυλότητος ἢ πλημμελείας τινός. ὥς που καὶ Πλάτωνος ἀπομιμεῖσθαί φασι τοὺς συνήθεις τὸ ἐπί-
D κυρτον, Ἀριστοτέλους δὲ τὸν τραυλισμόν, Ἀλεξάνδρου δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως τὴν ἔγκλισιν τοῦ τραχήλου καὶ τὴν ἐν τῷ διαλέγεσθαι τραχύτητα τῆς φωνῆς· τὰ γὰρ πολλὰ λανθάνουσιν ἔνιοι καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἠθῶν καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν βίων ἀναλαμβάνοντες. ὁ δὲ κόλαξ ἀτεχνῶς τὸ τοῦ χαμαιλέοντος πέπονθεν. ἐκεῖνός τε

[1] ξεῖν' ἐφάνης] ξεῖνε φάνης or νέον φάνης Homer π 181.

[a] Homer, *Odyssey*, xvi. 181.
[b] Adapted from Sophocles, *Antigone*, 523.
[c] *Cf.* 26 B, *supra.*

ought long ago to have secured release from turmoils and jealousies." But again if you appear to be bent on public activity and speaking, then he chimes in, "Your thoughts are worthy of you; ease is a pleasant thing, but it is inglorious and mean." Without more ado we must say to such a man:

> Stranger, you seem to me now a different man than aforetime.[a]

I have no use for a friend that shifts about just as I do and nods assent just as I do (for my shadow better performs that function), but I want one that tells the truth as I do, and decides for himself as I do.

This is one method, then, of detecting the flatterer; (9) but here follows a second point of difference which ought to be observed, in his habits of imitation. The true friend is neither an imitator of everything nor ready to commend everything, but only the best things;

> His nature 'tis to share not hate but love,

as Sophocles [b] has it, and most assuredly to share also in right conduct and in love for the good, not in error and evil-doing, unless, as a result of association and close acquaintance, an emanation and infection, like that which comes from a diseased eye, contaminate him against his will with a touch of baseness or error. In a similar way it is said that close acquaintances used to copy [c] Plato's stoop, Aristotle's lisp, and King Alexander's twisted neck as well as the harshness of his voice in conversation. In fact, some people unconsciously acquire most of their peculiarities from the traits or the lives of others. But the flatterer's case is exactly the same as that of the chameleon. For the chameleon can make

(53) γὰρ ἁπάσῃ χρόᾳ πλὴν τοῦ λευκοῦ συναφομοιοῦται, καὶ ὁ κόλαξ ἐν τοῖς ἀξίοις σπουδῆς ὅμοιον ἑαυτὸν ἐξαδυνατῶν παρέχειν οὐδὲν ἀπολείπει τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀμίμητον, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ φαῦλοι ζωγράφοι τῶν καλῶν ἐφικνεῖσθαι μὴ δυνάμενοι δι' ἀσθένειαν ἐν ῥυτίσι καὶ φακοῖς καὶ οὐλαῖς τὰς ὁμοιότητας ἀνα-
E φέρουσιν, οὕτως ἐκεῖνος ἀκρασίας γίγνεται μιμητής, δεισιδαιμονίας, ἀκροχολίας, πικρίας πρὸς οἰκέτας, ἀπιστίας πρὸς οἰκείους καὶ συγγενεῖς. φύσει τε γὰρ ἀφ' ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς τὰ χείρονα κατάντης ἐστί, καὶ δοκεῖ πορρωτάτω τοῦ ψέγειν τὸ αἰσχρὸν εἶναι μιμούμενος. ὕποπτοι γὰρ οἱ τὰ βελτίω ζητοῦντες καὶ δοκοῦντες ἄχθεσθαι καὶ δυσκολαίνειν τοῖς ἁμαρτήμασι τῶν φίλων· ὃ δὴ καὶ Διονυσίῳ Δίωνα καὶ Σάμιον Φιλίππῳ καὶ Κλεομένῃ Πτολεμαίῳ διέβαλε καὶ ἀπώλεσεν. ὁ δὲ βουλόμενος εἶναι καὶ δοκεῖν ὁμοίως ἡδὺς ἅμα καὶ πιστὸς τοῖς χείροσι μᾶλλον ὑποκρίνεται χαίρειν, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ σφόδρα φιλεῖν οὐδὲ
F τὰ φαῦλα δυσχεραίνων, ἀλλὰ συμπαθὴς πᾶσι καὶ συμφυὴς γιγνόμενος. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τῶν ἀβουλήτων καὶ τυχηρῶν ἀμοιρεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοσεῖν ὅμοια προσποιοῦνται, κολακεύοντες τοὺς νοσώδεις, καὶ μήτε βλέπειν ὀξὺ μήτ' ἀκούειν, ἂν ὑποτύφλοις ἢ ὑποκώφοις συνῶσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ Διονυσίου κόλακες ἀμβλυωποῦντος[1] ἐμπίπτοντες ἀλλήλοις καὶ τὰς παροψίδας ἐν τῷ δειπνεῖν καταβάλλοντες. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἁπτόμενοι τῶν παθῶν ἐνδοτέρω ποιοῦσιν

[1] ἀμβλυωποῦντες most mss.

himself like to every colour except white, and the flatterer, being utterly incapable of making himself like to another in any quality that is really worth while, leaves no shameful thing unimitated; but even as bad painters, who by reason of incompetence are unable to attain to the beautiful, depend upon wrinkles, moles, and scars to bring out their resemblances, so the flatterer makes himself an imitator of licentiousness, superstition, passionate anger, harshness toward servants, and distrust toward household and kinsmen. For by nature he is of himself prone to the worse, and he seems very far removed from disapproving what is shameful, since he imitates it. In fact it is those who follow a higher ideal and show distress and annoyance at the errors of their friends, who fall under suspicion. This is the thing that brought Dion into disfavour with Dionysius, Samius with Philip, Cleomenes with Ptolemy, and finally brought about their undoing. But the flatterer, desiring to be and to seem pleasant and loyal at the same time, affects to take greater delight in the worse things, as one who for the great love he bears will take no offence even at what is base, but feels with his friend and shares his nature in all things. For this reason flatterers will not be denied a share even in the chances of life which happen without our will; but they flatter the sickly by pretending to be afflicted with the same malady, and not to be able to see or hear distinctly if they have to do with those who are dim-sighted or hard of hearing, just as the flatterers of Dionysius, whose sight was failing, used to bump against one another and upset the dishes at dinner. And some seize upon afflictions rather as a means to insinuate themselves

54 ἑαυτούς, καὶ καταμιγνύουσιν ἄχρι τῶν ἀπορρήτων
τὰς ὁμοιοπαθείας. αἰσθόμενοι γὰρ ἢ περὶ γάμον
δυστυχοῦντας ἢ πρὸς υἱοὺς ἢ πρὸς οἰκείους ὑπ-
όπτως ἔχοντας αὐτοὶ σφῶν αὐτῶν ἀφειδοῦσι καὶ ἀπ-
οδύρονται περὶ τέκνων ἰδίων ἢ γυναικὸς ἢ συγγενῶν
ἢ οἰκείων, αἰτίας τινὰς ἀπορρήτους ἐξαγορεύοντες.
ἡ γὰρ ὁμοιότης συμπαθεστέρους ποιεῖ, καὶ μᾶλλον
ὥσπερ ὅμηρα δεδεγμένοι προΐενταί τι τῶν ἀπορ-
ρήτων αὐτοῖς, προέμενοι δὲ χρῶνται καὶ δεδίασιν
ἐγκαταλιπεῖν τὴν πίστιν. ἐγὼ δ' οἶδά τινα συνεκ-
βαλόντα γαμετήν, ὡς ὁ φίλος ἀπεπέμψατο τὴν ἑαυ-
B τοῦ· κρύφα δὲ φοιτῶν πρὸς αὐτὴν καὶ διαπεμπό-
μενος ἐφωράθη, συναισθομένης τῆς τοῦ φίλου γυναι-
κός. οὕτως ἄπειρος ἦν κόλακος ὁ νομίζων τὰ ἰαμ-
βεῖα ταυτὶ τῷ κόλακι[1] μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ καρκίνῳ[1]
προσήκειν·

γαστὴρ ὅλον τὸ σῶμα, πανταχῆ βλέπων
ὀφθαλμός, ἕρπον τοῖς ὀδοῦσι θηρίον·

παρασίτου γὰρ ὁ τοιοῦτος εἰκονισμός ἐστι,

τῶν περὶ τάγηνον καὶ μετ' ἄριστον φίλων,

ὡς Εὔπολίς φησιν.

10. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ ταῦτα μὲν εἰς τὸν οἰκεῖον
ἀναθώμεθα τοῦ λόγου τόπον· ἐκεῖνο δὲ μὴ παρῶμεν
ἐν ταῖς μιμήσεσι τὸ σόφισμα τοῦ κόλακος, ὅτι κἂν
C τῶν καλῶν τι μιμῆται τοῦ κολακευομένου, δια-
φυλάττει τὴν ὑπεροχὴν ἐκείνῳ. τοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἀληθῶς
φίλοις οὔτε ζῆλος οὐδείς ἐστι πρὸς ἀλλήλους οὔτε
φθόνος, ἀλλὰ κἂν ἴσον ἔχωσιν ἐν τῷ κατορθοῦν

[1] καρκίνῳ . . . κόλακι most mss.

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. 669.

still more, and carry their fellow-feeling so far as to include inmost secrets. If they know, for example, that one or another is unfortunate in his marriage, or suspicious towards his sons or his household, they do not spare themselves, but lament over their own children or wife or kinsmen or household, divulging certain secret faults of theirs. For such similarity makes fellow-feeling stronger, so that the others, conceiving themselves to have received pledges, are more inclined to let out some of their own secrets to the flatterers, and having so done they take up with them, and are afraid to abandon the confidential relation. I personally know of one man who put away his wife after his friend had sent his own away; but he was caught visiting her in secret and sending messages to her after his friend's wife had got wind of what was going on. Quite unacquainted with a flatterer, then, was he who thought that these iambic verses [a] applied to a flatterer rather than to a crab:

> His body is all belly; eyes that look
> All ways; a beast that travels on its teeth.

For such a description is that of a parasite, one of

> The saucepan friends and friends postprandial,

as Eupolis [b] puts it.

10. However, let us reserve this matter for its proper place in our discussion. But let us not omit to note this clever turn which the flatterer has in his imitations, that if he does imitate any of the good qualities of the person whom he flatters, he gives him always the upper hand. The reason is this: between true friends there is neither emulation nor envy, but whether their share of success is equal or less, they

[b] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* i. 349.

(54) κἂν ἔλαττον, ἀνεπαχθῶς καὶ μετρίως φέρουσιν. ὁ δὲ κόλαξ ἀεὶ μνημονεύων τοῦ τὰ δεύτερα λέγειν ὑφίεται τῇ ὁμοιότητι τῆς ἰσότητος, ἡττᾶσθαι πανταχοῦ καὶ ἀπολείπεσθαι πλὴν τῶν φαύλων ὁμολογῶν. ἐν δὲ τοῖς φαύλοις οὐ παρίησι τὸ πρωτεῖον, ἀλλά φησιν, ἂν ἐκεῖνος ᾖ δύσκολος, αὐτὸν εἶναι μελαγχολικόν· ἂν ἐκεῖνος δεισιδαίμων, αὐτὸν θεο-
D φόρητον· ἐρᾶν ἐκεῖνον, μαίνεσθαι δ' αὐτόν. "ἀκαίρως," φησίν, "ἐγέλας, ἐγὼ δ' ἐξέθνῃσκον ὑπὸ τοῦ γέλωτος." ἀλλ' ἔν γε τοῖς χρηστοῖς τοὐναντίον. αὐτός φησι ταχέως τρέχειν, ἵππασθαι δ' ἐκεῖνον· αὐτὸς ἱππεύειν ἐπιεικῶς, "ἀλλὰ τί πρὸς τὸν ἱπποκένταυρον τοῦτον; εὐφυής εἰμι ποιητὴς καὶ στίχον οὐ φαυλότατον γράφω,

βροντᾶν δ' οὐκ ἐμὸν ἀλλὰ Διός."

ἅμα γὰρ αὐτοῦ δοκεῖ καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν ἀποφαίνειν καλὴν μιμούμενος καὶ τὴν δύναμιν ἀνέφικτον ἡττώμενος.

Ἐν μὲν οὖν ταῖς ἐξομοιώσεσι τοιαῦταί τινές εἰσιν αἱ τοῦ κόλακος διαφοραὶ πρὸς τὸν φίλον.

11. Ἐπεὶ δ' ὥσπερ εἴρηται καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς κοινόν ἐστι (χαίρει γὰρ οὐχ ἧττον τοῖς φίλοις ὁ χρηστὸς ἢ τοῖς κόλαξιν ὁ φαῦλος), φέρε καὶ τοῦτο διορίσωμεν. ἔστι δὲ διορισμὸς ἡ πρὸς τὸ τέλος
E ἀναφορὰ τῆς ἡδονῆς. σκόπει δ' οὕτως· ἔνεστι μέν που τῷ μύρῳ τὸ εὐῶδες, ἔνεστι δ' ἐν ἀντιδότῳ.

[a] Author unknown; *cf.* Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. p. 736.

bear it with moderation and without vexation. But the flatterer, mindful always that he is to play the second part, abates from his equality in the imitation, admitting that he is beaten and distanced in everything save what is bad. In bad things, however, he does not relinquish the first place, but, if the other man is malcontent, he calls himself choleric; if the man is superstitious he says of himself that he is possessed; that the man is in love, but that he himself is mad with passion. "You laughed inopportunely," he says, "but I nearly died of laughing." But in good things it is just the reverse. The flatterer says that he himself is a good runner, but the other man simply flies; that he himself is a fairly good horseman, "but what is that compared with this Centaur?" "I am a natural born poet, and I write verse that is not at all bad, yet

To Zeus belongs the thunder, not to me." [a]

Thus at the same time he thinks to show that the other's tastes are excellent by imitating them, and that his prowess is unrivalled by letting himself be outdone.

Thus, then, in the flatterer's attempts to conform himself to another, differences like these are found which distinguish him from a friend.

11. Since, however, as has been said before, the element of pleasure is common to both (for the good man takes no less delight in his friends than the bad man in his flatterers), let us now, if you will, draw the distinction between them in this respect. The distinction lies in referring the pleasure to its end. Look at it in this way: There is a pleasant odour in a perfume, there is a pleasant odour in a medicine.

διαφέρει δ' ὅτι τοῦτο μὲν πρὸς ἡδονὴν καὶ πρὸς οὐδὲν ἕτερον γέγονεν, ἐκεῖ δὲ τὸ καθαίρον ἢ τὸ θερμαῖνον ἢ τὸ σαρκοῦν τῆς δυνάμεως ἄλλως εὐῶδές ἐστι. πάλιν οἱ γραφεῖς ἀνθηρὰ χρώματα καὶ βάμματα μιγνύουσιν, ἔστι δὲ καὶ τῶν ἰατρικῶν φαρμάκων ἔνια τὴν ὄψιν ἀνθηρὰ καὶ τὴν χρόαν οὐκ ἀπάνθρωπον ἔχοντα. τί τοίνυν διαφέρει; ἢ δῆλον ὅτι τῷ τέλει τῆς χρείας διακρινοῦμεν;
F οὐκοῦν ὁμοίως αἱ μὲν τῶν φίλων χάριτες ἐπὶ καλῷ τινι καὶ ὠφελίμῳ τὸ εὐφραῖνον ὥσπερ ἐπανθοῦν ἔχουσιν, ἔστι δ' ὅτε καὶ παιδιᾷ καὶ τραπέζῃ καὶ οἴνῳ καὶ νὴ Δία γέλωτι καὶ φλυάρῳ πρὸς ἀλλήλους οἷον ἡδύσμασιν ἐχρήσαντο τῶν καλῶν καὶ σπουδαίων. πρὸς ὃ δὴ καὶ λέλεκται τὸ

μύθοισιν τέρποντο πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἐνέποντες

καὶ τὸ

οὐδέ κεν ἄλλο
ἄμμε[1] *διέκρινεν φιλέοντέ τε τερπομένω τε.*

55 τοῦ δὲ κόλακος τοῦτ' ἔργον ἐστὶ καὶ τέλος, ἀεί τινα παιδιὰν ἢ πρᾶξιν ἢ λόγον ἐφ' ἡδονῇ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν ὀψοποιεῖν καὶ καρυκεύειν. συνελόντι δ' εἰπεῖν ὁ μὲν ἵν' ἡδὺς ᾖ πάντα δεῖν οἴεται ποιεῖν, ὁ δ' ἀεὶ ποιῶν ἃ δεῖ πολλάκις μὲν ἡδὺς πολλάκις δ' ἀηδής ἐστιν, οὐ τοῦτο βουλόμενος, εἰ δὲ βέλτιον εἴη, μηδὲ τοῦτο φεύγων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἰατρός, ἂν συμφέρῃ, κρόκον καὶ νάρδον ἐπέβαλε καὶ νὴ Δία

[1] ἄλλο ἄμμε] ἠμέας ἄλλο Homer δ 178.

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[a] Homer, *Il.* ii. 643.
[b] Homer, *Od.* iv. 178.
[c] Possibly a reminiscence from Plato, *Gorgias*, 465 ff.

But the difference is that the former has been created for pleasure and for nothing else, while in the latter the purgative, stimulative, or tissue-building principle that gives it value is only incidentally sweet-smelling. Then again, painters mix bright colours and pigments, and there are also some physicians' drugs that are bright in appearance, and have a colour that is not repellent. What, then, is the difference? Is it not plain that we shall distinguish them by the end for which they are employed? So, in a similar way, the graciousness of friends, in addition to goodness and profit, possesses also the power of giving pleasure as a sort of efflorescence, and there are times when friends enjoy together jest and food and wine, and indeed even mirth and nonsense, as a sort of spice for noble and serious things. To this purport it has been said:

> Joy they had in converse, speaking each to the other [a]

and

> Else there were nothing
> Which could have parted us twain in the midst of our love and enjoyment.[b]

But the whole work and final aim of the flatterer is always to be serving up some spicy and highly-seasoned jest or prank or story, incited by pleasure and to incite pleasure.[c] To put it in few words, the flatterer thinks he ought to do anything to be agreeable, while the friend, by doing always what he ought to do, is oftentimes agreeable and oftentimes disagreeable, not from any desire to be disagreeable, and yet not attempting to avoid even this if it be better. For he is like a physician, who, if it be for the good of the patient, administers saffron or spikenard, and indeed oftentimes prescribes a

(55) *πολλάκις ἔλουσε προσηνῶς καὶ ἔθρεψε φιλανθρώπως, ἔστι δ' ὅπου ταῦτ' ἐάσας καστόριον ἐνέσεισεν*

ἢ πόλιον βαρύοσμον ὃ δὴ ῥίγιστον ὄδωδεν

B *ἢ τινα ἐλλέβορον ἐκπιεῖν τρίψας ἠνάγκασεν, οὔτ' ἐνταῦθα τὸ ἀηδὲς οὔτ' ἐκεῖ τὸ ἡδὺ ποιούμενος τέλος ἀλλ' ἐφ' ἓν δι' ἀμφοτέρων ἐπὶ τὸ συμφέρον ἄγων τὸν θεραπευόμενον, οὕτως ὁ φίλος ἔστι μὲν ὅτε σὺν ἐπαίνῳ καὶ χάριτι μεγαλύνων ἀεὶ καὶ εὐφραίνων ἄγει πρὸς τὸ καλόν, ὥσπερ οὗτος*

Τεῦκρε, φίλη κεφαλή, Τελαμώνιε, κοίρανε λαῶν, βάλλ' οὕτω

καὶ

πῶς ἂν ἔπειτ' Ὀδυσῆος ἐγὼ θείοιο λαθοίμην;

ὅπου δ' αὖ πάλιν ἐπιστροφῆς δεῖται, λόγῳ δήκτῃ καὶ παρρησίᾳ κηδεμονικῇ καθαπτόμενος

C *ἀφραίνεις, Μενέλαε διοτρεφές, οὐδέ τί σε χρὴ ταύτης ἀφροσύνης.*

ἔστι δ' ὅπου καὶ τὸ ἔργον ἅμα τῷ λόγῳ συνῆψεν, ὡς Μενέδημος Ἀσκληπιάδου τοῦ φίλου τὸν υἱὸν ἄσωτον ὄντα καὶ ἄτακτον ἀποκλείων καὶ μὴ προσαγορεύων ἐσωφρόνισε, καὶ Βάτωνι[1] *τὴν σχολὴν ἀπεῖπεν Ἀρκεσίλαος, ὅτε πρὸς Κλεάνθην στίχον ἐποίησεν ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ, πείσαντος δὲ τὸν Κλεάνθην καὶ μεταμελομένου διηλλάγη. δεῖ γὰρ ὠφελοῦντα*

[1] Βάτωνι Meineke: *βάτῳ.*

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[a] Nicander, *Theriaca*, 64. On the herb *polium* see Pliny, *Natural History*, xxi. 7 (21). 44 and xxi. 20 (84). 145.

[b] Homer, *Il.* viii. 281.

[c] *Ibid.* x. 243, and *Od.* i. 65.

[d] *Il.* vii. 109.

grateful bath or generous diet, but there are cases where he lets all these go and drops in a dose of castor, or else of

> Polium, pungent to smell, whose stench is surely most horrid,[a]

or he compounds some hellebore and makes a man drink it down, setting neither in this case the disagreeable nor in the other the agreeable as his final aim, but endeavouring through either course to bring his patient to one state—that which is for his good. So it is with the friend; sometimes by constantly exalting and gladdening another with praise and graciousness he leads him on toward that which is honourable, as did he who said

> Teucer, dear to my heart, son of Telamon, prince of the people,
> Aim your other shafts like this,[b]

and

> How then, I ask, could I ever forget Odysseus the godlike?[c]

Or again, when there is need of reprehension, he assails with stinging words and all the frankness of a guardian:

> Foolish you are, Menelaus, cherished by Zeus; nor is needed,
> Any such folly as this.[d]

There are times, too, when he combines deeds with words, as did Menedemus, who chastened the profligate and disorderly son of his friend Asclepiades by shutting the door upon him and not speaking to him; and Arcesilaus forbade Baton his lecture-room when the latter had composed a comic line on Cleanthes, and it was only when Baton had placated Cleanthes and was repentant that Arcesilaus became reconciled with him. For one ought to hurt a friend

(55) λυπεῖν τὸν φίλον, οὐ δεῖ δὲ λυποῦντα τὴν φιλίαν
ἀναιρεῖν, ἀλλ' ὡς φαρμάκῳ τῷ δάκνοντι χρῆσθαι,
D σῴζοντι καὶ φυλάττοντι τὸ θεραπευόμενον. ὅθεν
ὥσπερ ἁρμονικὸς ὁ φίλος τῇ πρὸς τὸ καλὸν καὶ
συμφέρον μεταβολῇ τὰ μὲν ἐνδιδοὺς τὰ δ' ἐπιτείνων
πολλάκις μὲν ἡδὺς ἀεὶ δ' ὠφέλιμός ἐστι· ὁ δὲ κόλαξ
ἀφ' ἑνὸς διαγράμματος ἀεὶ τὸ ἡδὺ καὶ τὸ πρὸς
χάριν εἰωθὼς ὑποκρέκειν οὔτ' ἔργον οἶδεν ἀντι-
τεῖνον οὔτε ῥῆμα λυποῦν, ἀλλὰ μόνῳ παρέπεται
τῷ βουλομένῳ, συνάδων ἀεὶ καὶ συμφθεγγόμενος.
ὥσπερ οὖν τὸν Ἀγησίλαον ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἡδέως ἐπ-
αινεῖσθαί φησιν ὑπὸ τῶν καὶ ψέγειν ἐθελόντων, οὕτω
δεῖ τὸ εὐφραῖνον καὶ χαριζόμενον ἡγεῖσθαι φιλικόν,
ἂν καὶ λυπεῖν ποτε δύνηται καὶ ἀντιτείνειν, τὴν δὲ
E συνεχῆ ταῖς ἡδοναῖς καὶ τὸ πρὸς χάριν ἔχουσαν
ἄκρατον ἀεὶ καὶ ἄδηκτον ὁμιλίαν ὑπονοεῖν, καὶ νὴ
Δία τὸ τοῦ Λάκωνος ἔχειν πρόχειρον, ὃς ἐπαινου-
μένου Χαρίλλου τοῦ βασιλέως "πῶς οὗτος" ἔφη
"χρηστός, ὃς οὐδὲ τοῖς πονηροῖς πικρός ἐστι;"

12. Τοῖς μὲν οὖν ταύροις τὸν οἶστρον ἐνδύεσθαι
παρὰ τὸ οὖς λέγουσι, καὶ τοῖς κυσὶ τὸν κρότωνα·
τῶν δὲ φιλοτίμων ὁ κόλαξ τὰ ὦτα κατέχων τοῖς
ἐπαίνοις καὶ προσπεφυκὼς δυσαπότριπτός ἐστιν.
ὅθεν ἐνταῦθα δεῖ μάλιστα τὴν κρίσιν ἔχειν ἐγρη-
F γορυῖαν καὶ παραφυλάττουσαν πότερον τοῦ πράγμα-
τος ἢ τοῦ ἀνδρὸς ὁ ἔπαινός ἐστιν. ἔστι δὲ τοῦ
πράγματος, ἂν ἀπόντας μᾶλλον ἢ παρόντας ἐπ-
αινῶσιν, ἂν καὶ αὐτοὶ ταὐτὰ βουλόμενοι καὶ ζηλοῦν-

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[a] Xen. *Agesilaus*, 11. 5.

[1] Archidamidas, according to Plutarch, *Moralia*, 218 B

only to help him ; and ought not by hurting him to kill friendship, but to use the stinging word as a medicine which restores and preserves health in that to which it is applied. Wherefore a friend, like a skilled musician, in effecting a transition to what is noble and beneficial, now relaxes and now tightens a string, and so is often pleasant and always profitable; but the flatterer, being accustomed to play his accompaniment of pleasantness and graciousness in one key only, knows nothing either of acts of resistance or of words that hurt, but is guided by the other's wish only, and makes every note and utterance to accord with him. As Xenophon [a] says of Agesilaus, that he was glad to be commended by those who were willing to blame him also, so we must regard that which gives delight and joy as true to friendship, if at times it is able also to hurt our feelings and to resist our desires ; but we must be suspicious of an association that is confined to pleasures, one whose complaisance is unmixed and without a sting ; and we ought in fact to keep in mind the saying of the Spartan,[b] who, when Charillus the king was commended, said, " How can he be a good man, who is not harsh even with rascals ? "

12. They say that the gad-fly finds lodgement with cattle close by the ear, as does the tick with dogs ; so also the flatterer takes hold of ambitious men's ears with his words of praise, and once settled there, he is hard to dislodge. Wherefore in this matter especially it is necessary to keep the judgement awake and on the alert, to see whether the praise is for the action or for the man. It is for the action if they praise us in absence rather than in our presence ; also if they, too, cherish the same desires and

τες μὴ μόνους ἡμᾶς ἀλλὰ πάντας ἐπὶ τοῖς ὁμοίοις ἐπαινῶσιν, ἂν μὴ νῦν μὲν ταῦτα νῦν δὲ τἀναντία πράττοντες καὶ λέγοντες φαίνωνται[1]· τὸ δὲ μέγιστον, ἂν αὐτοὶ γιγνώσκωμεν ἑαυτοὺς μὴ μεταμελομένους ἐφ' οἷς ἐπαινούμεθα μηδ' αἰσχυνομένους μηδὲ μᾶλλον ἡμῖν τἀναντία τούτων πεπρᾶχθαι καὶ λελέχθαι βουλομένους. ἡ γὰρ οἴκοθεν κρίσις ἀντιμαρτυροῦσα καὶ μὴ προσδεχομένη τὸν ἔπαινον
56 ἀπαθής ἐστι καὶ ἄθικτος καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ κολακεύοντος ἀνάλωτος. ἀλλ' οὐκ οἶδ' ὅπως οἱ πολλοὶ τὰς μὲν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀτυχήμασι παρηγορίας οὐχ ὑπομένουσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ὑπὸ τῶν συνεπιθρηνούντων ἄγονται καὶ συνοδυρομένων· ὅταν δ' ἁμαρτάνωσι καὶ πλημμελῶσιν, ὁ μὲν ἐλέγχῳ καὶ ψόγῳ δηγμὸν ἐμποιῶν καὶ μετάνοιαν ἐχθρὸς δοκεῖ καὶ κατήγορος, τὸν δ' ἐπαινοῦντα καὶ κατευλογοῦντα τὰ πεπραγμένα ἀσπάζονται καὶ νομίζουσιν εὔνουν
B καὶ φίλον. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἢ πρᾶξιν ἢ λόγον ἢ σπουδάσαντος ὁτιοῦν ἢ σκώψαντος εὐχερῶς ἐπαινοῦσι καὶ συνεπικροτοῦσιν, εἰς τὸ παρὸν εἰσιν οὗτοι καὶ τὰ ὑπὸ χεῖρα βλαβεροὶ μόνον· ὅσοι δὲ πρὸς τὸ ἦθος ἐξικνοῦνται τοῖς ἐπαίνοις καὶ νὴ Δία τοῦ τρόπου τῇ κολακείᾳ θιγγάνουσι, ταὐτὸ ποιοῦσι τῶν οἰκετῶν τοῖς μὴ ἀπὸ τοῦ σωροῦ κλέπτουσιν ἀλλ' ἀπὸ τοῦ σπέρματος· σπέρμα γὰρ τῶν πράξεων οὖσαν τὴν διάθεσιν καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἀρχὴν καὶ πηγὴν τοῦ βίου διαστρέφουσι, τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς ὀνόματα τῇ κακίᾳ περιτιθέντες. ἐν μὲν

[1] *φαίνωνται* Hercher: *φαίνοιντο*.

aspirations themselves and praise not us alone but all persons for like conduct; also if they are not found doing and saying now this and now the opposite; but, chief of all, if we ourselves know that we feel no regret for those actions for which we are praised, no feeling of shame and no wish that we had said or done the opposite. For if our own conscience protests and refuses to accept the praise, then it is not affected or touched, and is proof against assault by the flatterer. Yet, in some way that passes my knowledge, most people have no patience with efforts to console them in their misfortunes, but are more influenced by those who commiserate and condole with them; and whenever these same people are guilty of mistakes and blunders, the man who by chiding and blaming implants the sting of repentance is taken to be an enemy and an accuser, whereas they welcome the man who praises and extols what they have done, and regard him as kindly and friendly. Now those who unthinkingly praise and join in applauding an act or a saying, or anything offered by another, whether he be in earnest or in jest, are harmful only for the moment and for the matter at hand; but those who with their praises pierce to the man's character, and indeed even touch his habit of mind with their flattery, are doing the very thing that servants do who steal not from the heap [a] but from the seed-corn. For, since the disposition and character are the seed from which actions spring, such persons are thus perverting the very first principle and fountain-head of living, inasmuch as they are investing vice with the names that belong to

[a] The grain, after being winnowed, was heaped on the threshing-floor.

(56) γὰρ ταῖς στάσεσι καὶ τοῖς πολέμοις ὁ Θουκυδίδης φησὶν ὅτι "τὴν εἰωθυῖαν ἀξίωσιν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐς τὰ ἔργα ἀντήλλαξαν τῇ δικαιώσει. τόλμα μὲν
C γὰρ ἀλόγιστος ἀνδρεία φιλέταιρος ἐνομίσθη, μέλλησις δὲ προμηθὴς δειλία εὐπρεπής, τὸ δὲ σῶφρον τοῦ ἀνάνδρου πρόσχημα, καὶ τὸ πρὸς ἅπαν συνετὸν ἐπὶ πᾶν ἀργόν." ἐν δὲ ταῖς κολακείαις ὁρᾶν χρὴ καὶ παραφυλάττειν ἀσωτίαν μὲν ἐλευθεριότητα καλουμένην καὶ δειλίαν ἀσφάλειαν, ἐμπληξίαν δ' ὀξύτητα, μικρολογίαν δὲ σωφροσύνην, τὸν δ' ἐρωτικὸν φιλοσυνήθη καὶ φιλόστοργον, ἀνδρεῖον δὲ τὸν ὀργίλον καὶ ὑπερήφανον, φιλάνθρωπον δὲ
D τὸν εὐτελῆ καὶ ταπεινόν. ὥς που καὶ Πλάτων φησὶ τὸν ἐραστὴν κόλακα τῶν ἐρωμένων ὄντα τὸν μὲν σιμὸν καλεῖν ἐπίχαριν, τὸν δὲ γρυπὸν βασιλικόν, μέλανας δ' ἀνδρικούς, λευκοὺς δὲ θεῶν παῖδας· τὸ δὲ μελίχρουν[1] ὅλως ἐραστοῦ προσποίημα[2] εἶναι ὑποκοριζομένου καὶ εὐκόλως φέροντος τὴν ὠχρότητα. καίτοι καλὸς μὲν εἶναι πεισθεὶς ὁ αἰσχρὸς ἢ μέγας ὁ μικρὸς οὔτε χρόνον πολὺν τῇ ἀπάτῃ
E σύνεστι καὶ βλάπτεται βλάβην ἐλαφρὰν καὶ οὐκ ἀνήκεστον. ὁ δὲ ταῖς κακίαις ἐθίζων ἔπαινος ὡς ἀρεταῖς μὴ ἀχθόμενον ἀλλὰ χαίροντα χρῆσθαι, καὶ τὸ αἰδεῖσθαι τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων ἀφαιρῶν, οὗτος ἐπέτριψε Σικελιώτας, τὴν Διονυσίου καὶ Φαλάριδος ὠμότητα μισοπονηρίαν προσαγορεύων, οὗτος Αἴγυπτον ἀπώλεσε, τὴν Πτολεμαίου θηλύτητα καὶ θεοληψίαν καὶ ὀλολυγμοὺς καὶ τυμπάνων

[1] μελίχρουν] μελιχλώρους Plato.
[2] προσποίημα] ποίημα Plato.

[a] Thuc. iii. 82. [b] *Republic*, 474 E; *cf. supra*, 45 A.
[c] Ptolemy Philopator (221-205 B.C.); *cf.* Polybius, v. 34.

virtue. Amid factions and wars, Thucydides [a] says, "they changed the commonly accepted meaning of words when applied to deeds as they thought proper. Reckless daring came to be regarded as devoted courage, watchful waiting as specious cowardice, moderation as a craven's pretext, a keen understanding for everything as want of energy to undertake anything." And so in attempts at flattery we should be observant and on our guard against prodigality being called "liberality," cowardice "self-preservation," impulsiveness "quickness," stinginess "frugality," the amorous man "companionable and amiable," the irascible and overbearing "spirited," the insignificant and meek "kindly." So Plato [b] somewhere says that the lover, being a flatterer of his beloved, calls one with a snub nose "fetching," one with a hooked nose "kingly," dark persons "manly," and fair persons "children of the gods"; while "honey-hued" is purely the creation of a lover who calls sallowness by this endearing term, and cheerfully puts up with it. And yet an ugly man who is made to believe that he is handsome, or a short man that he is tall, is not for long a party to the deception, and the injury that he suffers is slight and not irremediable. But as for the praise which accustoms a man to treat vices as virtues, so that he feels not disgusted with them but delighted, which also takes away all shame for his errors—this is the sort that brought afflictions upon the people of Sicily, by calling the savage cruelty of Dionysius and of Phalaris "hatred of wickedness"; this it is that ruined Egypt,[c] by giving to Ptolemy's effeminacy, his religious mania, his hallelujahs, his clashing of cymbals, the name of

ἐγχαράξεις[1] εὐσέβειαν ὀνομάζων καὶ θεῶν λατρείαν, οὗτος τὰ Ῥωμαίων ἤθη τηνικαῦτα παρ' οὐδὲν ἦλθεν ἀνατρέψαι καὶ ἀνελεῖν, τὰς Ἀντωνίου τρυφὰς καὶ ἀκολασίας καὶ πανηγυρισμοὺς ἱλαρὰ πράγματα[2] καὶ φιλάνθρωπα χρωμένης ἀφθόνως
F αὐτῷ δυνάμεως καὶ τύχης ὑποκοριζόμενος. Πτολεμαίῳ δὲ τί περιῆψεν ἄλλο φορβειὰν καὶ αὐλούς, τί δὲ Νέρωνι τραγικὴν ἐπήξατο σκηνὴν καὶ προσωπεῖα καὶ κοθόρνους περιέθηκεν; οὐχ ὁ τῶν κολακευόντων ἔπαινος; οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ τῶν βασιλέων οὐκ Ἀπόλλωνες μὲν ἂν μινυρίσωσι, Διόνυσοι δ' ἂν μεθυσθῶσιν, Ἡρακλεῖς δ' ἂν παλαίσωσι προσαγορευόμενοι καὶ χαίροντες εἰς ἅπασαν αἰσχύνην ὑπὸ τῆς κολακείας ἐξάγονται;

13. Διὸ φυλακτέον ἐστὶ μάλιστα τὸν κόλακα περὶ τοὺς ἐπαίνους. ὅπερ οὐδ' αὐτὸν ἐκεῖνον λέ-
57 ληθεν, ἀλλὰ δεινὸς ὢν φυλάττεσθαι τὸ ὕποπτον, ἂν μὲν εὐπαρύφου τινὸς ἢ[3] ἀγροίκου λάβηται φορίνην παχεῖαν φέροντος, ὅλῳ τῷ μυκτῆρι χρῆται, καθαπερ ὁ Στρουθίας ἐμπεριπατῶν τῷ Βίαντι καὶ κατορχούμενος τῆς ἀναισθησίας αὐτοῦ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις

Ἀλεξάνδρου πλέον
τοῦ βασιλέως πέπωκας

καὶ

γελῶ τό[4] πρὸς τὸν Κύπριον ἐννοούμενος.[5]

τοὺς δὲ κομψοτέρους ὁρῶν ἐνταῦθα μάλιστα προσ-

[1] χαράξεις L. Dindorf.
[2] πράγματα] παίγματα Hercher.
[3] τινὸς ἢ] τινὸς Schellens.
[4] γελῶ τὸ Cobet: γέλωτι.
[5] ἐννοούμενος Cobet: ἐνηθούμενος.

" piety " and " devotion to the gods " ; this it is that all but subverted and destroyed the character of the Romans in those days, by trying to extenuate Antony's [a] luxuriousness, his excesses and ostentatious displays, as " blithe and kind-hearted actions due to his generous treatment at the hands of Power and Fortune." What else was it that fastened the mouthpiece and flute upon Ptolemy [b]? What else set a tragic stage for Nero, and invested him with mask and buskins? Was it not the praise of his flatterers? And is not almost any king called an Apollo if he can hum a tune, and a Dionysus if he gets drunk, and a Heracles if he can wrestle? And is he not delighted, and thus led on into all kinds of disgrace by the flattery?

13. For this reason we must be especially on our guard against the flatterer in the matter of his praises. But of this he is not unconscious himself, and he is adroit at guarding against the breath of suspicion. If, for example, he gets hold of some coxcomb, or a rustic wearing a thick coat of skin, he indulges his raillery without limit, just as Strouthias, in the play, walks all over Bias, and takes a fling at his stupidity by such praise as this :

> More you have drunk
> Than royal Alexander,[c]

and

> Ha! ha! A good one on the Cyprian.[d]

But as for the more clever people, he observes that

[a] See Plutarch, *Life of Antony*, chap. ix. (920).
[b] Ptolemy Auletes (80-51 B.C.); *cf.* Strabo xvii. 11 (p. 796).
[c] From the *Flatterer* of Menander; Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii., *Menander*, No. 293.
[d] *Ibid.* No. 29.

(57) ἔχοντας αὐτῷ καὶ φυλαττομένους τὸ χωρίον τοῦτο καὶ τὸν τόπον οὐκ ἀπ' εὐθείας ἐπάγει τὸν ἔπαινον, ἀλλ' ἀπαγαγὼν πόρρω κυκλοῦται καὶ

B πρόσεισιν, οἷον ἀψοφητὶ θρέμματος

ἐπιψαύων καὶ ἀποπειρώμενος. νῦν μὲν γὰρ ἑτέρων περὶ αὐτοῦ τινων ἐπαίνους ἀπαγγέλλει, καθάπερ οἱ ῥήτορες, ἀλλοτρίῳ προσχρώμενος προσώπῳ, ξένοις λέγων ἢ πρεσβυτέροις ἐν ἀγορᾷ μάλ' ἡδέως παραγενέσθαι πολλὰ κἀγαθὰ μεμνημένοις αὐτοῦ καὶ θαυμάζουσι· νῦν δ' αὖ πάλιν αἰτίας ἐλαφρὰς καὶ ψευδεῖς πλασάμενος καὶ συνθεὶς ἐπ' αὐτόν, ὡς ἀκηκοὼς ἑτέρων ἀφῖκται μετὰ σπουδῆς, πυνθανόμενος ποῦ τοῦτ' εἶπεν ἢ ποῦ τοῦτ' ἔπραξεν. ἀρνουμένου δ', ὡς εἰκός, αὐτόθεν ἑλὼν[1] ἐμβέβληκεν εἰς

C τοὺς ἐπαίνους τὸν ἄνθρωπον, "ἐγὼ δ' ἐθαύμαζον εἰ σὺ κακῶς τινα τῶν συνήθων εἶπας ὁ μηδὲ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς πεφυκώς, εἰ σὺ τοῖς ἀλλοτρίοις ἐπεχείρησας ὁ τοσαῦτα τῶν ἰδίων δωρούμενος."

14. Ἕτεροι τοίνυν, ὥσπερ οἱ ζωγράφοι τὰ φωτεινὰ καὶ λαμπρὰ τοῖς σκιεροῖς καὶ σκοτεινοῖς ἐπιτείνουσιν ἐγγὺς παρατιθεμένοις, οὕτω τῷ ψέγειν τἀναντία καὶ λοιδορεῖν ἢ διασύρειν καὶ καταγελᾶν λανθάνουσι τὰ προσόντα κακὰ τοῖς κολακευομένοις ἐπαινοῦντες καὶ τρέφοντες. σωφροσύνην τε γὰρ ὡς ἀγροικίαν ψέγουσιν ἐν ἀσώτοις, κἀν[2] πλεονέκταις καὶ κακούργοις καὶ πλουτοῦσιν ἀπὸ πραγμάτων

D αἰσχρῶν καὶ πονηρῶν αὐτάρκειάν τε[3] καὶ δικαιοσύ-

[1] ἑλὼν Courier: ἔχων.
[2] κἀν Bernardakis: καί.
[3] τε Hercher: δὲ.

[a] Source unknown.

they are particularly on the look-out for him in this quarter, that they stand well upon their guard in this place and region; so he does not deploy his praise in a frontal attack, but fetches a wide circuit, and

Approaches noiseless as to catch a beast,[a]

touching and handling him. Now he will report other people's praise of him, quoting another's words as public speakers do, how he had the pleasure of meeting in the market-place with some strangers or elderly men, who recounted many handsome things of him and expressed their admiration; then again, he will fabricate and concoct some trivial and false accusation against him, which he feigns to have heard from others, and comes up in hot haste to inquire when it was he said this or when it was he did that. And if the man denies the thing, as he naturally will, then on the instant the flatterer seizes him and launches him into a flood of praise: "I wondered if you did speak ill of any of your good friends, since it is not your nature to speak ill even of your enemies, or if you did make any attempt on other's property when you give away so much of your own."

14. Others, like painters who set off bright and brilliant colours by laying on dark and sombre tints close beside them, covertly praise and foster the vices to which their victims are addicted by condemning and abusing, or disparaging and ridiculing, the opposite qualities. Among the profligate they condemn frugality as "rusticity"; and among avaricious evil-doers, whose wealth is gained from shameful and unscrupulous deeds, they condemn contented independence and honesty as "the want

(57) νην ὡς ἀτολμίαν καὶ ἀρρωστίαν πρὸς τὸ πράττειν· ὅταν δὲ ῥᾳθύμοις σχολασταῖς καὶ τὰ μέσα φεύγουσι τῶν πόλεων ὁμιλῶσιν, οὐκ αἰσχύνονται πολιτείαν μὲν ἀλλοτριοπραγίαν ἐπίπονον, φιλοτιμίαν δὲ κενοδοξίαν ἄκαρπον ὀνομάζοντες. ἤδη δὲ καὶ ῥήτορος ἔστιν ὅτε κολακεία διασύρει φιλόσοφον, καὶ παρὰ γυναιξὶν ἀκολάστοις εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ[1] τὰς μονολεχεῖς καὶ φιλάνδρους ἀναφροδίτους καὶ ἀγροίκους ἀποκαλοῦντες. ὑπερβάλλει δὲ μοχθηρίᾳ τὸ μηδ' ἑαυτῶν ἀπέχεσθαι τοὺς κόλακας. ὡς γὰρ οἱ παλαισταὶ τὸ σῶμα ποιοῦσι ταπεινόν, ὅπως ἑτέρους κατα-
E βάλωσιν, οὕτω τῷ ψέγειν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς τὸ θαυμάζειν τοὺς πλησίον ὑπορρέουσιν. "ἀνδράποδόν εἰμι δειλὸν ἐν θαλάττῃ, πρὸς τοὺς πόνους ἀπαγορεύω, μαίνομαι κακῶς ἀκούσας ὑπ' ὀργῆς· ἀλλὰ τούτῳ," φησίν, "οὐδέν ἐστι δεινόν, οὐδὲν πονηρόν, ἀλλ' ἴδιος ἄνθρωπος, πάντα πράως φέρει, πάντ' ἀλύπως." ἂν δ' ᾖ τις οἰόμενος πολὺν ἔχειν νοῦν καὶ βουλόμενος αὐστηρὸς εἶναι καὶ αὐθέκαστος ὑπὸ δή τινος ὀρθότητος ἀεὶ προβάλληται τὸ

Τυδείδη, μήτ' ἄρ με μάλ' αἴνεε μήτε τι νείκει,

F οὐ ταύτῃ πρόσεισιν ὁ τεχνίτης κόλαξ, ἀλλ' ἔστι τις ἑτέρα μηχανὴ πρὸς τὸν τοιοῦτον. ἥκει γὰρ αὐτῷ περὶ πραγμάτων ἰδίων ὡς δὴ φρονήσει περισσοτέρῳ συμβουλευσόμενος, καί φησι μᾶλλον μὲν ἑτέρους

[1] εὐδοκιμοῦσιν οἱ Hercher: εὐδοκιμοῦσι.

[a] Homer, *Il.* x. 249.

of courage and vigour for active life " ; but when they associate with the easy-going and quiet people who avoid the crowded centres of the cities, they are not ashamed to call public life " a troublesome meddling with others' affairs," and ambition " unprofitable vainglory." Often enough a way to flatter a public speaker is to disparage a philosopher, and with lascivious women great repute is gained by those who brand faithful and loving wives as " cold " and " countrified." But here is the height of depravity, in that the flatterers do not spare their own selves. For as wrestlers put their own bodies into a lowly posture in order to throw their opponents, so flatterers, by blaming themselves, pass surreptitiously into admiration for their neighbours : " I am a miserable coward on the water, I have no stomach for hardships, I go mad with anger when anyone speaks ill of me ; but for this man here," he says, " nothing has any terrors, nothing any hardship, but he is a singular person ; he bears everything with good humour, everything without distress." But if there be somebody who imagines himself possessed of great sense, and desires to be downright and uncompromising, who because he poses as an upright man, forsooth, always uses as a defence and shield this line :

Son of Tydeus, praise me not too much, nor chide me,[a]

the accomplished flatterer does not approach him by this road, but there is another device to apply to a man of this sort. Accordingly the flatterer comes to consult with him about his own affairs, as with one obviously his superior in wisdom, and says that while he has other friends more intimate yet he

ἔχειν συνήθεις, ἐνοχλεῖν δ' ἀναγκαίως ἐκείνῳ· "ποῖ γὰρ καταφύγωμεν οἱ γνώμης δεόμενοι, τίνι δὲ πιστεύσωμεν;" εἶτ' ἀκούσας ὅ τι ἂν εἴπῃ, χρησμὸν εἰληφέναι φήσας οὐ γνώμην ἄπεισιν. ἂν δὲ καὶ λό-
58 γων τινὸς ἐμπειρίας ὁρᾷ μεταποιούμενον, ἔδωκέ τι τῶν αὑτῷ γεγραμμένων, ἀναγνῶναι καὶ διορθῶσαι κελεύσας. Μιθριδάτῃ δὲ τῷ βασιλεῖ φιλιατροῦντι καὶ τεμεῖν ἔνιοι καὶ καῦσαι παρέσχον αὑτοὺς τῶν ἑταίρων, ἔργῳ κολακεύοντες οὐλόγῳ· μαρτυρεῖσθαι γὰρ ἐμπειρίαν ἐδόκει πιστευόμενος ὑπ' αὐτῶν.

πολλαὶ μορφαὶ τῶν δαιμονίων,

τὸ δὲ γένος τοῦτο τῶν ἀρνουμένων ἐπαίνων πανουργοτέρας δεόμενον εὐλαβείας ἐλεγκτέον ἐπίτηδες ἀτόπους ἐκτάττοντα συμβουλίας καὶ ὑποθήκας, καὶ
B διορθώσεις ποιούμενον ἀλόγους. πρὸς μηδὲν γὰρ ἀντιλέγων, ἀλλὰ πᾶσι συνεπινεύων καὶ δεχόμενος πάντα καὶ βοῶν παρ' ἕκαστον ὡς εὖ καὶ καλῶς, γίγνεται καταφανὴς

σύνθημ' ἐρωτῶν, ἄλλο μαστεύων χρέος,

ἐπαινέσαι καὶ συνεπιτυφῶσαι βουλόμενος.

15. Ἔτι τοίνυν ὥσπερ ἔνιοι τὴν ζωγραφίαν σιωπῶσαν ἀπεφήναντο ποιητικήν, οὕτως ἔστι τις κολακείας σιωπώσης ἔπαινος. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ θηρεύοντες ἂν μὴ τοῦτο ποιεῖν ἀλλ' ὁδοιπορεῖν ἢ νέμειν ἢ γεωργεῖν δοκῶσι, μᾶλλον τὰ θηρευόμενα λανθάνουσιν, οὕτως οἱ κόλακες ἅπτονται μάλιστα τοῖς ἐπαίνοις,

[a] From the stock lines used at the close of the *Alcestis*, the *Andromache*, the *Bacchae*, and the *Helena*, of Euripides.

[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag., Adesp.* No. 365.

[c] A dictum attributed to Simonides by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 346 F, where it is quoted in full. The full form is found also *supra*, 17 F.

finds it necessary to trouble him. "For where can we resort who are in need of counsel, and whom can we trust?" Then having heard whatever the other may say, he asserts that he has received, not counsel, but the word of authority; and with that he takes his departure. And if he observes that the man lays some claim to skill in letters, he gives him some of his own writings, and asks him to read and correct them. Mithridates, the king, posed as an amateur physician, and some of his companions offered themselves to be operated upon and cauterized by him, thus flattering by deeds and not by words; for he felt that their confidence in him was a testimony to his skill.

In many a guise do the gods appear,[a]

and this class of dissimulated praise, which calls for a more cunning sort of precaution, is to be brought to light by deliberately formulating absurd advice and suggestions, and by making senseless corrections. For if he fails to contradict anything, if he assents to everything and accepts it, and at each suggestion exclaims "good" and "excellent," he makes it perfectly plain that he

The password asks, to gain some other end,[b]

his real desire being to praise his victim and to puff him up all the more.

15. Moreover, just as some have defined painting as silent poetry,[c] so there is a kind of praise that is silent flattery. For just as men engaged in hunting are less noticed by their quarry if they pretend not to be so engaged, but to be going along the road or tending flocks or tilling the soil, so flatterers gain the best hold with their praise when they pretend

(58) ὅταν ἐπαινεῖν μὴ δοκῶσιν ἀλλ' ἕτερόν τι πράττειν. ὁ γὰρ ἕδρας εἴκων καὶ κλισίας ἐπιόντι καὶ λέγων
C πρὸς δῆμον ἢ βουλὴν ἂν αἴσθηταί τινα τῶν πλουσίων βουλόμενον εἰπεῖν, ἀποσιωπῶν μεταξὺ καὶ παραδιδοὺς τὸ βῆμα καὶ τὸν λόγον ἐνδείκνυται σιωπῶν μᾶλλον τοῦ βοῶντος ὅτι κρείττονα νομίζει καὶ διαφέροντα τῷ φρονεῖν ἐκεῖνον. ὅθεν ὁρᾶν ἔστιν αὐτοὺς ἕδρας τε τὰς πρώτας ἐν ἀκροάσεσι καὶ θεάτροις καταλαμβάνοντας, οὐχ ὅτι τούτων ἀξιοῦσιν αὑτούς, ἀλλ' ὅπως ὑπεξιστάμενοι τοῖς πλουσίοις κολακεύωσι, καὶ λόγου κατάρχοντας ἐν συνόδοις καὶ συνεδρίοις, εἶτα παραχωροῦντας ὡς κρείττοσι καὶ
D μετατιθεμένους ῥᾷστα πρὸς τοὐναντίον, ἄνπερ ᾖ δυνατὸς ἢ πλούσιος ἢ ἔνδοξος ὁ ἀντιλέγων. ᾧ καὶ μάλιστα δεῖ τὰς τοιαύτας ὑποκατακλίσεις καὶ ἀναχωρήσεις ἐξελέγχειν, οὐκ ἐμπειρίαις οὐδ' ἀρεταῖς οὐδ' ἡλικίαις ὑφιεμένων ἀλλὰ πλούτοις καὶ δόξαις. Ἀπελλῆς μὲν γὰρ ὁ ζωγράφος, Μεγαβύζου παρακαθίσαντος αὐτῷ καὶ περὶ γραμμῆς τι καὶ σκιᾶς βουλομένου λαλεῖν, "ὁρᾷς" ἔφη "τὰ παιδάρια ταυτὶ τὰ τὴν μηλίδα τρίβοντα; πάνυ σοι προσεῖχε τὸν νοῦν σιωπῶντι, καὶ τὴν πορφύραν ἐθαύμαζε καὶ τὰ
E χρυσία· νῦν δέ σου καταγελᾷ περὶ ὧν οὐ μεμάθηκας ἀρξαμένου λαλεῖν." καὶ Σόλων, Κροίσου περὶ εὐδαιμονίας πυνθανομένου, Τέλλον τινὰ τῶν οὐκ

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[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 472 A.

[b] Herodotus, i. 30-33; *cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, xxvii. (93 B).

</transription>

not to be praising, but to be doing something else. Take, for example, a man who yields his seat or his place at table to a new-comer, or if he is engaged in speaking to the popular assembly or the senate and discovers that someone of the wealthy wants to speak, suddenly lapses into silence in the midst of his argument, and surrenders the platform with his right to speak ; such a man by his silence, far more than one who indulges in loud acclaim, makes it plain that he regards the rich person as his better and his superior in intelligence. This is the reason why such persons are to be seen taking possession of the front seats at entertainments and theatres, not because they think they have any right to them, but so that they may flatter the rich by giving up their seats. So, too, in an assemblage or a formal meeting they may be observed to begin a subject of discussion, and later to give ground as though before their betters, and to shift over with the utmost readiness to the other side, if the man opposing them be a person of power or wealth or repute. Herein lies the supreme test by which we must detect such cases of cringing submission and giving way, in that deference is paid, not to experience or virtue or age, but to wealth and repute. Apelles, the painter, as Megabyzus [a] took a seat by his side, eager to discuss line and chiaroscuro, said, " Do you see these boys here who are grinding the body for my colours ? They were all attention while you kept silent, and admired your purple robe and golden ornaments, but now they are laughing at you because you have undertaken to speak of matters which you have never learned." And Solon,[b] when Croesus inquired about happiness, declared that Tellus, one of the

ἐπιφανῶν Ἀθήνησι καὶ Κλέοβιν καὶ Βίτωνα ἀπέφηνεν εὐποτμοτέρους. οἱ δὲ κόλακες τοὺς βασιλεῖς καὶ πλουσίους καὶ ἄρχοντας οὐκ ὀλβίους μόνον καὶ μακαρίους ἀλλὰ καὶ φρονήσει καὶ τέχνῃ καὶ ἀρετῇ πάσῃ πρωτεύοντας ἀναγορεύουσιν.

16. Εἶτα τῶν μὲν Στωϊκῶν οὐδ' ἀκούειν ἔνιοι ὑπομένουσι τὸν σοφὸν ὁμοῦ πλούσιον καλὸν εὐγενῆ βασιλέα προσαγορευόντων, οἱ δὲ κόλακες τὸν πλούσιον ὁμοῦ καὶ ῥήτορα καὶ ποιητήν, ἂν δὲ βούληται,
F καὶ ζωγράφον καὶ αὐλητὴν ἀποφαίνουσι καὶ ποδώκη καὶ ῥωμαλέον, ὑποπίπτοντες ἐν τῷ παλαίειν καὶ ἀπολειπόμενοι θεόντων, ὥσπερ Κρίσων ὁ Ἰμεραῖος ἀπελείφθη διαθέων πρὸς Ἀλέξανδρον, ὁ δ' αἰσθόμενος ἠγανάκτησε. Καρνεάδης δ' ἔλεγε ὅτι πλουσίων καὶ βασιλέων παῖδες ἱππεύειν μόνον, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν εὖ καὶ καλῶς μανθάνουσι· κολακεύει γὰρ αὐτοὺς ἐν ταῖς διατριβαῖς ὁ διδάσκαλος ἐπαινῶν καὶ ὁ προσπαλαίων ὑποκατακλινόμενος, ὁ δ' ἵππος,
59 οὐκ εἰδὼς οὐδὲ φροντίζων ὅστις ἰδιώτης ἢ ἄρχων ἢ πλούσιος ἢ πένης, ἐκτραχηλίζει τοὺς μὴ δυναμένους ὀχεῖσθαι. εὐήθη τοίνυν καὶ ἀβέλτερα τὰ τοῦ Βίωνος "εἰ τὸν ἀγρὸν ἔμελλεν ἐγκωμιάζων εὔφορον ποιεῖν καὶ εὔκαρπον, εἶτ' οὐκ ἂν ἁμαρτάνειν ἐδόκει τοῦτο μὴ ποιῶν μᾶλλον ἢ σκάπτων καὶ πράγματα ἔχων; οὐ τοίνυν οὐδ' ἄνθρωπος ἄτοπος ἂν ἐπαίνων[1] εἴη, εἰ τοῖς ἐπαίνοις μόνοις[2] ὠφέλιμός ἐστι καὶ πάμφορος." ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἀγρὸς οὐ γίγνεται χείρων ἐπ-

[1] ἐπαίνων F.C.B. : ἐπαινῶν.
[2] ἐπαίνοις μόνοις F.C.B. : ἐπαινουμένοις.

inconspicuous men at Athens, and Cleobis and Biton, were more blest by fate than he. But flatterers proclaim that kings and wealthy persons and rulers are not only prosperous and blessed, but that they also rank first in understanding, technical skill, and every form of virtue.

16. Again, some people will not even listen to the Stoics, when they call the wise man at the same time rich, handsome, well-born, and a king ; but flatterers declare of the rich man that he is at the same time an orator and a poet, and, if he will, a painter and a musician, and swift of foot and strong of body ; and they allow themselves to be thrown in wrestling and outdistanced in running, as Crison of Himera was outdistanced in a foot-race with Alexander, but Alexander saw through the deception and was indignant.[a] Carneades used to say that the sons of the wealthy and sons of kings do learn to ride on horseback, but that they learn nothing else well and properly ; for in their studies their teacher flatters them with praise, and their opponent in wrestling does the same by submitting to be thrown, whereas the horse, having no knowledge or concern even as to who is private citizen or ruler, or rich or poor, throws headlong those who cannot ride him. It was therefore silly and foolish of Bion to say that " if he were sure to make his field productive and fruitful by lauding it, should he not then seem to be in error if he did not do this rather than give himself the trouble to dig it over ? And so, too, a man would not be an improper subject for praise, if by virtue of praise alone he becomes profitable and abundantly productive of good." But the truth is that a field is

[a] *Cf. Moralia*, 471 F.

(59) αινούμενος, ἄνθρωπον δὲ τυφοῦσι καὶ ἀπολλύουσιν οἱ ψευδῶς καὶ παρ' ἀξίαν ἐπαινοῦντες.

17. Ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἀπόχρη περὶ τούτων· ἐφεξῆς δὲ τὸ τῆς παρρησίας ἴδωμεν. ἔδει μὲν γάρ, ὡς ὁ
B Πάτροκλος τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως τὰ ὅπλα περιβαλλόμενος καὶ τοὺς ἵππους ἐξελαύνων ἐπὶ τὴν μάχην μόνης οὐκ ἐτόλμησε τῆς Πηλιάδος θιγεῖν ἀλλ' ἀφῆκεν, οὕτω τὸν κόλακα τοῖς τοῦ φίλου σκευοποιούμενον καὶ ἀναπλαττόμενον ἐπισήμοις καὶ συμβόλοις μόνην τὴν παρρησίαν ὥσπερ ἐξαίρετον βάσταγμα φιλίας

βριθὺ μέγα στιβαρὸν

καταλείπειν ἄθικτον καὶ ἀμίμητον. ἐπεὶ δὲ φεύγοντες τὸν ἐν γέλωτι καὶ ἀκράτῳ καὶ σκώμμασι καὶ παιδιαῖς ἔλεγχον εἰς ὀφρῦν αἴρουσιν ἤδη τὸ
C πρᾶγμα καὶ κολακεύουσιν ἐσκυθρωπακότες καὶ ψόγον τινὰ καὶ νουθεσίαν παραμιγνύουσι, φέρε μηδὲ τοῦτο παραλίπωμεν ἀβασάνιστον. οἶμαι δέ, ὥσπερ ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ Μενάνδρου Ψευδηρακλῆς πρόσεισι[1] ῥόπαλον οὐ στιβαρὸν κομίζων οὐδ' ἰσχυρὸν ἀλλὰ χαῦνόν τι πλάσμα καὶ διάκενον, οὕτω τὴν τοῦ κόλακος παρρησίαν φανεῖσθαι πειρωμένοις μαλακὴν καὶ ἀβαρῆ καὶ τόνον οὐκ ἔχουσαν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὰ τοῖς τῶν γυναικῶν προσκεφαλαίοις δρῶσαν, ἃ δοκοῦντα ταῖς κεφαλαῖς ἀντερείδειν καὶ ἀντέχειν ἐνδίδωσι καὶ
D ὑπείκει μᾶλλον· ὥσπερ ἡ κίβδηλος αὕτη παρρησία κενὸν ἔχουσα καὶ ψευδῆ καὶ ὕπουλον ὄγκον ἐξήρθη καὶ ᾠδησεν, ἵνα συσταλεῖσα καὶ συμπεσοῦσα

[1] πρόεισι Nikitin.

[a] Homer, *Il.* xvi. 14.

[b] "High-brow"; *cf.* the note in Allinson, *Menander* in the L.C.L., p. 316.

[c] The few fragments may be found in Kock, *Com. Att.*

not made any the worse by being praised, whereas a man is puffed up and ruined by those who praise him falsely and beyond his deserts.

17. Enough, then, on this topic. Let us, as the next step, look at the subject of frankness. As Patroclus, when he equipped himself with the armour of Achilles, and drove forth his horses to battle, did not venture to touch the Pelian spear, but left that, and that only, behind, so the flatterer, when he arrays himself to masquerade in the badges and insignia proper to a friend, ought to leave frankness alone as the one thing not to be touched or imitated. as though it were a choice piece of equipment,

Heavy and big and solid,[a]

belonging to friendship only. But since they shrink from the exposure that awaits them in laughter and wine, and in jest and jollity, and their next effort is to raise their business to a serious [b] level, by putting a stern face on their flattery, and tempering it with a little blame and admonition, let us not neglect to examine this point also. My mind is this : Just as in Menander's comedy [c] the sham Heracles comes on carrying a club which is not solid nor strong, but a light and hollow counterfeit, so the flatterer's frankness will appear, if we test it, to be soft and without weight or firmness, just like women's cushions, which, while they seem to support and to offer resistance to their heads, yet rather yield and give way to them ; and in the same way this counterfeit frankness, through having a hollow, false, and unsound bulk, is inflated and swollen, to the intent that later when it contracts and collapses it may

Frag. iii. p. 148, or in Allinson, *Menander* in the L.C.L., p. 458.

(59) δέξηται καὶ συνεπισπάσηται τὸν καταφερόμενον εἰς αὐτήν. ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἀληθὴς καὶ φιλικὴ παρρησία τοῖς ἁμαρτανομένοις ἐπιφύεται, σωτήριον ἔχουσα καὶ κηδεμονικὸν τὸ λυποῦν, ὥσπερ τὸ μέλι τὰ ἡλκωμένα δάκνουσα καὶ καθαίρουσα, τἄλλα δ' ὠφέλιμος οὖσα καὶ γλυκεῖα, περὶ ἧς ἴδιος ἔσται λόγος. ὁ δὲ κόλαξ πρῶτον μὲν ἐνδείκνυται τὸ πικρὸς εἶναι καὶ περισπερχὴς καὶ ἀπαραίτητος ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἑτέρους (οἰκέταις γὰρ αὐτοῦ χαλεπός ἐστι καὶ συγγενῶν καὶ οἰκείων ἐπεμβῆναι δεινὸς ἁμαρτήμασι καὶ μη-
E δένα θαυμάσαι μηδὲ σεμνῦναι τῶν ἐκτὸς ἀλλ' ὑπεροράν, ἀσυγγνώμων δὲ καὶ διάβολος ἐν τῷ πρὸς ὀργὴν ἑτέρους παροξύνειν, θηρώμενος μισοπονηρίας δόξαν, ὡς οὐκ ἂν ἑκὼν ὑφέμενος παρρησίας αὐτοῖς οὐδὲ ποιήσας οὐδὲν οὐδ' εἰπὼν πρὸς χάριν), ἔπειτα δὲ τῶν μὲν ἀληθινῶν καὶ μεγάλων ἁμαρτημάτων οὐδὲν εἰδέναι προσποιούμενος οὐδὲ γιγνώσκειν, πρὸς δὲ τὰ μικρὰ καὶ τὰ ἐκτὸς ἐλλείμματα δεινὸς ᾄξαι καὶ μετὰ τόνου καθάψασθαι καὶ σφοδρότητος,
F ἂν σκεῦος ἀμελῶς ἴδῃ κείμενον, ἂν οἰκοῦντα φαύλως, ἂν ὀλιγωροῦντα κουρᾶς ἢ ἀμπεχόνης ἢ κυνός τινος ἢ ἵππου μὴ κατ' ἀξίαν ἐπιμελόμενον· γονέων δὲ ὀλιγωρία καὶ παίδων ἀμέλεια καὶ ἀτιμία γαμετῆς καὶ πρὸς οἰκείους ὑπεροψία καὶ χρημάτων ὄλεθρος οὐδέν ἐστι πρὸς αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἄφωνος ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἄτολμος, ὥσπερ ἀθλητὴν ἀλείπτης ἐῶν μεθύειν καὶ ἀκολασταίνειν, εἶτα περὶ ληκύθου χαλεπὸς ὢν καὶ

[a] There are many references in ancient writers to this property of honey. *Cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Phocion*, chap. ii. (p. 742 B). The fact that honey quickly destroys pathogenic germs, like those of typhoid, has recently received scientific demonstration; *cf. Bulletin* 252 of the Colorado Agricultural College.

take in and drag along with it the man who throws himself upon it. For the true frankness such as a friend displays applies itself to errors that are being committed ; the pain which it causes is salutary and benignant, and, like honey, it causes the sore places to smart and cleanses them too,[a] but in its other uses it is wholesome and sweet ; this later shall have a chapter to itself.[b] But the flatterer, in the first place, makes a parade of harshness and of being acrimonious and inexorable in his bearing towards others. For he is rough with his own servants, and very quick to pounce on the errors of his kinsmen and household, refusing to admire or extol any outsider but rather despising all such ; he is relentless in his efforts to stir up others to anger by his slanders ; his aim is to get the name of a hater of iniquity, and to give the impression that he would not willingly abate his frankness to please others, nor do or say anything at all to curry favour. In the second place, he pretends not to know or notice a single real and important misdeed, but he is very quick to swoop down upon trifling and immaterial shortcomings, and to indulge in an intense and vehement tirade if he sees that a bit of furniture is carelessly placed, if he sees that a man is a poor manager, if anyone is careless about having his hair cut or about his clothing, or does not give proper care to some dog or horse ; but let a man disregard his parents, neglect his children, insult his wife, disdain his household, squander his money, all this is nothing to him, but in the midst of such matters he is mute and craven, like a trainer who allows an athlete to get drunk and live loosely, and then is very stern about oil-

[b] Chap. 26, *infra*.

στλεγγίδος, ἢ γραμματικὸς ἐπιπλήττων παιδὶ περὶ δέλτου καὶ γραφείου, σολοικίζοντος δὲ καὶ βαρβαρίζοντος οὐ δοκῶν ἀκούειν. τοιοῦτος γὰρ ὁ κόλαξ, οἷος ῥήτορος φαύλου καὶ καταγελάστου μηδὲν εἰπεῖν
60 πρὸς τὸν λόγον, ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς φωνῆς αἰτιᾶσθαι καὶ χαλεπῶς ἐγκαλεῖν ὅτι τὴν ἀρτηρίαν διαφθείρει ψυχροποτῶν, καὶ σύγγραμμα κελευσθεὶς ἄθλιον διελθεῖν αἰτιᾶσθαι τὸ χαρτίον ὡς δασὺ καὶ τὸν γραφέα μιαρὸν καὶ ὀλίγωρον ἀποκαλεῖν. οὕτω δὲ καὶ Πτολεμαίῳ φιλομαθεῖν δοκοῦντι περὶ γλώττης καὶ στιχιδίου μαχόμενοι καὶ ἱστορίας μέχρι μέσων νυκτῶν ἀπέτεινον· ὠμότητι δὲ χρωμένου καὶ ὕβρει καὶ τυμπανίζοντος καὶ τελοῦντος οὐδεὶς ἐνέστη τῶν
B τοσούτων. ὥσπερ οὖν εἴ τις ἀνθρώπου φύματα καὶ σύριγγας ἔχοντος ἰατρικῷ σμιλίῳ τὰς τρίχας τέμνοι καὶ τοὺς ὄνυχας, οὕτως οἱ κόλακες τὴν παρρησίαν πρὸς τὰ μὴ λυπούμενα μέρη μηδ' ἀλγοῦντα προσφέρουσιν.

18. Ἔτι δὲ τούτων ἕτεροι πανουργότεροι καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὴν χρῶνται τῷ παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ ψέγειν. καθάπερ Ἄγις ὁ Ἀργεῖος, Ἀλεξάνδρου γελωτοποιῷ τινι μεγάλας δωρεὰς διδόντος, ὑπὸ φθόνου καὶ λύπης ἐξέκραγεν "ὦ τῆς πολλῆς ἀτοπίας," ἐπιστρέψαντος δὲ τοῦ βασιλέως πρὸς αὐτὸν ὀργῇ καὶ "τί δὴ σὺ λέγεις;" εἰπόντος "ὁμολογῶ," φησίν, "ἄχθεσθαι καὶ ἀγανακτεῖν, ὁρῶν ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἐκ Διὸς γεγονότας ἅπαντας ὁμοίως
C κόλαξιν ἀνθρώποις καὶ καταγελάστοις χαίροντας·

[a] Probably Ptolemy Euergetes II., also called Physcon (146–117 B.C.); *cf.* Athenaeus, xii. 73 (p. 549 D).

flask and flesh-scraper, or like a schoolmaster who scolds a boy about his slate and pencil, and affects not to hear his blunders in grammar and diction. For the flatterer is the sort of person who will not say a word regarding the actual discourse of a cheap and ridiculous speaker, but will find fault with his voice, and accuse him severely because he ruins his throat by drinking cold water; or if he is requested to look over a wretched piece of writing, he will find fault with the paper for being rough, and call the copyist abominably careless. So it was with the flatterers of Ptolemy,[a] who posed as a lover of learning; they would contend with him about an obscure word or a trifling verse or a point of history, and keep it up till midnight; but when he indulged in wanton cruelty and violence, played the cymbals and conducted his initiations, not one of all these people opposed his course. Just imagine a man using a surgeon's lancet to cut the hair and nails of a person suffering from tumours and abscesses! Yet this is the sort of thing that flatterers do, who apply their frankness to those parts that feel no hurt or pain.

18. There is still another class of persons, even more unscrupulous than these, who employ this frankness of speech and reprehension of theirs in order to give pleasure. For example, Agis, the Argive, on an occasion when Alexander gave great gifts to a jester, in his jealousy and chagrin shouted out, "Heavens, what gross absurdity!" The king turned upon him angrily and said, "What's that you say?" Whereupon he replied, "I confess that I feel troubled and indignant at seeing that all you sons of Zeus alike show favour to flatterers and ridiculous persons. For Heracles had pleasure in

(60) καὶ γὰρ Ἡρακλῆς Κέρκωψί τισι, καὶ Σειληνοῖς ὁ Διόνυσος ἐτέρπετο, καὶ παρὰ σοὶ τοιούτους ἰδεῖν ἔστιν εὐδοκιμοῦντας." Τιβερίου δὲ Καίσαρος εἰς τὴν σύγκλητόν ποτε παρελθόντος εἷς τῶν κολάκων ἀναστὰς ἔφη δεῖν ἐλευθέρους ὄντας παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ὑποστέλλεσθαι μηδ' ἀποσιωπᾶν τῶν συμφερόντων· ἀνατείνας δὲ πάντας οὕτως, γενομένης αὐτῷ σιωπῆς καὶ τοῦ Τιβερίου προσέχοντος, "ἄκουσον," ἔφη, "Καῖσαρ ἃ σοι πάντες ἐγκαλοῦμεν, οὐδεὶς δὲ τολμᾷ φανερῶς λέγειν. ἀμελεῖς σεαυτοῦ καὶ προΐεσαι τὸ σῶμα καὶ κατατρύχεις ἀεὶ φροντίσι καὶ πόνοις ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, οὔτε μεθ'
D ἡμέραν οὔτε νυκτὸς ἀναπαυόμενος." πολλὰ δ' αὐτοῦ τοιαῦτα συνείροντος, εἰπεῖν φασι τὸν ῥήτορα Κάσσιον Σευῆρον "αὕτη τοῦτον ἡ παρρησία τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἀποκτενεῖ."

19. Καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν ἐλάττονά ἐστιν. ἐκεῖνα δ' ἤδη χαλεπὰ καὶ λυμαινόμενα τοὺς ἀνοήτους, ὅταν εἰς τἀναντία πάθη καὶ νοσήματα κατηγορῶσιν (ὥσπερ Ἰμέριος ὁ κόλαξ τῶν πλουσίων τινὰ τὸν[1] ἀνελευθερώτατον καὶ φιλαργυρώτατον Ἀθήνησιν ὡς ἄσωτον ἐλοιδόρει καὶ ἀμελῆ καὶ πεινήσοντα
E κακῶς μετὰ τῶν τέκνων) ἢ τοὺς ἀσώτους αὖ πάλιν καὶ πολυτελεῖς εἰς μικρολογίαν καὶ ῥυπαρίαν ὀνειδίζωσιν (ὥσπερ Νέρωνα Τίτος Πετρώνιος) ἢ τοὺς ὠμῶς καὶ ἀγρίως προσφερομένους ἄρχοντας ὑπηκόοις ἀποθέσθαι κελεύωσι τὴν πολλὴν ἐπιείκειαν καὶ τὸν ἄκαιρον ἔλεον καὶ ἀσύμφορον. ὅμοιος δὲ τούτοις καὶ ὁ τὸν εὐήθη καὶ βλᾶκα καὶ

[1] τὸν added by Hercher.

certain Cercopes, and Dionysus in Sileni, and one can see that such persons are in good repute with you." And once, when Tiberius Caesar had come into the Senate, one of the flatterers arose and said that they ought, being free men, to speak frankly, and not to dissemble or refrain from discussing anything that might be for the general good. Having thus aroused general attention, in the ensuing silence, as Tiberius gave ear, he said, " Listen, Caesar, to the charges which we are all making against you, but which no one dares to speak out. You do not take proper care of yourself, you are prodigal of your bodily strength, you are continually wearing it out in your anxieties and labours in our behalf, you give yourself no respite either by day or by night." As he drew out a long string of such phrases, they say that the orator Cassius Severus remarked, " Such frankness as this will be the death of this man ! "

19. All that is really a minor matter. But we come now to matters that are a serious problem, and do great damage to the foolish, when the flatterer's accusations are directed against emotions and weaknesses the contrary to those that a person really has. For example, Himerius the flatterer used to vilify a man, the most illiberal and avaricious of the rich men at Athens, as a careless profligate destined to starve miserably together with his children. Or again, on the other hand, they will reproach profligate and lavish spenders with meanness and sordidness (as Titus Petronius did with Nero) ; or they will bid rulers who deal savagely and fiercely with their subjects to lay aside their excessive clemency and their inopportune and unprofitable pity. Very like to these also is the man who pretends to be on his

ἀβέλτερον ὡς δεινόν τινα καὶ πανοῦργον καὶ φυλάττεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι προσποιούμενος, καὶ ὁ τοῦ βασκάνου δὲ καὶ τῷ κακολογεῖν ἀεὶ καὶ ψέγειν χαίροντος, ἄν ποτε προαχθεὶς ἐπαινέσῃ τινὰ τῶν ἐνδόξων, καθαπτόμενος καὶ ἀντιλέγων ὡς νόσημα
F τοῦτ' ἔχοντος, ἀνθρώπους ἐπαινεῖν καὶ μηδενὸς ἀξίους. "τίς γὰρ οὗτός ἐστιν ἢ τί λαμπρὸν εἴρηκεν ἢ πεποίηκε;" μάλιστα δὲ περὶ τοὺς ἔρωτας τοῖς κολακευομένοις ἐπιτίθενται καὶ προσεκκάουσιν. ἀδελφοῖς μὲν γὰρ ὁρῶντες διαφερομένους ἢ γονέων ὑπερφρονοῦντας ἢ πρὸς γυναῖκας αὐτῶν ὑπεροπτικῶς ἔχοντας οὔτε νουθετοῦσιν οὔτ' ἐγκαλοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσεπιτείνουσι τὰς ὀργάς. "οὐ γὰρ αἰσθάνῃ σαυτοῦ" καὶ "σὺ τούτων αἴτιος, ἀεὶ θεραπευτικῶς προσφερόμενος καὶ ταπεινῶς."
61 ἂν δὲ πρὸς ἑταίραν ἢ μοιχεύτριαν ἐρωμένην κνησμός τις ἐξ ὀργῆς καὶ ζηλοτυπίας ἐγγένηται, πάρεστιν εὐθὺς μετὰ παρρησίας λαμπρᾶς ἡ κολακεία, πῦρ ἐπὶ πῦρ εἰσφέρουσα καὶ δικαιολογουμένη καὶ κατηγοροῦσα τοῦ ἐρῶντος ὡς ἀνέραστα πολλὰ καὶ σκληρὰ καὶ νεμεσητὰ ποιοῦντος·

ὦ δυσχάριστε, τῶν πυκνῶν φιλημάτων.

οὕτως Ἀντώνιον οἱ φίλοι τῆς Αἰγυπτίας ἐρῶντα καὶ καόμενον ἀνέπειθον ὡς ὑπ' ἐκείνης ἐρῷτο, καὶ λοιδοροῦντες ἐκάλουν ἀπαθῆ καὶ ὑπερήφανον. "ἡ μὲν γὰρ γυνὴ καταλιποῦσα βασιλείαν τοσαύτην
B καὶ διατριβὰς εὐδαίμονας φθείρεται μετὰ σοῦ στρατευομένη, σχῆμα παλλακίδος ἔχουσα·

[a] From the *Myrmidons* of Aeschylus. Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Aesch.*, No. 135; *cf.* also Plutarch, *Moralia*, 715 c.

[b] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Antony*, chap. liii. (940 D).

guard against some simple and stupid fool, and to fear him as a clever rascal ; and so, too, if a malicious person, and one that delights in constant evil-speaking and fault-finding, be induced to commend some man of note, a flatterer of this stamp takes him straight in hand, and contradicts him, declaring that it is a weakness of his to commend even the worthless. " For who is this fellow, or what brilliant thing has he said or done ? " Especially in regard to love affairs they beset their victims and add fuel to their fire. Likewise if they see that any are in disagreement with their brothers, or that they contemn their parents, or deal scornfully with their wives, they do not admonish or arraign them, but try to intensify such feelings. " You have no proper appreciation of yourself," they say, and, " You have yourself to blame for this, because you always affect such an obsequious and humble air." And if, as a result of temper and jealousy, a feeling of irritation is engendered toward a mistress or another man's wife with whom the man has a love-affair, in comes flattery at once with a splendid frankness, adding fire to fire, pleading for justice, accusing the lover of many unloving, obdurate, and reprehensible actions :

O ingrate, after crowding kiss on kiss ! [a]

So the friends of Antony, who was consumed with love of the Egyptian woman,[b] tried to make him believe that she was enamoured of him, and, upbraiding him, they would call him cold and haughty : " For the woman, forsaking so great a kingdom and so many happy employments, is wearing her life away, as she follows with you on your marches in the guise of a concubine;

(61) σοὶ δέ τις ἐν στήθεσσιν ἀκήλητος νόος ἐστί
καὶ περιορᾷς αὐτὴν ἀνιωμένην." ὁ δ' ἡδέως
ἐλεγχόμενος ὡς ἀδικῶν καὶ τοῖς κατηγοροῦσι
χαίρων ὡς οὐδὲ τοῖς ἐπαινοῦσιν ἐλάνθανε τῷ
νουθετεῖν δοκοῦντι προσδιαστρεφόμενος. ἔοικε γὰρ
ἡ τοιαύτη παρρησία τοῖς τῶν ἀκολάστων δήγμασι
γυναικῶν, ἐγείρουσα καὶ γαργαλίζουσα τῷ δοκοῦντι
λυπεῖν τὸ ἡδόμενον. καὶ καθάπερ τὸν ἄκρατον
ἄλλως βοηθοῦντα πρὸς τὸ κώνειον ἂν ἐμμείξωσι
C προσεμβαλόντες αὐτῷ, κομιδῇ ποιοῦσι τὴν τοῦ
φαρμάκου δύναμιν ἀβοήθητον, ὀξέως ἀναφερο-
μένην ἐπὶ τὴν καρδίαν ὑπὸ θερμότητος, οὕτω τὴν
παρρησίαν ἐπιστάμενοι μέγα βοήθημα πρὸς τὴν
κολακείαν οὖσαν οἱ πονηροὶ δι' αὐτῆς κολακεύουσι
τῆς παρρησίας. ὅθεν οὐδ' ὁ Βίας ἀπεκρίνατο
καλῶς τῷ πυθομένῳ τί τῶν ζῴων χαλεπώτατόν
ἐστιν, ἀποκρινάμενος ὅτι τῶν μὲν ἀγρίων ὁ τύραν-
νος, τῶν δ' ἡμέρων ὁ κόλαξ. ἀληθέστερον γὰρ ἦν
εἰπεῖν ὅτι τῶν κολάκων ἥμεροι μέν εἰσιν οἱ περὶ
D τὸ βαλανεῖον καὶ περὶ τὴν τράπεζαν, ὁ δ' εἰς τὰ
δωμάτια καὶ τὴν γυναικωνῖτιν ἐκτείνων ὥσπερ
πλεκτάνας τὸ πολύπραγμον καὶ διάβολον καὶ κακό-
ηθες ἄγριος καὶ θηριώδης καὶ δυσμεταχείριστος.

20. Εἷς δέ τις ἔοικε τρόπος εἶναι φυλακῆς τὸ
γιγνώσκειν καὶ μνημονεύειν ἀεὶ ὅτι τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ
μὲν ἀληθινὸν καὶ φιλόκαλον καὶ λογικὸν ἐχούσης,
τὸ δ' ἄλογον καὶ φιλοψευδὲς καὶ παθητικόν, ὁ μὲν
φίλος ἀεὶ τῷ κρείττονι πάρεστι σύμβουλος καὶ

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[a] Homer, *Od.* x. 329.

But the mind in your breast is proof against enchantment,[a]

and you are indifferent to her distress." He was pleased at being taken to task for such wrongdoing, and taking more pleasure in those who accused him than he did even in any who commended him, he failed to see that by this seeming admonition he was being perversely drawn towards her. Such frankness is like the love bites of lascivious women ; it arouses and tickles the sense of pleasure by pretending to cause pain. So undiluted wine is of itself a helpful remedy for the hemlock poison, but if they add it to hemlock and mix the two together they make the potency of the drug quite beyond remedy, since it is rapidly carried to the heart by the heat. In like manner the unscrupulous, being well aware that frankness is a great remedy for flattery, flatter by means of frankness itself. It is for this reason that Bias did not give a good answer to the man who asked him " What is the fiercest animal ? " when he replied, " Of the wild animals the tyrant, and of the domesticated the flatterer." For it were nearer the truth to say, that among flatterers those who hover about the bath and the table are domesticated, whereas he that extends his meddling and slander and malice like tentacles into the bedchamber and the women's privacy, is an uncivilized brute and most hard to handle.

20. One mode of protection, as it would seem, is to realize and remember always that our soul has its two sides : on the one side are truthfulness, love for what is honourable, and power to reason, and on the other side irrationality, love of falsehood, and the emotional element ; the friend is always found on the better side as counsel and advocate, trying, after

συνήγορος, ὥσπερ ἰατρὸς τὸ ὑγιαῖνον αὔξων καὶ διαφυλάττων, ὁ δὲ κόλαξ τῷ παθητικῷ καὶ ἀλόγῳ
E παρακάθηται, καὶ τοῦτο κνᾷ καὶ γαργαλίζει καὶ ἀναπείθει, καὶ ἀφίστησι τοῦ λογισμοῦ, μηχανώμενος αὐτῷ πονηράς τινας ἡδυπαθείας. ὥσπερ οὖν τῶν σιτίων ἔστιν ἃ μήθ' αἵματι προσφύεται μήτε πνεύματι, μηδὲ[1] νεύροις τινὰ τόνον ἢ μυελοῖς προστίθησιν, ἀλλ' αἰδοῖα παρακινεῖ καὶ κοιλίαν ἐγείρει καὶ σάρκα ποιεῖ σαθρὰν καὶ ὕπουλον, οὕτως ὁ τοῦ κόλακος λόγος οὐδὲν τῷ φρονοῦντι καὶ λογιζομένῳ προστίθησιν, ἀλλ' ἡδονήν τινα τιθασεύων ἔρωτος ἢ θυμὸν ἐντείνων ἀνόητον ἢ διερεθίζων φθόνον ἢ φρονήματος ὄγκον ἐμποιῶν ἐπαχθῆ
F καὶ κενὸν ἢ λύπῃ συνεπιθρηνῶν ἢ τὸ κακόηθες καὶ ἀνελεύθερον καὶ ἄπιστον ἀεί τισι διαβολαῖς καὶ προαισθήσεσι δριμὺ καὶ ψοφοδεὲς ποιῶν καὶ ὕποπτον οὐ διαφεύξεται τοὺς προσέχοντας. ἀεὶ γὰρ ὑφορμεῖ τινι πάθει καὶ τοῦτο πιαίνει, καὶ πάρεστι βουβῶνος δίκην ἑκάστοτε τοῖς ὑπούλοις καὶ φλεγμαίνουσι τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιγιγνόμενος. "ὀργίζῃ; κόλασον. ἐπιθυμεῖς; ὄνησαι. φοβῇ; φύγωμεν. ὑπονοεῖς; πίστευσον.[2]"

"Αν δὲ περὶ ταῦτα δυσφώρατος ᾖ τὰ πάθη, διὰ σφοδρότητα καὶ μέγεθος ἐκκρουομένου τοῦ λογισμοῦ, περὶ τὰ μικρὰ λαβὴν παρέξει μᾶλλον, ὅμοιος
62 ὤν. καὶ γὰρ ἐν ὑποψίᾳ κραιπάλης τινὸς ἢ πλη-

[1] μηδὲ Hercher: μήτε.
[2] ἀπίστησον, "distrust," Hatzidakis.

the manner of a physician, to foster the growth of what is sound and to preserve it; but the flatterer takes his place on the side of the emotional and irrational, and this he excites and tickles and wheedles, and tries to divorce from the reasoning powers by contriving for it divers low forms of pleasurable enjoyment. There are some sorts of food, for example, that are without affinity for either the blood or the breath, which add no vigour to nerves or marrow, but only excite the lower passions, arouse the appetite, and make unsound flesh that is morbid within. So the flatterer's talk adds nothing to the thinking and reasoning powers, but only promotes familiarity with some amorous pleasure, intensifies a foolish fit of temper, provokes envy, engenders an offensive and inane bulk of conceit, commiserates in distress, or, by a succession of slanders and forebodings, causes malice, illiberality and distrust to grow bitter, timorous, and suspicious; and these are all matters that will not escape the observant. For the flatterer is always covertly on the watch for some emotion, and pampering it, and his presence is like that of a tumour in that he ever comes immediately following some morbid or inflamed condition of the soul. "Are you angry? Punish then." "Do you crave a thing? Then buy it." "Are you afraid? Let's run away." "Have you a suspicion? Then give it credence."

But if it is hard to detect the flatterer when he is engaged with these major emotions, inasmuch as our power to reason is deranged by their vehemence and magnitude, yet with the lesser ones he will better give a vantage, since his behaviour here will be the same. For example, if a man is afraid that he may

(62) σμονῆς γενόμενον καὶ διστάζοντα περὶ λουτροῦ καὶ τροφῆς ὁ μὲν φίλος ἐφέξει, φυλάττεσθαι καὶ προσέχειν παραινῶν, ὁ δὲ κόλαξ εἰς τὸ βαλανεῖον ἕλκει, καὶ κελεύει νεαρόν τι παρατιθέναι καὶ μὴ κακοῦν ἀνατάσει τὸ σῶμα. καὶ πρὸς ὁδὸν ἢ πλοῦν ἤ τινα πρᾶξιν ὁρῶν ἀπομαλακιζόμενον οὐ φήσει κατεπείγειν τὸν καιρόν, ἀλλὰ ταὐτὸ ποιήσειν ὑπερθεμένους ἢ πέμψαντας ἕτερον. ἂν δ' ὑπεσχημένος ἀργύριον οἰκείῳ τινὶ δανείσειν ἢ ἐπιδώσειν
B μεταμέληται μὲν αἰδῆται δέ, τῇ χείρονι ῥοπῇ προστιθεὶς ἑαυτὸν ὁ κόλαξ ἐπέρρωσε τὴν εἰς τὸ βαλλάντιον γνώμην καὶ τὸ δυσωπούμενον ἐξέκοψεν, ὡς ἀναλίσκοντα πολλὰ καὶ πολλοῖς ἀρκεῖν ὀφείλοντα φείδεσθαι κελεύων. ὅθεν εἰ μὴ λανθάνομεν ἑαυτοὺς ἐπιθυμοῦντες ἀναισχυντοῦντες ἀποδειλιῶντες, ὁ κόλαξ ἡμᾶς οὐ λήσεται. ἔστι γὰρ συνηγορῶν ἀεὶ τούτοις τοῖς πάθεσι καὶ περὶ τὰς τούτων ἐκβάσεις[1] παρρησιαζόμενος. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν ἱκανὰ περὶ τούτων.

21. Ἐπὶ δὲ τὰς χρείας καὶ τὰς ὑπουργίας ἴωμεν ἤδη· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταύταις πολλὴν ἀπεργάζεται
C σύγχυσιν καὶ ἀσάφειαν ὁ κόλαξ τῆς πρὸς τὸν φίλον διαφορᾶς ἄοκνος δοκῶν εἶναι καὶ πρόθυμος ἐν πᾶσι καὶ ἀπροφάσιστος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ φίλου τρόπος ὥσπερ ὁ τῆς ἀληθείας μῦθος ἁπλοῦς ἐστι κατ' Εὐριπίδην καὶ ἀφελὴς καὶ ἄπλαστος, ὁ δὲ τοῦ κόλακος ὄντως

[1] ἐκβάσεις] ἐνστάσεις Wyttenbach.

[a] Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 469, 472.

have a headache or a digestive upset from drinking or eating to excess, and hesitates about bathing and taking food, a friend will try to hold him back, and advise him to be careful and cautious, but the flatterer drags him off to the baths, and bids him order some novel dish, and not to maltreat his body by forced abstinence. And if he sees his man to be feebly inclined towards some journey or voyage or undertaking, he will say that the occasion is not pressing but that they will accomplish the same result by postponement or by sending somebody else. If the man, after promising money as a loan or a gift to some personal friend, wants to change his mind, but is ashamed to do so, the flatterer throws his weight upon the worse inclination, strengthens his opinion touching his purse, and banishes his feeling of mortification, bidding him be economical, since he has many expenses and many mouths to feed. It follows, therefore, that if we are not unaware of our own feelings of covetousness, shamelessness, and cowardice, we shall not be unaware of the flatterer. For he always acts as an advocate of such emotions, and is frank in discussing the results to which they lead.

This, then, is enough on this subject.

21. Let us come without more ado to the topic of services and ministrations; for it is in these that the flatterer brings about a great confusion and uncertainty in regard to the difference between himself and the friend, because he appears to be brisk and eager in everything and never to make an excuse. For the character of a friend, like the "language of truth," is, as Euripides [a] puts it, "simple," plain, and unaffected, whereas that of the flatterer, in very truth

(62) νοσῶν ἐν αὑτῷ φαρμάκων δεῖται σοφῶν καὶ πολλῶν νὴ Δία καὶ περιττῶν. ὥσπερ οὖν ἐν ταῖς ἀπαντήσεσιν ὁ μὲν φίλος ἔστιν ὅτε μήτ' εἰπὼν μήτ' ἀκούσας μηδὲν ἀλλὰ προσβλέψας καὶ μειδιάσας τὸ εὐμενὲς καὶ τὸ οἰκεῖον ἔνδοθεν δοὺς ταῖς ὄψεσι
D καὶ δεξάμενος παρῆλθεν, ὁ δὲ κόλαξ τρέχει καταδιώκει δεξιοῦται πόρρωθεν, ἂν προσαγορευθῇ πρότερον ὀφθείς, ἀπολογεῖται μετὰ μαρτύρων καὶ ὅρκων πολλάκις, οὕτως ἐν ταῖς πράξεσι πολλὰ παραλείπουσιν οἱ φίλοι τῶν μικρῶν, οὐκ ἐξακριβοῦντες οὐδὲ πολυπραγμονοῦντες οὐδέν, οὐδ' ἑαυτοὺς εἰς πᾶσαν ὑπουργίαν ἐμβάλλοντες. ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνος ἐνταῦθα συνεχὴς καὶ ἐνδελεχὴς καὶ ἄτρυτος, οὐ διδοὺς ἑτέρῳ τόπον οὐδὲ χώραν διακονίας, ἀλλὰ βουλόμενος κελεύεσθαι, κἂν μὴ κελευσθῇ, δακνόμενος, μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως ἐξαθυμῶν καὶ ποτνιώμενος.

22. Ἔστι μὲν οὖν καὶ ταῦτα δηλώματα τοῖς
E νοῦν ἔχουσιν οὐκ ἀληθινῆς φιλίας οὐδὲ σώφρονος ἀλλ' ἑταιρούσης καὶ περιπλεκομένης ἑτοιμότερον τῶν δεομένων.

Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ δεῖ πρῶτον ἐν ταῖς ἐπαγγελίαις σκοπεῖν τὴν διαφοράν. εὖ γὰρ εἴρηται καὶ τοῖς πρὸ ἡμῶν φίλου μὲν ἐκείνην εἶναι τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν

εἰ δύναμαι τελέσαι γε καὶ εἰ τετελεσμένον ἐστί,

κόλακος δὲ ταύτην

ἄϋδα ὅ τι φρονέεις.

καὶ γὰρ οἱ κωμικοὶ τοιούτους εἰσάγουσιν

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[a] Homer, *Il.* xiv. 196; xviii. 427; *Od.* v. 90.
[b] Homer, *Il.* xiv. 195; xviii. 426; *Od.* v. 89.

Self-sick, hath need of dextrous remedies,

and of a good many too, I venture to affirm, and of an uncommon sort. Take the case of one person meeting another: a friend sometimes, without the exchange of a word, but merely by a glance and a smile, gives and receives through the medium of the eyes an intimation of the goodwill and intimacy that is in the heart, and passes on. But the flatterer runs, pursues, extends his greeting at a distance, and if he be seen and spoken to first, he pleads his defence with witnesses and oaths over and over again. It is the same with actions: friends omit many of the trifling formalities, not being at all exacting or officious in this respect, not putting themselves forward for every kind of ministration; whereas the flatterer is in these matters persistent, assiduous, and untiring, giving to no one else place or space for a good office, but he is eager for orders, and if he receives none he is nettled, or rather he is utterly dispirited and gives way to lamentations.

22. Now to people of sense these are manifestations, not of a pure nor a chaste friendship, but of a friendship that is more ready than it should be to solicit and embrace.

We need first, however, to consider the difference shown by the two men in offering their services. It has been well said by writers before our time that a friend's offer takes this form:

Yes, if I have the power, and if it can be accomplished,[a]

while a flatterer's is like this:

Speak what you have in mind.[b]

In fact the comic poets introduce on the stage characters of this sort:

ἐμέ, Νικόμαχε, πρὸς τὸν στρατιώτην τάξατε,
ἂν μὴ ποιήσω πέπονα μαστιγῶν ὅλον,
ἂν μὴ ποιήσω σπογγιᾶς μαλακώτερον
τὸ πρόσωπον.

F ἔπειτα τῶν μὲν φίλων οὐδεὶς γίγνεται συνεργός, εἰ μὴ γένηται σύμβουλος πρότερον, ἀλλ' ὅταν δοκιμάσῃ καὶ συγκαταστήσῃ τὴν πρᾶξιν εἰς τὸ πρέπον ἢ τὸ συμφέρον· ὁ δὲ κόλαξ, κἂν ἀποδῷ τις αὐτῷ τὸ συνδοκιμάσαι καὶ συναποφήνασθαι περὶ τοῦ πράγματος, οὐ μόνον ὑπείκειν καὶ χαρίζεσθαι βουλόμενος, ἀλλὰ καὶ δεδιὼς ὑποψίαν ὀκνοῦντος παρέχειν καὶ φεύγοντος τὸ ἔργον, ἐνδίδωσι καὶ συνεξορμᾷ τῇ ἐπιθυμίᾳ. οὐδεὶς γάρ ἐστι ῥᾳδίως πλούσιος οὐδὲ βασιλεὺς οἷος εἰπεῖν

63 ἐμοὶ γὰρ εἴη πτωχός, εἰ δὲ βούλεται,
πτωχοῦ κακίων, ὅστις ὢν εὔνους ἐμοὶ
φόβον παρελθὼν τἀπὸ καρδίας ἐρεῖ,

ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ τραγῳδοὶ χοροῦ δέονται φίλων συναδόντων ἢ θεάτρου συνεπικροτοῦντος. ὅθεν ἡ μὲν τραγικὴ Μερόπη παραινεῖ

φίλους δὲ τοὺς μὲν μὴ χαλῶντας ἐν λόγοις
κέκτησο, τοὺς δὲ πρὸς χάριν σὺν ἡδονῇ
τῇ σῇ πονηροὺς κλῆθρον εἰργέτω στέγης,

B οἱ δὲ τοὐναντίον δρῶσι, "τοὺς μὲν μὴ χαλῶντας ἐν λόγοις" ἀλλ' ἀντιβαίνοντας ὑπὲρ τοῦ συμφέροντος ἀφοσιοῦνται, "τοὺς δὲ πρὸς χάριν πονηροὺς" καὶ

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[a] Kock, *Com. Att. Frag.* iii. p. 432, *Adespot.* No. 125.
[b] From the *Ino* of Euripides; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Eurip.* No. 412.

> Match me, Nicomachus, against that brute;
> If I don't pulp his carcase with my whip
> And make his visage softer than a sponge.[a]

In the second place, no friend enters into co-operation unless he has first been taken into consultation, and then only after he has examined the undertaking and agreed in setting it down as fitting or expedient; but if anyone concedes to the flatterer an opportunity to take part in examining and pronouncing upon some matter in hand, inasmuch as he not only desires to yield and give gratification, but also fears to afford suspicion that he may draw back and avoid the task, he gives way and adds his urgency to the other's desires. For it is not easy to find a wealthy man or a king who will say:

> Give me a beggar—and if he so will,
> Worse than a beggar—who, through love for me
> Leaves fear behind, and speaks his heart's belief;[b]

but such people, like the tragedians, want to have a chorus of friends singing the same tune or a sympathetic audience to applaud them. This is the reason why Merope in the tragedy gives this advice:

> Have friends who are not yielding in their speech,
> But let your house be barred against the knaves
> Who try by pleasing you to win regard.[c]

But such people generally do just the opposite; they abominate those who are "not yielding in speech," who take a stand against them for their own good, while "the knaves who try to win regard," the

[c] Part of a much longer fragment from the *Erechtheus* of Euripides; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag., Eurip.* No. 362, xi. 18-20. There is no evidence, save this quotation, for Merope's appearance in the play, and it seems much more probable that the lines were spoken by Praxithea, the wife of Erechtheus.

(63) ἀνελευθέρους καὶ γόητας οὐ μόνον "κλῄθρων καὶ στέγης" ἐντὸς ἀλλὰ καὶ παθῶν καὶ πραγμάτων ἀπορρήτων λαμβάνουσιν. ὧν ὁ μὲν ἁπλούστερος οὐκ οἴεται δεῖν οὐδ' ἀξιοῖ σύμβουλος εἶναι πραγμάτων τηλικούτων ἀλλ' ὑπουργὸς καὶ διάκονος, ὁ δὲ πανουργότερος ἔστη μὲν ἐν τῷ συνδιαπορεῖν καὶ τὰς ὀφρῦς συνάγειν καὶ συνδιανεύειν τῷ προσώπῳ, λέγει δ' οὐδέν· ἂν δ' ἐκεῖνος εἴπῃ τὸ φαινόμενον, "ὦ Ἡράκλεις, ἔφθης με," φησί, "μικρὸν εἰπών, ἐγὼ γὰρ αὐτὸ τοῦτο λέγειν ἔμελλον." ὡς γὰρ οἱ μαθηματικοὶ τὰς ἐπιφανείας καὶ
C τὰς γραμμὰς λέγουσι μήτε κάμπτεσθαι μήτε διατείνεσθαι μήτε κινεῖσθαι καθ' ἑαυτάς, νοητὰς καὶ ἀσωμάτους οὔσας, συγκάμπτεσθαι δὲ καὶ συνδιατείνεσθαι καὶ συμμεθίστασθαι τοῖς σώμασιν ὧν πέρατά εἰσιν, οὕτω τὸν κόλακα φωράσεις ἀεὶ συνεπιφάσκοντα καὶ συναποφαινόμενον καὶ συννεύοντα καὶ συναποφαινόμενον καὶ συννεδόμενον νὴ Δία καὶ συνοργιζόμενον, ὥστε παντελῶς ἔν γε τούτοις εὐφώρατον εἶναι τὴν διαφοράν. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ τρόπῳ τῆς ὑπουργίας. ἡ μὲν γὰρ παρὰ τοῦ φίλου χάρις ὥσπερ ζῷον[1] ἐν βάθει
D τὰς κυριωτάτας ἔχει δυνάμεις, ἐπιδεικτικὸν δὲ καὶ πανηγυρικὸν οὐδὲν ἔπεστιν ἀλλὰ πολλάκις, ὥσπερ ἰατρὸς λαθὼν ἐθεράπευσε, καὶ φίλος ὠφέλησεν ἐντυχὼν ἢ διαλυσάμενος, ἀγνοοῦντος ἐπιμεληθείς. τοιοῦτος Ἀρκεσίλαος περί τε τἄλλα καὶ νοσοῦντος Ἀπελλοῦ τοῦ Χίου τὴν πενίαν καταμαθὼν ἐπανῆλθεν αὖθις ἔχων εἴκοσι δραχμάς, καὶ καθίσας

[1] ᾠόν A. Platt.

servile impostors, they receive not only within their "houses barred," but even within their secret emotions and concerns. The more simple-minded of such flatterers does not think it necessary or proper that he be taken into consultation regarding matters of this sort, but only that he be a ministrant and servant; whereas the more unscrupulous will do no more than to join in the deliberation, contracting his brows, and looking his assent, but says not a word. However, if the other man states his view, then he says, "Gad, but you got a bit ahead of me; I was just going to say that very thing." Now the mathematicians tell us that surfaces and lines do not bend or extend or move of themselves, being imaginary conceptions without material substance, but that they bend and extend and change their position along with the bodies of which they are the boundaries: so, too, you shall detect the flatterer by his being always in agreement with his victim in words and expressions, —yes, in pleasures and in angry passions too—so that in these matters, at least, the difference is quite easy to detect. Still more is this evident in the manner of his ministrations. For a gracious act on the part of a friend is like a living thing: it has its most potent qualities deep within it, and there is nothing on the surface to suggest show or display; but, as a physician cures without his patient's knowledge, so oftentimes a friend does a good turn by interceding or by settling, while the object of his solicitude knows nothing of it. Such a friend was Arcesilaus in all his dealings, and this was especially seen of him when he discovered the poverty of Apelles of Chios, who was ill; for on his next visit he came with twenty shillings, and taking a seat by the bed,

πλησίον "ἐνταῦθα μέν," εἶπεν, "οὐδὲν ἧ τὰ Ἐμπεδοκλέους στοιχεῖα ταυτὶ

πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ γαῖα καὶ αἰθέρος ἄπιον[1] ὕψος.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ κατάκεισαι σὺ δεξιῶς," ἅμα δὲ διακινῶν τὸ προσκεφάλαιον αὐτοῦ, λαθὼν ὑπέβαλε τὸ κερ-
E μάτιον. ὡς οὖν ἡ διακονοῦσα πρεσβῦτις εὗρε καὶ θαυμάσασα τῷ Ἀπελλῇ προσήγγειλε, γελάσας ἐκεῖνος "Ἀρκεσιλάου," εἶπε, "τοῦτο τὸ κλέμμα." καὶ μὴν ἐοικότα γε τέκνα φύεται γονεῦσιν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ. Λακύδης γοῦν ὁ Ἀρκεσιλάου γνώριμος ἀπ' εἰσαγγελίας φεύγοντι δίκην Κηφισοκράτει μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων φίλων παρειστήκει. τοῦ δὲ κατηγόρου τὸν δακτύλιον αἰτήσαντος, ὁ μὲν ἡσυχῇ παρακαθῆκεν, αἰσθόμενος δ' ὁ Λακύδης ἐπέβη τῷ ποδὶ καὶ ἐπέκρυψεν· ἦν γὰρ ὁ ἔλεγχος ἐν ἐκείνῳ. μετὰ δὲ τὴν ἀπόφασιν τοῦ Κηφισοκράτους δεξιουμένου τοὺς
F δικαστὰς εἴς τις ὡς ἔοικεν ἑωρακὼς τὸ γενόμενον ἐκέλευσε Λακύδῃ χάριν ἔχειν καὶ τὸ πρᾶγμα διηγήσατο, τοῦ Λακύδου πρὸς μηδένα φράσαντος. οὕτως οἶμαι καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς εὐεργετεῖν τὰ πολλὰ λανθάνοντας, αὐτῷ τῷ χαρίζεσθαι καὶ εὖ ποιεῖν φύσιν ἔχοντας ἥδεσθαι. τὸ δὲ τοῦ κόλακος ἔργον οὐδὲν ἔχει δίκαιον οὐδ' ἀληθινὸν οὐδ' ἁπλοῦν οὐδ' ἐλεύθέριον, ἀλλ' ἱδρῶτα καὶ κραυγὴν καὶ διαδρομὴν καὶ σύντασιν προσώπου ποιοῦσαν ἔμφασιν καὶ δόκησιν
64 ἐπιπόνου χρείας καὶ κατεσπευσμένης, ὥσπερ ζωγράφημα περίεργον ἀναιδέσι φαρμάκοις καὶ κεκλα-

[1] ἄπιον] ἄπλετον, "boundless," is found in some writers who quote the passage.

[a] From a much longer quotation; *cf.* Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, I. 230, i. 18.

remarked, " There is nothing here but Empedocles' elements,

Fire and water and earth and the gentle heights of ether.[a]

But you are not even lying at ease." And with that he re-arranged his pillow, and, unobserved, slipped the money underneath. When the aged serving-woman discovered it, and in amazement announced her discovery to Apelles, he said with a laugh, " Arcesilaus contrived that fraud ! " Moreover, the saying that " children are born like their parents " [b] holds true in the field of philosophy. At any rate, Lacydes, the associate of Arcesilaus, stood by Cephisocrates, as did his other friends, when he was impeached ;[c] and when the prosecutor demanded his ring, Cephisocrates quietly let it fall beside him, and Lacydes, perceiving this, put his foot on it and concealed it ; for the tell-tale evidence was in the ring. After the verdict, Cephisocrates was shaking hands with the jurors, when one of them, who apparently had seen what happened, bade him thank Lacydes, and related the whole affair ; but Lacydes had told it to nobody. So, too, I imagine the gods confer their benefits, for the most part, without our knowledge, since it is their nature to take pleasure in the mere act of being gracious and doing good. But the flatterer's activity shows no sign of honesty, truth, straightforwardness, or generosity, but only sweating and clamour and running to and fro, and a strained look that gives the appearance and suggestion of onerous and urgent business. It is like an extravagantly wrought picture, which by means of gaudy pigments, irregular folds in the garments,

[b] *Cf.* Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 235.

[c] The facts are not otherwise known.

(64) τμέναις στολίσι καὶ ῥυτίσι καὶ γωνίαις ἐναργείας φαντασίαν ἐπαγόμενον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ διηγούμενος ἐπαχθὴς ὡς ἔπραξε πλάνας τινὰς ἐπ' αὐτῷ καὶ φροντίδας, εἶτ' ἀπεχθείας πρὸς ἑτέρους εἶτα πράγματα μυρία καὶ μεγάλα πάθη διεξιών, ὥστ' εἰπεῖν οὐκ ἄξια ταῦτ' ἐκείνων· πᾶσα μὲν γὰρ ὀνειδιζομένη χάρις ἐπαχθὴς καὶ ἄχαρις καὶ οὐκ ἀνεκτή, ταῖς δὲ
B τῶν κολάκων οὐχ ὕστερον ἀλλὰ πραττομέναις ἔνεστιν εὐθὺς τὸ ἐπονείδιστον καὶ δυσωποῦν. ὁ δὲ φίλος, ἂν[1] εἰπεῖν δεήσῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, μετρίως ἀπήγγειλε, περὶ αὑτοῦ δ' εἶπεν οὐδέν. ᾗ δὴ καὶ Λακεδαιμόνιοι Σμυρναίοις δεομένοις σῖτον πέμψαντες, ὡς ἐθαύμαζον ἐκεῖνοι τὴν χάριν, "οὐδέν," ἔφασαν, "μέγα· μίαν γὰρ ἡμέραν ψηφισάμενοι τὸ ἄριστον ἀφελεῖν ἑαυτῶν καὶ τῶν ὑποζυγίων ταῦτ' ἠθροίσαμεν." οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἐλευθέριος ἡ τοιαύτη χάρις, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς λαμβάνουσιν ἡδίων, ὅτι τοὺς ὠφελοῦντας οὐ μεγάλα βλάπτεσθαι νομίζουσιν.

23. Οὐ τοίνυν μάλιστα τῷ περὶ τὰς ὑπουργίας ἐπαχθεῖ τοῦ κόλακος οὐδὲ τῇ περὶ τὰς ἐπαγγελίας
C εὐχερείᾳ γνοίη τις ἂν τὴν φύσιν, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ καλῷ τῆς χρείας ἢ αἰσχρῷ καὶ διαφέροντι πρὸς ἡδονὴν ἢ ὠφέλειαν. ὁ μὲν γὰρ φίλος οὐχ, ὥσπερ ἀπεφαίνετο Γοργίας, αὐτῷ μὲν ἀξιώσει τὰ δίκαια τὸν φίλον ὑπουργεῖν, ἐκείνῳ δ' αὐτὸς ὑπηρετήσει πολλὰ καὶ τῶν μὴ δικαίων·

[1] ἂν Hercher: κἂν.

wrinkles, and sharp angles, strives to produce an impression of vividness. He is offensive, too, as he relates how he has had to go hither and thither on the business, how he has worried over it, and then, as he tells of all the enmity he has incurred, and then of his countless troubles and great tribulations ; and, as a result, he gets a declaration that it was not worth all that. For any favour that evokes a reproach from its recipient is offensive, disfavoured, intolerable; and in the flatterer's favours there is this reproach and mortification, which is felt, not at some later time, but at the very time when they are performed. But if a friend has to tell what he has done, he reports it modestly and says nothing about himself. It was in this spirit that the Lacedaemonians sent corn to the people of Smyrna in their need, and when these expressed their admiration of the gracious action, the Lacedaemonians said, " It was nothing of any importance ; we merely voted that we and our cattle go without dinner for one day, and collected the amount." Such graciousness is not only the mark of a generous spirit, but it is pleasanter for the recipients, since they feel that those who assist them suffer no great damage.

23. It is not therefore by the flatterer's offensiveness in his ministrations, or by his facile way of offering his services, that one can best learn to know his nature, but a better distinction may be found in the nature of his service, whether it is honourable or dishonourable, and whether its purpose is to give pleasure or help. For a friend will not, as Gorgias was wont to declare, expect his friend to support him in honest projects, and yet himself serve the other in many also that are dishonest, for he

(64) *συσσωφρονεῖν γάρ, οὐχὶ συννοσεῖν ἔφυ.*[1]

μᾶλλον οὖν κἀκεῖνον ἀποτρέψει τῶν μὴ προσηκόντων· ἂν δὲ μὴ πείθῃ, καλὸν τὸ Φωκίωνος πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον "οὐ δύνασαί μοι καὶ φίλῳ χρῆσθαι καὶ κόλακι," τουτέστι καὶ φίλῳ καὶ μὴ φίλῳ. συνεργεῖν γὰρ δεῖ τῷ φίλῳ μὴ συμπανουργεῖν, καὶ συμβουλεύειν μὴ συνεπιβουλεύειν, καὶ συμμαρτυρεῖν μὴ συνεξαπατᾶν, καὶ συνατυχεῖν νὴ Δία μὴ
D *συναδικεῖν. οὐδὲ γὰρ τὸ συνειδέναι τοῖς φίλοις τὰ αἰσχρά, πόθεν γε δὴ τὸ συμπράττειν καὶ συνασχημονεῖν αἱρετόν ἐστιν; ὥσπερ οὖν Λακεδαιμόνιοι μάχῃ κρατηθέντες ὑπ' Ἀντιπάτρου καὶ ποιούμενοι διαλύσεις ἠξίουν ὅ τι βούλεται ζημιῶδες, αἰσχρὸν δὲ μηδὲν ἐπιτάττειν αὐτοῖς, οὕτως ὁ φίλος, ἄν τις ἢ δαπάνην ἢ κινδυνον ἢ πόνον ἔχουσα χρεία καταλαμβάνῃ, πρῶτος ἀξιῶν καλεῖσθαι καὶ μετέχειν ἀ-*
E *προφασίστως καὶ προθύμως, ὅπου δὲ πρόσεστιν αἰσχύνη, μόνον ἐᾶν καὶ φείδεσθαι παραιτούμενος. ἀλλ' ἥ γε κολακεία τοὐναντίον ἐν μὲν ταῖς ἐπιπόνοις καὶ κινδυνώδεσιν ὑπουργίαις ἀπαγορεύει, κἂν διαπειρώμενος κρούσῃς, σαθρὸν ἔκ τινος προφάσεως ὑπηχεῖ καὶ ἀγεννές· ἐν δὲ ταῖς αἰσχραῖς καὶ ταπειναῖς καὶ ἀδόξοις διακονίαις ἀπόχρησαι πάτησον, οὐδὲν ἡγεῖται δεινὸν οὐδ' ὑβριστικόν.*

Ὁρᾷς τὸν πίθηκον; οὐ δύναται τὴν οἰκίαν φυλάττειν ὡς ὁ κύων, οὐδὲ βαστάζειν ὡς ὁ ἵππος, οὐδ'

[1] *συσωφρονεῖν σοι βούλομ' ἀλλ' οὐ συννοσεῖν* Eur. *I.A.* 407.

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[a] Euripides, *Iphigenia at Aulis*, 407.

[b] Again referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 142 B, 188 F;

In virtue joins, and not in viciousness.[a]

Much rather, therefore, will he try to turn his friend aside from what is unbecoming; and if he cannot persuade him, then he may well retort with Phocion's remark [b] to Antipater: "You cannot use me as both friend and flatterer," that is as a friend and not a friend. For one should assist a friend in doing, not in misdoing, in advising, not in ill-devising, in supporting his conclusions, not his delusions, in sharing his mishaps, not his misdeeds. No, we would choose not even to have knowledge of our friends' dishonourable actions; how then can we possibly choose to co-operate in them and to share in the unseemly conduct? As the Lacedaemonians, defeated in battle by Antipater, in making terms of peace bade him prescribe any penalty he would, but nothing dishonourable, so a friend, if need befall for his services that involves expense, danger, or labour, is foremost in insisting, without excuse or hesitation, that he be called upon and that he do his share, but wherever disgrace goes with it, he is also foremost in begging to be left alone and spared from participation. But flattery, on the contrary, in arduous and dangerous ministrations fails you, and if you test it by sounding, it does not ring clear, but has an ignoble tone jangling with some excuse; but for any shameful, mean, or disreputable service you may use the flatterer as you will, and treat him as the dirt beneath your feet; and he thinks it nothing dreadful or insulting.

You must have noticed the ape. He cannot guard the house like the dog, nor carry a load like the horse,

[a] *Life of Phocion*, chap. xxx. (755 B); and *Life of Agis*, chap. ii. (795 E).

ἀροῦν τὴν γῆν ὡς οἱ βόες· ὕβριν οὖν φέρει καὶ βωμολοχίαν καὶ παιδιὰς ἀνέχεται, γέλωτος ὄργανον ἐμπαρέχων ἑαυτόν. οὕτω δὴ καὶ ὁ κόλαξ οὐ συνειπεῖν οὐ συνεισενεγκεῖν οὐ συναγωνίσασθαι δυνάμενος, πόνου τε καὶ σπουδῆς ἁπάσης ἀπολειπόμενος, ἐν ταῖς ὑπὸ μάλης πράξεσιν ἀπροφάσιστός ἐστι, καὶ πιστὸς ἔρωτος ὑπηρέτης καὶ περὶ λύσιν πόρνης ἀκριβὴς καὶ πότου δαπάνης ἐκκαθῆραι λογισμὸν οὐκ ἀμελής, οὐδὲ ῥᾴθυμος ἐν δείπνων παρασκευαῖς, θεραπευτικὸς δὲ παλλακίδων, πρὸς δὲ κηδεστὰς ἀποθρασύνεσθαι κελευσθεὶς καὶ συνεκβαλεῖν γαμετὴν ἄτεγκτος καὶ ἀδυσώπητος. ὥστε μηδὲ ταύτῃ δυσφώρατον εἶναι τὸν ἄνδρα· προστάττομένος γὰρ ὅ τι βούλει τῶν ἀδόξων καὶ μὴ καλῶν ἕτοιμος ἀφειδεῖν ἑαυτοῦ, τῷ προστάττοντι χαριζόμενος.

24. Οὐχ ἥκιστα δ' ἄν τις αὐτὸν ἐν τῇ πρὸς τοὺς ἄλλους φίλους διαθέσει καταμάθοι πολὺ τοῦ φίλου διαφέροντα. τῷ μὲν γὰρ ἥδιστόν ἐστι μετὰ πολλῶν φιλεῖν καὶ φιλεῖσθαι, καὶ τοῦτο πράττων ἀεὶ διατελεῖ περὶ τὸν φίλον ὅπως πολύφιλος καὶ πολυτίμητος ἔσται· κοινὰ γὰρ τὰ φίλων ἡγούμενος οὐδὲν οὕτως οἴεται δεῖν κοινὸν ὡς τοὺς φίλους ὑπάρχειν· ὁ δὲ ψευδὴς καὶ νόθος καὶ ὑπόχαλκος ὤν, ἅτε δὴ μάλιστα γιγνώσκων ἑαυτὸν ἀδικοῦντα τὴν φιλίαν ὥσπερ νόμισμα παράσημον ὑπ' αὐτοῦ γενομένην, ἔστι μὲν καὶ φύσει φθονερός, ἀλλὰ τῷ φθόνῳ χρῆται πρὸς τοὺς ὁμοίους, διαμιλλώμενος

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[a] Plutarch has devoted a separate essay (*De amicorum multitudine*) to this subject (*Moralia*, 93 B-79 B).

[b] Euripides, *Orestes*, 735.

nor plough the land like oxen ; and so he has to bear abuse and scurrility, and endure practical jokes, thus submitting to be made an instrument of laughter. So also with the flatterer : unable to help another with words or money or to back him in a quarrel, and unequal to anything laborious or serious, yet he makes no excuses when it comes to underhand actions, he is a faithful helper in a love-affair, he knows exactly the price to be paid for a prostitute, he is not careless in checking up the charge for a wine supper, nor slow in making arrangements for dinners, he tries to be in the good graces of mistresses ; but if bidden to be impudent toward a wife's relatives or to help in hustling a wife out of doors he is relentless and unabashed. As a result the man is not hard to detect in this way, either ; for if he is told to do any disreputable and dishonourable thing that you will, he is ready to be prodigal of himself in trying to gratify the man who tells him to do it.

24. The great difference between flatterer and friend may be most clearly perceived by his disposition towards one's other friends. For a friend finds it most pleasant to love and be loved along with many others, and he is always constant in his endeavours that his friend shall have many friends [a] and be much honoured ; believing that " friends own everything in common " [b] he thinks that no possession ought to be held so much in common as friends. But the flatterer is false, spurious, and debased, inasmuch as he fully understands that he is committing a crime against friendship, which in his hands becomes a counterfeit coin as it were. While he is by nature jealous, yet he employs his jealousy against his own kind, striving constantly to outdo them in scurrility

(65) ὑπερβαλέσθαι βωμολοχίᾳ καὶ σπερμολογίᾳ, τὸν δὲ κρείττονα τρέμει καὶ δέδοικεν, οὐ μὰ Δία

παρὰ Λύδιον ἄρμα πεζὸς οἰχνεύων

ἀλλὰ

"παρὰ χρυσὸν ἐφθόν," ὥς φησι Σιμωνίδης,
"ἀκήρατον οὐδὲ μόλυβδον ἔχων."

ὅταν οὖν ἐλαφρὸς ὢν καὶ ἐπίτηκτος[1] καὶ ἀπατηλὸς ἐγγύθεν ἀντεξετάζηται πρὸς ἀληθινὴν καὶ ἐμβριθῆ
C φιλίαν καὶ σφυρήλατον, οὐκ ἀναφέρων ἀλλ' ἐξελεγχόμενος ταὐτὸ ποιεῖ τῷ ζωγραφήσαντι τοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας ἀθλίως. ἐκεῖνός τε γὰρ ἐκέλευε τὸν παῖδα τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς ἀλεκτρυόνας ἀποσοβεῖν ἀπωτάτω τοῦ πίνακος, οὗτός τε τοὺς ἀληθινοὺς ἀποσοβεῖ φίλους καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πλησιάζειν· ἂν δὲ μὴ δύνηται, φανερῶς μὲν ὑποσαίνει καὶ περιέπει καὶ τέθηπεν ὡς ἀμείνονας, λάθρᾳ δ' ὑφίησί τινας καὶ ὑποσπείρει διαβολάς. κρυφίου δὲ λόγου κνήσαντος ἕλκος, κἂν μὴ παντελῶς εὐθὺς ἐργάσηται, τὸ τοῦ Μηδίου φυλάττει μεμνημένος. ἦν δ' ὁ Μήδιος τοῦ περὶ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον χοροῦ τῶν κολάκων οἷον ἔξαρχος καὶ σοφιστὴς
D κορυφαῖος ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀρίστους συντεταγμένων.[2] ἐκέλευεν οὖν θαρροῦντας ἅπτεσθαι καὶ δάκνειν ταῖς διαβολαῖς, διδάσκων ὅτι, κἂν θεραπεύσῃ τὸ ἕλκος ὁ δεδηγμένος, ἡ οὐλὴ μενεῖ τῆς διαβολῆς. ταύταις μέντοι ταῖς οὐλαῖς, μᾶλλον δὲ γαγγραίναις καὶ καρ-

[1] ἐπίτηκτος Wyttenbach: ἐπίκτητος.
[2] συντεταγμένων Hartman: συντεταγμένος.

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[a] From Pindar according to Plutarch, *Life of Nicias*, chap. i. (523 B). *Cf.* Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* i. 469 (*Frag.* 206).

and idle gossip, but he stands in awesome dread of his betters, not indeed because he is

Trudging afoot beside a Lydian chariot,[a]

but because, as Simonides [b] puts it, he

Hath not even lead to show
'Gainst gold refined and unalloyed.

Whenever, then, the flatterer, who is but a light and deceptive plated-ware, is examined and closely compared with genuine and solid-wrought friendship, he does not stand the test, but he is exposed, and so he does the same thing as the man who had painted a wretched picture of some cocks. For the painter bade his servant scare all real cocks as far away as possible from the canvas ; and so the flatterer scares all real friends away, and does not allow them to come near ; or if he cannot accomplish this, he openly cringes to them, pays them attentions, and makes a great show of respect for them as for superiors, but secretly he is suggesting and spreading some sort of calumny ; and when secret talk has caused an irritating sore, even though he be not entirely successful at the outset, yet he remembers and observes the precept of Medius. This Medius was, if I may call him so, leader and skilled master of the choir of flatterers that danced attendance on Alexander, and were banded together against all good men. Now he urged them not to be afraid to assail and sting with their calumnies, pointing out that, even if the man who is stung succeeds in healing the wound, the scar of the calumny will still remain. In fact it was by such scars, or rather such gangrenes

[b] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. 417 (*Frag.* 64) has adopted an amended reading.

(65) κινώμασι διαβρωθεὶς Ἀλέξανδρος ἀπώλεσε καὶ Καλλισθένη καὶ Παρμενίωνα καὶ Φιλώταν· Ἄγνωσι δὲ καὶ Βαγώαις καὶ Ἀγησίαις[1] καὶ Δημητρίοις ἀφειδῶς ἐνέδωκεν ἑαυτὸν ὑποσκελίζεσθαι, προσκυνούμενον καὶ καταστολιζόμενον καὶ ἀναπλαττό-
E μενον ὑπ' αὐτῶν ὥσπερ ἄγαλμα βαρβαρικόν. οὕτω μεγάλην ἔχει τὸ πρὸς χάριν δύναμιν, καὶ μεγίστην ὡς ἔοικεν ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις εἶναι δοκοῦσι· τὸ γὰρ οἴεσθαι τὰ κάλλιστα μετὰ τοῦ βούλεσθαι πίστιν ἅμα τῷ κόλακι καὶ θάρσος δίδωσι. τῶν μὲν γὰρ τόπων τὰ ὑψηλὰ δυσπρόσοδα καὶ δυσέφικτα γίγνεται τοῖς ἐπιβουλεύουσι, τὸ δ' ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦν οὐκ ἐχούσῃ δι' εὐτυχίαν ἢ δι' εὐφυΐαν ὕψος καὶ φρόνημα τοῖς μικροῖς καὶ ταπεινοῖς μάλιστα βάσιμόν ἐστιν.

25. Ὅθεν ἀρχόμενοί τε τοῦ λόγου παρεκελευσάμεθα καὶ νῦν παρακελευόμεθα τὸ φίλαυτον ἐκ-
F κόπτειν ἑαυτῶν καὶ τὴν οἴησιν· αὕτη γὰρ ἡμᾶς προκολακεύουσα μαλακωτέρους ποιεῖ τοῖς θυραίοις κόλαξιν, ὡς ἑτοίμους ὄντας. ἂν δὲ πειθόμενοι τῷ θεῷ καὶ τὸ "γνῶθι σαυτὸν" ὡς ἑκάστῳ τοῦ παντὸς ἄξιόν ἐστι μαθόντες ἅμα καὶ φύσιν καὶ τροφὴν καὶ παίδευσιν ἑαυτῶν ἀναθεωρῶμεν ἐλλείμματα μυρία τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ πολὺ τὸ φαύλως καὶ εἰκῇ συμμεμιγμένον ἔχουσαν ἐν πράξεσιν ἐν λόγοις ἐν πάθεσιν, οὐ πάνυ ῥᾳδίως ἐμπεριπατεῖν τοῖς κόλαξιν ἑαυτοὺς παρέξομεν. Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν γὰρ ἀπιστεῖν ἔφη τοῖς θεὸν αὐτὸν ἀναγορεύουσιν ἐν τῷ καθεύδειν μάλιστα καὶ ἀφροδισιάζειν, ὡς ἀγεννέστερος

[1] Ἀγησίαις] Ἄγισι is suggested by Wyttenbach.

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[a] *Cf.* the first chapter of the essay, *supra*, 49 A.

[b] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, chap. xxii. (677 B) and *Moralia*, 717 B.

and cancers, that Alexander was consumed so that he destroyed Callisthenes, Parmenio, and Philotas, and put himself without reserve into the hands of men like Hagno, Bagoas, Agesias, and Demetrius, to be brought low, by submitting to be worshipped, bedecked and fantastically tricked out by them, after the manner of a barbaric idol. So great is the power wielded by giving gratification, and it is greatest, apparently, with those who seem to be the greatest personages. For self-conceit regarding the noblest qualities, coupled with the wish to have them, gives both confidence and boldness to the flatterer.[a] It is true that lofty places are difficult of approach and access for those who propose to capture them, but loftiness or conceit, in a mind which lacks sense because of the favours of Fortune or Nature, lies at the mercy of the insignificant and mean.

25. Wherefore I now urge, as I did at the beginning of this treatise, that we eradicate from ourselves self-love and conceit. For these, by flattering us beforehand, render us less resistant to flatterers from without, since we are quite ready to receive them. But if, in obedience to the god, we learn that the precept, "Know thyself," is invaluable to each of us, and if at the same time we carefully review our own nature and upbringing and education, how in countless ways they fall short of true excellence, and have inseparably connected with them many a sad and heedless fault of word, deed, and feeling, we shall not very readily let the flatterers walk over us. Now Alexander[b] said that two things moved him to discredit those who proclaimed him a god, his sleeping and his passion for women, evidently feeling that

περὶ ταῦτα καὶ παθητικώτερος αὐτοῦ γιγνόμενος·
66 ἡμεῖς δὲ πολλὰ πολλαχοῦ τῶν ἰδίων αἰσχρὰ καὶ λυπηρὰ καὶ ἀτελῆ καὶ ἡμαρτημένα καθορῶντες ἀεὶ φωράσομεν ἑαυτοὺς οὐκ ἐπαινοῦντος φίλου καὶ κατευλογοῦντος δεομένους, ἀλλ' ἐλέγχοντος καὶ παρρησιαζομένου καὶ ψέγοντος ἡμᾶς νὴ Δία κακῶς πράττοντας. ὀλίγοι μὲν γὰρ ἐκ πολλῶν εἰσιν οἱ παρρησιάζεσθαι μᾶλλον ἢ χαρίζεσθαι τοῖς φίλοις τολμῶντες· ἐν δὲ τοῖς ὀλίγοις αὖθις οὐ ῥᾳδίως ἂν εὕροις ἐπισταμένους τοῦτο ποιεῖν, ἀλλ' οἰομένους, ἂν λοιδορῶσι καὶ ψέγωσι, παρρησίᾳ χρῆσθαι. καί-
B τοι καθάπερ ἄλλῳ τινὶ φαρμάκῳ, καὶ τῷ παρρησιάζεσθαι μὴ τυχόντι καιροῦ τὸ λυπεῖν ἀχρήστως καὶ ταράττειν περίεστι καὶ ποιεῖν τρόπον τινὰ μετ' ἀλγηδόνος ὃ ποιεῖ μεθ' ἡδονῆς τὸ κολακεύειν. βλάπτονται γὰρ οὐκ ἐπαινούμενοι μόνον ἀκαίρως ἀλλὰ καὶ ψεγόμενοι· καὶ τοῦτο μάλιστα τοῖς κόλαξιν εὐλήπτους καὶ πλαγίους παραδίδωσιν, ἀπὸ τῶν σφόδρα προσάντων καὶ ἀντιτύπων ὥσπερ ἐπὶ τὰ κοῖλα καὶ μαλακὰ δίκην ὕδατος ἀπολισθάνοντας. διὸ δεῖ τὴν παρρησίαν ἦθει κεκρᾶσθαι καὶ λόγον ἔχειν ἀφαιροῦντα τὸ ἄγαν καὶ τὸ ἄκρατον αὐτῆς ὥσπερ φωτός, ἵνα μὴ ταραττόμενοι μηδ' ἀλγοῦντες ὑπὸ τῶν ἅπαντα μεμφομένων καὶ πᾶσιν ἐγκαλούντων καταφεύγωσιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ κόλακος σκιάν, καὶ πρὸς τὸ μὴ λυποῦν ἀποστρέφωνται.
C Πᾶσαν μὲν γάρ, ὦ Φιλόπαππε, κακίαν φευκτέον ἐστὶ δι' ἀρετῆς, οὐχὶ διὰ τῆς ἐναντίας κακίας, ὥσπερ

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[a] *Cf.* Aristotle, *Ethics*, ii. 7, and Horace, *Satires*, i. 2. 24.

in these matters he revealed the more ignoble and susceptible side of himself; and so in our own case, if we are careful to observe many and many a fault of our own, shameful and grievous, both of omission and commission, we shall constantly be detecting our own need, not of a friend to commend and extol us, but of a friend to take us to task, to be frank with us, and indeed to blame us when our conduct is bad. For there are but few among many who have the courage to show frankness rather than favour to their friends. And again, among those few you cannot easily find men who know how to do this, but rather you shall find those who think that if they abuse and find fault they use frankness. Yet frankness, like any other medicine, if it be not applied at the proper time, does but cause useless suffering and disturbance, and it accomplishes, one may say, painfully what flattery accomplishes pleasantly. For people are injured, not only by untimely praise, but by untimely blame as well; and it is this especially that delivers them over, broadside on, to the flatterers, an easy prey, since like water they glide away from the steeps that repel toward the valleys that softly invite. Frankness, therefore, should be combined with good manners, and there should be reason in it to take away its excess and intensity, which may be compared to that of light, so that any who are exposed to it shall not, for being disturbed and distressed by those who find fault with everything and accuse every one, take refuge in the shadow of the flatterer, and turn away towards what does not cause pain.

Now every form of vice, my dear Philopappus, is to be avoided through virtue, and not through the vice that is its antithesis,[a] as some people, for

(66) ἔνιοι δοκοῦσιν αἰσχυντηλίαν μὲν ἀναισχυντίᾳ φεύγειν ἀγροικίαν δὲ βωμολοχίᾳ, δειλίας δὲ καὶ μαλακίας ἀπωτάτω τίθεσθαι τὸν τρόπον ἂν ἔγγιστα φαίνωνται λαμυρίας καὶ θρασύτητος. ἔνιοι δὲ καὶ δεισιδαιμονίας ἀθεότητα καὶ πανουργίαν ἀβελτε-
D ρίας ἀπολόγημα ποιοῦνται, καθάπερ ξύλον τὸ ἦθος ἐκ καμπῆς εἰς τοὐναντίον ἀπειρίᾳ τοῦ κατορθοῦν διαστρέφοντες. αἰσχίστη δὲ κολακείας ἄρνησις ἀνωφελῶς λυπηρὸν εἶναι, καὶ κομιδῇ τινος ἀμούσου καὶ ἀτέχνου πρὸς εὔνοιαν ὁμιλίας ἀηδίᾳ καὶ χαλεπότητι φεύγειν τὸ ἀγεννὲς ἐν φιλίᾳ καὶ ταπεινόν, ὥσπερ ἀπελεύθερον ἐν κωμῳδίᾳ τὴν κατηγορίαν ἰσηγορίας ἀπόλαυσιν ἡγούμενον.

Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν αἰσχρὸν μέν ἐστι κολακείᾳ περιπεσεῖν διώκοντα τὸ πρὸς χάριν, αἰσχρὸν δὲ φεύγοντα κολακείαν παρρησίας ἀμετρίᾳ διαφθεῖραι τὸ φιλικὸν καὶ κηδεμονικόν, δεῖ δὲ μηδέτερον παθεῖν ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἄλλῳ τινὶ καὶ τῇ παρρησίᾳ τὸ καλὸν ἐκ τοῦ
E μετρίου λαβεῖν, αὐτὸς ἔοικεν ὁ λόγος ὁ τὸ ἐφεξῆς ἀπαιτῶν ἐπιτιθέναι τὴν κορωνίδα τῷ συγγράμματι.

26. Ὥσπερ οὖν κῆράς τινας ἐπούσας τῇ παρρησίᾳ πλείονας ὁρῶντες πρῶτον ἀφαιρῶμεν αὐτῆς τὴν φιλαυτίαν, εὖ μάλα φυλαττόμενοι μὴ διά τι τῶν ἰδίων οἷον ἀδικούμενοι καὶ ἀλγοῦντες ἐξονειδίζειν δοκῶμεν. οὔτε γὰρ ὑπ' εὐνοίας ἀλλ' ὑπ' ὀργῆς οἴονται γίγνεσθαι τὸν ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τοῦ λέγοντος

instance, think to escape bashfulness through shamelessness, rusticity through scurrility, and to make their manner to be farthest removed from cowardice and softness if they can make themselves seem nearest to impudence and boldness. Others again, to prove themselves free from superstition, adopt atheism, and play the knave to show that they are not fools, and thus distort their character, like a piece of wood, from one form of crookedness to its opposite, because they do not know how to straighten it. But the most shameful way of disavowing the name of flatterer is to cause pain without profit; and it shows an utterly rude and tactless disregard of goodwill in one's relations with friends to resort to being disagreeable and harsh in order to avoid abasement and servility in friendship. Such a person is like a freedman of the comic stage, who thinks that abuse is a fair use of equal speech.

Since, therefore, it is a shameful thing to fall into flattery in aiming to please, and a shameful thing also, in trying to avoid flattery, to destroy the friendly thoughtfulness for another by immoderate liberty of speech, we ought to keep ourselves from both the one and the other extreme, and in frankness, as in anything else, achieve the right from the mean. The subject itself requiring, as it does, consequent elaboration, seems to determine that this be the final complement of our work.

26. Seeing, therefore, that there are certain fatal faults attending upon frankness, let us in the first place divest it of all self-regard by exercising all vigilance lest we seem to have some private reason for our reproaches, such as a personal wrong or grievance. For people are wont to think that anger, not goodwill, is the motive of a man who

γιγνόμενον λόγον, οὔτε νουθεσίαν ἀλλὰ μέμψιν εἶναι. φιλικὸν γὰρ ἡ παρρησία καὶ σεμνόν, ἡ δὲ μέμψις καὶ φίλαυτον καὶ μικρολόγον. ὅθεν αἰδοῦνται τοὺς παρρησιαζομένους καὶ θαυμάζουσι, τοῖς δὲ μεμφομένοις ἀντεγκαλοῦσι καὶ καταφρονοῦσιν.

F ὥσπερ ὁ Ἀγαμέμνων τὸν Ἀχιλλέα παρρησιάζεσθαι δοκοῦντα μετρίως οὐχ ὑπέμεινε, τοῦ δ' Ὀδυσσέως καθαπτομένου πικρῶς καὶ λέγοντος

οὐλόμεν', αἴθ' ὄφελλες ἀεικελίου στρατοῦ ἄλλου σημαίνειν

εἴκει καὶ καρτερεῖ, τῷ κηδεμονικῷ τοῦ λόγου καὶ νοῦν ἔχοντι συστελλόμενος. οὗτος μὲν γὰρ οὐκ
67 ἔχων ἰδίας πρόφασιν ὀργῆς ἐπαρρησιάζετο πρὸς αὐτὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος, ἐκεῖνος δὲ δι' αὐτὸν ἐδόκει μάλιστα χαλεπαίνειν. αὐτός γε μὴν ὁ Ἀχιλλεύς, καίπερ οὐ γλυκύθυμος ὢν οὐδ' ἀγανόφρων ἀλλὰ

δεινὸς ἀνήρ, οἷος καὶ ἀναίτιον αἰτιάασθαι,

παρεῖχε τῷ Πατρόκλῳ σιωπῇ καταφέρειν αὐτοῦ πολλὰ τοιαῦτα·

νηλεές, οὐκ ἄρα σοί γε πατὴρ ἦν ἱππότα Πηλεὺς οὐδὲ Θέτις μήτηρ· γλαυκὴ δέ σε τίκτε θάλασσα πέτραι τ' ἠλίβατοι, ὅτι τοι νόος ἐστὶν ἀπηνής.

B ὥσπερ γὰρ Ὑπερείδης ὁ ῥήτωρ ἠξίου σκοπεῖν Ἀθηναίους μὴ μόνον εἰ πικρός ἐστιν, ἀλλ' εἰ προῖκα πικρός, οὕτως ἡ τοῦ φίλου νουθεσία καθαρεύουσα

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[a] Homer, *Il.* xiv. 84. [b] *Ibid.* xx. 467.
[c] A verse made by combining words contained in Homer, *Il.* xi. 653-4 and xiii. 775.

speaks on his own behalf, and that this is not admonition but fault-finding. For frankness is friendly and noble, but fault-finding is selfish and mean. For this reason those who speak frankly are respected and admired, while fault-finders meet with recrimination and contempt. Agamemnon, for instance, has no patience with Achilles, who appears to have spoken with moderate frankness only, but when Odysseus assails him bitterly and says,

> Hopeless and helpless ! Would you had to rule some other
> Paltry band, not this,[a]

he yields and puts up with it, quieted by the friendly concern and good sense of the other's words. For Odysseus, who had no ground for anger personally, spoke boldly to him in behalf of Greece, while Achilles seemed to be incensed chiefly on his own account. And it is true that Achilles himself, although he was "not a man of sweet or gentle temper," [b] but a

> Terrible man, who is given to blaming even the blameless,[c]

submitted himself to Patroclus in silence, although Patroclus often launched upon him strictures like this :

> Ruthless man, your sire was not the knightly Peleus,
> Nor was Thetis your mother ; no, the grey-gleaming ocean
> Bore you, and high rugged rocks, you are so hard-hearted.[d]

The orator Hypereides [e] used to tell the Athenians that it was only right that they consider, not merely whether he was bitter, but whether he was so upon no cause ; and in the same way, the admonition of a friend, when it is kept clear of personal feeling, is

[d] Homer, *Il.* xvi. 33.
[e] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Phocion*, chap. x. (746 D).

(67) παντὸς ἰδίου πάθους αἰδεστόν ἐστι καὶ σεμνὸν καὶ ἀναντίβλεπτον. ἐὰν δὲ δὴ καὶ φανερὸς ᾖ τις ἐν τῷ παρρησιάζεσθαι τὰ μὲν εἰς αὑτὸν ἁμαρτήματα τοῦ φίλου κομιδῇ προϊέμενος καὶ ἀπολείπων, ἄλλας δέ τινας αὐτοῦ πλημμελείας ἐλέγχων καὶ δάκνων ἐφ' ἑτέροις καὶ μὴ φειδόμενος, ἄμαχος ὁ τόνος τῆς παρρησίας οὗτός ἐστι καὶ τῇ γλυκύτητι τοῦ νουθετοῦντος ἐπιτείνων τὸ πικρὸν καὶ αὐστηρὸν τῆς νουθεσίας. ὅθεν εὖ μὲν εἴρηται τὸ δεῖν ἐν ταῖς ὀργαῖς
C καὶ ταῖς διαφοραῖς ταῖς πρὸς τοὺς φίλους μάλιστα πράττειν τι καὶ σκοπεῖν τῶν ἐκείνοις συμφερόντων ἢ πρεπόντων, οὐχ ἧττον δὲ τούτου φιλικόν ἐστι τὸ παρορᾶσθαι καὶ ἀμελεῖσθαι δοκοῦντας αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἄλλων ἀμελουμένων παρρησιάζεσθαι καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκειν. ὡς Πλάτων ἐν ταῖς πρὸς Διονύσιον ὑποφίαις[1] καὶ διαφοραῖς ἠτήσατο καιρὸν ἐντυχίας· εἶθ' ὁ μὲν ἔδωκεν, οἰόμενος ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ τι ἔχειν μέμψασθαι τὸν Πλάτωνα καὶ διελθεῖν, ὁ δὲ Πλάτων οὕτω πως διελέχθη πρὸς αὐτόν. "εἴ τινα αἴσθοιο, Διονύσιε,
D δυσμενῆ πεπλευκότα εἰς Σικελίαν, κακόν τί σε ποιῆσαι βουλόμενον οὐκ ἔχοντα δὲ καιρόν, ἆρ' ἂν ἐάσειας αὐτὸν ἐκπλεῦσαι καὶ περιίδοις ἀθῷον ἀπαλλαγέντα;" "πολλοῦ δέω," εἶπεν ὁ Διονύσιος, "ὦ Πλάτων· δεῖ γὰρ οὐ τὰ ἔργα τῶν ἐχθρῶν μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν προαίρεσιν μισεῖν καὶ κολάζειν." "εἰ τοίνυν," εἶπεν ὁ Πλάτων, "ἐπ' εὐνοίᾳ τις ἀφιγμένος τῇ σῇ δεῦρο βούλεται μὲν ἀγαθοῦ τινος αἴτιός σοι γενέσθαι, σὺ δὲ καιρὸν οὐ παρέχεις,

[1] ὑποψίαις Greek-Latin ed. Paris, 1624: ὑπεροψίαις.

a thing to be treated with respect and reverence, not to be faced out. And if one also makes it clear that in speaking frankly he is leaving out of all account or consideration his friend's lapses toward himself, but taking him to task for certain other shortcomings, and that it is in the interest of other persons that he visits him with stinging reproof so unsparingly, the force of such frankness is irresistible, and the generous attitude of the speaker serves only to intensify the bitterness and severity of his admonition. Therefore, while it has been well said that when we are angry or at variance with friends, we ought then most of all to be doing or planning what will be for their advantage or interest, yet it is no less material in friendship, when we feel that we ourselves are slighted and neglected, to speak frankly in behalf of others who are likewise being neglected, and to remind our friends of them. For example, Plato, in the midst of suspicions and disagreements with Dionysius, asked him for an appointment for an interview, and Dionysius granted it, supposing that Plato had some long tale of fault-finding to rehearse on his own account. But Plato talked with him somewhat after this fashion: "If you should learn, Dionysius, that some ill-disposed man had made the voyage to Sicily, cherishing the desire to do you harm, but unable to find an opportunity, would you allow him to sail away, and should you let him withdraw unscathed?" "Far from it, Plato," said Dionysius, "for not only the acts of enemies but their intentions as well must be detested and punished." "If now," said Plato, "somebody has come hither out of goodwill to you, wishing to be the author of some good to you, but you give him no

ἄξιόν ἐστι τοῦτον ἀχαρίστως προέσθαι καὶ ὀλιγώρως;" ἐρωτήσαντος δὲ τοῦ Διονυσίου τίς ἐστιν οὗτος, "Αἰσχίνης," εἶπεν, "ἀνὴρ τῷ τε ἤθει παρ' ὁντινοῦν τῶν Σωκράτους ἑταίρων ἐπιεικὴς καὶ τῷ λόγῳ δυνατὸς ἐπανορθοῦν οἷς συνείη· E πλεύσας δὲ δεῦρο πολλὴν θάλατταν, ὡς συγγένοιτό σοι διὰ φιλοσοφίας, ἠμέληται." ταῦθ' οὕτως ἐκίνησε τὸν Διονύσιον, ὥστε τὰς μὲν χεῖρας τῷ Πλάτωνι εὐθὺς περιβαλεῖν καὶ κατασπάζεσθαι, τὴν εὐμένειαν καὶ τὴν μεγαλοφροσύνην ἀγάμενον, τοῦ δ' Αἰσχίνου καλῶς καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῶς ἐπιμεληθῆναι.

27. Δεύτερον τοίνυν ὥσπερ ἐκκαθαίροντες ὕβριν ἅπασαν καὶ γέλωτα καὶ σκῶμμα καὶ βωμολοχίαν ἡδύσματα πονηρὰ τῆς παρρησίας ἀφαιρῶμεν. ὥσπερ F γὰρ ἰατροῦ σάρκα τέμνοντος εὐρυθμίαν τινὰ δεῖ καὶ καθαριότητα τοῖς ἔργοις ἐπιτρέχειν, ὀρχηστικὴν δὲ καὶ παράβολον καὶ περιτρέχουσαν ὑγρότητα καὶ περιεργίαν ἀπεῖναι τῆς χειρός, οὕτως ἡ παρρησία δέχεται τὸ ἐπιδέξιον καὶ τὸ ἀστεῖον, ἂν ἡ χάρις τὴν σεμνότητα σῴζῃ, θρασύτης δὲ καὶ βδελυρία καὶ ὕβρις προσοῦσα πάνυ διαφθείρει καὶ ἀπόλλυσιν. ὅθεν ὁ μὲν ψάλτης οὐκ ἀπιθάνως οὐδ' ἀμούσως ἐπεστόμισε τὸν Φίλιππον ἐπιχειροῦντα περὶ κρου- μάτων διαφέρεσθαι πρὸς αὐτόν, εἰπὼν "μὴ γένοιτό 68 σοι οὕτως, ὦ βασιλεῦ, κακῶς, ἵν' ἐμοῦ ταῦτα σὺ[1] βέλτιον εἰδῇς." Ἐπίχαρμος δ' οὐκ ὀρθῶς, τοῦ Ἱέρωνος ἀνελόντος ἑνίους τῶν συνήθων καὶ μεθ' ἡμέρας ὀλίγας καλέσαντος ἐπὶ δεῖπνον αὐτόν,

[1] *σὺ ταῦτα* 634 D.

[a] The story is repeated by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 179 B, 334 D, and 634 D.

opportunity, is it proper to let such a man go without showing him any gratitude or attention?" When Dionysius asked who the man was, "Aeschines," he said, "in character as fair as any one of Socrates' companions, and potent in speech to improve those with whom he may associate; but after sailing hither over a vast expanse of the sea in order to discuss philosophy with you, he finds himself neglected." These words so moved Dionysius, that he straightway embraced Plato affectionately, marvelling at his kindliness and high-mindedness, and afterwards he paid to Aeschines honourable and distinguished attentions.

27. In the second place, then, let us purge away, as it were, and eliminate from our frankness all arrogance, ridicule, scoffing, and scurrility, which are the unwholesome seasoning of free speech. Just as a certain orderliness and neatness should pervade the work of a surgeon when he performs an operation, but his hand should forbear all dancing and reckless motions, all flourishes and superfluity of gesticulation, so frankness has plenty of room for tact and urbanity, if such graciousness does not impair the high office of frankness; but when effrontery and offensiveness and arrogance are coupled with it, they spoil and ruin it completely. There was point, therefore, and polish in the retort with which the harper [a] stopped Philip's mouth when Philip attempted to argue with him about playing upon his instrument. "God forbid," said he, "that your Majesty should ever fall so low as to have a better knowledge of these matters than I." But Epicharmus was not right in his retort upon Hiero, who had made away with some of his intimate friends, and then a few days later invited

(68) "ἀλλὰ πρῴην," ἔφη, "θύων τοὺς φίλους οὐκ ἐκάλεσας." κακῶς δὲ καὶ Ἀντιφῶν, παρὰ Διονυσίῳ ζητήσεως οὔσης καὶ λόγου "ποῖος χαλκὸς ἄριστος," "ἐκεῖνος," εἶπεν, "ἐξ οὗ Ἀθήνησι κατεσκεύασαν τὰς Ἁρμοδίου καὶ Ἀριστογείτονος εἰκόνας." οὔτε γὰρ ὠφελεῖ τούτων τὸ λυπηρὸν καὶ πικρόν, οὔτε τέρπει τὸ βωμολόχον καὶ παιδιῶδες, ἀλλ' ἔστι κακοηθείᾳ καὶ ὕβρει μεμιγμένης
B ἀκρασίας μετ' ἔχθρας τὸ τοιοῦτον εἶδος, ᾧ χρώμενοι προσαπολλύουσιν αὐτούς, τὴν περὶ τὸ φρέαρ ὄρχησιν ἀτεχνῶς ὀρχούμενοι. καὶ γὰρ Ἀντιφῶν ἀπέθανεν ὑπὸ Διονυσίου καὶ Τιμαγένης ἐξέπεσε τῆς Καίσαρος φιλίας, ἐλευθέρᾳ μὲν οὐδέποτε φωνῇ χρησάμενος, ἐν δὲ τοῖς συμποσίοις καὶ τοῖς περιπάτοις ἑκάστοτε πρὸς οὐδ' ἡντινοῦν σπουδὴν

ἀλλ' ὅ τι οἱ εἴσαιτο γελοίιον Ἀργείοισιν

αἰτίαν φιλίας ὥσπερ σόφισμα λοιδορίας προφερόμενος.

Ἐπεὶ καὶ τοῖς κωμικοῖς πολλὰ πρὸς τὸ θέατρον αὐστηρὰ καὶ πολιτικὰ πεποίητο· συμμεμιγμένον δὲ
C τὸ γελοῖον αὐτοῖς καὶ βωμολόχον, ὥσπερ σιτίοις ὑπότριμμα μοχθηρόν, ἐξίτηλον ἐποίει τὴν παρρησίαν καὶ ἄχρηστον, ὥστε περιῆν κακοηθείας δόξα καὶ βδελυρίας τοῖς λέγουσι, χρήσιμον δὲ τοῖς ἀκούουσιν οὐδὲν ἀπὸ τῶν λεγομένων. ἄλλως μὲν οὖν προσοιστέον ἐστὶ καὶ παιδιὰν καὶ γέλωτα τοῖς φίλοις· ἡ δὲ παρρησία σπουδὴν ἐχέτω καὶ ἦθος.

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[a] The traditional "tyrannicides" of Athens.
[b] Caesar Augustus.
[c] Homer, *Il.* ii. 215.
[d] Aristophanes, for example, as in the *Frogs*, 686 ff.

Epicharmus to dinner. "But the other day," said Epicharmus, "you held a sacrifice without invitation, of friends!" As badly answered Antiphon, when the question was up for discussion in the presence of Dionysius as to "what is the best kind of bronze," and he said, "The kind from which they fashioned the statues of Harmodius and Aristogeiton [a] at Athens." For the offensiveness and bitterness of such retorts profits nothing, their scurrility and frivolity gives no pleasure; but a retort of this kind betokens intemperance of the tongue combined with malice and arrogance, and not without enmity. By employing it men eventually bring about their own destruction, since they are simply "dancing on the edge of the pit." For Antiphon was put to death by order of Dionysius, and Timagenes lost his place in Caesar's [b] friendship because, while he never indulged in any high-minded utterance, yet in social gatherings and in discussions, for no serious purpose at all, but

> Whatsoever he thought would move the Argives to laughter,[c]

he would on every possible occasion put forward friendship's cause as an artful excuse for railing.

It is true that the comic poets [d] addressed to their audiences many stern rebukes of value to the citizens; but the admixture of drollery and scurrility in them, like a vile dressing with food, made their frankness ineffective and useless, so that there was nothing left for the authors but a name of malice and coarseness, and no profit for the hearers from their words. On other occasions jest and laughter may well enough be employed with friends, but frankness of speech ought to have seriousness and

(68) ἂν δ' ὑπὲρ μειζόνων ᾖ, καὶ πάθει καὶ σχήματι καὶ τόνῳ φωνῆς ὁ λόγος ἀξιόπιστος ἔστω καὶ κινητικός. Ὁ δὲ καιρὸς ἐν παντὶ μὲν παρεθεὶς μεγάλα βλάπτει, μάλιστα δὲ τῆς παρρησίας διαφθείρει τὸ χρήσιμον. ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἐν οἴνῳ καὶ μέθῃ τὸ τοιοῦτο
D φυλακτέον, εὔδηλόν ἐστιν. εὐδίᾳ γὰρ ἐπάγει νέφος ὁ κινῶν ἐν παιδιᾷ καὶ φιλοφροσύνῃ λόγον ὀφρῦν ἀνασπῶντα καὶ συνιστάντα τὸ πρόσωπον, ὥσπερ ἀντιταττόμενον τῷ Λυαίῳ[1] θεῷ καὶ "λύοντι τὸ τῶν δυσφόρων[2] σχοινίον μεριμνᾶν[3]" κατὰ Πίνδαρον. ἔχει δὲ καὶ κίνδυνον ἡ ἀκαιρία μέγαν. ἀκροσφαλεῖς γάρ εἰσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ πρὸς ὀργὴν διὰ τὸν οἶνον, καὶ πολλάκις ἡ μέθη παραλαβοῦσα τὴν παρρησίαν ἔχθραν ἐποίησε. καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστι γενναῖον οὐδὲ θαρραλέον ἀλλ' ἄνανδρον ἐν τῷ νήφειν ἀ-
παρρησιάστου τὸ παρρησιάζεσθαι παρὰ τράπεζαν ὥσπερ οἱ δειλοὶ κύνες. οὐδὲν οὖν δεῖ περὶ τούτων λέγοντα μηκύνειν.

E 28. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλοὶ τοὺς φίλους εὖ φερομένους ἐν τοῖς πράγμασιν οὔτ' ἀξιοῦσιν οὔτε τολμῶσι ῥυθμίζειν, ἀλλ' ὅλως ἀπρόσιτον καὶ ἀνέφικτον ἡγοῦνται νουθεσίᾳ τὸ εὐτυχοῦν εἶναι, σφαλλομένοις δὲ καὶ πταίουσιν ἐπιτίθενται καὶ πατοῦσιν ὑπὸ χεῖρα καὶ ταπεινοὺς γεγενημένους, ὥσπερ ῥεῦμα κεκρατημένον παρὰ φύσιν τὴν παρρησίαν ἀθρόως ἐφιέντες αὐτοῖς καὶ ἀπολαύοντες ἄσμενοι τῆς μετα-

[1] Λυαίῳ Reiske: Λυδίῳ.
[2] δυσφόρων] δυσφρόνων Nauck.
[3] μεριμνᾶν Boeckh: μεριμνῶν.

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* i. 480 (*Frag.* 248). Lyaeus, an epithet of Bacchus, Plutarch assumes to be derived from λύειν, *to loose*.

character. And if it concern matters of greater moment, let feeling be so evident, the countenance so serious, and the voice so earnest that the words may claim credence and touch the heart.

Failure to observe the proper occasion is in any case exceedingly harmful, but particularly when frankness is concerned it destroys its profitableness. That in the midst of wine and hard drinking we must be on our guard against anything of this sort is plain enough. It is like overcasting fair weather with a storm-cloud, when in the midst of jesting and merry-making someone starts a discussion that makes others frown and sets the face in rigid lines, as though the topic were meant to combat the god of Relaxation who "relaxes the bond of troubled cares," as Pindar[a] puts it. This neglect of occasion contains a great danger also. For men's minds are perilously inclined to anger on account of the wine, and oftentimes heavy drinking takes control of their frankness and creates enmity. And in general, it does not show a noble or stout heart, but unmanliness rather, for one who never displays boldness of speech when he is sober to be bold at table, as is the way of cowardly curs. There is no need, then, to multiply words on this subject.

28. Now we observe that many people have neither the assurance nor the courage to school their friends when these are prospering, but on the contrary feel that good fortune is altogether inaccessible and impregnable to admonition, whereas, when one of their friends has fallen and come to grief, they assail him and trample upon him now he is reduced to a subordinate and humble position, letting loose upon him a flood of frank speech, like a stream which has been held in unnatural restraint, and they find a welcome

βολῆς διὰ τὴν πρόσθεν ὑπεροψίαν ἐκείνων αὐτῶν δ' ἀσθένειαν, οὐ χεῖρόν ἐστι καὶ περὶ τούτων διελθεῖν καὶ ἀποκρίνασθαι τῷ Εὐριπίδῃ λέγοντι

ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων εὖ διδῷ, τί δεῖ φίλων;

F ὅτι δεῖ μάλιστα παρρησιαζομένων φίλων τοῖς εὐτυχοῦσι καὶ τὸ ἄγαν ὑφιέντων τοῦ φρονήματος. ὀλίγοι γάρ εἰσιν οἷς μετὰ τοῦ εὐτυχεῖν παραγίγνεται τὸ φρονεῖν· οἱ δὲ πολλοὶ φρενῶν ἐπεισάκτων δέονται καὶ λογισμῶν πιεζόντων ἔξωθεν αὐτοὺς ὑπὸ τῆς τύχης φυσωμένους καὶ σαλευομένους. ὅταν δ' ὁ δαίμων καταβάλῃ καὶ περιέλῃ τὸν ὄγκον, αὐτοῖς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἔνεστι τὸ νουθετοῦν καὶ μετάνοιαν ἐμποιοῦν. ὅθεν οὐδὲν ἔργον τότε παρρησίας φιλικῆς οὐδὲ λόγων βάρος ἐχόντων καὶ δηγμόν, ἀλλ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ἐν ταῖς τοιαύταις μεταβολαῖς

69 εἰς ὄμματ' εὔνου φωτὸς ἐμβλέψαι γλυκὺ

παρηγοροῦντος καὶ παραθαρρύνοντος, ὥσπερ τοῦ Κλεάρχου τὸ πρόσωπον ὁ Ξενοφῶν ἐν ταῖς μάχαις καὶ παρὰ τὰ δεινά φησιν ὁρώμενον εὐμενὲς καὶ φιλάνθρωπον εὐθαρσεστέρους ποιεῖν τοὺς κινδυνεύοντας. ὁ δὲ παρρησίαν καὶ δηγμὸν ἀνθρώπῳ δυστυχοῦντι προσάγων ὥσπερ ὀξυδορκικὸν ὄμματι ταραττομένῳ καὶ φλεγμαίνοντι, θεραπεύει μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδ' ἀφαιρεῖ τοῦ λυποῦντος, ὀργὴν δὲ τῇ λύπῃ

B προστίθησι καὶ παροξύνει τὸν ἀνιώμενον. αὐτίκα γοῦν ὑγιαίνων μέν τις οὐ χαλεπός ἐστιν οὐδ' ἄγριος παντάπασιν ἀνδρὶ φίλῳ ψέγοντι μὲν συνουσίας καὶ πότους αὐτοῦ ψέγοντι δ' ἀργίαν καὶ ἀγυμνασίαν καὶ λουτρὰ συνεχῆ καὶ πλησμονὰς ἀκαίρους· νο-

[a] *Orestes*, 667. [b] Euripides, *Ion*, 732.
[c] *Anabasis*, ii. 6. 11.

pleasure in the change because of their friend's former disdain and their own weakness; it would therefore be well to discuss this matter also, and to make a reply to Euripides[a] when he says,

When Heaven grants us luck, what need of friends?

The reply is, that in good fortune men have most need of friends to speak frankly and reduce their excess of pride. For there are few persons who in good fortune have still a sober mind; most have need of discretion and reason to be put into them from without, which shall repress them when they are puffed up and unsettled with the favours of fortune. But when the Heavenly power casts them down and strips off their importance, there is in these calamities alone admonition enough to work repentance. Wherefore at such a time there is no use for a friend's frankness or for words charged with grave and stinging reproof; but in such reversals truly

'Tis sweet to gaze into a kind man's eyes,[b]

when he offers consolation and encouragement. And this was true of Clearchus, the sight of whose face, Xenophon[c] says, so kindly and benevolent in the midst of "battles and perils," strengthened the confidence of the men in the face of danger. But he who applies frankness of speech and stinging reproof to a person in misfortune, might as well apply some stimulant of vision to a disordered and inflamed eye; he effects no cure nor any abatement of the pain, but only adds irritation to the painfulness, and exasperates the sufferer. Thus no man in good health, for instance, is at all harsh or ferocious against a friend who blames him for yielding to women and wine, or for being lazy and neglecting to take exercise, or for indulging perpetually in baths or

(69) *σοῦντι δ' οὐκ ἀνεκτὸν ἀλλὰ μείζων νόσος ἀκούειν ὅτι ταῦτά σοι γέγονεν ἐξ ἀκρασίας καὶ μαλακίας καὶ δι' ὄψα καὶ γυναῖκας. ὦ τῆς ἀκαιρίας, ἄνθρωπε· διαθήκην γράφω καὶ παρασκευάζεταί μοι καστόριον ἢ σκαμώνιον ὑπὸ τῶν ἰατρῶν, σὺ δὲ νουθετεῖς καὶ φιλοσοφεῖς. οὕτω τοίνυν καὶ τὰ πράγματα τῶν δυστυχούντων οὐ παρρησίαν ἐνδέχεται καὶ γνωμο-*
C *λογίαν, ἀλλ' ἐπιεικείας δεῖται καὶ βοηθείας. καὶ γὰρ αἱ τίτθαι τοῖς παιδίοις πεσοῦσιν οὐ λοιδορησόμεναι προστρέχουσιν, ἀλλ' ἤγειραν καὶ περιέπλυναν καὶ κατέστειλαν, εἶθ' οὕτως ἐπιπλήττουσι καὶ κολάζουσι.*

Λέγεται δὲ καὶ Δημήτριος ὁ Φαληρεὺς ὅτε τῆς πατρίδος ἐξέπεσε καὶ περὶ Θήβας ἀδοξῶν καὶ ταπεινὰ πράττων διῆγεν, οὐχ ἡδέως ἰδεῖν προσιόντα Κράτητα, παρρησίαν κυνικὴν καὶ λόγους τραχεῖς προσδεχόμενος· ἐντυχόντος δὲ πράως αὐτῷ τοῦ Κράτητος καὶ διαλεχθέντος περὶ φυγῆς ὡς οὐδὲν
D *ἔχοι κακὸν οὐδ' ἄξιον φέρειν βαρέως πραγμάτων σφαλερῶν καὶ ἀβεβαίων ἀπηλλαγμένον, ἅμα δὲ θαρρεῖν ἑαυτῷ καὶ τῇ διαθέσει παρακαλοῦντος, ἡδίων γενόμενος καὶ ἀναθαρρήσας πρὸς τοὺς φίλους εἶπε "φεῦ τῶν πράξεων ἐκείνων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν δι' ἃς ἄνδρα τοιοῦτον οὐκ ἔγνωμεν."*

λυπουμένῳ γὰρ[1] *μῦθος εὐμενὴς φίλων,*
ἄγαν δὲ μωραίνοντι νουθετήματα.

[1] *γὰρ μὲν* in other citations, *e.g.* 102 B.

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[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Euripides*, No. 962. Again cited by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 102 B.

unseasonable gourmandise. But for a man who is sick it is intolerable, nay, an aggravation of the sickness, to be told, "See what comes of your intemperance, your soft living, your gluttony and wenching." "Heavens, man, what a time to talk of that! I am writing my will, the doctors are preparing for me a dose of castor or scammony, and you admonish and lecture me!" Under such conditions, then, the very circumstances in which the unfortunate find themselves leave no room for frank speaking and sententious saws, but they do require gentle usage and help. When children fall down, the nurses do not rush up to them to berate them, but they take them up, wash them, and straighten their clothes, and, after all this is done, they then rebuke and punish them.

It is said that when Demetrius of Phalerum had been banished from his native land and was living in obscurity and humble station near Thebes, he was not well pleased to see Crates approaching, anticipating some cynical frankness and harsh language. But Crates met him with all gentleness, and conversed with him concerning the subject of banishment, how there was nothing bad in it, nor any good cause to feel distress, since thus he was set free from a hazardous and insecure office; at the same time he urged him not to be discouraged over himself and his present condition. Whereupon Demetrius, becoming more cheerful and once more taking heart, said to his friends, "What a pity that those activities and occupations of mine have kept me from knowing a man like this!"

> The kindly words of friends for one in grief
> And admonitions when one plays the fool.[a]

Οὗτος ὁ τρόπος τῶν γενναίων φίλων· οἱ δ' ἀγεννεῖς καὶ ταπεινοὶ τῶν εὐτυχούντων κόλακες,
E "ὥσπερ τὰ ῥήγματα καὶ τὰ σπάσματά," φησι Δημοσθένης, "ὅταν τι κακὸν τὸ σῶμα λάβῃ τότε κινεῖσθαι," καὶ οὗτοι ταῖς μεταβολαῖς ἐπιφύονται, καθάπερ ἡδόμενοι καὶ ἀπολαύοντες. καὶ γὰρ ἂν δέηταί τινος ὑπομνήσεως ἐν οἷς δι' αὐτὸν ἔπταισε βουλευσάμενος κακῶς, ἱκανόν ἐστι τὸ

οὔ τι καθ' ἡμέτερόν γε νόον· μάλα γάρ τοι
ἔγωγε
πόλλ' ἀπεμυθεόμην.

29. Ἐν τίσιν οὖν σφοδρὸν εἶναι δεῖ τὸν φίλον καὶ πότε τῷ τόνῳ χρῆσθαι τῆς παρρησίας; ὅταν ἡδονῆς ἢ ὀργῆς ἢ ὕβρεως ἐπιλαβέσθαι φερομένης οἱ
F καιροὶ παρακαλῶσιν ἢ κολοῦσαι φιλαργυρίαν ἢ ἀπροσεξίαν ἀνασχεῖν ἀνόητον. οὕτως ἐπαρρησιάζετο Σόλων πρὸς Κροῖσον ὑπ' εὐτυχίας ἀβεβαίου διεφθορότα καὶ τρυφῶντα, τὸ τέλος ὁρᾶν κελεύσας· οὕτω Σωκράτης Ἀλκιβιάδην ἐκόλουε, καὶ δάκρυον ἐξῆγεν ἀληθινὸν ἐξελεγχομένου καὶ τὴν καρδίαν ἔστρεφε.[1] τοιαῦτα τὰ Κύρου πρὸς Κυαξάρην καὶ τὰ πρὸς Δίωνα Πλάτωνος, ὅτε λαμπρότατος ἦν καὶ πάντας εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀνθρώπους ἐπέστρεφε διὰ τὸ
70 κάλλος τῶν πράξεων καὶ τὸ μέγεθος, παρακελευομένου φυλάττεσθαι καὶ δεδιέναι τὴν "αὐθάδειαν, ὡς ἐρημίᾳ ξύνοικον." ἔγραφε δὲ καὶ Σπεύσιππος

[1] ἔστρεφε Hercher: ἀνέστρεφε.

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[a] *De corona*, 198. [b] Homer, *Il.* ix. 108.
[c] Herodotus, i. 30-32; Plutarch, *Life of Solon*, xx. 94 D
[d] Plato, *Symposium*, 215 E.
Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, v. 5. 5 ff.

This is the way of noble friends, but the ignoble and degraded flatterers of the fortunate are " like the old fractures and sprains," which, as Demosthenes[a] says, " are stirred afresh whenever the body suffers some ill," and so these persons have a clinging fondness for reverses, as though they were pleased with them and derived enjoyment from them. For if a man really needs a reminder where he has come to grief through following his own ill-advised counsel, sufficient are the words :

> Never did I approve the act ; indeed I often
> Spoke against it.[b]

29. In what circumstances, then, should a friend be severe, and when should he be emphatic in using frank speech ? It is when occasions demand of him that he check the headlong course of pleasure or of anger or of arrogance, or that he abate avarice or curb inconsiderate heedlessness. Such was the frankness of Solon[c] towards Croesus, who was spoiled and pampered by fickle fortune, when he bade him look to the end. In such manner Socrates[d] tried to keep Alcibiades in check, and drew an honest tear from his eyes by exposing his faults, and so turned his heart. Of such sort was the conduct of Cyrus[e] towards Cyaxares, and of Plato toward Dion at the time when the latter was at the height of his splendour and was drawing the eyes of all mankind upon himself through the beauty and magnificence of his works, when Plato exhorted him to be on his guard against " arbitrary self-will " and to fear it, " since it is companion to solitude."[f] Speusippus also

[f] Plato, *Letters*, iv. 321 c. Again quoted by Plutarch, *Life of Dion*, chap. viii. (961 c) ; chap. lii. (981 B) ; and *Life of Coriolanus*, chap. xv. (220 D) ; *cf.* also 220 D

(70) αὐτῷ μὴ μέγα φρονεῖν εἰ πολὺς αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐστὶν ἐν παιδαρίοις καὶ γυναίοις, ἀλλ' ὁρᾶν ὅπως ὁσιότητι καὶ δικαιοσύνῃ καὶ νόμοις ἀρίστοις κοσμήσας Σικελίαν "εὐκλεᾶ θήσει" τὴν Ἀκαδήμειαν. Εὔκτος δὲ καὶ Εὐλαῖος, ἑταῖροι Περσέως, εὐτυχοῦντι μὲν ἀεὶ πρὸς χάριν ὁμιλοῦντες καὶ συνεπινεύοντες ὥσπερ οἱ λοιποὶ παρηκολούθουν· ἐπεὶ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις συμβαλὼν περὶ Πύδναν ἔπταισε καὶ ἔφυγε, προσπεσόντες ἐπετίμων πικρῶς καὶ ἀνεμίμνησκον ὧν ἐξήμαρτεν ἢ παρεῖδεν, ἕκαστον ἐξονειδίζοντες, ἄχρι οὗ
B διαλγήσας ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὸ λύπης καὶ ὀργῆς ἀμφοτέρους τῷ ξιφιδίῳ παίων ἀνεῖλεν.

30. Ὁ μὲν οὖν κοινὸς οὕτω προωρίσθω καιρός· οὓς δὲ παρέχουσιν αὐτοὶ πολλάκις οὐ χρὴ προΐεσθαι τὸν κηδόμενον φίλον ἀλλὰ χρῆσθαι· καὶ γὰρ ἐρώτησις ἐνίοις καὶ διήγησις καὶ ψόγος ὁμοίων ἐφ' ἑτέροις ἢ ἔπαινος ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον εἰς παρρησίαν ἐστίν. οἷον ἐλθεῖν Δημάρατον εἰς Μακεδονίαν λέγουσι καθ' ὃν χρόνον ἐν διαφορᾷ πρὸς τὴν γυναῖκα
C καὶ τὸν υἱὸν ὁ Φίλιππος ἦν· ἀσπασαμένου δ' αὐτὸν τοῦ Φιλίππου καὶ πυθομένου πῶς πρὸς ἀλλήλους ἔχουσιν ὁμονοίας οἱ Ἕλληνες, εἰπεῖν τὸν Δημάρατον εὖνουν ὄντα καὶ συνήθη "πάνυ γοῦν, ὦ Φίλιππε, καλόν ἐστί σοι πυνθάνεσθαι μὲν περὶ τῆς Ἀθηναίων καὶ Πελοποννησίων ὁμοφροσύνης, τὴν δ' οἰκίαν περιορᾶν τὴν σεαυτοῦ τοσαύτης στάσεως καὶ διχο-

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[a] Diogenes Laertius, iv. 5, also records that Speusippus wrote letters to Dion.

[b] Adapted from Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 1742.

[c] Under Lucius Aemilius Paullus (168 B.C.).

wrote to Dion [a] not to feel proud if there was much talk of him among children and light-minded women, but to see to it that by adorning Sicily with holiness, justice, and the best of laws, he should " bring name and fame " to the Academy.[b] But, on the other hand, Euctus and Eulaeus, companions of Perseus, while his good fortune lasted always behaved so as to please him, and complied with his humour, and like all the rest they followed where he led ; but when, after his disastrous encounter with the Romans [c] at Pydna, he took to flight, these men beset him with bitter reproaches, and continually reminded him of his errors and omissions, reviling him for everything he had done, until the man, smarting with grief and anger, stabbed them with his dagger and made an end of both of them.

30. Let thus much, then, serve to define the proper occasion in general. But the friend who is concerned for his friends must not let slip the occasions which they themselves often present, but he should turn these to account. For sometimes a question, the telling of a story, blame or commendation of like things in other people, may serve as an opening for frank speech. For example, Demaratus [d] is said to have come to Macedonia during the time when Philip was at odds with his wife and son. Philip, after greeting him, inquired how well the Greeks were at harmony together ; and Demaratus, who knew him well and wished him well, said, " A glorious thing for you, Philip, to be inquiring about the concord of Athenians and Peloponnesians, while you let your own household be full of all this quarrelling

[d] In the *Moralia*, 179 c, Plutarch records the successful result of Demaratus's frankness with Philip.

(70) νοίας γέμουσαν." εὖ δὲ καὶ Διογένης, ὃς ἐπεὶ παρελθὼν εἰς τὸ τοῦ Φιλίππου στρατόπεδον, ὅτε τοῖς Ἕλλησιν ἐβάδιζε μαχούμενος, ἀνήχθη πρὸς αὐτόν, ὁ δ' ἀγνοῶν ἠρώτησεν εἰ κατάσκοπός ἐστι, "πάνυ μὲν οὖν," ἔφη, "κατάσκοπος, ὦ Φίλιππε, τῆς
D ἀβουλίας σου καὶ τῆς ἀνοίας, δι' ἣν οὐδενὸς ἀναγκάζοντος ἔρχῃ περὶ βασιλείας καὶ τοῦ σώματος ὥρᾳ μιᾷ διακυβεύσων."

Τοῦτο μὲν οὖν ἴσως σφοδρότερον· (31) ἕτερος δὲ καιρός ἐστι νουθεσίας ὅταν ὑπ' ἄλλων λοιδορηθέντες ἐφ' οἷς ἁμαρτάνουσι ταπεινοί τε γένωνται καὶ συνταλῶσιν. ᾧ χρῶτ' ἂν ἐμμελῶς ὁ χαρίεις τοὺς μὲν λοιδοροῦντας ἀνακόπτων καὶ διακρουόμενος, ἰδίᾳ δ' αὐτὸς ἁπτόμενος τοῦ φίλου καὶ ὑπομιμνήσκων ὡς εἰ διὰ μηδὲν ἄλλο προσεκτέον αὐτῷ, ὅπως γε μὴ θρασεῖς ὦσιν οἱ ἐχθροί. "ποῦ γὰρ ἔστι τούτοις τὸ στόμα διᾶραι, τί δὲ πρὸς σὲ εἰπεῖν, ἂν ἀφῇς ταῦτα
E καὶ ῥίψῃς ἐφ' οἷς κακῶς ἀκούεις;" γίγνεται γὰρ οὕτω τὸ μὲν λυπηρὸν τοῦ λοιδοροῦντος, τὸ δ' ὠφέλιμον τοῦ νουθετοῦντος.

Ἔνιοι δὲ κομψότερον, ἄλλους ψέγοντες, ἐπιστρέφουσι τοὺς συνήθεις· κατηγοροῦσι γὰρ ἑτέρων ἃ πράττοντας ἐκείνους ἴσασιν. ὁ δ' ἡμέτερος καθηγητὴς Ἀμμώνιος ἐν δειλινῇ διατριβῇ τῶν γνωρίμων τινὰς αἰσθόμενος ἠριστηκότας οὐχ ἁπλοῦν ἄριστον ἐκέλευσεν ἰδίῳ παιδὶ πληγὰς ἐμβαλεῖν τὸν ἀπελεύθερον, ἐπειπὼν ὅτι χωρὶς ὄξους ἀριστᾶν

[a] The story is repeated by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 606 B.

and dissension!" Excellent, too, was the retort of Diogenes[a] on the occasion when he had entered Philip's camp and was brought before Philip himself, at the time when Philip was on his way to fight the Greeks. Not knowing who Diogenes was, Philip asked him if he were a spy. "Yes, indeed, Philip," he replied, "I am here to spy upon your ill-advised folly, because of which you, without any compelling reason, are on your way to hazard a kingdom and your life on the outcome of a single hour."

This perhaps was rather severe. (31) But another opportunity for admonition arises when people, having been reviled by others for their errors, have become submissive and downcast. The tactful man will make an adept use of this, by rebuffing and dispersing the revilers, and by taking hold of his friend in private and reminding him that, if there is no other reason for his being circumspect, he should at least try to keep his enemies from being bold. "For where have these fellows a chance to open their mouths, or what can they say against you, if you put away and cast from you all that which gets you a bad name?" In this way he who reviles is charged with hurting, and he who admonishes is credited with helping.

But some persons manage more cleverly, and by finding fault with strangers, turn their own intimate acquaintances to repentance; for they accuse the others of what they know their own acquaintances are doing. My professor, Ammonius, at an afternoon lecture perceived that some of his students had eaten a luncheon that was anything but frugal, and so he ordered his freedman to chastise his own servant, remarking by way of explanation that "that boy

οὐ δύναται. καὶ ἅμα πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀπέβλεψεν, ὥστε τῶν ἐνόχων ἅψασθαι τὴν ἐπιτίμησιν.

32. Ἔτι τοίνυν εὐλαβητέον ἐστὶν ἐν πολλοῖς παρρησίᾳ χρῆσθαι πρὸς φίλον, ἐνθυμούμενον τὸ τοῦ
F Πλάτωνος. ἐπεὶ γὰρ ὁ Σωκράτης ἥψατό τινος τῶν συνήθων σφοδρότερον ἐπὶ ταῖς τραπέζαις διαλεγόμενος, "οὐκ ἄμεινον ἦν," ὁ Πλάτων ἔφη, "ἰδίᾳ ταῦτα λελέχθαι;" καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης "σὺ δ' οὐκ ἄμεινον," εἶπεν, "ἐποίησας ἂν ἰδίᾳ πρὸς ἐμὲ τοῦτ' εἰπών;" Πυθαγόρου δὲ τραχύτερον ἐν πολλοῖς γνωρίμῳ προσενεχθέντος ἀπάγξασθαι τὸ μειράκιον λέγουσιν, ἐκ τούτου δὲ μηδέποτε τὸν Πυθαγόραν
71 αὖθις ἄλλου παρόντος ἄλλον νουθετῆσαι. δεῖ γὰρ ὡς νοσήματος οὐκ εὐπρεποῦς τῆς ἁμαρτίας τὴν νουθέτησιν καὶ ἀνακάλυψιν ἀπόρρητον εἶναι καὶ μὴ παηγυρικὴν μηδ' ἐπιδεικτικὴν μηδὲ μάρτυρας καὶ θεατὰς συνάγουσαν. οὐ γὰρ φιλικὸν ἀλλὰ σοφιστικὸν ἀλλοτρίοις ἐνευδοκιμεῖν σφάλμασι, καλλωπιζόμενον πρὸς τοὺς παρόντας, ὥσπερ οἱ χειρουργοῦντες ἐν τοῖς θεάτροις ἰατροὶ πρὸς ἐργολαβίαν. ἄνευ δὲ τῆς ὕβρεως, ἣν οὐδεμιᾷ θεραπείᾳ προσεῖναι δίκαιόν ἐστι, καὶ τὸ τῆς κακίας σκεπτέον φιλόνεικον καὶ αὔθαδες. οὐ γὰρ ἁπλῶς

νουθετούμενος ἔρως
μᾶλλον πιέζει

κατ' Εὐριπίδην, ἀλλ' ἂν νουθετῇ τις ἐν πολλοῖς καὶ

[a] In the *Stheneboea*; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Eurip.* No. 665.

can't lunch without his wine ! " At the same time he glanced towards us, so that the rebuke took hold of the guilty.

32. One other point: we must be very careful about the use of frank speech toward a friend before a large company, bearing in mind the incident in which Plato was involved. It so happened that Socrates had handled one of his acquaintances rather severely in a conversation which took place close by the money-changers', whereupon Plato said, " Were it not better that this had been said in private ? " Socrates retorted, " Should you not have done better if you had addressed your remark to me in private ? " And again, when Pythagoras once assailed a devoted pupil pretty roughly in the presence of several persons, the youth, as the story goes, hanged himself, and from that time on Pythagoras never admonished anybody when anyone else was present. For error should be treated as a foul disease, and all admonition and disclosure should be in secret, with nothing of show or display in it to attract a crowd of witnesses and spectators. For it is not like friendship, but sophistry, to seek for glory in other men's faults, and to make a fair show before the spectators, like the physicians who perform operations in the theatres with an eye to attracting patients. Quite apart from the affront involved—which ought never to be allowed in any corrective treatment—some regard must be paid to the contentiousness and self-will that belong to vice ; for it is not enough to say, as Euripides [a] has it, that

> Love reproved
> More urgent grows,

but if admonition be offered in public, and un-

(71) μὴ φειδόμενος, πᾶν νόσημα καὶ πᾶν πάθος εἰς τὸ
B ἀναίσχυντον καθίστησιν. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ Πλάτων
τοὺς παρασκευάζοντας ἐν τοῖς νέοις αἰσχύνην γέρον-
τας αὐτοὺς ἀξιοῖ πρῶτον αἰσχύνεσθαι τοὺς νέους,
οὕτω τῶν φίλων ἡ δυσωπουμένη παρρησία δυσωπεῖ
μάλιστα, καὶ τὸ μετ' εὐλαβείας ἀτρέμα προσιέναι
καὶ ἅπτεσθαι τοῦ ἁμαρτάνοντος ὑπερείπει καὶ διερ-
γάζεται τὴν κακίαν ἀναπιμπλαμένην τοῦ αἰδεῖσθαι
τὸ αἰδούμενον. ὅθεν ἄριστα μὲν ἔχει τὸ

ἄγχι σχὼν κεφαλήν, ἵνα μὴ πευθοίαθ' οἱ ἄλλοι,

C ἥκιστα δὲ πρέπει γαμετῆς ἀκουούσης ἄνδρα καὶ
παίδων ἐν ὄψει πατέρα καὶ ἐραστὴν ἐρωμένου παρ-
όντος ἢ γνωρίμων διδάσκαλον ἀποκαλύπτειν· ἐξ-
ίστανται γὰρ ὑπὸ λύπης καὶ ὀργῆς ἐλεγχόμενοι
παρ' οἷς εὐδοκιμεῖν ἀξιοῦσιν. οἶμαι δὲ καὶ Κλεῖτος
οὐχ οὕτω παρώξυνε[1] διὰ τὸν οἶνον, ὡς ὅτι πολλῶν
παρόντων ἐδόκει κολούειν Ἀλέξανδρον.

Καὶ Ἀριστομένης ὁ Πτολεμαίου καθηγητὴς ὅτι
νυστάζοντα πρεσβείας παρούσης ἐπάταξεν ἐξεγείρων, λαβήν τινα παρέσχε τοῖς κόλαξι, προσποιουμένοις ἀγανακτεῖν ὑπὲρ τοῦ βασιλέως καὶ λέγουσιν
D "εἰ τοσαῦτα κοπιῶν καὶ ἀγρυπνῶν κατηνέχθης, ἰδίᾳ σε νουθετεῖν ὀφείλομεν, οὐκ ἐναντίον ἀνθρώπων τοσούτων προσφέρειν τὰς χεῖρας." ὁ δὲ φαρμάκου

[1] παρώξυνε Hercher: παροξύναι.

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[a] *Laws*, 729 c. Also cited or referred to by Plutarch, *Moralia*, 14 B, 144 F, 272 C.

[b] Homer, *Od.* i. 157.

[c] The story is told in detail by Plutarch, *Life of Alexander*, chaps. l., li. (693 C).

[d] Ptolemy V. Epiphanes (205-181 B.C.); *cf.* Polybius, xv. 31.

sparingly, it only confirms each and every morbid emotion in its shamelessness. Hence, just as Plato [a] insists that elderly men who are trying to cultivate a sense of respect among the young, must themselves, first of all, show respect for the young, so among friends a modest frankness best engenders modesty, and a cautious quiet approach and treatment of the erring one saps the foundations of his vice and annihilates it, since it gradually becomes imbued with consideration for the consideration shown to it. It follows, then, that the best way is to

> Hold one's head quite close, that the others may not hear it.[b]

And least of all is it decent to expose a husband in the hearing of his wife, and a father in the sight of his children, and a lover in the presence of his beloved, or a teacher in the presence of his students: for such persons are driven almost insane with grief and anger at being taken to task before those with whom they feel it is necessary to stand well. I imagine also that it was not so much the wine that caused Cleitus [c] to be so exasperating to Alexander, as that he gave the impression of trying to curb him before a large company.

And Aristomenes, Ptolemy's [d] tutor, because he gave Ptolemy a slap to wake him up, as he was nodding while an embassy was present, thereby afforded a hold to the flatterers, who affected to be indignant on the king's behalf, and said, "If with all your fatiguing duties and great lack of sleep you dropped off, we ought to admonish you in private, not to lay hands on you before so many people"; and Ptolemy sent a goblet of poison with orders that

(71) κύλικα πέμψας ἐκέλευσεν ἐκπιεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. Ἀριστοφάνης δὲ καὶ τὸν Κλέωνα τοῦτ' ἐγκαλεῖν φησιν ὅτι

ξένων παρόντων τὴν πόλιν κακῶς λέγει

καὶ παροξύνειν[1] τοὺς Ἀθηναίους. διὸ δεῖ φυλάττεσθαι καὶ τοῦτο μετὰ τῶν ἄλλων τοὺς μὴ παρεπιδείκνυσθαι μηδὲ δημαγωγεῖν ἀλλ' ὀνησιφόρως καὶ θεραπευτικῶς χρῆσθαι τῇ παρρησίᾳ βουλομένους. E καὶ μὴν ὅπερ ὁ Θουκυδίδης τοὺς Κορινθίους λέγοντας περὶ αὐτῶν πεποίηκεν, ὡς "ἄξιοί" εἰσιν ἑτέροις "ἐπενεγκεῖν ψόγον," οὐ κακῶς εἰρημένον, ἔδει παρεῖναι τοῖς παρρησιαζομένοις. Λύσανδρος μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔοικε πρὸς τὸν ἐκ Μεγάρων ἐν τοῖς συμμάχοις παρρησιαζόμενον ὑπὲρ τῆς Ἑλλάδος ἔφη τοὺς λόγους αὐτοῦ πόλεως δεῖσθαι· παρρησία δὲ παντὸς ἀνδρὸς ἤθους ἴσως δεῖται, καὶ τοῦτ' ἀληθέστατόν ἐστιν ἐπὶ τῶν ἑτέρους νουθετούντων καὶ σωφρονιζόντων λεγόμενον. ὁ γοῦν Πλάτων ἔλεγε νουθετεῖν τῷ βίῳ τὸν Σπεύσιππον, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ Πολέμωνα Ξενοκράτης ὀφθεὶς μόνον ἐν τῇ F διατριβῇ καὶ ἀποβλέψας πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐτρέψατο καὶ μετέθηκεν. ἐλαφροῦ δὲ καὶ φαύλου τὸ ἦθος ἀνθρώπου λόγῳ παρρησίας ἁπτομένῳ περίεστι προσακοῦσαι τὸ

[1] παροξύνειν Wyttenbach: παροξύνει.

the man should drink it off. So, too, Aristophanes [a] says that Cleon accused him because

With strangers present he reviles the State,

thus trying to exasperate the Athenians against him. This blunder, therefore, along with the others, must be guarded against by those who desire, not to show off, or to win popularity, but to employ frank speaking in a way that is beneficial and salutary. In fact, persons that use frank speaking ought to be able to say what Thucydides [b] represents the Corinthians as saying about themselves, that they "have a good right to reprove others"—which is not a bad way of putting it. For as Lysander,[c] we are told, said to the man from Megara, who in the council of the allies was making bold to speak for Greece, that "his words needed a country to back them"; so it may well be that every man's frank speaking needs to be backed by character, but this is especially true in the case of those who admonish others and try to bring them to their sober senses. Plato [d] at any rate used to say that he admonished Speusippus by his life, as, to be sure, the mere sight of Xenocrates in the lecture-room, and a glance from him, converted Polemon and made him a changed man. But the speech of a man light-minded and mean in character, when it undertakes to deal in frankness, results only in evoking the retort:

[a] *Acharnians*, 503; *cf.* also lines 378 ff. and the scholium on 378.

[b] i. 70.

[c] Plutarch, *Life of Lysander*, chap. xxii. (445 D). The story is repeated in *Moralia*, 190 E and 229 C. A similar remark is attributed to Agesilaus in *Moralia*, 212 E.

[d] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 491 F.

ἄλλων ἰατρὸς αὐτὸς ἕλκεσιν βρύων.

33. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλ' ἐπεὶ φαύλους γε ὄντας αὐτοὺς ἑτέροις τε τοιούτοις ὁμιλοῦντας ἐξάγει τὰ πράγματα πολλάκις εἰς τὸ νουθετεῖν, ἐπιεικέστατος ἂν εἴη τρόπος ὁ συνεμπλέκων καὶ συμπεριλαμβάνων ἁμηγέπη τῷ ἐγκλήματι τὸν παρρησιαζόμενον· ἐφ' ᾧ λέλεκται καὶ τὸ

Τυδείδη, τί παθόντε λελάσμεθα θούριδος ἀλκῆς;

72 καὶ τὸ

νῦν δ' οὐδ' ἑνὸς ἄξιοί εἰμεν

Ἕκτορος.

καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης οὕτως ἀτρέμα τοὺς νέους ἤλεγχεν, ὡς μηδ' αὐτὸς ἀπηλλαγμένος ἀμαθίας, ἀλλὰ μετ' ἐκείνων οἰόμενος δεῖν ἀρετῆς ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ζητεῖν τἀληθές· καὶ γὰρ εὔνοιαν καὶ πίστιν ἔχουσιν οἱ ταὐτὰ μὲν ἁμαρτάνειν, ἐπανορθοῦσθαι δὲ τοὺς φίλους ὥσπερ αὐτοὺς δοκοῦντες. ὁ δὲ σεμνύνων ἑαυτὸν ἐν τῷ κολούειν ἕτερον, ὡς δή τις εἰλικρινὴς καὶ ἀπαθής, ἂν μὴ πολὺ καθ' ἡλικίαν ᾖ προήκων μηδ' ἔχων ἀρετῆς ὁμολογούμενον ἀξίωμα καὶ δόξης,
B ἐπαχθὴς φανεὶς καὶ βαρὺς οὐδὲν ὠφέλησεν. ὅθεν οὐχ ἁπλῶς ὁ Φοῖνιξ ἐνέβαλε τὰ περὶ αὐτὸν ἀτυχήματα, δι' ὀργὴν ἐπιχειρήσαντος ἀνελεῖν τὸν πατέρα καὶ ταχὺ μεταγνόντος,

ὡς μὴ πατροφόνος μετ' Ἀχαιοῖσιν καλεοίμην,

ἵνα μὴ δοκῇ νουθετεῖν ἐκεῖνον ὡς αὐτὸς ἀπαθὴς ὢν

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[a] From Euripides; *cf.* Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Eurip.* No. 1086; quoted also in *Moralia*, 88 D, 481 E, 1110 E.

[b] Homer, *Il.* xi. 313; quoted with additional lines, *supra*, 30 E.

[c] *Ibid.* viii. 234.

Wouldst thou heal others, full of sores thyself! [a]

33. Since, however, circumstances oftentimes impel men that are none too good themselves to use admonition when in the company of others who are no better than they, the most reasonable method would be that which in some way involves and includes in the arraignment the speaker himself. This is the principle of the reproof—

Son of Tydeus, what has made us forget our swift prowess? [b]

and

We are no match now even for Hector
Who is only one man.[c]

And in this way Socrates quietly took the young men to task, not assuming that he himself was exempted from ignorance, but feeling that he had need as well as they to study virtue and to search for truth. For those win goodwill and confidence who give the impression that, while addicted to the same faults, they are correcting their friends precisely as they correct themselves. But the man who gives himself airs in trying to curb another as though he himself were some pure and passionless being, unless he be well on in years or possessed of an acknowledged position in virtue and repute, only appears annoying and tedious, and profits nothing. Therefore it was not without a purpose that Phoenix interjected the account of his own misfortunes, his attempt in a fit of anger to slay his father, and his sudden change of heart,

Lest I be known among the Greeks as my father's slayer.[d]

This he did because he would not seem to admonish

[a] *Ibid.* ix. 461. See the note on 26 F, *supra.*

(72) ὑπ' ὀργῆς καὶ ἀναμάρτητος. ἐνδύεται γὰρ ἠθικῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα, καὶ μᾶλλον εἰκουσι τοῖς ὁμοιοπαθεῖν ἀλλὰ μὴ περιφρονεῖν δοκοῦσιν.

Ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε φῶς λαμπρὸν ὄμματι φλεγμαίνοντι προσοιστέον, οὔτ' ἐμπαθὴς ψυχὴ παρρησίαν ἀνα-
C δέχεται καὶ νουθεσίαν ἄκρατον, ἐν τοῖς χρησιμωτάτοις ἐστὶ τῶν βοηθημάτων ὁ παραμιγνύμενος ἐλαφρὸς ἔπαινος, ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις

ὑμεῖς δ' οὐκέτι καλὰ μεθίετε θούριδος ἀλκῆς
πάντες ἄριστοι ἐόντες ἀνὰ στρατόν. οὐδ' ἂν ἔγωγε
ἀνδρὶ μαχεσσαίμην ὅστις πολέμοιο μεθείη
λυγρὸς ἐών· ὑμῖν δὲ νεμεσσῶμαι περὶ κῆρι

καὶ

Πάνδαρε, ποῦ τοι τόξον ἰδὲ πτερόεντες ὀιστοὶ
καὶ κλέος, ᾧ οὔ τίς τοι ἐρίζεται ἐνθάδε γ' ἀνήρ;

σφόδρα δ' ἐμφανῶς ἀνακαλεῖται καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα τοὺς ὑποφερομένους

ὁ δ' Οἰδίπους ποῦ καὶ τὰ κλεῖν' αἰνίγματα;

καὶ

ὁ πολλὰ δὴ τλὰς Ἡρακλῆς λέγει τάδε;

D οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀνίησι τοῦ ψόγου τὸ τραχὺ καὶ κελευστικόν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ζῆλον ἐμποιεῖ πρὸς ἑαυτὸν αἰδουμένῳ τὰ αἰσχρὰ τῇ τῶν καλῶν ὑπομνήσει καὶ παράδειγμα ποιουμένῳ τῶν βελτιόνων ἑαυτόν. ὅταν δ' ἑτέρους οἷον ἡλικας ἢ πολίτας ἢ συγγενεῖς παραβάλλωμεν, ἄχθεται καὶ διαγριαίνεται τὸ φιλό-

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[a] Homer, *Il.* xiii. 116. [b] *Ibid.* v. 171.
[c] Euripides, *Phoenissae*, 1688.
[d] Euripides, *Hercules Furens*, 1250.

Achilles as though he were unaffected by anger and without fault himself. For such things make a deep moral impression, and persons are more wont to yield to those who seem to have like emotions but no feeling of contempt.

Since a brilliant light must not be brought near to an inflamed eye, and a troubled spirit likewise does not put up with frank speaking and plain reproof, among the most useful helps is a light admixture of praise, as in the following :

> Not with honour now can you be remiss in swift prowess,
> You who are all the best in our host. No cause for a quarrel
> Have I 'gainst any man who may be remiss in the fighting,
> If he is craven, but with you I am wroth beyond measure,[a]

and

> Pandarus, where is now your bow and its winged arrows ?
> Where your repute which no man among us can rival ? [b]

Lines like the following also sound a clear summons to come back when men are on the verge of giving way :

> Where's Oedipus and all those riddles famed ? [c]

and

> Can much-enduring Heracles speak thus ? [d]

For not only do they mitigate the harsh and peremptory tone of the censure, but they also arouse in a man a desire to emulate his better self, since he is made to feel ashamed of disgraceful conduct by being reminded of his honourable actions, and is prompted to look upon himself as an example of what is better. But whenever we draw comparisons with other people, as, for example, with those of a man's own age or his fellow-citizens or his kinsmen, then the spirit of contentiousness that belongs

νεικον τῆς κακίας, καὶ τοῦτο πολλάκις εἴωθεν ὑποφωνεῖν μετ' ὀργῆς "τί οὖν οὐκ ἄπει πρὸς τοὺς ἐμοῦ κρείττονας, ἐμοὶ δὲ μὴ παρέχεις πράγματα;" φυλακτέον οὖν ἑτέρους ἐπαινεῖν παρρησιαζόμενον πρὸς ἑτέρους, ἂν μὴ νὴ Δία γονεῖς ὦσιν. ὡς Ἀγαμέμνων

E ἦ ὀλίγον οἱ παῖδα ἐοικότα γείνατο Τυδεύς,

καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Σκυρίοις Ὀδυσσεὺς

σὺ δ', ὦ τὸ λαμπρὸν φῶς καταισχύνων[1] γένους,
ξαίνεις, ἀρίστου πατρὸς Ἑλλήνων γεγώς;

34. Ἥκιστα δὲ προσήκει νουθετούμενον ἀντινουθετεῖν καὶ παρρησίᾳ παρρησίαν ἀντεισφέρειν[2]· ταχὺ γὰρ ἐκκάει καὶ ποιεῖ διαφοράν, καὶ ὅλως οὐκ ἀντιπαρρησιαζομένου δόξειεν ἂν ἀλλὰ παρρησίαν μὴ F φέροντος ὁ τοιοῦτος ὠθισμὸς εἶναι. βέλτιον οὖν ὑπομένειν τὸν νουθετεῖν δοκοῦντα φίλον· ἂν γὰρ ὕστερον αὐτὸς ἁμαρτάνῃ καὶ δέηται νουθεσίας, αὐτὸ τοῦτο τῇ παρρησίᾳ τρόπον τινὰ παρρησίαν δίδωσιν. ὑπομιμνῃσκόμενος γὰρ ἄνευ μνησικακίας ὅτι τοὺς φίλους καὶ αὐτὸς εἰώθει μὴ περιορᾶν ἁμαρτάνοντας ἀλλ' ἐξελέγχειν καὶ διδάσκειν, μᾶλλον ἐνδώσει καὶ παραδέξεται τὴν ἐπανόρθωσιν, ὡς οὖσαν εὐνοίας καὶ χάριτος οὐ μέμψεως ἀνταπόδοσιν οὐδ' ὀργῆς.

73 35. Ἔτι τοίνυν ὁ μὲν Θουκυδίδης φησὶν "ὅστις ἐπὶ μεγίστοις τὸ ἐπίφθονον λαμβάνει, ὀρθῶς βου-

[1] ἀποσβεννὺς 34 D.
[2] ἀντεισφέρειν Cobet: ἀντεκφέρειν.

[a] Homer, *Il.* v. 800.
[b] From an unknown poet; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Adesp.* No. 9; quoted with variant reading, *supra*, 34 D.

to vice is made sullen and savage, and it will often suggest with some temper, "Then why don't you go away to my betters, and not trouble me?" One must, therefore, in frank speaking toward one set of persons be on his guard against commending another set, with the single exception, it is true, of parents. For example, Agamemnon can say:

> Truly Tydeus' son is not much like his father,[a]

and so, too, Odysseus in the *Scyrians*:

> Dost thou, to shame the glory of thy race,
> Card wool, whose father was the noblest Greek?[b]

34. Least of all is it becoming to reply to admonition with admonition, and to counter frank speaking with frank speaking. For this provokes instant heat, and causes estrangement, and such altercation, as a rule, bewrays, not the man that merely rewards frankness with frankness, but the man that cannot tolerate frankness. It is better, therefore, to bear patiently with a friend who affects to offer admonition; for if later he errs himself, and requires admonition, this very fact, in a certain way, gives our frank speaking a chance to speak frankly. For if he be gently reminded, without any show of resentment, that he himself has not been wont to overlook the errors of his friends, but to take his friends to task and enlighten them, he will be much more inclined to yield and accept the correction, as being a way to requite a kindly and gracious feeling, and not fault-finding or anger.

35. Then again, as Thucydides[c] says, "Whoever incurs unpopularity over matters of the highest

[c] ii. 64.

(73) λεύεται ''· τῷ δὲ φίλῳ προσήκει τὸ ἐκ τοῦ νουθετεῖν ἐπαχθὲς ὑπὲρ μεγάλων ἀναδέχεσθαι καὶ σφόδρα διαφερόντων. ἂν δ' ἐπὶ πᾶσι καὶ πρὸς πάντα δυσκολαίνῃ καὶ μὴ φιλικῶς ἀλλὰ παιδαγωγικῶς προσφέρηται τοῖς συνήθεσιν, ἀμβλὺς ἐν τοῖς μεγίστοις νουθετῶν ἔσται καὶ ἄπρακτος, ὥσπερ ἰατρὸς δριμὺ φάρμακον ἢ πικρὸν ἀναγκαῖον δὲ
B καὶ πολυτελὲς εἰς πολλὰ καὶ μικρὰ καὶ οὐκ ἀναγκαῖα διελὼν τῇ παρρησίᾳ κατακεχρημένος. αὐτὸς μὲν οὖν σφόδρα φυλάξεται τὸ συνεχὲς καὶ φιλαίτιον· ἑτέρου δὲ μικρολογουμένου περὶ πάντα καὶ παρασυκοφαντοῦντος ὥσπερ ἐνδόσιμον ἕξει πρὸς τὰ μείζονα τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων. καὶ γὰρ ἰατρὸς Φιλότιμος ἐμπύου τὸ ἧπαρ ἀνθρώπου δείξαντος αὐτῷ τὸν δάκτυλον ἡλκωμένον "οὐκ ἔστι σοι," εἶπεν, "ὦ τᾶν, περὶ παρωνυχίας ὁ λόγος." οὐκοῦν καὶ τῷ φίλῳ δίδωσιν ὁ καιρὸς εἰπεῖν πρὸς τὸν ἐπὶ μικροῖς καὶ μηδενὸς ἀξίοις ἐγκαλοῦντα "τί παιδιὰς καὶ πότους καὶ φλυάρους λέγομεν; οὗτος, ὦ τᾶν, ἀποπεμψάσθω τὴν ἑταίραν ἢ παυσάσθω κυβεύων, καὶ τἄλλα θαυμαστὸς ἡμῖν ἄνθρωπός ἐστιν." ὁ
C γὰρ εἰς τὰ μικρὰ συγγνώμην λαβὼν οὐκ ἀηδῶς εἰς τὰ μείζονα τῷ φίλῳ παρρησίαν δίδωσιν· ὁ δ' ἐγκείμενος ἀεὶ καὶ πανταχοῦ πικρὸς καὶ ἀτερπὴς

[a] Essentially the same story that is told *supra*, 43 B.

importance, shows a right judgement"; so it is the duty of a friend to accept the odium that comes from giving admonition when matters of importance and of great concern are at stake. But if he is for ever bickering over everything and about everything, and approaches his acquaintance in the manner not of a friend but of a schoolmaster, his admonitions will lose their edge and effectiveness in matters of the highest importance, since, like a physician who should dole out his supply of a pungent or bitter but necessary and costly medicine by prescribing it in a great number of slight cases where it is not necessary, he will have used up his supply of frankness without result. He will, therefore, be earnestly on his guard against continual censoriousness in himself; and if another person is apt to search narrowly into everything, and keeps up a continual comment of petty accusation, this will give him the key, as it were, in opening an attack on faults that are more important. The physician Philotimus, on an occasion when a man with an ulcerated liver showed him his finger with a whitlow on it, said, "My friend, you need not concern yourself about a sore finger."[a] And so, too, the right occasion gives a friend a chance to say to the man whose accusations are based on trifles of no real import, "Why dwell on playful sports and conviviality and nonsense? Let this man, my friend, but get rid of the woman he keeps, or cease gambling, and there we have a man in all else admirable." For the man who receives indulgence in small matters is not unready to grant to his friend the right to speak frankly in regard to the greater. But the inveterate nagger, everywhere sour and unpleasant, noticing

(73) καὶ πάντα γιγνώσκων καὶ πολυπραγμονῶν οὐδὲ παισὶν ἀνεκτὸς οὐδ' ἀδελφοῖς, ἀλλὰ καὶ δούλοις ἀφόρητος.

36. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε τῷ γήρᾳ πάντα πρόσεστι κακὰ κατ' Εὐριπίδην οὔτε τῇ τῶν φίλων ἀβελτερίᾳ, δεῖ μὴ μόνον ἁμαρτάνοντας ἀλλὰ καὶ κατορθοῦντας ἐπιτηρεῖν τοὺς φίλους, καὶ νὴ Δία προθύμως ἐπαινεῖν τὸ πρῶτον· εἶθ' ὥσπερ ὁ σίδηρος πυκνοῦται
D τῇ περιψύξει καὶ δέχεται τὴν στόμωσιν ἀνεθεὶς πρῶτον ὑπὸ θερμότητος καὶ μαλακὸς γενόμενος, οὕτω τοῖς φίλοις διακεχυμένοις καὶ θερμοῖς οὖσιν ὑπὸ τῶν ἐπαίνων ὥσπερ βαφὴν ἀτρέμα τὴν παρρησίαν ἐπάγειν. δίδωσι γὰρ ὁ καιρὸς εἰπεῖν "ἆρ' ἄξιον ἐκεῖνα τούτοις παραβάλλειν; ὁρᾷς τὸ καλὸν οἵους καρποὺς ἀποδίδωσι; ταῦτ' ἀπαιτοῦμεν οἱ φίλοι, ταῦτ' ἐστὶν οἰκεῖα, πρὸς ταῦτα πέφυκας· ἐκεῖνα δ' ἀποδιοπομπητέον

εἰς ὄρος ἢ ἐς κῦμα πολυφλοίσβοιο θαλάσσης.

ὡς γὰρ ἰατρὸς εὐγνώμων βούλοιτ' ἂν ὕπνῳ καὶ τροφῇ μᾶλλον ἢ καστορίῳ καὶ σκαμωνίῳ τὸ νόσημα λῦσαι τοῦ κάμνοντος, οὕτω καὶ φίλος ἐπιεικὴς καὶ
E πατὴρ χρηστὸς καὶ διδάσκαλος ἐπαίνῳ μᾶλλον ἢ ψόγῳ χαίρει πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους χρώμενος. οὐδὲν γὰρ ἄλλο ποιεῖ τὸν παρρησιαζόμενον ἧκιστα λυπεῖν καὶ μάλιστα θεραπεύειν ἢ τὸ φειδόμενον ὀργῆς ἐν ἤθει καὶ μετ' εὐνοίας προσφέρεσθαι τοῖς ἁμαρτάνουσιν. ὅθεν οὔτ' ἀρνουμένους δεῖ πικρῶς ἐξελέγχειν οὔτε κωλύειν ἀπologουμένους, ἀλλὰ καὶ

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[a] *Phoenissae*, 528. [b] Homer, *Π.* vi. 347.

everything and officiously making it his concern, is not only intolerable to children and brothers, but is unendurable even to slaves.

36. But since, to quote Euripides,[a] "not everything connected with old age is bad," and the same thing holds true also of our friends' fatuity, we ought to keep close watch upon our friends not only when they go wrong but also when they are right, and indeed the first step should be commendation cheerfully bestowed. Then later, just as steel is made compact by cooling, and takes on a temper as the result of having first been relaxed and softened by heat, so when our friends have become mollified and warmed by our commendations we should give them an application of frankness like a tempering bath. For the right occasion gives us a chance to say, "Is this conduct worthy to compare with that? Do you see what fruits honour yields? This is what we your friends demand; this befits your own character; nature intended you for this." But those other promptings must be exorcised—

> Off to the mountain or else to the surge of the loud-roaring ocean.[b]

For as a kind-hearted physician would prefer to relieve a sick man's ailment by sleep and diet rather than by castor and scammony, so a kindly friend, a good father, and a teacher, take pleasure in using commendation rather than blame for the correction of character. For nothing else makes the frank person give so little pain and do so much good by his words, as to refrain from all show of temper, and to approach the erring good-humouredly and with kindliness. For this reason they should not be sharply refuted when they make denial, nor prevented from

προφάσεις εὐσχήμονας ἀμωσγέπως συνεκπορίζειν καὶ τῆς χείρονος αἰτίας ἀφισταμένους αὐτοὺς ἐνδιδόναι μετριωτέραν, ὡς ὁ Ἕκτωρ

δαιμόνι', οὐ μὲν καλὰ χόλον τόνδ' ἔνθεο θυμῷ

F πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν, ὡς οὐκ ἀπόδρασιν οὐδὲ δειλίαν οὖσαν ἀλλ' ὀργὴν τὴν ἐκ τῆς μάχης ἀναχώρησιν αὐτοῦ. καὶ πρὸς τὸν Ἀγαμέμνονα ὁ Νέστωρ

σὺ δὲ σῷ μεγαλήτορι θυμῷ

εἶξας.

ἠθικώτερον γὰρ οἶμαι τοῦ "ἠδίκησας" τὸ[1] "ἠσχημόνησας" καὶ "οὐκ ἐπέστησας" τοῦ "ἠγνόησας," καὶ τὸ "μὴ φιλονείκει πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφόν" ἢ τὸ
74 "μὴ φθόνει τῷ ἀδελφῷ," καὶ τὸ "φύγε τὴν γυναῖκα διαφθείρουσαν" ἢ τὸ "παῦσαι τὴν γυναῖκα διαφθείρων"· τοιοῦτον γὰρ ἡ θεραπευτικὴ παρρησία ζητεῖ τρόπον, ἡ δὲ πρακτικὴ τὸν ἐναντίον. ὅταν γὰρ ἢ μέλλοντας ἁμαρτάνειν ἐκκροῦσαι δεήσῃ ἢ πρὸς ὁρμήν τινα βίαιον ἱσταμένους ἐξ ἐναντίας φερομένην ἢ πρὸς τὰ καλὰ μαλακῶς καὶ ἀπροθύμως ἔχοντας ἐντεῖναι καὶ παρορμῆσαι θελήσωμεν, εἰς αἰτίας δεῖ περιφέρειν ἀτόπους καὶ μὴ πρεπούσας τὸ γιγνόμενον. ὡς ὁ παρὰ Σοφοκλεῖ τὸν Ἀχιλλέα παροξύνων Ὀδυσσεὺς οὔ φησιν ὀργίζεσθαι διὰ τὸ δεῖπνον, ἀλλ'

[1] τὸ F.C.B.: καί.

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[a] Homer, *Il.* vi. 326.

[b] *Ibid.* ix. 109.

[c] In the *Dinner-guests* probably; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag., Soph.* No. 141. See, however, Jebb-Pearson, *The Fragments of Sophocles*, ii. p. 205 (No. 566).

defending themselves; but we should in some way or other help them to evolve some presentable excuses, and, repudiating the worse motive, provide one more tolerable ourselves, such as is found in Hector's [a] words to his brother:

> Strange man! 'Tis not right to nurse this wrath in your bosom,

as though his withdrawal from the combat were not desertion, or cowardice, but only a display of temper. And so Nestor [b] to Agamemnon:

> But you to your high-minded spirit
> Gave way.

For a higher moral tone, I think, is assumed in saying "You acted unbecomingly" rather than "You did wrong," and "You were inadvertent" rather than "You were ignorant," and "Don't be contentious with your brother" rather than "Don't be jealous of your brother," and "Keep away from the woman who is trying to ruin you" rather than "Stop trying to ruin the woman." Such is the method which frankness seeks to take when it would reclaim a wrongdoer; but to stir a man to action it tries the opposite method. For example, whenever it either becomes necessary to divert persons that are on the point of going wrong, or when we would give an earnest impulse to those who are trying to make a stand against the onset of a violent adverse impulse, or who are quite without energy and spirit for what is noble, we should turn round and ascribe their action to some unnatural or unbecoming motives. Thus Odysseus, as Sophocles [c] represents him, in trying to rouse the spirit of Achilles, says that Achilles is not angry on account of the dinner, but

(74) B "ἤδη," φησί, "τὰ Τροίας εἰσορῶν ἑδώλια δέδοικας,"

καὶ πρὸς ταῦτα πάλιν τοῦ Ἀχιλλέως διαγανακτοῦντος καὶ ἀποπλεῖν λέγοντος

ἐγῷδ' ὃ φεύγεις, οὐ τὸ μὴ κλύειν κακῶς,
ἀλλ' ἐγγὺς Ἕκτωρ ἐστί· οὐ μένειν καλόν.

τὸν μὲν οὖν θυμοειδῆ καὶ ἀνδρώδη δειλίας δόξῃ, τὸν δὲ σώφρονα καὶ κόσμιον ἀκολασίας, τὸν δ' ἐλευθέριον καὶ μεγαλοπρεπῆ μικρολογίας καὶ φιλαργυρίας δεδιττόμενοι παρορμῶσι πρὸς τὰ καλὰ καὶ τῶν αἰσχρῶν ἀπελαύνουσι, μέτριοι μὲν ἐν τοῖς C ἀνηκέστοις ἐξεταζόμενοι καὶ τὸ λυπούμενον καὶ τὸ συναλγοῦν πλέον ἐν τῷ παρρησιάζεσθαι τοῦ ψέγοντος ἔχοντες, ἐν δὲ ταῖς κωλύσεσι τῶν ἁμαρτανομένων καὶ πρὸς τὰ πάθη διαμάχαις σφοδροὶ καὶ ἀπαραίτητοι καὶ συνεχεῖς ὄντες· οὗτος γὰρ ὁ καιρὸς εὐνοίας ἀθρύπτου καὶ παρρησίας ἀληθινῆς ἐστι.

Τῷ δὲ ψέγειν τὰ πραχθέντα καὶ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς κατ' ἀλλήλων ὁρῶμεν χρωμένους, ὥσπερ Διογένης ἔλεγεν ὅτι τῷ μέλλοντι σώζεσθαι δεῖ φίλους ἀγαθοὺς ἢ διαπύρους ἐχθροὺς ὑπάρχειν· οἱ μὲν γὰρ διδάσκουσιν, οἱ δ' ἐλέγχουσι. βέλτιον δὲ τὰς ἁμαρτίας φυλάττεσθαι τοῖς συμβουλεύουσι πειθόμενον ἢ μετανοεῖν ἁμαρτόντα διὰ τοὺς κακῶς D λέγοντας. καὶ διὰ τοῦτο δεῖ καὶ περὶ τὴν παρρησίαν φιλοτεχνεῖν, ὅσῳ μέγιστόν ἐστι καὶ κράτιστον ἐν φιλίᾳ φάρμακον, εὐστοχίας τε καιροῦ μάλιστα καὶ κράσεως μέτρον ἐχούσης ἀεὶ δεομένην.

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[a] In the *Dinner-guests* probably. See note *c*, p. 390.

> Already at the sight of builded Troy
> You are afraid.

And again when Achilles is exceedingly indignant at this, and says that he is for sailing away, Odysseus says

> I know what 'tis you flee; not ill repute,
> But Hector's near; it is not good to stay.[a]

So by alarming the spirited and manly man with an imputation of cowardice, the chaste and orderly with an imputation of licentiousness, the liberal and lordly with an imputation of pettiness and stinginess, they give to such persons an impulse toward what is noble, and turn them away from what is disgraceful, proving themselves moderate in matters beyond remedy, and owning more to sorrow and sympathy than to blame in their frank speaking; but in efforts to prevent the commission of error and in any wrestling with the emotions they are severe, inexorable, and unremitting. For this is the right time for a resolute goodwill and genuine frankness.

Blame for past deeds is a weapon which we see enemies using against each other. Whereby is confirmed the saying of Diogenes that as a matter of self-preservation, a man needs to be supplied with good friends or else with ardent enemies; for the former instruct him, and the latter take him to task. But it is better to guard against errors by following proffered advice than to repent of errors because of men's upbraiding. This is the reason why it is necessary to treat frankness as a fine art, inasmuch as it is the greatest and most potent medicine in friendship, always needing, however, all care to hit the right occasion, and a tempering with moderation.

(74) 37. Ἐπεὶ τοίνυν, ὥσπερ εἴρηται, πολλάκις ἡ παρρησία τῷ θεραπευομένῳ λυπηρὰ πέφυκε, δεῖ μιμεῖσθαι τοὺς ἰατρούς· οὔτε γὰρ ἐκεῖνοι τέμνοντες ἐν τῷ πονεῖν καὶ ἀλγεῖν καταλείπουσι τὸ πεπονθός, ἀλλ' ἐνέβρεξαν προσηνῶς καὶ κατῳόνησαν, οὔθ' οἱ νουθετοῦντες ἀστείως τὸ πικρὸν καὶ δηκτικὸν προσβαλόντες ἀποτρέχουσιν, ἀλλ' ὁμιλίαις ἑτέραις
E καὶ λόγοις ἐπιεικέσιν ἐκπραΰνουσι καὶ διαχέουσιν, ὥσπερ οἱ λιθοξόοι τὰ πληγέντα καὶ περικοπέντα τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἐπιλεαίνοντες καὶ γανοῦντες. ὁ δὲ πληγεὶς μὲν τῇ παρρησίᾳ καὶ χαραχθείς, ἀφεθεὶς δὲ τραχὺς καὶ οἰδῶν καὶ ἀνώμαλος ὑπ' ὀργῆς δυσανάκλητος αὖθίς ἐστι καὶ δυσπαρηγόρητος. διὸ καὶ τοῦτο δεῖ παραφυλάττειν ἐν τοῖς μάλιστα τοὺς νουθετοῦντας καὶ μὴ προαπολείπειν, μηδὲ ποιεῖσθαι πέρας ὁμιλίας καὶ συνουσίας τὸ λυποῦν καὶ παροξῦνον τοὺς συνήθεις.

37. Since, then, as has been said, frankness, from its very nature, is oftentimes painful to the person to whom it is applied, there is need to follow the example of the physicians; for they, in a surgical operation, do not leave the part that has been operated upon in its suffering and pain, but treat it with soothing lotions and fomentations; nor do persons that use admonition with skill simply apply its bitterness and sting, and then run away; but by further converse and gentle words they mollify and assuage, even as stone-cutters smooth and polish the portions of statues that have been previously hammered and chiselled. But the man who has been hard hit and scored by frankness, if he be left rough and tumid and uneven, will, owing to the effect of anger, not readily respond to an appeal the next time, or put up with attempts to soothe him. Therefore those who employ admonition should be particularly on their guard in this respect, and not take their leave too soon, nor allow anything painful and irritating to their acquaintances to form the final topic of conversation at an interview.

HOW A MAN MAY BECOME AWARE OF HIS PROGRESS IN VIRTUE

(QUOMODO QUIS SUOS IN VIRTUTE SENTIAT PROFECTUS)

MAN MAY BECOME
RE OF HIS PROGRESS
VIR TUE
MODO QUIS SUOS IN VIRTUTE
SENTIAT PROFECTUS)

INTRODUCTION

The essay on Progress in Virtue is one of Plutarch's polemics against the Stoics, and is directed mainly against two of the doctrines of the Stoic philosophy. The first is that the wise man alone is virtuous, and that wisdom with attendant virtue is a sudden acquisition with no preliminary stages; the second is in a way the corollary of the first, since, if a man is not perfect *(i.e.* wise), it may be argued that it matters little how trivial is his imperfection and whether his faults be great or small. "He that offendeth in one point is guilty of all."

Against such doctrines as these Plutarch's strong common sense revolts, and he endeavours to show not only that ethical advance is possible, but that there are plenty of signs by which it can be recognized.

The essay is addressed (or dedicated) to Q. Sosius[a] Senecio, one of Plutarch's numerous Roman friends, who was twice consul in the early years of Trajan's reign. It was at his request that Plutarch composed the *Symposiacs*, in which his name frequently appears, and to him are inscribed also the parallel lives of Theseus and Romulus, Demosthenes and Cicero, and Dion and Brutus. Plutarch had been with him much in Rome, and he had visited Plutarch in Greece. It is doubtless the same Sosius whom the younger Pliny addressed in two letters (i. 13 and iv. 4) which have come down to us.

[a] So spelled in the best MSS. of Pliny and in inscriptions. Σόσσιος is found in Greek inscriptions.

ΠΩΣ ΑΝ ΤΙΣ ΑΙΣΘΟΙΤΟ ΕΑΥΤΟΥ ΠΡΟΚΟΠΤΟΝΤΟΣ ΕΠ' ΑΡΕΤΗΙ

75 B 1. Τίς τῶν λόγων, ὦ Σόσσιε Σενεκίων, σώσει τὴν ἑαυτοῦ βελτιουμένου πρὸς ἀρετὴν συναίσθησιν, εἰ μηδεμίαν αἱ προκοπαὶ ποιοῦσι τῆς ἀφροσύνης ἄνεσιν, ἀλλ' ἴσῳ σταθμῷ πᾶσιν ἡ κακία περικειμένη[1] μολυβδὶς ὥστε δίκτυον κατέσπασεν;

C οὐδὲ γὰρ ἐν μουσικοῖς τις ἢ γραμματικοῖς ἐπιδιδοὺς ἂν γνοίη μηδὲν ἐν τῷ μανθάνειν ἀπαρύτων τῆς περὶ ταῦτα ἀμαθίας ἀλλ' ἴσης ἀεὶ τῆς ἀτεχνίας αὐτῷ παρούσης, οὐδὲ κάμνοντι θεραπεία μὴ ποιοῦσα ῥᾳστώνην μηδὲ κουφισμὸν ἀμωσγέπως τοῦ νοσήματος ὑπείκοντος καὶ χαλῶντος αἴσθησιν ἂν παρέχοι διαφορᾶς, πρὶν εἰλικρινῆ τὴν ἐναντίαν ἕξιν ἐγγενέσθαι παντάπασιν ἀναρρωσθέντος τοῦ σώματος. ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐν τούτοις οὐ προκόπτουσιν, ἂν προκόπτοντες ἀνέσει τοῦ βαρύνοντος οἷον ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ

[1] περικειμένη (or περιημμένη?) F.C.B.: περιτιθεμένη Emperius: περιθεμένη.

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[a] From an unknown drama of Sophocles; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 756.

HOW A MAN MAY BECOME AWARE OF HIS PROGRESS IN VIRTUE

1. What possible form of argument, my dear Sosius Senecio, will keep alive in a man the consciousness that he is growing better in regard to virtue, if it is a fact that the successive stages of his progress produce no abatement of his unwisdom, but, on the contrary, vice constantly besets all progress, and with countervailing weight drags him down,

> As leaden weights submerge the fisher's net ? [a]

For, by the same token, in music or grammar a man would not realize that he was making any improvement if in the process of learning he should in no wise lower the level of his ignorance about these subjects, and his lack of proficiency should all the time persist to the same degree. So, too, in the case of a sick man, a course of treatment that should not in some way effect an easing and alleviation of the malady, by making it to yield and let go its hold on him, would not afford him any perception of a change for the better until the opposite condition had been unmistakably engendered, his body having completely recovered its strength. On the contrary, just as in these cases persons make no progress unless their progress is marked by such an abatement of what is oppressing them, that, when the scale turns

(75) πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀναφερόμενοι μὴ γιγνώσκωσι τὴν μεταβολήν, οὕτως ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν οὔτε προκοπὴν οὔτε τινὰ προκοπῆς αἴσθησιν ὑποληπτέον, εἰ μηδὲν ἡ ψυχὴ μεθίησι μηδ' ἀποκαθαίρεται τῆς ἀβελτερίας, ἄχρι δὲ τοῦ λαβεῖν ἄκρατον τὸ ἀγαθὸν καὶ τέλειον ἀκράτῳ τῷ κακῷ χρῆται. καὶ γὰρ ἀκαρεῖ χρόνου
D καὶ ὥρας ἐκ τῆς ὡς ἔνι μάλιστα φαυλότητος εἰς οὐκ ἔχουσαν ὑπερβολὴν ἀρετῆς διάθεσιν μεταβαλὼν ὁ σοφός, ἧς οὐδ' ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ μέρος ἀφεῖλε κακίας ἅμα πᾶσαν ἐξαίφνης ἐκπέφευγε.

Καίτοι ἤδη τοὺς ταῦτά γε λέγοντας οἶσθα δήπου πάλιν πολλὰ παρέχοντας αὐτοῖς πράγματα καὶ μεγάλας ἀπορίας περὶ τοῦ διαλεληθότος, ὃς αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν οὐδέπω κατείληφε γεγονὼς σοφός, ἀλλ' ἀγνοεῖ κἀμφιδοξεῖ τῷ κατὰ μικρὸν ἐν χρόνῳ πολλῷ τὰ μὲν ἀφαιροῦντι τὰ δὲ προστιθέντι γιγνομένην τὴν ἐπίδοσιν καθάπερ πορείαν τῇ ἀρετῇ λαθεῖν ἀτρέμα προσμείξασαν. εἰ δέ γε ἦν τάχος τοσοῦτον
E τῆς μεταβολῆς καὶ μέγεθος, ὥστε τὸν πρωΐ κάκιστον ἑσπέρας γεγονέναι κράτιστον, ἢ ἂν οὕτω τινὶ συντύχῃ τὰ τῆς μεταβολῆς, καταδαρθόντα[1] φαῦλον ἀνεγρέσθαι σοφὸν καὶ προσειπεῖν ἐκ τῆς ψυχῆς μεθεικότα τὰς χθιζὰς ἀβελτερίας καὶ ἀπάτας

ψευδεῖς ὄνειροι, χαίρετ'· οὐδὲν ἦτ' ἄρα,

[1] καταδαρθόντα Wyttenbach : καταδαρθέντα.

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[a] Plutarch deals more fully with this topic in the essay, 'Inconsistencies of the Stoics," *Moralia*, 1042 F.

[b] Euripides, *Iphigenia in Tauris*, 569.

and they swing upward in the opposite direction, they can note the change, so too, in the study of philosophy, neither progress nor any sense of progress is to be assumed, if the soul does not put aside any of its gross stupidity and purge itself thereof, and if, up to the moment of its attaining the absolute and perfect good, it is wedded to evil which is also absolute. Why, if this be so, the wise man in a moment or a second of time changes from the lowest possible depravity to an unsurpassable state of virtue ; and all his vice, of which he has not in long years succeeded in removing even a small portion, he suddenly leaves behind for ever.

Yet you doubtless know that, on the other hand, the authors of such assertions make for themselves much trouble and great difficulties over the unwitting man,[a] who has as yet failed to apprehend the fact that he has become wise, but does not know, and hesitates to believe, that his advancement, which has been effected by the gradual and long-continued process of divesting himself of some qualities and adding others, has, as walking brings one where he would be, imperceptibly and quietly brought him into virtue's company. But if there were such a swiftness in the change and a difference so vast, that the man who was the very worst in the morning should have become the very best at evening, or should the change so come about that he who was a worthless dolt when he fell asleep should awake wise, and, having dismissed from his soul his gross stupidities and false concepts of yesterday, could exclaim :

False dreams, farewell ! Ye are but naught, it seems,[b]

τίς ἂν[1] ἀγνοήσειεν ἑαυτοῦ διαφορὰν ἐν αὑτῷ τοσαύτην γενομένην καὶ φρόνησιν ἀθρόον ἐκλάμψασαν; ἐμοὶ μὲν γὰρ δοκεῖ μᾶλλον ἄν τις, ὡς ὁ Καινεύς, γενόμενος κατ' εὐχὴν ἀνὴρ ἐκ γυναικὸς ἀγνοῆσαι τὴν μετακόσμησιν, ἢ σώφρων καὶ φρόνιμος καὶ
F ἀνδρεῖος ἐκ δειλοῦ καὶ ἀνοήτου καὶ ἀκρατοῦς ἀποτελεσθεὶς καὶ μεταβαλὼν εἰς θεῖον ἐκ θηριώδους βίον ἀκαρὲς διαλαθεῖν αὑτόν.

2. Ἀλλ' ὀρθῶς μὲν εἴρηται τὸ

πρὸς στάθμῃ
πέτρον τίθεσθαι, μή τι πρὸς πέτρῳ στάθμην.

οἱ δὲ μὴ τιθέμενοι τὰ δόγματα πρὸς τοῖς πράγμασιν ἀλλὰ τὰ πράγματα πρὸς τὰς ἑαυτῶν ὑποθέσεις ὁμολογεῖν μὴ πεφυκότα καταβιαζόμενοι πολλῶν ἀπορίῶν ἐμπεπλήκασι τὴν φιλοσοφίαν, μεγίστης δὲ
76 τῆς εἰς μίαν ὁμοῦ κακίαν πάντας ἀνθρώπους πλὴν ἑνὸς τοῦ τελείου τιθεμένης, ὑφ' ἧς αἴνιγμα γέγονεν ἡ λεγομένη προκοπή, μικρὸν ἀπολείπουσα ἀφροσύνης ἐσχάτης, τοὺς δὲ[2] πάντων ἅμα παθῶν καὶ νοσημάτων ἀφειμένους ὑπ' αὐτῆς ἔτι τοῖς μηδενὸς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν κακίστων ὁμοίως παρέχουσα κακοδαιμονοῦντας. οὗτοι μὲν οὖν ἑαυτοὺς ἐλέγχουσιν, ἐν μὲν ταῖς σχολαῖς ἴσην ἀδικίαν τὴν Ἀριστείδου τῇ Φαλάριδος τιθέμενοι, καὶ δειλίαν τὴν
B Βρασίδου τῇ Δόλωνος, καὶ νὴ Δία τῆς Μελήτου μηδ'

[1] ἂν added by Emperius.

[2] μὴ, Wyttenbach's correction of δὲ of the MSS., better accords with the Stoic doctrines, but since hardly anybody is really σοφός (*cf.* 1048 E), δὲ may be right.

[a] *Cf.* Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, xii. 189 ff.

[b] Proverbial; *cf.* Leutsch and Schneidewin, *Paroemiographi Graeci*, ii. 625 (88 A).

—who would fail to recognize that a great difference like this had been wrought in his own self, and that the light of wisdom had all at once burst upon him? Why, it seems to me that anyone who, like Caeneus,[a] were made man from woman in answer to prayer, would sooner fail to recognize the transformation, than that anyone made temperate, wise, and brave, from being cowardly, foolish, and licentious, and transferred from a bestial to a godlike life, should for a single second not perceive what had happened to him.

2. Rightly has it been said:

> Adjust the stone to fit
> The line, and not the line to fit the stone.[b]

But those who do not adjust their tenets to fit the facts, but rather try to force the facts into an unnatural agreement with their own assumptions,[c] have filled philosophy with a great number of difficulties, of which the greatest is that which would assign all men to a general category of badness with the single exception of the absolutely perfect man; the result of which is to make a puzzle out of what we call progress, since it falls but little short of the uttermost foolishness, and represents men who have been released by it from all kinds of passions and weaknesses as living in a state of equal wretchedness with those who have not yet been freed from a single one of the worst evils. Now these men really refute themselves when, in their lectures, they put the wrongdoing of Aristeides on an equality with that of Phalaris, and the cowardice of Brasidas on an equality with that of Dolon, and the hard-hearted attitude of Plato

[c] Aimed at the Stoics.

(76) ὁτιοῦν τὴν Πλάτωνος ἀγνωμοσύνην διαφέρουσαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ βίῳ καὶ τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐκείνους μὲν ἐκτρεπόμενοι καὶ φεύγοντες ὡς ἀμειλίκτους,[1] τούτοις δ' ὡς ἀξίοις πολλοῦ τὰ μέγιστα καὶ χρώμενοι καὶ πιστεύοντες.

3. Ἡμεῖς δὲ παντὶ γένει κακοῦ, μάλιστα δὲ τῷ περὶ ψυχὴν ἀτάκτῳ καὶ ἀορίστῳ τὸ μᾶλλον καὶ ἧττον προσγιγνόμενον ὁρῶντες (ᾗ καὶ διαφέρουσιν αἱ προκοπαί, καθάπερ, σκιᾶς ἀνέσει τῆς μοχθηρίας τοῦ λόγου διαφωτίζοντος ἀτρέμα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ διακαθαίροντος) οὐκ ἄλογον οἰόμεθα τὴν συναίσθησιν εἶναι τῆς μεταβολῆς ὥσπερ ἐκ βυθοῦ τινὸς ἀνα-
C φερομένοις, ἀλλ' ἔχουσαν ἐπιλογισμούς. ὧν σκόπει τὸν πρῶτον εὐθύς. εἰ καθάπερ οἱ πρὸς ἀχανὲς θέοντες ἱστίοις πέλαγος ἅμα τῷ χρόνῳ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πνεύματος ῥώμην ἀναμετροῦνται τὸν δρόμον, ὅσον[2] εἰκὸς ἐν τοσούτῳ γεγονόσιν[3] ὑπὸ τοσαύτης κομιζομένοις ἠνύσθαι δυνάμεως, οὕτως ἄν τις ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὸ ἐνδελεχὲς καὶ τὸ συνεχὲς τῆς πορείας καὶ μὴ πολλὰς διὰ μέσου ποιούμενον ἐπιστάσεις, εἶτ' αὖθις ὁρμὰς καὶ ἐπιπηδήσεις, ἀλλὰ λείως καὶ ὁμαλῶς τοῦ πρόσθεν ἐπιλαμβανόμενον ἀεὶ καὶ διϊὸν ἀπταίστως διὰ τοῦ λόγου τεκμήριον ἑαυτῷ ποιήσαιτο προκοπῆς. τὸ γὰρ

> εἰ καὶ σμικρὸν ἐπὶ σμικρῷ καταθεῖο
> καὶ θαμὰ τοῦθ' ἕρδοις

D οὐ πρὸς ἀργυρίου μόνον αὔξησιν εἴρηται καλῶς, ἀλλ'

[1] ἀμίκτους Kronenberg. [2] ὅσον Meziriacus : ὡς.
[3] γεγονέναι or γεγονὼς some MSS.

[a] Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 361. Quoted more fully *supra*, 9 E.

as actually not differing at all from that of Meletus; whereas in their life and practice they show an aversion for these latter men and avoid them as ruthless, but the former they seem to think are men of great worth, for they cite them with confidence in the most important matters.

3. But as for us, we observe that there are degrees in every kind of evil, and especially in the indeterminate and undefined kind that has to do with the soul. (In the same way also there are different degrees of progress produced by the abatement of baseness like a receding shadow, as reason gradually illuminates and purifies the soul.) We do not, therefore, think that consciousness of the change is unreasonable in the case of persons who are, as it were, making their way upward out of some deep gorge, but that there are ways in which it can be computed. Of these I beg you to consider the first without further preface. Just as men sailing out into the open sea calculate their run by the time elapsed in conjunction with the strength of the wind, reckoning how much distance, after spending a certain time, while carried onward by a certain force, they are likely to have accomplished; so too in philosophy a man may take for himself as a proof that he is gaining ground the uniformity and continuity of his course, which makes on the way no frequent halts, followed by leaps and bounds, but smoothly and regularly forges ahead, and goes through the course of philosophic reasoning without mishap. For the lines:

> If even small upon the small you place
> And do this oft,[a]

are not merely well put in regard to the increase of

(76) εἰς ἅπαντα ποιεῖ, μάλιστα δ' εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπίδοσιν, πολὺ καὶ τελεσιουργὸν ἔθος τοῦ λόγου προσλαμβάνοντος· αἱ δ' ἀνωμαλίαι καὶ ἀμβλύτητες τῶν φιλοσοφούντων οὐ μόνον μονὰς[1] ποιοῦσι καὶ[2] ἐποχὰς ὥσπερ ἐν ὁδῷ τῆς προκοπῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἀναλύσεις, ἀεὶ τῷ παρείκοντι κατὰ σχολὴν τῆς κακίας ἐπιτιθεμένης καὶ πρὸς τοὐναντίον ἀνθυποφερούσης.

Τοὺς μὲν γὰρ πλάνητας οἱ μαθηματικοὶ στηρίζειν λέγουσι παυσαμένης τῆς εἰς τοὔμπροσθεν αὐτῶν πορείας, ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν οὐκ ἔστι ληγούσης
E διάλειμμα προκοπῆς οὐδὲ στηριγμός, ἀλλ' ἀεί τινας ἔχουσα κινήσεις ἡ φύσις ὥσπερ ἐπὶ ζυγοῦ ῥέπειν ἐθέλει καὶ κατατείνεσθαι ταῖς βελτίοσιν, ἢ ταῖς ἐναντίαις πρὸς τὸ χεῖρον οἴχεται φερομένη. ἂν οὖν κατὰ τὸν δοθέντα χρησμὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ "Κιρραίοις[3] πάντ' ἤματα καὶ πάσας νύκτας πολεμεῖν" οὕτω συνειδῇς σεαυτὸν ἡμέρας τε καὶ νύκτωρ ἀεὶ τῇ κακίᾳ διαμεμαχημένον, ἢ μὴ πολλάκις γε τὴν φρουρὰν ἀνεικότα μηδὲ συνεχῶς παρ' αὐτῆς οἱονεὶ κήρυκας ἡδονάς τινας ἢ ῥᾳστώνας ἢ ἀσχολίας ἐπὶ σπονδαῖς προσδεδεγμένον, εἰκότως ἂν εὐθαρσὴς καὶ πρόθυμος βαδίζοις ἐπὶ τὸ λειπόμενον.

F 4. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κἂν ᾖ διαλείμματα γιγνόμενα τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν, τὰ δ' ὕστερα τῶν πρότερον[4] ἑδραιό-

[1] *οὐ μόνον μονὰς* F.C.B.: *οὐ μόνας.*

[2] *ποιοῦσι καὶ* F.C.B.: *ποιοῦσιν.*

[3] *ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ Κιρραίοις* Boissonade: *Κιρραίοις ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ.* The correction is fairly certain; *cf.* Aeschines, *Against Ctesiphon*, §§ 107, 108.

[4] *τὰ δὲ πρότερα τῶν ὑστέρων* Hartman: *τὰ ὕστερα* (?) F.C.B.

money, but they apply to everything, and especially to advancement in virtue, since reason thereby gains the aid of constant and effective habit. But the variation and obtuseness often shown by students of philosophy not only cause delays and stoppages in their progress on the road to knowledge, but also bring about retrogressions, since vice always makes an onset on the man who yields ground by loitering, and carries him backward in the opposite direction.

Mathematicians tell us that the planets, when their forward movement ceases, become for the moment stationary, but in the study of philosophy there is no intermission when progress halts, nor any such thing as remaining stationary, but Nature, being never free from motion of some sort, is wont to move up or down, as though suspended on a balance, and to be swayed by the better motives, or else under the influence of the contrary motives it moves rapidly towards what is worse. If therefore you follow the advice given by the god in the oracle, to "fight the Cirrhaeans all days and all nights," and are conscious that you likewise in the daytime and the nighttime have always carried on an unrelenting warfare against vice, or at least that you have not often relaxed your vigilance nor constantly granted admission to divers pleasures, recreations, and pastimes, which are, as it were, envoys sent by vice to treat for a truce, it is then quite probable that you may go on with good courage and confidence to what still remains.

4. However, even though it be that intermissions occur in one's philosophical studies, yet if the later periods of study are more constant and

τερα καὶ μακρότερα, σημεῖον οὐ φαῦλόν ἐστιν ἐκθλιβομένης πόνῳ καὶ ἀσκήσει τῆς ῥᾳθυμίας· τὸ δ' ἐναντίον πονηρόν, αἱ μετ' οὐ πολὺν χρόνον πολλαὶ καὶ συνεχεῖς ἀνακοπαί, τῆς προθυμίας οἷον ἀπομαραινομένης. ὡς γὰρ ἡ τοῦ καλάμου βλάστησις,
77 ὁρμὴν ἔχουσα πλείστην ἀπ' ἀρχῆς εἰς μῆκος ὁμαλὸν καὶ συνεχές, τὸ πρῶτον ἐν διαστήμασι μεγάλοις ὀλίγας λαμβάνουσα προσκρούσεις καὶ ἀντικοπάς, εἶθ' οἷον ὑπ' ἄσθματος ἄνω δι' ἀσθένειαν ἀπαγορεύουσα πολλοῖς ἐνίσχεται καὶ πυκνοῖς τοῖς γόνασι, τοῦ πνεύματος πληγὰς καὶ τρόμους λαμβάνοντος, οὕτως ὅσοι τὸ πρῶτον μεγάλαις ἐκδρομαῖς ἐχρήσαντο πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν, εἶτα πολλὰ καὶ συνεχῆ προσκρούματα καὶ διασπάσματα λαμβάνουσι μη-
B δενὸς διαφόρου πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἐπαισθανόμενοι, τελευτῶντες ἐξέκαμον καὶ ἀπηγόρευσαν. "τῷ δ' αὖτε[1] πτερὰ γίγνετο" δι' ὠφέλειαν φερομένῳ καὶ διακόπτοντι τὰς προφάσεις ὥσπερ ὄχλον ἐμποδὼν ὄντα ῥώμῃ καὶ προθυμίᾳ τῆς ἀνύσεως. καθάπερ οὖν ἔρωτος ἀρχομένου σημεῖόν ἐστιν οὐ τὸ χαίρειν τῷ καλῷ παρόντι (τοῦτο γὰρ κοινόν) ἀλλὰ τὸ δάκνεσθαι καὶ ἀλγεῖν ἀποσπώμενον, οὕτως ἄγονται μὲν ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας πολλοὶ καὶ σφόδρα γε φιλοτίμως ἀντιλαμβάνεσθαι τοῦ μανθάνειν δοκοῦσιν, ἂν δ' ἀπελαθῶσι[2] ὑπὸ πραγμάτων ἄλλων καὶ ἀσχολιῶν, ἐξερρύη τὸ πάθος αὐτῶν ἐκεῖνο, καὶ ῥᾳδίως φέρουσιν.

[1] αὖτε: εὖτε most Homeric mss.
[2] ἀπελαθῶσι Kronenberg: ἀπέλθωσι.

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[a] Some editors would amend the text here, and perhaps rightly, to make the text correspond better to what the sense plainly requires.
[b] Homer, *Iliad*, xix. 386.

long-continued than they were earlier,[a] this is no slight indication that the spirit of indifference is being expelled through industry and practice; but there is something pernicious in the opposite condition, when numerous and continued set-backs occur after no long time, as if the spirit of eagerness were withering away. We may compare a reed, the growth of which at its beginning has a very great impetus, which results in an even and continuous length, at first in long sections, since it meets with few obstacles and repulses, but later, as though for lack of breath as it gets higher up, it grows weak and weary, and is gathered up in the many frequent nodules, when the life-giving spirit meets with buffets and shocks; so with philosophy, those who at the outset engage in long excursions into its realms and later meet with a long series of obstacles and distractions without becoming aware of any change toward the better, finally get wearied out, and give up. But a man of the other type " is again given wings " [b] by the help he gets as he is carried onward, and by the strength and eagerness born of successful accomplishment brushes aside pretences as though they were a hindering crowd in his path. In the same way that an indication of the beginning of love is to be found, not in the taking delight in the presence of the loved one (for this is usual), but in feeling a sting of pain when separated; just so are many allured by philosophy and seem to take hold of the task of learning with high aspirations, but if they are forced by other business and occupations to leave it, all that excitement of theirs subsides and they no longer care. But

(77) ὅτῳ δ' ἔρωτος δῆγμα παιδικῶν

C πρόσεστι, μέτριος μὲν ἄν σοι φανείη καὶ πρᾶος ἐν τῷ παρεῖναι καὶ συμφιλοσοφεῖν ὅταν δ' ἀποσπασθῇ καὶ χωρὶς γένηται, θεῶ φλεγόμενον καὶ ἀδημονοῦντα καὶ δυσκολαίνοντα πᾶσι πράγμασι καὶ ἀσχολίαις, μνήμην δὲ φιλῶν[1] ὥσπερ ἄλογος ἐλαύνεται πόθῳ τῷ πρὸς φιλοσοφίαν. οὐ γὰρ δεῖ τοῖς λογοις εὐφραίνεσθαι μὲν παρόντας ὥσπερ τοῖς μύροις, ἀποστάντας δὲ μὴ ζητεῖν μηδ' ἀσχάλλειν, ἀλλὰ πείνῃ τινὶ καὶ δίψῃ πάθος ὅμοιον ἐν τοῖς ἀποσπασμοῖς πάσχοντας ἔχεσθαι τοῦ προκόπτοντος ἀληθῶς, ἄν τε γάμος ἄν τε πλοῦτος ἄν τε φιλία τις ἄν τε στρα-
D τεία προσπεσοῦσα ποιήσῃ τὸν χωρισμόν. ὅσῳ γὰρ πλέον ἐστὶ τὸ προσειλημμένον ἐκ φιλοσοφίας, τοσούτῳ πλέον ἐνοχλεῖ τὸ ἀπολειπόμενον.

5. Τούτῳ δ' ὁμοῦ τι ταὐτόν ἐστιν ἢ σύνεγγυς τὸ πρεσβύτατον δήλωμα προκοπῆς τοῦ Ἡσιόδου, μηκέτι προσάντη μηδ' ὄρθιον ἄγαν ἀλλὰ ῥᾳδίαν καὶ λείαν καὶ δι' εὐπετείας εἶναι τὴν ὁδόν, οἷον ἐκλειαινομένην τῇ ἀσκήσει καὶ φῶς ἐν τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν καὶ λαμπρότητα ποιοῦσαν ἐξ ἀπορίας καὶ πλάνης καὶ μεταμελειῶν, αἷς προστυγχάνουσιν οἱ φιλο-
E σοφοῦντες τὸ πρῶτον, ὥσπερ οἱ γῆν ἀπολιπόντες ἣν ἴσασι, μηδέπω δὲ καθορῶντες ἐφ' ἣν πλέουσι. προέμενοι γὰρ τὰ κοινὰ καὶ συνήθη πρὶν ἢ τὰ βελτίονα γνῶναι καὶ λαβεῖν, ἐν μέσῳ περιφέρονται

[1] μνήμην δὲ φιλῶν F.C.B.: μνήμῃ or λήθῃ φίλων.

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[a] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Sophocles*, No. 757; *cf.* Plutarch, *Moralia*, 619 A.

[b] *Works and Days*, 289.

He in whose heart the prick of youthful love [a]

is planted may appear to you moderate and mild while present at philosophical discussions ; but when he is separated and apart from them, behold him ardent and troubled, and dissatisfied with all business and occupations, and, cherishing the mere recollection, he is driven about like an irrational being by his yearning towards philosophy. For we ought not to enjoy being present at discussions as we enjoy the presence of perfumes, and then when we are removed from them not seek after them or even feel uneasy ; but we ought in our periods of separation to experience a sensation akin in a way to hunger and thirst, and so be led to cleave to what makes for real progress, whether it chance to be a wedding or wealth or the duties of friendship or military service that causes the temporary parting. For the greater the acquisition from philosophy is, the more annoyance there is in being cut off from it.

5. Quite the same as this, or nearly the same, is the very ancient elucidation of progress found in Hesiod,[b] which sets forth that the way is no longer uphill, nor very steep, but easy and smooth and readily accomplished, as though it were made smooth by practice, and as though it brought on a light, which is to be found in the study of philosophy, and an illumination succeeding upon perplexity, errant thought, and much vacillation, which students of philosophy encounter at the outset, like persons who have left behind the land which they know and are not yet in sight of the land to which they are sailing. For having given up the common and familiar things before gaining knowledge and possession of the better, they are carried hither and thither in the

πολλάκις ὑποτρεπόμενοι. καθάπερ φασὶ Σέξτιον τὸν Ῥωμαῖον ἀφεικότα τὰς ἐν τῇ πόλει τιμὰς καὶ ἀρχὰς διὰ φιλοσοφίαν, ἐν δὲ τῷ φιλοσοφεῖν αὖ πάλιν δυσπαθοῦντα καὶ χρώμενον τῷ λόγῳ χαλεπῷ τὸ πρῶτον, ὀλίγου δεῆσαι καταβαλεῖν ἑαυτὸν ἔκ τινος διήρους. καὶ περὶ Διογένους ὅμοια τοῦ Σινωπέως ἱστοροῦσιν ἀρχομένου φιλοσοφεῖν, ὡς Ἀθηναίοις ἦν ἑορτὴ καὶ δεῖπνα δημοτελῆ καὶ θέατρα
F καὶ συνουσίας μετ' ἀλλήλων ἔχοντες ἐχρῶντο κώμοις καὶ παννυχίσιν, ὁ δ' ἔν τινι γωνίᾳ συνεσπειραμένος ὡς καθευδήσων ἐνέπιπτεν εἰς λογισμοὺς τρέποντας αὐτὸν οὐκ ἀτρέμα καὶ θραύοντας, ὡς ἀπ' οὐδεμιᾶς ἀνάγκης εἰς ἐπίπονον καὶ ἀλλόκοτον ἥκων βίον αὐτὸς ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ κάθηται τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἁπάντων ἐστερημένος. εἶτα μέντοι μῦν τινα προσερπύσαντα λέγεται περὶ τὰς ψίχας αὐτοῦ τῆς μάζης ἀναστρέφεσθαι, τὸν δ' αὖθις ἀναφέρειν τῷ φρονήματι καὶ
78 λέγειν πρὸς ἑαυτὸν οἷον ἐπιπλήττοντα καὶ κακίζοντα "τί φῄς, ὦ Διόγενες; τοῦτον μὲν εὐωχεῖ τὰ σὰ λείμματα, σὺ δ' ὁ γενναῖος ὅτι μὴ μεθύεις ἐκεῖ κατακείμενος ἐν ἁπαλοῖς καὶ ἀνθίνοις στρώμασιν ὀδύρῃ καὶ θρηνεῖς σεαυτόν;" ὅταν οὖν οἱ τοιοῦτοι κατασπασμοὶ γένωνται μὴ πολλάκις, αἵ τε πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἐξαιρέσεις[1] καὶ ἀνακρούσεις τοῦ φρονήματος ὥσπερ ἐκ τροπῆς ταχεῖαι παρῶσι καὶ διαλύωσι ῥᾳδίως τὸν ἄλυν καὶ τὴν ἀδημονίαν, ἔν τινι βεβαίῳ τὴν προκοπὴν εἶναι δεῖ νομίζειν.

[1] ἐξαιρέσεις F.C.B. : ἐξαιρήσεις.

[a] The story is found also in Aelian, *Var. Hist.* xiii. 26.

interval, and oftentimes in the wrong direction. An illustration is the story told about Sextius, the Roman, to the effect that he had renounced his honours and offices in the State for philosophy, but, because he was impatient and found the subject difficult at the outset, he came very near throwing himself down from an upper story. A similar tale, too, they record about Diogenes[a] of Sinope at the beginning of his devotion to philosophy. The Athenians were keeping holiday with public banquets and shows in the theatre and informal gatherings among themselves, and indulging in merry-making the whole night long, while Diogenes, huddled up in a corner trying to sleep, fell into some very disturbing and disheartening reflexions how he from no compulsion had entered upon a toilsome and strange mode of life, and as a result of his own act he was now sitting without part or parcel in all these good things. A moment later, however, a mouse, it is said, crept up and busied itself with the crumbs of his bread, whereupon he once more recovered his spirits, and said to himself as though rebuking himself for cowardice, "What are you saying, Diogenes? Your leavings make a feast for this creature, but as for you, a man of birth and breeding, just because you cannot be getting drunk over there, reclining on soft and flowery couches, do you bewail and lament your lot?" Now when such fits of dejection become of infrequent occurrence and the objections and protests made by sound sense against them quickly come to our help, as though rallying after a temporary rout, and easily dissipate our depression and dismay, we may well believe that our progress rests on a firm foundation.

(78) 6. Ἐπεὶ δ' οὐ μόνον ἐξ αὑτῶν τὰ κατασείοντα καὶ στρέφοντα πρὸς τοὐναντίον ὑπ' ἀσθενείας ἐπι-
B γίγνεται[1] τοῖς φιλοσοφοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ φίλων συμβουλαὶ μετὰ σπουδῆς καὶ διαφόρων ἀντιλήψεις ἐν γέλωτι καὶ παιδιᾷ γιγνόμεναι κάμπτουσι καὶ μαλάσσουσιν, ἐνίους δὲ καὶ τέλεον ἤδη φιλοσοφίας ἐξέσεισαν, οὐ φαῦλον ἄν τι προκοπῆς εἴη σημεῖον ἡ πρὸς ταῦτα πραότης ἑκάστου καὶ τὸ μὴ ταραττόμενον μηδὲ κνιζόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν λεγόντων καὶ ὀνομαζόντων ἥλικάς τινας ἐν αὐλαῖς βασιλέων εὐημεροῦντας ἢ φερνὰς ἐπὶ γάμοις λαμβάνοντας ἢ κατιόντας ὑπὸ πλήθους εἰς ἀγορὰν ἐπ' ἀρχήν τινα ἢ συνηγορίαν. ὁ γὰρ ἀνέκπληκτος ἐν τούτοις καὶ ἄτεγκτος ἤδη δῆλός ἐστιν εἰλημμένος ἥν προσήκει
C λαβὴν ὑπὸ φιλοσοφίας. οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τε παύσασθαι ζηλοῦντας ἅπερ οἱ πολλοὶ θαυμάζουσιν, οἷς ἂν μὴ τὸ θαυμάζειν ἀρετὴν ἐγγένηται. πρὸς μὲν γὰρ ἀνθρώπους θρασύνεσθαι καὶ δι' ὀργὴν ἐνίοις παρέστη καὶ διὰ παραφροσύνην· ὧν δὲ θαυμάζουσιν ἄνθρωποι πραγμάτων οὐκ ἔστιν ἄνευ φρονήματος ἀληθινοῦ καὶ βεβαίου καταφρονῆσαι. διὸ καὶ ταῦτα παραβάλλοντες ἐκείνοις ἐπιγαυροῦσιν ἑαυτούς, ὥσπερ ὁ Σόλων

ἀλλ' ἡμεῖς αὐτοῖς οὐ διαμειψόμεθα
τῆς ἀρετῆς τὸν πλοῦτον, ἐπεὶ τὸ μὲν ἔμπεδον αἰεί,
χρήματα δ' ἀνθρώπων ἄλλοτε ἄλλος ἔχει.

καὶ Διογένης τὴν εἰς Ἀθήνας ἐκ Κορίνθου καὶ
D πάλιν εἰς Κόρινθον ἐξ Ἀθηνῶν μετάβασιν ἑαυτοῦ

[1] ἐπιγίγνεται Iunius: ἐπιτείνεται.

[a] Bergk, *Poetae Lyrici Graeci*, ii. 427, No. 15. Quoted by Plutarch also, *Moralia*, 92 E, 472 D, and *Life of Solon*, ch. iii. (p. 79 F).

6. Since, however, students of philosophy are not of themselves the only source of the dejecting and reactionary influences, which, as the result of weakness, affect them, but since also the sober advice of friends and the bitter criticisms of the unfriendly, in the form of scoffing and joking, cause a warping and weakening of purpose, and have even made some persons renounce philosophy altogether, no slight indication of progress would be shown by gentleness of demeanour in the face of such criticisms, and by not being disturbed or irritated by those who name this or that acquaintance of about the same age, and tell how he is prospering at Court, or getting a big dower at marriage, or going down to the Forum, attended by a great crowd, to stand for some office or to advocate some cause. For plainly the man who is not disconcerted or affected under such circumstances is one on whom philosophy has got a right hold. For to cease emulating what the great majority admire is impossible, except for those who have acquired the faculty of admiring virtue. For to confront the world boldly is with some people possible only under the influence of anger or mental derangement; but to contemn actions which the world admires is quite impossible without real and solid wisdom. This is the reason why they compare their own state with the other and vaunt themselves over it, as does Solon :[a]

> We will not bargain with them ever to take in exchange
> All of their wealth for our virtue, since virtue is ever abiding;
> Riches are held for a time here or there among men.

Diogenes, too, used to compare his moving from Corinth to Athens, and from Athens to Corinth

(78) παρέβαλλε ταῖς βασιλέως ἔαρος μὲν ἐν Σούσοις καὶ χειμῶνος ἐν Βαβυλῶνι, θέρους δ' ἐν Μηδίᾳ διατριβαῖς. καὶ Ἀγησίλαος περὶ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως "τί γὰρ ἐμοῦ μείζων ἐκεῖνος, εἰ μὴ καὶ δικαιότερος;" ὁ δ' Ἀριστοτέλης πρὸς Ἀντίπατρον περὶ Ἀλεξάνδρου γράφων ἔφη μὴ μόνον ἐκείνῳ προσήκειν ὅτι πολλῶν κρατεῖ μέγα φρονεῖν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἧττον εἴ
E τις ὀρθῶς γιγνώσκει περὶ θεῶν. ὁ δὲ Ζήνων ὁρῶν τὸν Θεόφραστον ἐπὶ τῷ πολλοὺς ἔχειν μαθητὰς θαυμαζόμενον, "ὁ ἐκείνου μὲν χορός," ἔφη, "μείζων, οὑμὸς δὲ συμφωνότερος."

7. Ὅταν οὖν οὕτω τὰ τῆς ἀρετῆς πρὸς τὰ ἐκτὸς ἀντιτιθεὶς ὑπεκχέῃς φθόνους καὶ ζηλοτυπίας καὶ τὰ κνίζοντα καὶ ταπεινοῦντα πολλοὺς τῶν ἀρχομένων φιλοσοφεῖν, μέγα καὶ τοῦτο δήλωμα σεαυτῷ τοῦ προκόπτειν ποιεῖς. οὐκ ἔστι δὲ μικρὸν οὐδ' ἡ περὶ τοὺς λόγους μεταβολή. πάντες γὰρ ὡς εἰπεῖν οἱ φιλοσοφεῖν ἀρχόμενοι τοὺς πρὸς δόξαν διώκουσι μᾶλλον, οἱ μὲν ὥσπερ ὄρνιθες ἐπὶ τὴν λαμπρότητα τῶν φυσικῶν καὶ τὸ ὕψος ὑπὸ κουφότητος καὶ φιλοτιμίας καταίροντες, οἱ δ' "ὥσπερ τὰ σκυλάκια,"
F φησὶν ὁ Πλάτων, "τῷ ἕλκειν καὶ σπαράττειν χαίροντες" ἐπὶ τὰς ἔριδας καὶ τὰς ἀπορίας χωροῦσι καὶ τὰ σοφίσματα, οἱ δὲ πλεῖστοι τοῖς διαλεκτικοῖς ἐνδύντες εὐθὺς ἐπισιτίζονται πρὸς σοφιστείαν, ἔνιοι δὲ χρείας καὶ ἱστορίας ἀναλεγόμενοι περιίασιν, ὥσπερ Ἀνάχαρσις ἔλεγε τῷ νομίσματι τοὺς Ἕλληνας πρὸς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ τὸ ἀριθμεῖν χρωμένους

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[a] *Cf.* Julian's *Letter to Themistius*, p. 265 A (translated in the L.C.L. ii. p. 231), and Plutarch, *Moralia*, 472 E.

[b] *Republic*, 539 B.

again, with the sojourns of the Persian king at Susa in the spring, at Babylon in the winter, and in Media in the summer. So too Agesilaus remarked in regard to the Great King, "In what is he greater than I, unless he be more just?" And Aristotle, writing to Antipater about Alexander, said that it was not Alexander alone who had the right to be proud because he held sway over many, but any man had just as good a right, if he had the correct ideas about God.[a] And Zeno, seeing that Theophrastus was admired for having many pupils, said, "It is true his chorus is larger, but mine is more harmonious."

7. Whenever, then, by thus setting the advantages of virtue over against merely external advantages, you have succeeded in dispelling all envy and jealousy and the things that vex and depress many beginners in philosophy, you are thus again making clear to yourself in a significant way the reality of your progress. Of no slight significance either is the change which occurs in one's discourse. For practically all beginners in philosophy are more inclined to pursue those forms of discourse which make for repute; some of these beginners, like birds, are led by their flightiness and ambition to alight on the resplendent heights of the Natural Sciences; while others, "like puppies, delighting to pull and tear," as Plato puts it,[b] go in for the disputations, knotty problems, and quibbles; but the majority enter a course in Logic and Argumentation, where they straightway stock themselves up for the practice of sophistry; while a few go about making a collection of apophthegms and anecdotes, but, as Anacharsis said of the Greeks that he never saw them put their money to any use

ὁρᾶν, οὕτω τοὺς λόγους παραριθμούμενοι καὶ παρα-
μετροῦντες, ἄλλο δ' οὐδὲν εἰς ὄνησιν αὑτῶν τιθέ-
79 μενοι. συμβαίνει δὴ τὸ τοῦ Ἀντιφάνους, ὅ τις
εἶπεν ἐπὶ[1] τῶν Πλάτωνος συνήθων. ὁ γὰρ Ἀντι-
φάνης ἔλεγε παίζων ἔν τινι πόλει τὰς φωνὰς εὐθὺς
λεγομένας πήγνυσθαι διὰ ψῦχος, εἶθ' ὕστερον
ἀνιεμένων ἀκούειν θέρους ἃ τοῦ χειμῶνος δι-
ελέχθησαν· οὕτω δὴ τῶν ὑπὸ Πλάτωνος ἔφη νέοις
οὖσιν ἔτι λεχθέντων μόλις ὀψὲ τοὺς πολλοὺς
αἰσθάνεσθαι γέροντας γενομένους. καὶ πρὸς ὅλην
δὲ τοῦτο τὴν φιλοσοφίαν πεπόνθασιν, ἄχρι οὗ
κατάστασιν ὑγιεινὴν ἡ κρίσις λαβοῦσα τοῖς ἤθος
ἐμποιοῦσι καὶ μέγεθος ἄρξηται συμφέρεσθαι καὶ
ζητεῖν λόγους, ὧν κατὰ τὸν Αἴσωπον εἴσω μᾶλλον ἢ
B ἔξω τὰ ἴχνη τέτραπται. ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ Σοφοκλῆς
ἔλεγε τὸν Αἰσχύλου διαπεπαιχὼς[2] ὄγκον εἶτα τὸ
πικρὸν[3] καὶ κατάτεχνον τῆς αὐτοῦ κατασκευῆς
τρίτον ἤδη τὸ τῆς λέξεως μεταβάλλειν εἶδος, ὅπερ
ἠθικώτατόν ἐστι καὶ βέλτιστον, οὕτως οἱ φιλοσο-
φοῦντες, ὅταν ἐκ τῶν πανηγυρικῶν καὶ κατατέχνων
εἰς τὸν ἀπτόμενον ἤθους καὶ πάθους λόγον μετα-
βῶσιν, ἄρχονται τὴν ἀληθῆ προκοπὴν προκόπτειν
καὶ ἄτυφον.

8. Ὅρα δὴ μὴ μόνον φιλοσόφων συγγράμματα
C διεξιὼν καὶ λόγους ἀκούων εἰ μὴ πλέον τοῖς ὀνό-

[1] εἶπεν ἐπὶ Madvig: εἶπε.

[2] διαπεπαιχὼς] διαπεπλιχὼς Bernhardy: διαπεπλακὼς Bergk: διαπεπαικὼς Herwerden. There are other difficulties also in the text as it stands.

[3] περιττὸν Wyttenbach.

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[a] *Cf.* the elaboration of this idea by Addison in the *Tatler*, No. 254 (Nov. 23, 1710), and by Rabelais in *Pantagruel*, iv. 55 and 56, as well as the postilion's horn in Baron Munchausen's *Adventures*, chap. vi.

save to count it, so these persons are for ever foolishly taking account and inventory of their literary stock, but they lay up nothing else which would be to their own profit. Quite in place here is Antiphanes' [a] story, which somebody has recounted and applied to Plato's close acquaintances. Antiphanes said humorously that in a certain city words congealed with the cold the moment they were spoken, and later, as they thawed out, people heard in the summer what they had said to one another in the winter ; it was the same way, he asserted, with what was said by Plato to men still in their youth ; not until long afterwards, if ever, did most of them come to perceive the meaning, when they had become old men. And this is the general experience with philosophy as a whole until the judgement acquires a healthy stability, and begins to find itself in accord with principles productive of character and breadth of mind, and to look for the kind of discourse whose footprints, in the words of Aesop,[b] are turned toward us rather than away from us. For as Sophocles said, that only after handling with a light touch the turgidity of Aeschylus and next his harshness and artificiality in composition, did he, as a third step, change the character of the language, which has the most to do with moral character and goodness, so, in the same way, when students of philosophy pass from the ostentatious and artificial to the kind of discourse which deals with character and feeling they begin to make real and unaffected progress.

8. Observe, then, not only when you are perusing the writings of philosophers and listening to

[b] In *Lion and Fox*, No. 137 in the *Fables* passing as Aesop's.

(79) μασι μόνοις προσέχεις ἢ τοῖς πράγμασι μηδὲ μᾶλλον ἐπιπηδᾷς τοῖς τὸ δύσκολον ἔχουσι καὶ περιττὸν ἢ τοῖς τὸ χρήσιμον καὶ σάρκινον καὶ ὠφέλιμον, ἀλλὰ καὶ ποιήμασιν ὁμιλῶν καὶ ἱστορίᾳ παραφύλαττε σεαυτὸν εἰ μηδέν σε διαφεύγει τῶν πρὸς ἐπανόρθωσιν ἤθους ἢ πάθους κουφισμὸν ἐμμελῶς λεγομένων. ὥσπερ γὰρ ἄνθεσιν ὁμιλεῖν ὁ Σιμωνίδης φησὶ τὴν μέλιτταν

ξανθὸν μέλι μηδομέναν,

οἱ δ' ἄλλοι χρόαν αὐτῶν καὶ ὀσμὴν ἕτερον δ' οὐδὲν ἀγαπῶσιν, οὐδὲ λαμβάνουσιν, οὕτω[1] τῶν ἄλλων ἐν ποιήμασιν ἡδονῆς ἕνεκα καὶ παιδιᾶς ἀναστρεφομένων αὐτὸς εὑρίσκων τι καὶ συνάγων σπουδῆς
D ἄξιον ἔοικεν ἤδη γνωριστικὸς ὑπὸ συνηθείας καὶ φιλίας τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ οἰκείου γεγονέναι. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ Πλάτωνι καὶ Ξενοφῶντι χρωμένους διὰ τὴν λέξιν, ἕτερον δὲ μηδὲν ἀλλ' ἢ τὸ καθαρόν τε καὶ Ἀττικὸν ὥσπερ δρόσον καὶ χνοῦν ἀποδρεπομένους τί ἂν ἄλλο φαίης ἢ φαρμάκων τὸ μὲν εὐῶδες καὶ ἀνθηρὸν ἀγαπᾶν, τὸ δ' ἀνώδυνον καὶ καθαρτικὸν μὴ προσίεσθαι μηδὲ διαγιγνώσκειν; ἀλλ' οἵ γε μᾶλλον ἔτι προκόπτοντες οὐκ ἀπὸ λόγων μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ θεαμάτων καὶ πραγμάτων πάντων ὠφελεῖσθαι
E δύνανται καὶ συνάγειν τὸ οἰκεῖον καὶ χρήσιμον,

[1] οὕτως ὁ Madvig.

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[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Graec.* iii. 411, *Simon.* No. 47; quoted also *Moralia*, 41 F and 494 A.

their discourses, whether you do not give more attention to the mere language than to the subject matter, and whether you are not more on the alert for passages which involve something difficult and odd rather than for those which convey something useful, substantial, and beneficial; moreover, when you are busying yourself with poems and history, you must watch yourself to see whether anything escapes you among the ideas which are suitably expressed and tend to improvement of character or alleviation of emotion. For as Simonides [a] says of the bee that it flits among the flowers,

Making the yellow honey its care,

while the rest of the world contents itself with their colour and fragrance, getting nothing else from them, so, while the rest of the world ranges amid poems for the sake of pleasure or diversion, if a man, through his own initiative, finds and collects something worth while, it is reasonable to expect that he at last, from force of habit and fondness for what is beautiful and appropriate, has made himself capable of appreciating it. In the case, for example, of persons who make use of Plato and Xenophon for their language, and gather therefrom nothing else but the purity of the Attic style, like dew and bloom, what can you say of them, save that they are the sort of persons that content themselves with the sweet odour and bouquet of medicines, but have no desire for their sedative and purgative virtues, nor the power to discern them? But those who are making still more and more progress are always able to derive benefit, not only from what is said, but also from what is seen and done, and to gather what is appropriate and useful therefrom.

οἷα καὶ περὶ Αἰσχύλου λέγουσι καὶ περὶ ἄλλων ὁμοίων. Αἰσχύλος μὲν γὰρ Ἰσθμοῖ θεώμενος ἀγῶνα πυκτῶν, ἐπεὶ πληγέντος τοῦ ἑτέρου τὸ θέατρον ἐξέκραγε, νύξας Ἴωνα τὸν Χῖον "ὁρᾷς," ἔφη, "οἷον ἡ ἄσκησίς ἐστιν[1]; ὁ πεπληγὼς σιωπᾷ, οἱ δὲ θεώμενοι βοῶσιν." Βρασίδας δὲ μῦν τινα συλλαβὼν ἐν ἰσχάσι καὶ δηχθεὶς ἀφῆκεν· εἶτα πρὸς ἑαυτόν "ὦ Ἡράκλεις," ἔφη, "ὡς οὐδέν ἐστι μικρὸν οὐδ' ἀσθενές, ὃ μὴ ζήσεται τολμῶν ἀμύνεσθαι." Διογένης δὲ τὸν πίνοντα ταῖς χερσὶ θεασάμενος τῆς πήρας
F ἐξέβαλε τὸ ποτήριον. οὕτω τὸ προσέχειν καὶ τετάσθαι τὴν ἄσκησιν αἰσθητικοὺς καὶ δεκτικοὺς ποιεῖ τῶν πρὸς ἀρετὴν φερόντων ἁπανταχόθεν. γίγνεται δὲ τοῦτο μᾶλλον ἂν τοὺς λόγους ταῖς πράξεσι μιγνύωσι, μὴ μόνον, ὡς Θουκυδίδης ἔλεγε, "μετὰ κινδύνων ποιούμενοι τὰς μελέτας," ἀλλὰ καὶ πρὸς ἡδονὰς καὶ πρὸς ἔριδας καὶ περὶ κρίσεις καὶ συνηγορίας καὶ ἀρχάς, οἷον ἀπόδειξιν αὐτοῖς τῶν δογμάτων διδόντες, μᾶλλον δὲ τῷ χρῆσθαι ποιοῦντες τὰ
80 δόγματα. ὡς τούς γε μανθάνοντας ἔτι καὶ πραγματευομένους καὶ σκοποῦντας ὃ λαβόντες ἐκ φιλοσοφίας εὐθὺς εἰς ἀγορὰν ἢ νέων διατριβὴν ἢ βασιλικὸν συμπόσιον ἐκκυκλήσουσιν, οὐ μᾶλλον οἴεσθαι χρὴ φιλοσοφεῖν ἢ τοὺς τὰ φάρμακα πωλοῦντας ἰατρεύειν· μᾶλλον δ' ὅλως οὐδὲν ὁ τοιοῦτος σοφιστὴς διαφέρει

[1] ἐστιν ἡ ἄσκησις Stobaeus, *Flor.* xxix. 89. But *cf.* 29 F.

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[a] Repeated in *Moralia*, 29 F.

[b] Repeated in *Moralia*, 190 B and 219 C, and with some variation, 208 F.

Examples are found in the stories told of Aeschylus and of others like him. Aeschylus at the Isthmian games was watching a boxing-match, and when one of the men was hit the crowd in the theatre burst into a roar. Aeschylus nudged Ion of Chios, and said, "You see what a thing training is; the man who is hit says nothing; it is the spectators who shout." [a] Brasidas caught a mouse among some dried figs, got bitten, and let it go; thereupon he said to himself, "Heavens, there is nothing so small or weak that it will not save its life if it has courage to defend itself." [b] Diogenes [c] at the first sight of a man drinking from his hands took his cup from his wallet and threw it away. Thus attention and intense application makes persons perceptive and receptive of anything that conduces to virtue, from whatever source it come. This is more apt to be the case if they combine theory with practice, not only, as Thucydides [d] said, "carrying on their practice amid dangers," but also when confronted by pleasures or contentions, and when busy over lawsuits and pleadings at court and the conduct of public offices, thus, as it were, giving themselves a demonstration of their convictions, or rather arriving at their convictions by putting them to a practical test; whereas, those who are still studying, and busily looking to see what they can get from philosophy which they can straightway haul out for display in the Forum, or at a gathering of young men, or at an evening party at Court, ought not to be thought to practise philosophy any more than apothecaries are to be thought to practise medicine; or rather, a charlatan of this sort does not

[a] *Cf.* Seneca, *Epist.* xc. and Diogenes Laertius, vi. 37.
[d] Thucydides, i. 18.

(80) τῆς Ὁμηρικῆς ὄρνιθος, ὅ τι ἂν λάβῃ[1] τοῖς μαθηταῖς ὥσπερ "ἀπτῆσι νεοσσοῖς[2]" προσφέρων διὰ τοῦ στόματος.

κακῶς δέ τέ οἱ πέλει αὐτῷ

μηδὲν εἰς ὄνησιν οἰκείαν ἀναδιδόντι μηδὲ καταπέττοντι τῶν λαμβανομένων.

B 9. Ὅθεν ἐπισκοπεῖν ἀναγκαῖον εἰ χρώμεθα τῷ λόγῳ πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς μὲν χρηστικῶς, πρὸς ἑτέρους δὲ μὴ δόξης εἰκαίας ἕνεκα μηδ' ἐκ φιλοτιμίας, ἀλλὰ μᾶλλον ἀκοῦσαί τι καὶ διδάξαι βουλόμενοι, μάλιστα δ' εἰ τὸ φιλόνεικον καὶ δύσερι περὶ τὰς ζητήσεις ὑφεῖται καὶ πεπαύμεθα τοὺς λόγους ὥσπερ ἱμάντας ἢ σφαίρας ἐπιδούμενοι πρὸς ἀλλήλους καὶ τῷ πατάξαι καὶ καταβαλεῖν μᾶλλον ἢ τῷ μαθεῖν τι καὶ διδάξαι χαίροντες· ἡ γὰρ ἐν τούτοις ἐπιείκεια καὶ πραότης καὶ τὸ μὴ μετ' ἀγῶνος συνίστασθαι μήτε
C διαλύεσθαι μετ' ὀργῆς τὰς κοινολογίας μηδ' οἷον ἐφυβρίζειν ἐλέγξαντας ἢ χαλεπαίνειν ἐλεγχθέντας ἱκανῶς προκόπτοντός ἐστιν. ἐδήλωσε δ' Ἀρίστιππος ἔν τινι λόγῳ κατασοφισθεὶς ὑπ' ἀνθρώπου τόλμαν μὲν ἔχοντος, ἄλλως δ' ἀνοήτου καὶ μανικοῦ. χαίροντα γὰρ ὁρῶν αὐτὸν καὶ τετυφωμένον "ἐγὼ μὲν οὖν," εἶπεν, "ὁ ἐλεγχθεὶς ἄπειμι σοῦ τοῦ ἐλέγξαντος ἥδιον καθευδήσων."

Ἔστι δὲ καὶ λέγοντας ἑαυτῶν λαμβάνειν διάπει-

[1] λάβῃ Pflugk: λάβοι. [2] νεοσσοῖσιν Homer.

[a] *Iliad*, ix. 323; referred to also in *Moralia*, 48 A and 494 D.

differ at all from the bird described by Homer,[a] for whatever he gets he proffers through the mouth to his pupils as to an " unfledged brood,"

Badly, however, it goes with himself,

if he does not devote to his own advantage, or assimilate at all, anything of what he receives.

9. It is therefore imperative that we consider carefully whether, as for ourselves, we employ our discourse for our own improvement, and whether, as it affects others, we employ it, not for the sake of momentary repute, nor from motives of ambition, but rather with the wish to hear and to impart something ; but most of all must we consider whether the spirit of contention and quarrelling over debatable questions has been put down, and whether we have ceased to equip ourselves with arguments, as with boxing-gloves or brass knuckles, with which to contend against one another, and to take more delight in scoring a hit or a knockout than in learning and imparting something. For reasonableness and mildness in such matters, and the ability to join in discussions without wrangling, and to close them without anger, and to avoid a sort of arrogance over success in argument and exasperation over defeat, are the marks of a man who is making adequate progress. Aristippus made this clear when he was once outwitted in an argument by a man who had plenty of assurance, but was otherwise foolish and flighty. For seeing that the man was rejoicing and in great conceit, Aristippus said, " For all that I have been defeated I am going home to enjoy a sweeter sleep than you who have defeated me."

It is possible also in the practice of speaking to

(80) ραν, εἰ μήτε πολλῶν παρὰ προσδοκίαν συνελθόντων
ὑπὸ δειλίας ἀναδυόμεθα, μήτ' ἐν ὀλίγοις ἀθυμοῦμεν
D ἀγωνιζόμενοι, μήτε πρὸς δῆμον ἢ πρὸς ἀρχὴν εἰπεῖν
δεῆσαν ἐνδείᾳ τῆς περὶ τὴν λέξιν παρασκευῆς προ-
ϊέμεθα τὸν καιρόν, οἷα περὶ Δημοσθένους[1] λέγουσι
καὶ Ἀλκιβιάδου. καὶ γὰρ οὗτος νοῆσαι μὲν πράγ-
ματα δεινότατος ὢν περὶ δὲ τὴν λέξιν ἀθαρσέστερος
ἑαυτὸν διέκρουεν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι, καὶ πολλάκις
ἐν αὐτῷ τῷ λέγειν ζητῶν καὶ διώκων ὄνομα καὶ
ῥῆμα διαφεῦγον ἐξέπιπτεν· Ὅμηρος δὲ τὸν πρῶτον
οὐ διηνέχθη τῶν στίχων ἐξενεγκὼν ἄμετρον· το-
σοῦτο περιῆν αὐτῷ φρονήματος εἰς τὰ λοιπὰ διὰ
E τὴν δύναμιν. οὐκοῦν μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστιν, οἷς πρὸς
ἀρετὴν καὶ τὸ καλὸν ἡ ἄμιλλα, τῷ καιρῷ καὶ τοῖς
πράγμασι χρῆσθαι τῶν ἐπὶ ταῖς λέξεσι θορύβων καὶ
κρότων ἐλάχιστα φροντίζοντας.

10. Οὐ μόνον δὲ δεῖ τοὺς λόγους ἀλλὰ καὶ τὰς
πράξεις ἕκαστον ἐπισκοπεῖν εἰ τὸ χρειῶδες τοῦ
πανηγυρικοῦ καὶ τοῦ πρὸς ἐπίδειξιν αὐταῖς πλέον
ἔνεστι τὸ πρὸς ἀλήθειαν. εἰ γὰρ ἀληθινὸς ἔρως
παιδὸς ἢ γυναικὸς οὐ ζητεῖ μάρτυρας, ἀλλὰ καρ-
ποῦται τὸ ἡδὺ κἂν κρύφα κατεργάσηται τὸν πόθον,
ἔτι μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστι τὸν φιλόκαλον καὶ φιλόσοφον
συνόντα διὰ τῶν πράξεων τῇ ἀρετῇ καὶ χρώμενον

[1] Nothing further is said about Demosthenes, and some editors infer that something has been omitted in the MSS. Possibly Plutarch felt that it was not necessary to repeat the well-known story here.

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[a] Traditionally the reference is to Πηληιάδεω, *Iliad*, i. 1.

take some measure of ourselves, if, when a large audience has unexpectedly assembled, we do not suffer from stage-fright, and if we are not dispirited when arguing in the presence of a small number ; and if, when the need has arisen to speak before the people or a magistrate, we do not let the occasion slip through lack of time to put our discourse into orderly form, as is told, for instance, of Demosthenes and Alcibiades. For the latter, although most keen in thinking out his subject matter, yet because of a certain lack of confidence about his manner of speaking, used to interrupt himself in the midst of his subject, and oftentimes, through his quest and pursuit of an elusive word or phrase while actually engaged in speaking, he made a flat failure. But Homer felt no repugnance against making the very first of his lines unmetrical ;[a] so abounding was his confidence regarding the rest on account of his ability. It is rather to be expected, therefore, that those whose strivings are towards virtue and honour will avail themselves of the occasion and the subject, and give least thought to the shouting and applause that may be called forth by their manner of speaking.

10. Everybody, without exception, ought to pay careful attention, not only to his words, but also to his actions, to see whether the element of usefulness in them prevails over ostentation, and whether their whole aim is the truth rather than display. For if true love for a youth or a woman does not seek witnesses, but enjoys the fruits of pleasure even if it consummate its desire in secret, it is even more to be expected that the lover of honour and wisdom, in the familiar intercourse with virtue which comes through his actions, should keep his pride in himself to him-

αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ σιωπῇ μέγα φρονεῖν, ἐπαινετῶν καὶ
F ἀκροατῶν μηδὲν δεόμενον. ὥσπερ οὖν ὁ καλῶν
ἐκεῖνος οἴκοι τὴν θεραπαινίδα καὶ βοῶν "θέασαι,
Διονυσία, πέπαυμαι τετυφωμένος," οὕτως ὁ ποιή-
σας τι χαρίεν καὶ ἀστεῖον εἶτα τοῦτο διηγούμενος
καὶ περιφέρων ἅπανταχόσε δῆλός ἐστιν ἔξω βλέπων
ἔτι καὶ πρὸς δόξαν ἑλκόμενος, οὔπω δὲ τῆς ἀρετῆς
γεγονὼς θεατής, οὐδ' ὕπαρ ἀλλ' ὄναρ αὐτῆς ἐν
σκιαῖς καὶ εἰδώλοις ῥεμβόμενος, εἶθ' ὥσπερ ζω-
γράφημα προτιθεὶς ἐπὶ θέαν τὸ πεπραγμένον. ἔστιν
81 οὖν τοῦ προκόπτοντος οὐ μόνον δόντα τῷ φίλῳ καὶ
γνώριμον εὐεργετήσαντα μὴ φράσαι πρὸς ἑτέρους,
ἀλλὰ καὶ ψῆφον ἐν πολλαῖς θέμενον ἀδίκοις δικαίαν
καὶ πρὸς ἔντευξιν αἰσχρὰν πλουσίου τινὸς ἢ ἄρχον-
τος ἀπισχυρισάμενον καὶ δωρεὰς ὑπεριδόντα καὶ νὴ
Δία διψήσαντα νύκτωρ καὶ μὴ πιόντα ἢ πρὸς φί-
λημα καλῆς ἢ καλοῦ διαμαχεσάμενον, ὡς ὁ Ἀγησι-
λαος, ἐν ἑαυτῷ κατασχεῖν καὶ σιγῆσαι. οὗτος γὰρ
αὐτὸς εὐδοκιμῶν παρ' ἑαυτῷ μὴ καταφρονῶν ἀλλὰ
χαίρων κἀγαπῶν ὡς ἱκανὸς ὢν μάρτυς ἅμα καὶ
B θεατὴς τῶν καλῶν δείκνυσι τὸν λόγον ἐντὸς ἤδη
τρεφόμενον καὶ ῥιζούμενον ἐν ἑαυτῷ καὶ κατὰ Δη-
μόκριτον αὐτὸν "ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ λαμβάνειν τὰς τέρψιας

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[a] Xenophon, *Agesilaus*, 5. 4; *cf.* also Plutarch, *Moralia*, 31 c, 209 D, and *Life of Agesilaus*, chap. xi. (602 A).

[b] Diels, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker*, ii. 88.

self and be silent, feeling no need of eulogists and auditors. Take, for example, the case of the man who in his own house called his maidservant and cried out, " Look at me, Dionysia ; I have stopped being conceited " ; very much like this is the behaviour of the man who performs some gracious and civil action, and then by telling about it and circulating it everywhere makes it clear that he is still looking beyond himself, and is still attracted toward repute, and that he has not yet had even a glimpse of virtue, nay, that he is not really awake but only dreaming as he roams about amid the shadows and phantoms of virtue, and afterwards puts what he has done on view like a painting. It is therefore the mark of a man who is making progress, not only when he has given to a friend or done a kindness to an acquaintance to refrain from telling of it to others, but also when he has given an honest judgement amidst a numerous and dishonest majority, when he has peremptorily declined a discreditable conference with some rich man or some official, when he has scorned bribes, and even when he has felt a craving in the night for a drink and has not taken it, or when he has fought a good fight, like Agesilaus,[a] against a kiss of a lovely girl or youth, to keep all this to himself and put the seal of silence on it. In fact, such a man, by standing well in his own estimation, inasmuch as he feels no disdain, but only pleasure and satisfaction at the thought that he is at the same time a competent witness and observer of honourable deeds, shows that reason is already growing within him and taking root in his own self, and, in the words of Democritus,[b] that he is " becoming accustomed to find within himself the sources of enjoyment."

(81) ἐθιζόμενον." οἱ μὲν οὖν γεωργοὶ τῶν σταχύων ἥδιον ὁρῶσι τοὺς κεκλιμένους καὶ νεύοντας ἐπὶ γῆν, τοὺς δ' ὑπὸ κουφότητος αἰρομένους ἄνω κενοὺς ἡγοῦνται καὶ ἀλαζόνας· οὕτω δὲ καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφεῖν βουλομένων νέων οἱ μάλιστα κενοὶ καὶ βάρος οὐκ ἔχοντες θράσος ἔχουσι καὶ σχῆμα καὶ βάδισμα καὶ πρόσωπον ὑπεροψίας καὶ ὀλιγωρίας μεστὸν ἀφειδούσης ἁπάντων, ἀρχόμενοι δὲ πληροῦσθαι καὶ συλλέγειν καρπὸν ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων τὸ σοβαρὸν καὶ
C φλοιῶδες ἀποτίθενται.—καὶ καθάπερ ἀγγείων κενῶν ὑγρὸν δεχομένων ὁ ἐντὸς ἀὴρ ὑπέξεισιν ἐκθλιβόμενος, οὕτως ἀνθρώποις πληρουμένοις τῶν ἀληθινῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐνδίδωσιν ὁ τῦφος καὶ γίγνεται τὸ οἴημα μαλακώτερον, καὶ παυόμενοι τοῦ διὰ πώγωνα καὶ τρίβωνα φρονεῖν μέγα τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν μεταφέρουσι, καὶ τῷ δηκτικῷ καὶ πικρῷ χρῶνται πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς μάλιστα, τοῖς δ' ἄλλοις πραότερον ἐντυγχάνουσι. τὸ δὲ φιλοσοφίας ὄνομα καὶ τὴν τοῦ φιλοσοφεῖν δόξαν οὐχ ἁρπάζουσιν ἑαυτοῖς ὡς
D πρότερον οὐδὲ προσγράφουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ προσαγορευθεὶς ὑφ' ἑτέρου τῇ προσηγορίᾳ ταύτῃ φθάσας ἂν εὐφυὴς νέος εἴποι μετ' ἐρυθήματος,

οὔ τίς τοι θεός εἰμι· τί μ' ἀθανάτοισιν ἐίσκεις;

" νέας " μὲν γὰρ " γυναικός," ὡς Αἰσχύλος φησίν, " οὔ τι λανθάνει φλέγων

ὀφθαλμός, ἥτις ἀνδρὸς ἢ γεγευμένη·"

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[a] Homer, *Od.* xvi. 187; again cited by Plutarch in *Moralia*, 543 D.

[b] From the *Toxotides* of Aeschylus; Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Aeschylus*, No. 243; quoted with variant reading in *Moralia*, 767 B.

Farmers take more pleasure in looking at the heads of grain that are bent over and bowed toward the ground, but those that tower aloft owing to their lightness the farmers think are empty cheats; so among the young men who would study philosophy: those who are most empty and have no weight, have assurance and a pose and a gait, and a countenance filled with a haughtiness and disdain which spares nobody; but, as their heads begin to fill and to accumulate some fruitage from their lectures and reading, they lay aside their swagger and superficiality. And just as when empty vessels are being filled with a liquid the air inside is expelled by the pressure, so when men are being filled with the really good things, their conceit gives way and their self-opinion becomes less inflexible; and, ceasing to feel pride in their philosopher's beard and gown, they transfer their training to their mind, and apply their stinging and bitter criticism most of all to themselves, and are milder in their intercourse with others. They do not arrogate to themselves, as before, the name of philosophy and the repute of studying it, or even give themselves the title of philosopher; in fact, a young man of good parts, on being addressed by this title by another, would be quick to say with a blush:

I am no god, I assure you; why think me like the immortals?[a]

For as Aeschylus[b] puts it:

> The ardent eye betrays the youthful maid
> Who once has tasted of the joys of love;

(81) *νέῳ δ' ἀνδρὶ γευσαμένῳ προκοπῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ τὰ Σαπφικὰ ταυτὶ παρέπεται*

καμ μὲν γλῶσσα ἔαγε, λέπτον δ'
αὔτικα χρῷ πῦρ ὑποδεδρόμακεν,[1]

ἀθόρυβον δ' ὄψει καὶ πρᾶον ὄμμα, φθεγγομένου δ' ἂν ἀκοῦσαι ποθήσειας. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τελούμενοι κατ' ἀρχὰς μὲν ἐν θορύβῳ καὶ βοῇ συνίασι πρὸς
E *ἀλλήλους ὠθούμενοι, δρωμένων δὲ καὶ δεικνυμένων τῶν ἱερῶν προσέχουσιν ἤδη μετὰ φόβου καὶ σιωπῆς, οὕτω καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἐν ἀρχῇ καὶ περὶ θύρας πολὺν θόρυβον ὄψει καὶ λαλιὰν καὶ θρασύτητα, ὠθουμένων πρὸς τὴν δόξαν ἐνίων ἀγροίκως τε καὶ βιαίως· ὁ δ' ἐντὸς γενόμενος καὶ μέγα φῶς ἰδών, οἷον ἀνακτόρων ἀνοιγομένων, ἕτερον λαβὼν σχῆμα καὶ σιωπὴν καὶ θαμβος ὥσπερ θεῷ τῷ λόγῳ "ταπεινὸς συνέπεται*[2] *καὶ κεκοσμημένος." εἰς δὲ τούτους ἔοικε καὶ τὸ Μενεδήμῳ πεπαιγμένον καλῶς λέγεσθαι·*
F *καταπλεῖν γὰρ ἔφη τοὺς πολλοὺς ἐπὶ σχολὴν Ἀθήναζε, σοφοὺς τὸ πρῶτον, εἶτα γίγνεσθαι φιλοσόφους, εἶτα ῥήτορας, τοῦ χρόνου δὲ προϊόντος ἰδιώτας, ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἅπτονται τοῦ λόγου, μᾶλλον τὸ οἴημα καὶ τὸν τῦφον κατατιθεμένους.*

11. *Τῶν τοίνυν δεομένων ἰατρείας οἱ μὲν ὀδόντα πονοῦντες ἢ δακτύλον αὐτόθεν βαδίζουσι παρὰ τοὺς θεραπεύοντας, οἱ δὲ πυρέττοντες οἴκαδε καλοῦσι*

[1] The text given follows the fairly certain restoration of Bergk based on Longinus, *De sublim.* 10. The MSS. have *κατὰ μὲν γλῶσσά γε λεπτὸν αὐτίκα χρῶ ὑποδέδρομεν*, or something similar.

[2] *συνέπεται*] *ξυνέπεται* Plato, *Laws*, 716 a.

[a] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* iii. 88, *Sappho*, No. 2: the

but with the young man who has had a taste of real progress in philosophy, these words of Sappho [a] are always associated :

> My tongue breaks down, and all at once
> A secret flame throughout my body runs ;

nevertheless, you will see an eye untroubled and serene, and you would yearn to hear him speak. Just as persons who are being initiated into the Mysteries throng together at the outset amid tumult and shouting, and jostle against one another, but when the holy rites are being performed and disclosed the people are immediately attentive in awe and silence, so too at the beginning of philosophy : about its portals also you will see great tumult and talking and boldness, as some boorishly and violently try to jostle their way towards the repute it bestows ; but he who has succeeded in getting inside, and has seen a great light, as though a shrine were opened, adopts another bearing of silence and amazement, and " humble and orderly attends upon " [b] reason as upon a god. To these the humorous remark of Menedemus may, as it seems, be nicely applied ; for he said that the multitudes who came to Athens to school were, at the outset, wise ; later they became lovers of wisdom, later still orators, and, as time went on, just ordinary persons, and the more they laid hold on reason the more they laid aside their self-opinion and conceit.

11. Of persons needing the services of a physician those who have a painful tooth or finger go straightway to those who treat such ills ; those who have

poem is again referred to in *Moralia*, 763 A ; *cf. Lyra Graeca* in the L.C.L. p. 186.

[b] Plato, *Laws*, 716 A.

καὶ δέονται βοηθεῖν, οἱ δ' εἰς μελαγχολίαν ἢ φρενῖτιν ἢ παρακοπὴν ἥκοντες οὐδὲ φοιτῶντας ἐνιαχοῦ πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἀνέχονται, ἀλλ' ἐξελαύνουσιν ἢ φεύ-
82 γουσιν, μηδ' ὅτι νοσοῦσιν ὑπὸ τοῦ σφόδρα νοσεῖν αἰσθανόμενοι. οὕτω δὴ καὶ τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων ἀνήκεστοι μέν εἰσιν οἱ πρὸς τοὺς ἐλέγχοντας καὶ νουθετοῦντας ἐχθρῶς καὶ ἀγρίως διατιθέμενοι καὶ χαλεπαίνοντες· οἱ δ' ὑπομένοντες καὶ προσιέμενοι πραότερον ἔχουσι. τὸ δ' ἑαυτὸν ἁμαρτάνοντα παρέχειν τοῖς ἐλέγχουσι καὶ τὸ πάθος λέγειν καὶ τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἀποκαλύπτειν καὶ μὴ χαίρειν λανθάνοντα μηδ' ἀγαπᾶν ἀγνοούμενον ἀλλ' ὁμολογεῖν καὶ δεῖσθαι τοῦ ἁπτομένου καὶ νουθετοῦντος οὐ φαῦλον ἂν εἴη προκοπῆς σημεῖον. ὥς που Διογένης ἔλεγε τῷ σωτηρίας δεομένῳ ζητεῖν προσήκειν ἢ φίλον σπουδαῖον ἢ διάπυρον ἐχθρόν, ὅπως ἐλεγχόμενος ἢ
B θεραπευόμενος ἐκφεύγοι τὴν κακίαν. ἄχρι δ' οὗ τις ἐπιδεικνύμενος ῥύπον ἢ κηλῖδα χιτῶνος ἢ διερρωγὸς ὑπόδημα καλλωπίζεται πρὸς τοὺς ἐκτὸς ἀτυφίᾳ κενῇ καὶ διασκώπτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὡς μικρὸν ἢ ὡς κυρτὸν οἴεται νεανιεύεσθαι, τὰ δ' ἐντὸς αἴσχη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τὰ περὶ τὸν βίον ἐγχρέμματα καὶ μικρολογίας καὶ φιληδονίας καὶ κακοηθείας καὶ φθόνους ὥσπερ ἕλκη περιστέλλων καὶ ἀποκρύπτων οὐδένα θιγεῖν οὐδὲ προσιδεῖν ἐᾷ δεδιὼς τὸν ἔλεγχον,

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[a] Again referred to, *Moralia*, 74 c, and in 89 B it is ascribed to Antisthenes.

fever summon the physicians to their houses, and implore their assistance ; but those who have reached a state of melancholia or frenzy or delirium sometimes cannot endure even the physicians' visits, but either drive them away or run away from them, not realizing even that they are ill, because of the violence of their illness. So also of the erring : the incurable are those who take an hostile and savage attitude and show a hot temper toward those who take them to task and admonish them, while those who patiently submit to admonition and welcome it are in less serious plight. And for a man who is in error to submit himself to those who take him to task, to tell what is the matter with him, to disclose his depravity, and not to rejoice in hiding his fault or to take satisfaction in its not being known, but to confess it, and to feel the need of somebody to take him in hand and admonish him, is no slight indication of progress. So Diogenes [a] has somewhere said that, as a matter of self-preservation, a man should be concerned to find either an earnest friend or an ardent enemy, so that either by stern reprehension or by kindly attention he may escape vice. But just so long as a man, displaying a spot or a stain on his garment or a rip in his shoe, puts on airs in public by affecting a silly unconcern for such matters, or, by passing some jest about himself for being dwarfed or humpbacked, imagines that he is thus showing a spirit of youthful bravado, while, at the same time, the inward ugliness of his soul, the despicable acts of his life, his displays of pettiness or love of pleasure or malice or envy, he covers up and conceals as though they were ulcerous sores, and allows nobody to touch them or even see them because of his fear of being

(82) ὀλίγον αὐτῷ προκοπῆς μέτεστι, μᾶλλον δ' οὐδέν.
C ἀλλ' ὁ τούτοις ὁμόσε χωρῶν καὶ μάλιστα μὲν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ἀλγύνειν ἁμαρτάνοντα καὶ κακίζειν, δεύτερον δὲ παρέχειν ἑτέρου νουθετοῦντος ἐγκαρτεροῦντα καὶ καθαιρόμενον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐλέγχων καὶ δυνάμενος καὶ βουλόμενος, οὗτος ἀποτριβομένῳ καὶ βδελυττομένῳ τὴν μοχθηρίαν ἀληθῶς ἔοικε. δεῖ μὲν γὰρ ἀμέλει καὶ τὸ δοκεῖν εἶναι πονηρὸν αἰδεῖσθαι καὶ φεύγειν· ὁ δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν μᾶλλον τῆς μοχθηρίας ἢ τὴν ἀδοξίαν δυσχεραίνων οὐ φεύγει τὸ κακῶς ἀκοῦσαι καὶ εἰπεῖν ἐπὶ τῷ βελτίων γενέσθαι. χαρίεν γὰρ τὸ τοῦ Διογένους πρός τινα νεανίσκον ὀφθέντα μὲν ἐν καπηλείῳ, καταφυγόντα δ' εἰς τὸ
D καπηλεῖον,[1] "ὅσῳ," γὰρ εἶπεν, "ἐνδοτέρω φεύγεις, μᾶλλον ἐν τῷ καπηλείῳ γίγνῃ." καὶ τῶν φαύλων ἕκαστος ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ἁρπεῖται, τοσούτῳ μᾶλλον ἐνδύεται καὶ καθείργνυσιν εἰς τὴν κακίαν ἑαυτόν. ἀμέλει τῶν πενομένων οἱ προσποιούμενοι πλουτεῖν ἔτι μᾶλλον πένονται διὰ τὴν ἀλαζονείαν· ὁ δὲ προκόπτων ἀληθῶς καὶ τὸν Ἱπποκράτη ποιεῖται παράδειγμα, τὸ περὶ τὰς ῥαφὰς τῆς κεφαλῆς ἀγνοηθὲν αὐτῷ καὶ ἐξαγορεύσαντα καὶ γράψαντα, λογιζόμενος ὅτι δεινόν ἐστιν ἐκεῖνον μέν, ὅπως ἂν ἕτεροι
E μὴ τὸ αὐτὸ πάθωσιν, ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ἁμαρτίαν κατειπεῖν, αὐτὸν δέ τινα μέλλοντα σώζεσθαι μὴ τολμᾶν

[1] *κατάγειον* Hartman: perhaps *τοὐπτανεῖον* (better *τοὐπτάνιον*) is the right reading; but *cf.* Diogenes Laertius, vi. 2. 34.

[a] According to Plutarch, *Moralia*, 847 F, and Diogenes Laertius, vi. 2. 34, the young man was Demosthenes the orator.

[b] Hippocrates' Works, ed. Chartier, ix. 340 F (Kuhn,

reprehended for them—such a man's part in progress is little, or rather none at all. But the man who grapples with these faults, especially if he shows himself able and willing to make himself unhappy and wretched over his errors, and, next to that, to submit to another's admonitions without flinching, and with a spirit made purer by such reproofs—such a man truly has every appearance of trying to divest himself of baseness and of abominating it. Beyond all question, anyone ought to have enough self-respect to avoid even giving the impression of being bad; but the man who is more disturbed over the actual existence of baseness than over any ill-repute does not try to avoid uncomplimentary remarks to himself, or replying to them, when this may be made a means of improvement. Very neat was the remark made by Diogenes to a young man,[a] who, being seen at a tavern, fled for refuge within. "The farther you flee inside," said he, "the more you are in the tavern." And so of low things, the more each man denies, just so much the deeper does he become involved in vice, and cut off his escape therefrom. So, too, it is that among poor people those who make a show of being rich are even poorer because of their pretension; but the man who is making true progress takes as his example Hippocrates,[b] who published and recorded his failure to apprehend the facts about the cranial sutures; for such a man accounts it a dreadful thing, that here was Hippocrates who declared his own error so that others should not repeat his experience, and yet he himself, a man bent on saving his soul alive, should not have the courage to submit to

iii. 561); *cf.* also Celsus, viii. 4; Quintilian, iii. 6. 64, and Julian, *Epist.* 58 ("To Dionysius").

ἐλέγχεσθαι μηδ' ὁμολογεῖν τὴν ἀβελτερίαν καὶ ἀμαθίαν. καὶ μὴν τά γε Βίωνος καὶ Πύρρωνος οὐ προκοπῆς ἄν τις ἀλλ' ἀμείνονος[1] ἕξεως σημεῖα θεῖτο καὶ τελειοτέρας. ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἠξίου τοὺς συνήθεις οἴεσθαι προκόπτειν ὅταν τῶν λοιδορούντων οὕτως ἀκούωσιν ὡς λεγόντων

ὦ ξέν'[2] ἐπεὶ οὔτε κακῷ οὔτ' ἄφρονι φωτὶ ἔοικας,
οὐλέ τε καὶ μέγα[3] χαῖρε, θεοὶ δέ τοι ὄλβια δοῖεν.

F Πύρρωνα δέ φασι πλέοντα καὶ κινδυνεύοντα χειμῶνος δελφάκιόν τι δεῖξαι χρώμενον ἀσμένως κριθαῖς παρεγκεχυμέναις, καὶ πρὸς τοὺς ἑταίρους εἰπεῖν ὅτι τοιαύτην ἀπάθειαν παρασκευαστέον ἐκ λόγου καὶ φιλοσοφίας τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν προστυγχανόντων παράττεσθαι μὴ βουλόμενον.

12. Ὅρα δὴ καὶ τὸ τοῦ Ζήνωνος ὁποῖόν ἐστιν. ἠξίου γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ὀνείρων ἕκαστον αὑτοῦ συναισθάνεσθαι προκόπτοντος, εἰ μήθ' ἡδόμενον αἰσχρῷ τινι ἑαυτὸν μήτε τι προσιέμενον ἢ πράττοντα τῶν δεινῶν καὶ ἀτόπων ὁρᾷ κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους, ἀλλ'
οἷον ἐν βυθῷ γαλήνης ἀκλύστου καταφανεῖ διαλάμπει τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ παθητικὸν διά-
83 κεχυμένον ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου. τοῦτο δὲ καὶ Πλάτων, ὡς ἔοικε, συνιδὼν πρότερος ἐξεμόρφωσε καὶ διετύπωσε τῆς φύσει τυραννικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ φανταστικὸν καὶ ἄλογον οἷα κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ὁρᾷ. "μητρί τε

[1] ἀλλ' ἀμείνονος Hartman : ἀλλὰ μείζονος.
[2] ὦ ξέν'] ξεῖν' Homer, *Od.* vi. 187, the usual Homeric form.
[3] μέγα] μάλα is found in some MSS. of Homer.

[a] Homer, *Od.* vi. 187 ; *cf.* xx. 227.
[b] *Ibid.* xxiv. 402.
[c] *Republic*, 571 D ; the entire passage should be compared.

being taken to task, and to confess his fatuity and ignorance. Indeed the declarations of Bion and Pyrrho might be construed as indication, not merely of progress, but rather of a higher state of mind and one which comes nearer to the ideal. Bion said to his intimate friends that they might well be justified in thinking that they were making progress when they could listen to their revilers as though they heard them say :

> Friend, since you have not the look of a man that is base or unthinking,[a]
> Health and great joy be yours, and God grant that you ever may prosper.[b]

And the story about Pyrrho is that when he was on a voyage, and in peril during a storm, he pointed to a little pig contentedly feeding upon some barley which had been spilled near by, and said to his companions that a similar indifference must be acquired from reason and philosophy by the man who does not wish to be disturbed by anything that may befall him.

12. Note also the significance of Zeno's statement. For he said that every man might fairly derive from his dreams a consciousness that he was making progress if he observed that during his period of sleep he felt no pleasure in anything disgraceful, and did not tolerate or commit any dreadful or untoward action, but as though in the clear depth of an absolute calm there came over him the radiant thought that the fanciful and emotional element in his soul had been dispelled by reason. Plato,[c] apparently realizing this even earlier, has given form and expression to the operations of the fanciful and irrational element in a naturally despotic soul

(83) γὰρ ἐπιχειρεῖ μίγνυσθαι" καὶ περὶ βρώσεις ὁρμᾷ παντοδαπάς, παρανομοῦν καὶ χρώμενον ἑαυτοῦ ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις οἷον λελυμέναις, ἃς μεθ' ἡμέραν ὁ νόμος αἰσχύνῃ καὶ φόβῳ καθείργυσιν. ὥσπερ οὖν τὰ πεπαιδευμένα καλῶς τῶν ὑποζυγίων, οὐδ' ἂν ἀφῇ τὰς ἡνίας ὁ ἄρχων, ἐπιχειρεῖ παρατρέπεσθαι καὶ
B ἀπολείπειν τὴν ὁδόν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἴθισται πρόεισιν ἐν τάξει, διαφυλάττοντα τὴν πορείαν ἄπταιστον, οὕτως οἷς ἂν εὐπειθὲς τὸ ἄλογον ἤδη καὶ πρᾶον ᾖ γεγονὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου καὶ κεκολασμένον, οὔτε καθ' ὕπνους οὔθ' ὑπὸ νόσων ἔτι ῥᾳδίως ἐξυβρίζειν ἢ παρανομεῖν ἐθέλει ταῖς ἐπιθυμίαις, ἀλλὰ τηρεῖ καὶ διαμνημονεύει τὸν ἐθισμόν, ἰσχὺν ἐμποιοῦντα τῇ προσοχῇ καὶ τόνον. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τὸ σῶμα τῇ ἀσκήσει τῆς ἀπαθείας ὑπήκοον ἑαυτὸ καὶ τὰ μέρη παρέχειν πέφυκεν, ὡς ὀφθαλμούς τε πρὸς οἶκτον ἴσχεσθαι δακρύων καὶ καρδίαν πηδήματος ἐν φό-
C βοις, αἰδοῖά τε σωφρόνως ἔχειν ἀτρέμα καὶ μηδὲν ἐνοχλεῖν παρὰ καλοῖς ἢ καλαῖς, πῶς οὐ μᾶλλον εἰκός ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ παθητικοῦ τὴν ἄσκησιν ἐπιλαβομένην οἷον ἐκλεαίνειν καὶ συσχηματίζειν τὰ φαντάσματα καὶ τὰ κινήματα μέχρι τῶν ὕπνων πιέζουσαν; οἷα λέγεται καὶ περὶ τοῦ φιλοσόφου Στίλπωνος, ὃς ἰδεῖν ἔδοξε κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους ὀργιζόμενον αὐτῷ τὸν Ποσειδῶνα μὴ θύσαντι βοῦν, ὥσπερ ἔθος ἦν ἱερεύειν[1]· αὐτὸν δὲ μηδὲν ἐκπλαγέντα "τί λέγεις," φάναι, "ὦ Πόσειδον; ὥσπερ παῖς

[1] ἱερεύειν F.C.B.: Μεγαρεῦσιν Haupt: ἱερεῦσιν.

during sleep. "It attempts incest," and feels a sudden hunger for a great variety of food, acting in lawless fashion, and giving loose rein to the desires which in the daytime the law keeps confined by means of shame and fear. Now well-trained beasts of burden, even if their driver lets go the reins, do not attempt to turn aside and leave the road, but in their accustomed manner they go on in their places and keep to their course without mishap; and so it is in the case of persons in whom the irrational impulse has already been rendered obedient and gentle by reason and has been thoroughly chastened; neither during sleep nor as a result of illness is it willing any longer to indulge readily in arrogance or lawlessness because of the desires, but it observes and bears in mind the habit it has acquired, and it is this which endows our vigilance with strength and intensity. For if the body by virtue of training is actually capable of rendering itself and its members so obedient to its injunctions of indifference that the eyes refrain from tears at a piteous sight, and the heart from throbbing in the midst of terrors, and the passions chastely remain unexcited and undisturbed in the presence of youthful or maidenly beauty, is it not indeed even more probable that training, by taking hold of the emotional element in the soul, will, as it were, do away with the irregularities and vagaries of our fancies and incitements, and carry its repression of them even into our slumbers? There is a story, illustrating this point, about the philosopher Stilpo, who thought in his slumber that he saw Poseidon, who was angry at him for not having offered up a bull, which was the customary sacrifice; but he himself, in his dream, nowise disconcerted, replied, "What are you saying,

(83) ἥκεις μεμψιμοιρῶν ὅτι μὴ δανεισάμενος ἐνέπλησα
D κνίσης τὴν πόλιν, ἀλλ' ἀφ' ὧν εἶχον ἔθυσά σοι μετρίως οἰκοθεν;" καὶ μέντοι δοκεῖν αὐτῷ τὸν Ποσειδῶνα μειδιάσαντα τὴν δεξιὰν προτεῖναι καὶ εἰπεῖν ὡς ἀφύων φορὰν Μεγαρεῦσι ποιήσει δι' ἐκεῖνον. οἷς οὖν οὕτως εὐόνειρα καὶ φανὰ καὶ ἄλυπα, φοβερὸν δὲ μηδὲν ἢ τραχὺ μηδὲ κακόηθες ἢ σκολιὸν ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἐπαναφέρεται, ταῦτα τῆς προκοπῆς ἀπαυγασμούς τινας εἶναι λέγουσιν, οἵστρους δὲ καὶ πτοίας καὶ φυγὰς ἀγεννεῖς καὶ παιδικὰς περιχαρείας καὶ ὀλοφύρσεις ἐνυπνίων οἰκτρῶν καὶ ἀλλοκότων ῥαχίαις τέ τισι καὶ σάλοις ἐοικέναι, ψυχῆς οὔπω τὸ κοσμοῦν ἐχούσης οἰκεῖον, ἀλλὰ πλαττομένης ἔτι δόξαις καὶ νόμοις, ὧν ἀπωτάτω γιγνο-
E μένη κατὰ τοὺς ὕπνους αὖθις ἀναλύεται καὶ ἀνελίττεται τοῖς πάθεσι. ταῦτα μὲν οὖν συνεπισκόπει καὶ αὐτός, εἴτε προκοπῆς ἐστιν εἴτε τινὸς ἕξεως ἤδη βεβαιότητα καὶ κράτος ἐχούσης ἐπὶ τοῖς λόγοις ἀσάλευτον.

13. Ἐπεὶ δ' ἡ παντελὴς ἀπάθεια μέγα καὶ θεῖον, ἡ προκοπὴ δ' ὡς λέγουσιν ἔοικεν ἐνδόσει τινὶ παθῶν καὶ πραότητι, δεῖ καὶ πρὸς αὐτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἄλληλα τὰ πάθη σκοποῦντας κρίνειν τὰς διαφοράς· πρὸς αὐτὰ μέν, εἰ νῦν ἐπιθυμίαις τε χρώμεθα μαλα-

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[a] *Cf.* Plato, *Republic*, 571 c, and Plutarch, *Moralia*, 100 F.

Poseidon? Do you come whining like a child because I did not run into debt to fill the city with the savour of burnt offerings, but presented a modest offering from what I had in my house?" And then it seemed to him that Poseidon smiled and held out his hand, and said that he would send an abundance of anchovies to the Megarians for Stilpo's sake. So in the case of persons blessed with dreams so pleasant and bright and untroubled, who experience in their hours of slumber no revival of anything terrifying or repellent nor of any act of malice or improbity, men like Zeno assert that such manifestations are bright reflections of their progress, but that torturing memories, perturbations, ignoble desertions, and childish transports of joy and sorrow, such as are experienced in dismal or abnormal dreams, are like to billows that break and toss, inasmuch as the soul does not yet possess the power to keep itself in order, but is still being moulded by external opinions and laws, and when it gets farthest away from these during the hours of slumber, it is again made free and open to other influences by the emotions.[a] I beg, therefore, that you also will consider whether these things belong to progress in virtue, or to a state of mind already possessed of a constancy and strength based on reason, and hence unwavering.

13. Inasmuch as complete indifference is a great and divine thing, whereas progress, as they say, resembles a sort of abatement and moderation of the emotions, it is our duty to compare our present emotions with their former selves and with one another, and thus determine the differences. We must compare them with their former selves, to see whether the desires and fears and angry passions

F κωτέραις τῶν πάλαι καὶ φόβοις καὶ ὀργαῖς, ταχὺ τῷ λόγῳ τὸ ἐξάπτον αὐτῶν καὶ φλεγμαῖνον ἀφαιροῦντες· πρὸς ἄλληλα δέ, εἰ μᾶλλον αἰσχυνόμεθα νῦν ἢ φοβούμεθα καὶ ζηλοῦμεν μᾶλλον ἢ φθονοῦμεν καὶ φιλοδοξοῦμεν ἢ φιλοχρηματοῦμεν, καὶ ὅλως εἰ Δωρίοις μᾶλλον ἢ Λυδίοις ὥσπερ οἱ μελῳδοῦντες ὑπερβολαῖς ἁμαρτάνομεν, σκληρότεροι περὶ τὴν δίαιταν ὄντες ἢ μαλακώτεροι, καὶ βραδύτεροι περὶ τὰς πράξεις ἢ προπετέστεροι, καὶ θαυμασταὶ παρ' ὃ δεῖ
84 λόγων καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἢ καταφρονηταί. καθάπερ γὰρ αἱ τῶν νόσων εἰς τὰ μὴ κύρια μέρη τοῦ σώματος ἐκτροπαὶ σημεῖόν εἰσιν οὐ φαῦλον, οὕτως ἡ κακία τῶν προκοπτόντων ἔοικεν εἰς ἐπιεικέστερα πάθη μεθισταμένη κατὰ μικρὸν ἐξαλείφεσθαι. Φρῦνιν μὲν γὰρ οἱ ἔφοροι ταῖς ἑπτὰ χορδαῖς δύο παρεντεινάμενον ἠρώτων πότερον τὰς ἄνωθεν ἢ τὰς κάτωθεν ἐκτεμεῖν αὐτοῖς ἐθέλει παρασχεῖν· ἡμῶν δὲ δεῖται μέν πως τὰ ἄνω καὶ τὰ κάτω περικοπῆς, εἰ μέλλομεν εἰς τὸ μέσον καθίστασθαι καὶ μέτριον· ἡ δὲ προκοπὴ τὰς ὑπερβολὰς πρότερον καὶ τὰς ὀξύτητας τῶν παθῶν ἀνίησι

B πρὸς ἅσπερ οἱ μαργῶντες ἐντονώτατοι

κατὰ Σοφοκλέα.

14. Καὶ μὴν ὅτι τὸ τὰς κρίσεις ἐπὶ τὰ ἔργα μετάγειν καὶ τοὺς λόγους μὴ λόγους ἐᾶν ἀλλὰ πράξεις ποιεῖν μάλιστα τῆς προκοπῆς ἴδιόν ἐστιν

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[a] Repeated in *Moralia*, 220 c, with some change.
[b] Nauck, *Trag. Graec. Frag.*, *Soph.*, No. 758.

which we experience to-day are less intense than they used to be, inasmuch as we, by means of reason, are rapidly getting rid of the cause that kindles and inflames them; and we must compare them with one another, to see whether now we are more inclined to feel shame than fear, to be emulous rather than envious, more eager for good repute than for money, and, in general, whether, in case we err by going to extremes, we, after the manner of musicians, incline to the severity of the Dorian key rather than to the softness of the Lydian, as shown by our being strict rather than lax in our mode of life, and deliberate rather than precipitate in our actions, and given to expressing undue admiration rather than contempt of doctrines and persons. For just as the turning aside of a disease into the less vital parts of the body is an encouraging symptom, so it is reasonable to assume that when the vice of those who are making progress is transformed into more moderate emotions, it is being gradually blotted out. When Phrynis added two strings to the seven-stringed lyre, the Ephors inquired whether he preferred to let them cut out the two upper or the two lower strings;[a] but in our case it is both the upper and the lower that require lopping off if we are to be brought to the state which is a mean between excess in either direction; and one of the first results of progress is an abatement of the excess and keenness of our emotions,

Wherein the frenzied are most vehement,

as Sophocles[b] expresses it.

14. Furthermore, as has already been said, the translating of our judgements into deeds, and not allowing our words to remain mere words, but to make them into actions, is, above all else, a specific mark of

(84) εἴρηται. δήλωμα δ' αὐτοῦ πρῶτον μὲν ὁ πρὸς τὰ ἐπαινούμενα ζῆλος καὶ τὸ ποιεῖν εἶναι προθύμους ἃ θαυμάζομεν, ἃ δὲ ψέγομεν μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ' ὑπομένειν. ἐπεὶ πάντας μὲν Ἀθηναίους εἰκὸς ἦν ἐπαινεῖν τὴν Μιλτιάδου τόλμαν καὶ ἀνδρείαν, Θεμιστο-
C κλῆς δ' εἰπὼν ὡς οὐκ ἐᾷ καθεύδειν αὐτὸν ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἀνίστησι τὸ Μιλτιάδου τρόπαιον, οὐκ ἐπαινῶν μόνον οὐδὲ θαυμάζων ἀλλὰ καὶ ζηλῶν καὶ μιμούμενος εὐθὺς ἦν καταφανὴς. σμικρὸν οὖν οἴεσθαι χρὴ προκόπτειν, ἄχρι οὗ τὸ θαυμάζειν τοὺς κατορθοῦντας ἀργὸν ἔχομεν καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ πρὸς μίμησιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἔρως σώματος ἐνεργός, εἰ μὴ μετὰ ζηλοτυπίας ἔνεστιν, οὔτ' ἔπαινος ἀρετῆς διάπυρος καὶ δραστήριος ὁ μὴ νύττων μηδὲ κεντρί-
D ζων μηδὲ ποιῶν ἀντὶ φθόνου ζῆλον ἐπὶ τοῖς καλοῖς, ἀναπληρώσεως ὀρεγόμενον. οὐ γὰρ ὑπὸ τῶν λόγων δεῖ τοῦ φιλοσοφοῦντος μόνον ὥσπερ Ἀλκιβιάδης ἔλεγε τὴν καρδίαν στρέφεσθαι καὶ δάκρυα ἐκπίπτειν, ἀλλ' ὅ γε προκόπτων ἀληθῶς, μᾶλλον ἔργοις καὶ πράξεσιν ἀνδρὸς ἀγαθοῦ καὶ τελείου παραβάλλων ἑαυτόν, ἅμα τῷ συνειδότι τοῦ ἐνδεοῦς δακνόμενος καὶ δι' ἐλπίδα καὶ πόθον χαίρων καὶ μεστὸς ὢν ὁρμῆς οὐκ ἠρεμούσης οἷός ἐστι[1] κατὰ Σιμωνίδην

ἄθηλος ἵππῳ πῶλος ὡς ἅμα τρέχειν,

E τῷ ἀγαθῷ μονονουχὶ συμφῦναι γλιχόμενος. καὶ γὰρ

[1] οἷός ἐστι Hatzidakis: οἷός τ' ἐστι.

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[a] *Cf.* Plutarch, *Life of Themistocles*, chap. iii. (113 B), and *Moralia*, 92 C.

[b] Plato, *Symposium*, 215 E.

[c] Bergk, *Poet. Lyr. Gr.* ii. 738, *Simonides of Amorgus*, No. 5; repeated in *Moralia*, 136 A, 446 E, 790 F, and in a fragment quoted by Stobaeus, *Florilegium*, cxv. 18.

progress. An indication of this is, in the first place, the desire to emulate what we commend, eagerness to do what we admire, and, on the other hand, unwillingness to do, or even to tolerate, what we censure. For example, it was to be expected that all the Athenians should commend the daring and bravery of Miltiades, yet the remark of Themistocles [a] that the trophy of Miltiades would not suffer him to sleep, but roused him from his slumbers, made it plain at once that he was not merely commending and admiring, but emulating and imitating as well. We must therefore believe we are making but little progress so long as the admiration which we feel for successful men remains inert within us and does not of its own self stir us to imitation. In fact, love for a person is not active unless there is some jealousy with it, nor is that commendation of virtue ardent and efficacious which does not prod and prick us, and create in us not envy but an emulation over honourable things which strives earnestly for satisfaction. For not only, as Alcibiades [b] used to say, must the heart feel such anguish at the philosopher's words that tears will flow; but more than that, the man who is truly making progress, comparing himself with the deeds and conduct of a good and perfect man, and being pricked by the consciousness of his own shortcomings, yet at the same time rejoicing because of his hope and yearning, and being filled with an urging that is never still, is ready in the words of Simonides [c]

To run like weanling colt beside its dam,

so great is his craving all but to merge his own identity in that of the good man. Indeed a peculiar

(84) τοῦτο προκοπῆς ἀληθοῦς ἴδιόν ἐστι πάθος, ὧν ζηλοῦμεν τὰ ἔργα τὴν διάθεσιν φιλεῖν καὶ ἀγαπᾶν καὶ μετ' εὐνοίας ἀεὶ τιμὴν εὔφημον ἀποδιδούσης ἐξομοιοῦσθαι. φιλονεικία δ' ὅτῳ καὶ φθόνος ἐνέστακται πρὸς τοὺς κρείττονας, οὗτος ἴστω δόξης τινὸς ἢ δυνάμεως ζηλοτυπίᾳ κνιζόμενος, ἀρετὴν δὲ μὴ τιμῶν μηδὲ θαυμάζων.

15. Ὅταν οὖν οὕτως ἀρχώμεθα τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἐρᾶν, ὥστε μὴ μόνον κατὰ Πλάτωνα μακάριον μὲν αὐτὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τὸν σώφρονα, "μακάριον δὲ τὸν ξυνήκοον τῶν ἐκ τοῦ σωφρονοῦντος στόματος ἰόντων λόγων," ἀλλὰ καὶ σχῆμα καὶ βάδισμα καὶ βλέμμα καὶ μειδίαμα θαυμάζοντες αὐτοῦ καὶ ἀγαπῶντες οἷον συναρμόττειν καὶ συγκολλᾶν ἑαυτοὺς ὦμεν
F πρόθυμοι, τότε χρὴ νομίζειν ἀληθῶς προκόπτειν. ἔτι δὲ μᾶλλον, ἂν μὴ μόνον εὐημεροῦντας τοὺς ἀγαθοὺς θαυμάζωμεν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ ἐρῶντες καὶ τραυλότητας ἀσπάζονται τῶν ἐν ὥρᾳ καὶ ὠχρότητας, τῆς δὲ Πανθείας καὶ δάκρυα καὶ κατήφεια πενθούσης ἄρα καὶ κεκακωμένης ἐξέπληξε τὸν Ἀράσπην, οὕτως ἡμεῖς μήτε φυγὴν Ἀριστείδου μήθ' εἱργμὸν Ἀναξαγόρου μήτε πενίαν[1] Σωκράτους ἢ Φωκίωνος καταδίκην ὑποδειμαίνωμεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ μετὰ τούτων ἀξιέραστον ἡγούμενοι τὴν ἀρετὴν ὁμόσε χωρῶμεν αὐτῇ, τὸ Εὐριπίδειον ἐφ' ἑκάστῳ φθεγγόμενοι

[1] κώνειον E. Capps.

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[a] Plato, *Laws*, 711 E.

[b] An echo from Plato, *Republic*, 474 E, which Plutarch cites more fully in *Moralia*, 45 A and 56 C.

[c] Xenophon, *Cyropaedia*, v. 1. 2, and vi. 1. 31.

[d] See Plutarch, *Life of Aristeides*, chap. vii. (323 A).

[e] See Plutarch, *Life of Phocion*, chap. xxxv. (758 B).

[f] Nauck, *Trag. Gr. Frag.*, *Eurip.* No. 961.

symptom of true progress is found in this feeling of love and affection for the disposition shown by those whose deeds we try to emulate, and in the fact that our efforts to make ourselves like them are always attended by a goodwill which accords to them a fair meed of honour. But, on the other hand, if any man is imbued with a spirit of contentiousness and envy towards his betters, let him understand that he is merely chafing with jealousy at another's repute or power, but not honouring or even admiring virtue.

15. Whenever, therefore, we begin so to love good men, that not only, as Plato [a] puts it, do we regard as blessed the man himself who has self-control, "and blessed, too, anyone of the company which hears the words that come from the lips of such a man," but also, through our admiration and affection for his habit, gait, look, and smile, we are eager to join, as it were, and cement ourselves to him, then we must believe that we are truly making progress. Still more is this the case if we do not limit our admiration of the good to their days of unclouded fortune, but if, just as lovers fondly welcome even lisping or pallor in their fair ones,[b] and as the tears and dejection of Pantheia[c] in all her grief and wretchedness smote the heart of Araspes, so we do not shrink at the thought of the exile of Aristeides,[d] the imprisonment of Anaxagoras, or the penury of Socrates, or the sentence pronounced on Phocion,[e] but because we believe that virtue, even when attended by such afflictions, is worthy of our love, we try to approach close to it, and at each experience of this sort give utterance to this sentiment of Euripides,[f]

85 φεῦ, τοῖσι γενναίοισιν ὡς ἄπαν καλόν.
τὸν γὰρ ἄχρι τοῦ καὶ τὰ φαινόμενα δεινὰ μὴ δυσχεραίνειν ἀλλὰ θαυμάζειν καὶ ζηλοῦν ἐνθουσιασμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἔτι γε τῶν καλῶν οὐδεὶς ἀποτρέψειεν. ἤδη δὲ τοῖς τοιούτοις παρέπεται τὸ βαδίζουσιν ἐπὶ πράξεις τινὰς ἢ λαβοῦσιν ἀρχὴν ἢ χρησαμένοις τύχῃ τίθεσθαι πρὸ ὀφθαλμῶν τοὺς ὄντας ἀγαθοὺς ἢ γενομένους, καὶ διανοεῖσθαι "τί δ' ἂν ἔπραξεν ἐν τούτῳ Πλάτων, τί δ' ἂν εἶπεν Ἐπαμεινώνδας, ποῖος
B δ' ἂν ὤφθη Λυκοῦργος ἢ Ἀγησίλαος," οἷόν τι πρὸς ἔσοπτρα κοσμοῦντας ἑαυτοὺς ἢ μεταρρυθμίζοντας ἢ φωνῆς ἀγεννεστέρας αὐτῶν[1] ἐπιλαμβανομένους ἢ πρός τι πάθος ἀντιβαίνοντας. οἱ μὲν γὰρ ἐκμεμαθηκότες τὰ τῶν Ἰδαίων ὀνόματα Δακτύλων χρῶνται πρὸς τοὺς φόβους αὐτοῖς ὡς ἀλεξικάκοις, ἀτρέμα καταλέγοντες ἕκαστον· ἡ δὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν ἀνδρῶν ἐπίνοια καὶ μνήμη ταχὺ παρισταμένη καὶ διαλαμβάνουσα τοὺς προκόπτοντας, ἐν πᾶσι πάθεσι καὶ ἀπορίαις ἁπάσαις ὀρθούς τε καὶ ἀπτῶτας διαφυλάττει. ὅθεν ἔστω σοι καὶ τοῦτο σημεῖον τοῦ πρὸς ἀρετὴν ἐπιδιδόντος.

16. Πρὸς δὲ τούτῳ τὸ μηκέτι ταράττεσθαι σφό-
C δρα μηδ' ἐρυθριᾶν μηδὲ κατακρύπτειν ἢ μετασχηματίζειν τι τῶν καθ' ἑαυτόν, ἀνδρὸς ἐνδόξου καὶ σώφρονος ἐξαπίνης ἐπιφανέντος, ἀλλὰ θαρρεῖν ὁμόσε χωροῦντα τοῖς τοιούτοις ἔχει τοῦ συνειδότος τινὰ

[1] αὐτῶν Wyttenbach: ἀὐτῶν.

[a] Seneca (*Epistulae Moral. ad Lucilium*, i. 11. 8) says that this idea comes from Epicurus.

[b] Fabulous gnomes associated with the Mount Ida of Crete and Phrygia. A possible connexion between these and the "Ephesia grammata" is discussed by Chester C. McCown in the *Trans. of the American Philological Assoc.* vol. liv. (1923) pp. 128 ff.; *cf.* also Plutarch, *Mor.* 706 D.

The noble honour find in everything.

For an enthusiasm which carries its possessor to the point where he feels no disquietude, but only admiration and emulation of what seems terrible, can never more be turned aside from what is honourable. With men of this sort it has already become a constant practice, on proceeding to any business, or on taking office, or on encountering any dispensation of Fortune, to set before their eyes good men of the present or of the past,[a] and to reflect: "What would Plato have done in this case? What would Epameinondas have said? How would Lycurgus have conducted himself, or Agesilaus?" And before such mirrors as these, figuratively speaking, they array themselves or readjust their habit, and either repress some of their more ignoble utterances, or resist the onset of some emotion. True it is that those who have got by heart the names of the Idaean Dactyls[b] use them as charms against terrors, repeating each name with calm assurance; but it is also true that the thought and recollection of good men almost instantly comes to mind and gives support to those who are making progress towards virtue, and in every onset of the emotions and in all difficulties keeps them upright and saves them from falling. Wherefore let this also serve you as a token by which you can mark the man who is advancing towards virtue.

16. Moreover, to be no longer thrown into great confusion, or to blush, or to conceal or rearrange some personal detail at the sudden appearance of a man of high repute and principles, but to be able to advance and meet such persons without timidity, gives a man some assurance that he knows where he stands. So

(85) βεβαίωσιν. Ἀλέξανδρος μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἔοικεν ἄγγελον ἰδὼν περιχαρῆ προσθέοντα καὶ τὴν δεξιὰν προτείνοντα "τί μοι μέλλεις," εἶπεν, "ὦ τᾶν ἀπαγγελεῖν; ἢ ὅτι Ὅμηρος ἀναβεβίωκεν;" οὐδενὸς αὐτῷ τὰ πράγματα πλὴν ὑστεροφημίας ἐνδεῖν οἰόμενος. νέῳ δ' ἀνδρὶ βελτιουμένῳ τὸ ἦθος οὐδενὸς
D ἔρως ἐμφύεται μᾶλλον ἢ καλοῖς κἀγαθοῖς ἀνδράσιν ἐγκαλλωπίσασθαι καὶ παρασχεῖν οἰκίαν αὐτοῦ καταφανῆ, τράπεζαν, γυναῖκα, παιδία,[1] σπουδήν, λόγους λεγομένους ἢ γραφομένους, ὥστε καὶ δάκνεσθαι πατρὸς τεθνεῶτος ἢ καθηγητοῦ μεμνημένον οὐκ ἐπιδόντος αὐτὸν ἐν διαθέσει τοιαύτῃ,[2] καὶ μηδὲν ἂν οὕτως εὔξασθαι παρὰ τῶν θεῶν, ὡς ἐκείνους ἀναβιώσαντας αὐτῷ γενέσθαι τοῦ βίου καὶ τῶν πράξεων θεατάς. ὥσπερ αὖ τοὐναντίον οἱ καταμελήσαντες ἑαυτῶν καὶ διαφθαρέντες οὐδ' ἐν ὕπνῳ τοὺς προσήκοντας ἀτρέμα καὶ ἀδεῶς ὁρῶσιν.
E 17. Ἔτι τοίνυν πρόσλαβε τοῖς εἰρημένοις σημεῖον οὐ μικρόν, εἰ βούλει, τὸ μηδὲν ἔτι μικρὸν ἡγεῖσθαι τῶν ἐξαμαρτανομένων ἀλλ' ἐξευλαβεῖσθαι καὶ προσέχειν ἅπασιν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τὸ πλουτήσειν ἀπεγνωκότες ἐν οὐδενὶ τίθενται τὰ μικρὰ δαπανήματα, μηδὲν οἰόμενοι ποιήσειν μέγα τὸ μικρῷ τινι προστιθέμενον, ἡ δ' ἐλπὶς ἐγγυτέρω τοῦ τέλους βαδίζουσα τῷ πλούτῳ συναύξει τὴν φιλοπλουτίαν, οὕτως ἐν τοῖς πρὸς ἀρετὴν πράγμασιν ὁ μὴ πολλὰ συγχωρῶν τῷ "τί γὰρ τὸ παρὰ τοῦτο;" καὶ "νῦν μὲν

[1] παιδία : παιδιάν Emperius.
[2] τοιαύτῃ Emperius : τοσαύτῃ.

[a] *Cf.* Cicero, *Pro Archia*, chap. x.
[b] The reference is to Hesiod, *Works and Days*, 361 (*cf.* 9 E).

Alexander, as it appears, on seeing a messenger hastening toward him with exceeding joy and holding out his hand, said, " What are you going to report to me, my good friend ? That Homer has come to life again ? " For he thought that his exploits lacked nothing save commemoration for posterity.[a] In the young man, however, who is still improving in character no love is more firmly implanted than that of taking a real pleasure in the presence of good and honourable men, and of affording to them free opportunity to see his house, his table, his wife, his children, his pursuits, his discourses, whether spoken or written ; and in consequence he feels a pang when he recalls a father or professor now dead who never saw him in such condition, and for no blessing would he pray God so earnestly as that they might come to life again, and become observers of his life and actions. On the other hand, in direct contrast with such men as these, those who have ruined themselves through their own neglect cannot even in their dreams look upon their relatives without fear and trembling.

17. Still another, and a not unimportant indication of progress, which, if you will, you may add to the foregoing, is this : a man no longer holds the opinion that any one of his sins is unimportant, but is studiously circumspect and heedful regarding all. For just as those who have given up the hope of ever being rich make nothing of their small expenditures, with the idea that whatever is added to a little will make nothing great,[b] whereas Hope as it draws nearer to its goal joins hands with wealth in increasing the desire for wealth, so it is with the activities which bear upon virtue : the man who does not acquiesce much in the sentiments " What difference does this

οὕτως αὖθις δὲ βέλτιον,'' ἀλλὰ προσέχων ἑκάστῳ κἂν εἰς τὸ σμικρότατον ἡ κακία ποτὲ τῶν ἁμαρτη-
F μάτων ἐνδῦσα συγγνώμην πορίζηται δυσανασχετῶν καὶ δυσκολαίνων, δῆλός ἐστιν ἤδη τι καθαρὸν κτώμενος ἑαυτῷ καὶ οὐδ' ὁπωσοῦν[1] ῥυπαίνεσθαι· τὸ δὲ μηδὲν οἴεσθαι καταισχύνειν μέγα μηδ' ἔχειν εὐχερεῖς ποιεῖ καὶ ὀλιγώρους πρὸς τὰ μικρά. καὶ γὰρ αἱμασιάν τινα καὶ θριγκὸν οἰκοδομοῦσιν οὐ διαφέρει ξύλον τὸ τυχὸν ἢ λίθον ὑποβαλεῖν χυδαῖον ἢ στήλην ὑποθεῖναι παραπεσοῦσαν ἀπὸ μνήματος, οἷα ποιοῦσιν οἱ φαῦλοι, πᾶσαν ἐργασίαν καὶ πρᾶξιν ὡς ἔτυχε συμφοροῦντες εἰς ταὐτὸ καὶ
86 σωρεύοντες· ἀλλ' οἵ γε προκόπτοντες, οἷς ἤδη, καθάπερ ἱεροῦ τινος οἰκοδομήματος καὶ βασιλικοῦ τοῦ βίου

κεκρότηται χρυσέα κρηπίς,

οὐδὲν εἰκῇ προσίενται τῶν γιγνομένων, ἀλλ' οἷον ἀπὸ στάθμης τοῦ λόγου προσάγουσι καὶ προσαρμόττουσιν ἕκαστον. ὑπὲρ οὗ τὸν Πολύκλειτον οἰόμεθα λέγειν ὡς ἔστι χαλεπώτατον τὸ ἔργον οἷς ἂν εἰς ὄνυχα ὁ πηλὸς ἀφίκηται.

[1] ἀξιοῦν Hartman.

[a] Pindar, *Frag.* 206 in Christ's ed.

[b] Plutarch again refers to this dictum in *Moralia*, 636 c. It is quite clear from the two passages that Plutarch refers Polycleitus's saying to modelling in clay, and so, too, it is possible to interpret Horace, *Sat.* i. 5. 32 ("ad unguem factus homo"), and *Ars Poet.* 294 ("castigavit ad unguem"), but in Persius, *Sat.* i. 65, the plural ("ungues") is used in describing the testing of the fineness of the joint in

make ? " and " This way now ; better next time," but who gives heed to each separate thing, and is impatient and vexed if vice ever finds its way into the most insignificant of his errors and suggests a reason for condoning it—this man already shows plainly that he is winning for himself a spotless treasure and that he scorns to sully himself in any way whatever. On the other hand, to imagine that nothing can cause any great disgrace, or can even be of any great importance, makes men easy-going and careless about little things. True enough, it makes no difference, when men are building some rough wall which is to have a coping, whether they throw into the foundation a chance piece of timber or a stone picked up from the ground, or whether they put into the lower courses a fallen slab from some tomb, the same sort of thing that moral slovens do when they bring together promiscuously and accumulate actions and conduct of every kind ; but those who are making progress, of whose life already, as of some holy temple or regal palace,

The golden foundation hath been wrought,[a]

do not indiscriminately accept for it a single action, but, using reason to guide them, they bring each one into place and fit it where it belongs. And we may well conceive that Polycleitus had this in mind when he said that the task is hardest for those whose clay has reached the stage when they must use the finger-nail.[b]

marble by drawing the nails over it. *Cf.* the note on ἐξ ὀνύχων, *supra*, 3 c.

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Abaris of Heracleides, 75: see Heracleides.

Academy, the, 285, 371: the school of philosophy founded by Plato at Athens, so called from the place of meeting.

Achaeans, 85, 151, 155, 159: a name applied to all or to a part of the Greeks who fought at Troy.

Achilles, 19, 85, 87, 99, 137, 139, 141, 151, 155, 163, 173, 181, 185, 277, 317, 355, 383, 391, 393: one of the most prominent Greek leaders in the Trojan war.

Adrastus, 159: a Trojan slain by Agamemnon.

Adrastus, 187: son of Talaus, king of Argos, and brother of Eriphyle, who betrayed her husband Amphiaraus for the sake of the necklace of Harmodia.

Aeschines, 55, 359: friend and follower of Socrates.

Aeschines, 213: Attic orator, opponent of Demosthenes, 389–314 B.C.

Aeschylus quoted, 87, 157, 171, 191, 325, 421, 425, 433: Athenian tragic poet, 525–456 B.C.

Aesop's Fables, 75, 83, 421: Aesop, at one time a slave, was a writer of fables, *circa* 570 B.C. The fables now current as Aesop's can hardly be in anything like their original form.

Agamemnon, 85, 99, 139, 151, 153, 155, 171, 177, 355, 385, 391: brother of Menelaus, and commander-in-chief of the Greeks in the Trojan war.

Agesias, 349: flatterer of Alexander. Wyttenbach thinks the reference may be to Agis the Argive poet.

Agesilaus, 285, 299, 419, 431, 453: king of Sparta, 398–360.

Agesipolis II., 221: son of Cleombrotus, and king of Sparta, 371–370 B.C.

Agis, 321: a poet from Argos, who accompanied Alexander on his Asiatic expeditions; a gross flatterer.

Ajax, 157, 185: son of Telamon, from the island of Salamis, one of the Greek heroes at Troy. Sophocles' *Ajax* portrays his last day.

Alcibiades, 283, 369, 429, 449: a handsome Athenian, ward of Pericles and friend of Socrates, banished 415 B.C. for alleged sacrilege; most of his later life was spent in exile.

Alcmaeon, 187: son of Amphiaraus and Eriphyle; the father enjoined his sons to kill their mother as soon as they should be grown up.

Alexander the Great, 51, 287, 305, 315, 321, 347, 349, 377, 419, 455: son of Philip, and king of Macedon, 356–323 B.C.

Alexander of Pherae, 273: was master of Thessaly from 369 to 358 B.C., when he was assassinated.

Alexis quoted, 111: Athenian comic poet, uncle of Menander, *circa* 394–288 B.C.

Amethysts, charms against intoxication, 77.

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Ammonius, 373: of Lamptrae, Peripatetic philosopher, Plutarch's teacher at Athens.

Anacharsis, 419: a Scythian of high rank and intelligence, who travelled widely in pursuit of knowledge, visiting Athens in the time of Solon, *circa* 594 B.C.

Anaxagoras, 451: Greek philosopher from Clazomenae in Asia Minor, friend of Pericles at Athens, banished from Athens he retired to Lampsacus, *circa* 500–528 B.C.

Antea, 169: wife of Proetus, king of Argos.

Antigonus, 53: called the "One-eyed," *circa* 380–301 B.C., general of Alexander the Great.

Antilochus, 169: a Greek who fought at Troy, and took part in the funeral games held in honour of Patroclus.

Antimachus, sons of, 159; Peisander and Hippolochus, Trojans slain by Agamemnon.

Antipater, 343, 419: trusted Macedonian officer, appointed regent by Alexander during his Asiatic expedition, 334 B.C., and continued as regent after Alexander's death until 320 B.C. Was general against the Greeks during the Lamian war.

Antiphanes, 421: of Berga in Thrace, writer of incredible and marvellous tales.

Antiphon, 361: tragic poet at the court of the elder Dionysius, by whom he was put to death.

Antisthenes, 175: of Athens, disciple of Socrates, and founder of the Cynic school of philosophy, 5th and 4th centuries B.C.

Antony, Mark (Marcus Antonius), 305, 325: friend of Caesar, triumvir with Octavian and Lepidus, enamoured of Cleopatra; lived 83–30 B.C. Plutarch wrote his life.

Apelles, 31, 313: perhaps the most famous Greek painter, 2nd half of 4th century B.C.

Apelles, 337, 339: of Chios, friend of Arcesilaus, otherwise unknown. *Cf.* Athenaeus, p. 420 d.

Aphrodite, 101: the Greek goddess of love.

Apollo, 85, 87, 305: the Greek god, brother of Artemis.

Araspes, 451: a Mede, friend of Cyrus the Great. He poses as an ascetic, but ends by falling in love with Pantheia, a captive in his charge.

Arcesilaus, 297, 337, 339: founder of the new Academy; lived towards the close of the 3rd century B.C., a witty man and an independent thinker.

Archidamidas, 298: a Spartan.

Archidamus, 7: king of the Spartans from 469 to 427 B.C.; father of Agis and Agesilaus.

Archilochus, 243: from the island of Paros, wrote elegiac poetry as well as the iambic, of which he was reputed to be the inventor, *circa* 650 B.C.

Archilochus quoted, 121, 173.

Archytas of Tarentum, 37, 49: general, statesman, philosopher, and mathematician, 1st half of the 4th century B.C.

Ares, 99, 101, 121: the Greek god of war.

Aristarchus, 141: the great Homeric critic, 1st half of 2nd century B.C.

Aristeides, 405, 451: a high-minded Athenian, often called "the Just," fought at Marathon and Salamis; died 468 B.C. Plutarch wrote his life.

Aristippus, 21, 424: of Cyrene in Africa, friend and follower of Socrates, and later the founder of the Cyrenaic school of philosophy.

Aristogeiton, 361: one of the two slayers of Hipparchus at Athens, 514 B.C.

Aristomenes, 377: adviser of Ptolemy V. of Egypt from 202 to 192 B.C., when he was put to death by Ptolemy.

Ariston, *Lycon* of, 75: from the island of Ceos, succeeded Lycon as head of the Peripatetic school of philosophy about 225 B.C.

Ariston, 227: probably Ariston of

Chios, Stoic philosopher, *circa* 275 B.C.
Aristophanes, 49, 360: Athenian comic poet, *circa* 445–388 B.C.
Aristophanes quoted, 159, 379.
Aristophon, 95: a Greek painter, brother of the more famous Polygnotus, 5th century B.C.
Aristotle, 137, 171, 287, 350, 419: the philosopher, 384–322 B.C.
Arsinoë, 51: sister and wife of Ptolemy Philadelphus.
Artaxerxes (Long-hand), 189: king of the Persians, 465–425 B.C.
Artemis, 113: the Greek goddess, sister of Apollo.
Asclepiades, 297: intimate friend of Menedemus.
Athena, 101, 161: the Greek goddess.
Athens, Athenians, 7, 57, 323, 355, 371, 417, 435, 449.

Babylon, 419: one of the capitals of the Persian Empire.
Bacchylides quoted, 191, 193: lyric poet of Ceos, nephew of Simonides, *circa* 468 B.C.
Bagoas, 349: a favourite eunuch of Alexander the Great.
Barbarians, 159, 195.
Baton, 297: Athenian comic poet, *circa* 280 B.C.
Batrachus, 95: probably a character in one of Menander's plays.
Bellerophon, 169: son of Glaucus, king of Corinth. Anteia, wife of Proetus, fell in love with him, etc.
Bias, 189, 209, 327: of Priene in Asia Minor, *circa* 550 B.C., one of the Seven Wise Men.
Bias, 305: a character in one of Menander's plays.
Bion, 113, 115, 315, 441: called Borysthenites, *circa* 250 B.C., a Scythian philosopher from Olbia on the north of the Black Sea, noted for his pungent sayings. He tried out the different systems of philosophy, and finally attached himself to the Peripatetics.
Biton, 315: an Argive, brother of Cleobis.
Brasidas, 405, 425: a distinguished Spartan general in the Peloponnesian war. He fell at Amphipolis in 422 B.C.
Briseïs, 173: Achilles' captive concubine in the *Iliad*.

Caesar Augustus, 361: Emperor of Rome, 29 B.C.–A.D. 14.
Caeneus, 405: one of the Lapithae, originally a girl by name of Caenis, changed to a man by Poseidon.
Calchas, 153: the famous soothsayer who accompanied the Greeks to Troy.
Callisthenes, 349: a philosopher, born at Olynthus; he studied with Aristotle, to whom he was distantly related, accompanied Alexander on his Asiatic expedition, and was put to death for his plain speaking about 328 B.C.
Carneades, 315: of Cyrene, 218 (?)–129 B.C., philosopher of the new Academy.
Cato, M. Porcius, 75, 155: the Elder, commonly called the Censor, 234 (?)–149 B.C. Plutarch wrote his life.
Cato, M. Porcius, 147: commonly called Uticensis, 95–46 B.C. Plutarch wrote his life.
Cebes, 55: friend and follower of Socrates.
Cephisocrates, 339: mentioned only here.
Cercopes, 323: droll and mischievous gnomes who, according to one story, were captured by Heracles, who was so amused by them that he released them.
Chaerephanes, 93: a Greek painter, perhaps a mistake for Nicophanes, who is known to have painted meretricious pictures.
Charillus, 299: an early king of Sparta, by tradition put in the time of Lycurgus.
Chilon, 189: of Lacedaemon, one of the Seven Wise Men, *circa* 590 B.C.
Chrysippus, 165, 179: Stoic philosopher, born at Soli in Cilicia, but early came to Athens, a con-

strnctive contributor to the Stoic doctrines; 280–207 B.C.
Cinesias, 11: Attic dithyrambic poet, 5th century B.C., often ridiculed by contemporary poets.
Circe, 283: the sorceress of the *Odyssey*, who changed men into animals.
Cirrhaeans, 409: inhabitants of the fertile plain south-west of Delphi.
Cleander, 77: son of Marcus Sedatus.
Cleanthes, 165, 173, 175, 255, 297: Stoic philosopher, and successor to Zeno in the Stoic school; author of a hymn to Zeus, which has been preserved, *circa* 300–220 B.C.
Clearchus, 365: Spartan general in the expedition of the younger Cyrus, put to death, 401 B.C., by the Persians.
Cleitus, 377: one of Alexander's generals, who saved Alexander's life at the battle of Granicus, 334 B.C.; he was killed by Alexander after a quarrel in 328 B.C.
Cleobis, 315: an Argive, brother of Biton.
Cleomenes III., 289: king of Sparta, 240–222 B.C. Plutarch wrote his life.
Cleon, 379: demagogue and leader of the popular party at Athens from 428 to 422 B.C.; he fell in the battle of Amphipolis, 422 B.C.
Cleopatra, 325: last queen of Egypt, 51–30 B.C., beloved by Anthony.
Cleophantus (v.l. Diophantus), 7: son of Themistocles.
Clytemnestra, 169: wife of Agamemnon.
Corinth, Corinthians, 379, 417.
Crates, 367: of Thebes in Boeotia, Cynic philosopher, disciple of Diogenes.
Crete, 57: the large island south of Greece, home of early Aegean civilization.
Crison, 315: of Himera in Sicily, champion sprinter.
Croesus, 313, 369: king of Lydia in Asia Minor, 560–546 B.C., famous for his wealth, conquered by Cyrus the Great.
Cyaxeres, 369: king of the Medes, uncle of Cyrus the Great, according to Xenophon's *Cyropaedia*.
Cyprus, 273: island in east end of the Mediterranean Sea.
Cyrus the Elder, 163, 369: also called "The Great," first king of the Persians, founder of the Persian empire, killed in 529 B.C.

Damonidas, a cripple, 95.
Darius I., 275: king of Persia, 521–485 B.C., associated with Gobryas in overthrowing Smerdis (Herodotus, iii. 67-78).
Dawn, the goddess, 87.
Demaratus, 371: of Corinth, a friend of Philip of Macedon.
Demetrius Poliorcetes, 27: king of Macedonia, and famous as a general, 337–283 B.C. (son of Antigonus, 53).
Demetrius of Phalerum, 367: Athenian orator and writer, 350 (?)–283 B.C., put in charge of Athens by the Macedonians (317 B.C.), but forced to flee, 307–8 B.C., by Demetrius Poliorcetes.
Demetrius, 349: incited Alexander against Callisthenes.
Democritus, quoted, 47, 431: of Abdera in Thrace, widely travelled, suggested the atomic theory; "the laughing philosopher." *Circa* 460–360 B.C.
Demosthenes, 29, 429, 438: the famous Attic orator, 385–322 B.C.
Demosthenes quoted, 29, 369.
Diogenes, 7, 23, 113, 373, 393, 415, 417, 425, 437, 439: of Sinope, 420 (?)–323 B.C., the famous Cynic philosopher, to whom are ascribed numerous pungent and witty sayings.
Diogenes, 223: Attic tragic poet, *circa* 400 B.C.
Diomede, 153, 155, 309, 381: son of Tydeus and king of Argos, he was a noted hero in the Trojan war.
Dion, 37, 285, 289, 369, 371: of Syracuse in Sicily, brother-in-law of the elder Dionysius. Plutarch wrote his life.

Dionysius the elder, 225, 361: born 430 B.C., rose to be tyrant of Syracuse, 405–367 B.C.
Dionysius the younger, 288, 285, 289, 303, 357, 359: son of Dionysius the elder, succeeded his father as ruler, but was finally driven out by Timoleon, 343 B.C.
Dionysus, 305, 323: the Greek god of wine and patron of the drama.
Diophantus, see Cleophantus.
Dolon, 155, 405: a Trojan sent to spy on the Greek camp, and slain by Diomede, *Iliad* x.

Echepolus, 171: son of Anchises of Sicyon; a rich man, released by Agamemnon from serving in the army sent against Troy.
Egypt, 79, 303.
Elis, 55: country in N.-W. of the Peloponnesus.
Empedocles, 83: physical philosopher of Acragas (Agrigentum) in Sicily, middle of 5th century B.C., said to have thrown himself into the crater of Mt. Etna.
Empedocles quoted, 91, 339.
Epameinondas, 37, 113, 213, 285, 453; of Thebes in Boeotia, *circa* 420–362 B.C., famous general and statesman, founder of the Theban League.
Ephors, 447: the highest Spartan officials.
Epicharmus, 359, 361: comic poet from the island of Cos, but lived his life in Sicily under the patronage of Hiero.
Epicurus (Epicurean), 79, 245: the celebrated Greek philosopher, 341–270 B.C., founder of the Epicurean school; greatly admired by the Roman poet, Lucretius.
Epicurus quoted, 191, 195, 197.
Epimetheus, 123, 125: "Afterthought," brother of Prometheus and husband of Pandora.
Eteocles, 97: son of Oedipus, king of Thebes.
Etruscans, 145: a people of Italy.
Euctus and Eulaeus, 371: companions of Perseus.
Eupolis quoted, 273, 291: Athenian comic poet, *circa* 446-411 B.C.
Euripides, 159, 243, 247: Athenian tragic poet, *circa* 485–406 B.C.
Euripides quoted, 5, 7, 27, 47, 55, 89, 95, 101, 105, 107, 119, 121, 129, 131, 133, 147, 149, 175, 177, 179, 183, 193, 195, 233, 251, 269, 281, 311, 331, 335, 343, 345, 365, 367, 375, 381, 383, 389, 403, 451.
Eurydice of Illyria, her inscription dedicated to the Muses, 67.
Eutropion, 53: Antigonus's cook.
Evenus, 271: the name of two poets of Paros; probably the reference here is to the younger, a contemporary of Socrates.

Fortune, a synonym for divine power of causation, 125.
Frozen words, 421.

Glaucus, 169: one of the Greek leaders at Troy.
Gobryas, 275: associated with Darius in overthrowing Smerdis (Herodotus, iii. 67-78).
Gorgias, 27, 79, 341: of Leontini in Sicily; famous as an author and rhetorician, born about 480 B.C., and said to have lived over one hundred years.
Graces, the, 239, 269.
Greek, Greeks, behaviour of, 157, 159, 171.
Gylippus, 47: a Spartan general, sent to Syracuse in Sicily to oppose the Athenians in 414 B.C.

Hagno, 349: satellite of Alexander.
Harmodius, 361: one of the two slayers of Hipparchus at Athens, 514 B.C.
Hector, 87, 99, 157, 159, 163, 183, 185, 391: son of Priam, and the great Trojan hero of the *Iliad*.
Hecuba, 147: wife of Priam.
Helen, 147: wife of Menelaus; her abduction by Paris was the alleged cause of the Trojan war.
Hephaestus, 121, 185: the Greek god of fire, and patron of workers in metal.
Hera, 101, 103, 185: sister and wife of Zeus, mother of Hephaestus.
Heracleides, *Abaris* of, 75. It is to be presumed that Heracleides

Ponticus (from Heracleia in Pontus), a pupil of Plato and a prolific writer, composed a tale about Abaris, the wonder-working Hyperborean priest of Apollo.
Heracleitus, quoted, 149, 221, 235: physical philosopher of Ephesus in Asia Minor, *circa* 560–500 B.C., often called "the Obscure."
Heracles, 305, 321, 383: the famous strong man of the Greeks.
Hermes, 239: the Greek god.
Herodotus, quoted, 205, 275, 313, 368: Greek historian of the 5th century B.C.
Hesiod, quoted, 45, 119, 123, 125, 129, 131, 147, 179, 191, 269, 339, 407, 413, 455: of Ascra in Boeotia, epic poet of the 8th or 9th century B.C.
Hiero, 359, 361: powerful tyrant of Syracuse and Gela in Sicily, 478–467 B.C.
Hieronymus, 257: probably the Peripatetic philosopher from Rhodes, *circa* 300 B.C.
Himerius, 323: an unknown flatterer.
Hippocrates, 439: of Cos, perhaps the most famous physician of antiquity; 5th and 4th centuries B.C.
Hippolochus, 159: son of Antimachus, a Trojan slain by Agamemnon.
Hippolytus, 147: son of Theseus, whose wife Phaedra falls in love with him.
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Hypereides, 245, 355: Attic orator, defendant of Phryne, put to death by Antipater, 322 B.C.

Idaean Dactyls, 453.
Ion of Chios, 425: tragic poet, contemporary of Aeschylus at Athens.
Irus, 119: the beggar among the suitors at the house of Odysseus.
Ithaca, 145: an island W. of Greece; the home of Odysseus.
Ixion, 97, 101: king of the Lapithae, punished by being for ever fastened to a revolving wheel.

Jocasta, 95: wife of Oedipus.

Lacedaemon, Lacedemonian, 57, 283, 341: see also Sparta.
Lacydes, 339: a philosopher from Cyrene, in Africa, who succeeded Arcesilaus as head of the New Academy at Athens. Died 241 B.C.
Lycaon, 159: a Trojan slain by Achilles.
Lycon, of Ariston, 75: Lycon was the predecessor of Ariston as head of the Peripatetic school of philosophy.
Lycurgus, 79: son of Dryas, and king of the Edonians in Thrace, persecutor of Dionysus.
Lycurgus, 13, 453: reputed founder of the Spartan constitution.
Lysander, 379: Spartan general and naval commander, brought to a close the Peloponnesian war by winning the battle of Aegospotami, 404 B.C., fell in the battle of Haliartus, 395 B.C.
Lysias, 221, 229: Attic orator, *circa* 440–380 B.C.

Medea, 93: wife of Jason and chief character in Euripides' play *Medea*.
Media, 419: the country of the Medes, early united with the Persian Empire.
Medius, 347: friend of Alexander the Great, and later commander under Antigonus.
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Melanthius, 273 : a parasite.
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Meletus, 407 : one of the accusers of Socrates.
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Menedemus, 297, 435 : of Eretria in Euboea, philosopher and statesman *circa* 300 B.C.
Menelaus, 297 : brother of Agamemnon.
Merope, 335 : probably the daughter of Erechtheus is meant.
Miltiades, 449 : Athenian general, hero of the battle of Marathon.
Mithridates VI., 311 : "the Great," king of Pontus, 120-63 B.C., best known for his wars against Rome.

Nausicaa, 141 : daughter of Alcinous, king of the Phaeacians : she conducts the shipwrecked Odysseus to her father's palace.
Nero, 305, 323 : Emperor of Rome, A.D. 54–68.
Nestor, 155, 391 : of Pylos, the wise old man of the Homeric poems.
Nicander, *Antidotes*, 83, *Theriaca*, 297 : of Colophon, pedestrian epic poet, *circa* 185–135 B.C.
Nicander, 205 : a friend of Plutarch, probably the Nicander connected with the temple at Delphi (*Moralia* 386 B and 438 B) and not the son of Euthydamus (*Moralia* 965 C).

Odysseus, 93, 103, 141, 143, 153, 157, 161, 163, 181, 185, 231, 283, 297, 355, 385, 391, 393 : a most important character in the Homeric poems.
Oedipus, 383 : king of Thebes in Boeotia, subject of Sophocles' plays which bear that name.
Olynthus, 221 : a Greek city in the Chalcidian peninsula, destroyed by Philip of Macedon in 348 B.C.
Orestes, 93 : son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra ; he slew his mother to avenge the death of his father.

"Painting is silent poetry," 98, 311.
Pandarus, 101, 169, 383 : a Lycian leader in the Trojan war, distinguished as an archer in the Trojan army.
Pantheia, 163, 451 : wife of Abradatas, king of Susa, taken captive by Cyrus the Great.
Paris, 183 : son of Priam, and abductor of Helen.
Parmenides, 83, 243 : of Elea, pupil and successor of Xenophanes in the Eleatic school of philosophy ; early 5th century B.C.
Parmenio, 349 : trusted general of Philip and Alexander ; accused of plotting against the life of Alexander, he was assassinated by command. He lived 400–330 B.C.
Parmeno, 93 : a famous comic actor, latter part of 4th century B.C.
Parrhasius, 93 : of Ephesus, a celebrated Greek painter.
Pataecion, 113 : a noted robber.
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Peisander, son of Antimachus, 159 : a Trojan slain by Agamemnon.
Peloponnesians, 371 : the traditional enemies of Athens.
Penelope (and her suitors), 35, 143 : she was Odysseus' wife, wooed by many in his absence.
Pericles, 29, 37 : the famous Athenian general and statesman. Died 429 B.C. Plutarch wrote his life.
Persephone, 119 : daughter of Demeter, and wife of Pluto, god of the lower world.
Perseus, 371 : son of Philip V. and last king of Macedonia from 178 to 168 B.C.
Petronius, Titus, 323 : better known as Gaius Petronius, the famous *elegantiae arbiter* under Nero,

made a conspicuous character in *Quo Vadis*.
Phaeacians, 143, 145: hosts of Odysseus after his raft was wrecked.
Phaedra, 147, 281: wife of Theseus.
Phalaris, 303, 405: tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily, *circa* 570 B.C.
Philemon quoted, 187: an Athenian comic poet of the New Comedy, born about 360 B.C.
Philip, 221, 289, 359, 371, 373: of Macedon, 382–336 B.C., conqueror of Greece, father of Alexander the Great.
Philip V., 289: king of Macedon, able and eminent, defeated by the Roman general Flaminius at Cynoscephalae in 197 B.C. He lived from 237 to 179 B.C.
Philoctetes, 95: son of Poeas, and the most celebrated archer in the Trojan war. He was bitten by a snake and left behind by the Greeks; subject of Sophocles' *Philoctetes*.
Philopappus, C. Julius Antiochus, 263, 265, 351: friend of Plutarch, to whom is addressed his essay on flatterers.
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Philotimus, 233, 387: an eminent Greek physician, *circa* 300 B.C.
Phocion, 343, 451: upright Athenian general and statesman 402–317 B.C., he was put to death on a charge of treason. Plutarch wrote his life.
Phocylides, 243: of Miletus, gnomic poet, born *circa* 560 B.C.
Phocylides quoted, 17, 255.
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Pindar quoted, 89, 107, 109, 347, 363, 457: famous Greek lyric poet, 522–442 B.C.
Plato, 9, 37, 49, 55, 75, 137, 189, 221, 245, 283, 285, 287, 357, 359, 369, 375, 377, 405, 421, 423, 441, 443, 451, 453: the celebrated philosopher, 427–346 B.C., friend and follower of Socrates, and founder of the Academic school of philosophy.
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Samius, 289: writer of lyric and epigrammatic verse, who was brought up with Philip V. of Macedon, by whom he was later put to death. He lived therefore *circa* 200 B.C.

Sappho quoted, 435: of Lesbos, the famous poetess, often called the tenth Muse.

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Xenophon, 55, 423 : Greek historian and general writer, 430-350 (?) B.C.
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